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
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
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
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A

HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE
EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

By GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S.,

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END
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EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece, would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence, and general slowness in resolving, might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians—but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed—had given them no encouragement.¹

State of feeling in Greece between the Thirty years' truce and the Peloponnesian war—recognised probability of war—Athens at that time not encroaching—decree interdicting trade with the Megarians.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Korkyra.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Periklēs, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was, her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis—partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosure.¹ In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians.² We may reasonably suppose

¹ Thucyd. i. 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἐπαῖς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, &c. Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609.

I agree with Gölle that two distinct violations of right are here imputed to the Megarians: one, that they had cultivated land the property of the goddesses at Eleusis—the other, that they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land on the border. Dr. Arnold's note takes a different view, less correct in my opinion: "The land on the frontier was consecrated to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the two countries," &c. Compare Thucyd. v. 42, about the border territory round Panaktum.

² Thucydides (i. 139), in assigning the reasons of this sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Mega-

rians, mentions only the two allegations here noticed—wrongful cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald Anthemokritus: still less does he notice that gossip of the day which Aristophanēs and other comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklēs, viz. that first, some young men of Athens stole away the courtesan Simætha from Megara: next, the Megarian youth revenged themselves by carrying off from Athens "two engaging courtesans," one of whom was the mistress of Periklēs; upon which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30).

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with the political scandal of the time. But the

that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before—which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief—the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge.¹ Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce: though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklēs compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that

Zealous
importunity
of the Co-
rinthians in
bringing
about a ge-
neral war,
for the pur-
pose of pre-
serving Poti-
dæa.

story of the herald Anthemokritus and his death cannot be altogether rejected. Though Thucydides, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that the herald's death had really been occasioned by the Megarians; yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect, under the influence of which the deceased herald received a public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. 159 R; Pausan. i. 36, 3; iii. 4, 2. The language of Plutarch (Periklēs, c. 30) is probably literally correct—"the herald's

death appeared to have been caused by the Megarians"—*αἴτια τῶν Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἔδοξε*. That neither Thucydides, nor Periklēs himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his death, is pretty certain: otherwise the fact would have been urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of exclusion—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian feeling.

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. *Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διὰφορα, μάλιστα δὲ, λιμένων τε εἰσεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ, &c.*

Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.¹

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.² Even

Relations of Sparta with her allies—they had a vote thus far—whether they would, or would not, approve of a course of policy which had been previously resolved by Sparta separately.

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὸν αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς. O. Müller (*Æginet.* p. 180) and Gölter in his note, think that the *truce* (or *covenant* generally) here alluded to is, not the Thirty years' truce concluded fourteen years before the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory of Platæa. Dr. Arnold on the contrary thinks that the Thirty years' truce is alluded to, which the *Æginetans* interpreted (rightly or not) as entitling them to independence.

The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion to *Ægina* in the speech of the Thebans (iii. 64):

but on the other hand, if we consult i. 115, it will appear possible that the wording of the Thirty years' truce may have been general, as—'Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ὅσα ἔχουσι Πελοποννησίῳ: at any rate, the *Æginetans* may have pretended, that by the same rule as Athens gave up Nisæa, Pégæ, &c., she ought also to renounce *Ægina*.

However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude the other: the *Æginetans* may have taken advantage of *both* in enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been the idea of the Scholiast, when he says—κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῶν σπονδῶν.

² Thucyd. i. 67. κατεβῶν ἐλθόντες

in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Ephor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

Assembly of the Spartans separately addressed by envoys of the allied powers, complaining that Athens had violated the truce.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favourably prepared for them—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise, to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in

The Corinthian envoys address the assembly last, after the envoys of the other allies have inflamed it against Athens.

τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδὰς τε λελυκότας εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The change of tense in these two verbs is to be noticed.

the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid to the Korkyræans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in the case of Potidæa and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their speech at Sparta, they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth¹—we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa. But at any rate the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians either of outrage towards Corinth,² or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

¹ Thucyd. i. 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυραν τε ὑπολαβόντες βία ἡμῶν εἶχον, καὶ Ποτίδαιαν ἐπολιόρκουν ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπικαιρότατον χροῖον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θρήκης ἀποχρῆσθαι,

ἢ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μέγιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

² Thucyd. i. 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμῶς οὐχ ἥκιστα εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγ-

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy : for against such, the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew, that as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa ; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure—of Athens : as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height : especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes, and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.¹ The Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy, not by acting, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow.² In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin ; while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

Tenor of the Corinthian address—little allusion to recent wrong—strong efforts to raise hatred and alarm against Athens.

After half apologising for the tartness of these reproofs—which, however, as the Spartans were now well disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy

Remarkable picture drawn of Athens by her enemies.

κλήματα ἔχοντες, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβρίζοντες, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελούμενοι.

¹ Thucyd. i. 69.

² Thucyd. i. 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἕλληνες, ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τιτὰ ἄλλα τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ

μόνοι οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξῃσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιουμένην δὲ, καταλύοντες. Καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὃν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει· τὸν τε γὰρ Μηδόν, &c.

who threatened them. "You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires.¹ *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgement, and keep alive their hopes in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power—you have no faith even in what your judgement guarantees—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back—you are habitual laggards: *they* love foreign service—you cannot stir from home—for *they* are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while *you* fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march: when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover, they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service.² When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realised appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty—and deeming inactive repose

¹ Thucyd. i. 70. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεωτεροποιοί, καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι δέξιν καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργον ὃ ἂν γινῶσιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν, καὶ ἐπιγινῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργον οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι.

The meaning of the word δέξιν—*sharp*—when applied to the latter half of the sentence, is in the nature of a sarcasm. But this is suitable to the character of the speech. Göller supposes some such word as ἰκανοί, instead of δέξιν to be understood: but we should

thereby both depart from the more obvious syntax, and weaken the general meaning.

² Thucyd. i. 70. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς μὲν σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτοις ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως χρῶνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειοτάτῃ ἐς τὸ πρᾶσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

It is difficult to convey in translation the antithesis between ἀλλοτριωτάτοις and οἰκειοτάτῃ—not without a certain conceit, which Thucydides is occasionally fond of.

a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.¹

"Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians—yet ye still hang back from action. . . . Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance.² It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica—they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.³

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Pelopon-

Reply made
by an Athe-
nian envoy,
accidentally
present in
Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. *l. c.* καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόρων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ὅλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχθοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μῆτε ἐορτὴν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ δέοντα πράξει, εὐμφορὰν δὲ οὐχ ἥσσαν ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσυχολίαν ἐπίπονον· ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυελῶν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μῆτε αὐτοὺς εἶχειν ἡσυχίαν ἢ ἡτε τοὺς

ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὁρθῶς ἂν εἶποι.

² Thucyd. *i. 71.* ἀρχαιοτρόπα ὁμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐστίν. 'Ἀνάγκη δ', ὥσπερ τέχνης, ἀεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνώμενα κρατεῖν καὶ ἡσυχάζουσιν μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκαζομένοις ἰέναι, πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.

³ Thucyd. *i. 71.*

nesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.¹

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognise Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honourably earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without imperilling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.² He then dwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from the Spartans and other Greeks—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistoklēs, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a

His account
of the empire
of Athens—
how it had
been ac-
quired, and
how it was
maintained.

¹ Thucyd. i. 72.

² Thucyd. i. 73. *ρηθήσεται δὲ οὐ καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς ὅταν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εἰδ
παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἔνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου, | βουλευμένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται.*

time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.¹ By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her ; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise :—no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia ; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city ; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.²

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.³

He adjures them not to break the truce, but to adjust all differences by that pacific appeal which the truce provided.

¹ Thucyd. i. 75. Ἄρ' ἄξιόι ἐσμεν, ὧ λακεδαίμονιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης συνέσεως, ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἑλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἔγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακείσθαι ; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήρδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλησάντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου καταναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προσαγγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τόδε, μέλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ

δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὅσπερ καὶ ὀφελείας.

² Thucyd. i. 77.

³ Thucyd. i. 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ πω τοιαύτῃ ἀμαρτίᾳ ὄντες, οὐτ' αὐτοὶ οὐτε ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἔτι ἀδοθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἡ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὅρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνθήκην· ἢ θεοὺς τοὺς ὀρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι, πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολλέμου ἀρχοῦτος ταύτῃ ἢ ἂν ὑφηγηθήσθε.

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city (though doubtless the account of a partisan) is in substance correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language¹—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion; the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honour of Sparta only—not however omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valour and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the

The Spartans exclude strangers, and discuss the point among themselves in the assembly.

Most Spartan speakers are in favour of war. King Archidamus opposes war. His speech.

¹ Thucyd. i. 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλείονων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἱ γνώμαι ἕφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε Ἀθηναίους ἤδη, καὶ πολεμηγέα εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.¹ He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?² Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation.³ Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them *in terrorem* without being actually consummated—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined;⁴ admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on

¹ Thucyd. i. 80.

² Thucyd. i. 80. πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας, οἱ γῆν τε ἐκὰς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι πολέμου ἐμπειρότατοι εἰσὶ, καὶ τοῖς ἕλλοις ἅπασιν ἔμιστα ἐξήρτουνται, πλοῦτος τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυὶ καὶ ἵπποις καὶ ὄπλοις, καὶ ἔχλην, ἕως οὐκ ἐν ἑλλὰς ἐνὶ γὰρ χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῇ ἐστίν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ξυμμάχους

πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τούτους βῆδ' ὡς πόλεμον ἔρασθαι, καὶ τινὶ πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρσκεύους ἐπειχθῆναι.

³ Thucyd. i. 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτῶν ὑπολίπωμεν, &c.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 82, 83.

their valour. "We Spartans owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valour is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.¹ And thus, not being otherwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of neighbouring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us for our parts not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the

¹ Thucyd. i. 84. Πολεμικοί τε καὶ ἐβουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδῶς σωφροσύνης πλείστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνῃς δὲ εὐψυχία· ἐβουλοὶ δὲ, ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροφίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ἔνν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστεῖν καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεΐα ξυνετοὶ ἔγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολέμων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμφομένοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπεξείναι, νομίζειν δὲ τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πέρας παραπλησίους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς.

In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and Poppo, in preference to Göller and Dr. Arnold.

The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward and obscure, though we make out pretty well the general sense. It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta, personally too a man of superior judge-

ment. The great points of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow, strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as of submission.

The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanes, Ran. 1070: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon (Thucyd. iii. 37).

Athenians on the subject of Potidæa and of the other grievances alleged by our allies—and that too the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies.”¹

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man—the temper of the assembly—and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgement, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

“I don’t understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good.² But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.³ Others have in abundance wealth, ships and horses—but *we* have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our

¹ Thucyd. i. 84, 85.

² Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans against the Plataeans (Thucyd. iii. 67).

³ Thucyd. i. 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους,

ἢν σωφρονῶμεν, οὐ περισφόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἐτι μέλλουσι κακῶν πάσχειν.

There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν which it is not easy to preserve in a translation.

The speech of Archidamus is ineffectual. Short, but warlike appeal of the Ephor Sthenelaidas.

wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can with honour deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong: it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly—which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Ay or No of the English House of Commons—the presiding Ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger.¹ Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He therefore directed a division—like the Speaker of the English House of Commons when his decision in favour of Ay or No is questioned by any member—"Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

Vote of the Spartan assembly in favour of war.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given²) was—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or

The Spartans send to Delphi—obtain an encouraging reply.

¹ Thucyd. i. 87. βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερώς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὀρμήσαι, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνέλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, &c.

uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorise war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to ensure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having now been carried, they had to enforce, upon the allies, generally, the dishonour as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested, the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot-city. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honourable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.¹ The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen—so

General congress of allies at Sparta. Second speech of the Corinthian envoy, enforcing the necessity and propriety of war.

¹ Thucyd. i. 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατήσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλῆθει προδχοῦντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα δμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελάμενα ἰόντας.

I conceive that the word *δμοίως* here alludes to the equal interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained subjects, partly of hired mercenaries—to both of which points, as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on to allude. The word *δμοίως* here designates the same fact as Periklēs in his

speech at Athens (i. 141), mentions under the words *πάντες ἰσόψηφοι*: the Corinthian orator treats it as an advantage to have all confederates equal and hearty in the cause: Periklēs, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it prevented unity of command and determination.

Poppo's view of this passage seems to me erroneous.

The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἴπερ βεβαϊότατον τὸ ταῦτα ἐμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, &c.

that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would excite revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed. Nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his co-operation, and the whole of Greece would sympathise in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. “Be ye persuaded then (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, has her means of attack prepared against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest. Let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery.”¹

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately: and the majority decided for war.² This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous

Vote of the majority of the allies in favour of war—B.C. 432.

¹ Thucyd. i. 123, 124.

² Thucyd. i. 125. *καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν.* It seems that the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

decision of the Spartans separately, may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Views and motives of the opposing powers.

Thucydides, recognising these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.¹ That the extraordinary aggrandisement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well-calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce,²—and moreover that that truce marked an

¹ Thucyd. i. 88. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμικὰ εἶναι, οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν συμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, μὴ ἐν μείζονι θυγηθῶσιν, ὁρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἦδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118.

² Plutarch's biography of Periklēs is very misleading from its inattention to chronology, ascribing to an earlier time feelings and tendencies which really belong to a later. Thus he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of Sicily, and even of Carthage and the

Tyrrhenian coast, as having become very popular at Athens even before the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded the Thirty years' truce: and he gives much credit to Periklēs for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in the Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war—done too, even

epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant.¹ It was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos;² peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandisement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—fomented by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was in point of fact the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to ensure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens,—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their

then, in a qualified manner and with much reserve. At the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, that Periklēs was eminently useful in discouraging rash and distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the credit of keeping down

Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, or towards Carthage (if indeed this latter ever was included in the catalogue of Athenian hopes)—for such desires were hardly known until after his death—in spite of the assertion again repeated by Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 17.

¹ Thucyd. i. 33-36.

² Thucyd. i. 40, 41.

highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendancy and unshaken resolution of Periklēs induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.¹

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect ; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklēs, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute.² But Periklēs was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else, by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens,—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war ; but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.³ Meanwhile

The hopes and confidence, on the side of Sparta ; the fears on the side of Athens. Heralds sent from Sparta to Athens with complaints and requisitions : meanwhile the preparations for war go on.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 8.

² Thucyd. i. 45 ; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 8.

³ Thucyd. i. 126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἐπερσεύοντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιοῦμενοι, ὥπως

the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.¹

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklēs, his chief opponent in that city. His mother Agaristē belonged to the great family of the Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inextinguishable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megaklēs nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.² Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenēs, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenēs (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenēs to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras the rival of Kleisthenēs,³ had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklēs (the grand-nephew of Kleisthenēs), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies. Religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out."⁴ If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklēs with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety⁵—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

σφίσις ὅτι μέγιστη πρόφασις
εἶναι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν, ἢν μὴ τι ἑσα-
κούωσι. ¹ Thucyd. i. 125.

² See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and the sacrilege which followed, in this History, ch. x.

³ See Herodot. v. 70: compare xi. 131; Thucyd. i. 126; and ch. xxxi. of this History.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 126. ἐκέλευον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλαύειν τῆς θεοῦ.

⁵ Thucyd. i. 127.

The influence of Periklēs with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it. Not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias.

Position of Periklēs at Athens: bitter hostility of his political opponents: attacks made upon him. Prosecution of Aspasia. Her character and accomplishments.

We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of Milētus, beautiful, well-educated, and aspiring. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed (though upon very doubtful evidence) to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtezans. Whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Periklēs,¹ it is certain that so

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 24. Respecting Aspasia, see Plato, Menexenus, c. 3, 4; Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 36; Harpokration, v. Ἀσπασία. Aspasia was doubtless no uncommon name among Grecian women: we know of one Phokæan girl who bore it, the mistress of Cyrus the younger (Plutarch, Artaxer. c. 26). The story about Aspasia having kept slave-girls for hire, is stated by both Plutarch and Athenæus (xiii. p. 570): but we may reasonably doubt whether there is any better evidence for it than that which is actually cited by the latter—the passage in Aristophanēs, Acharn. 497-505:—

Καὶ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς δύνανται πεφιστευμένοι
Ἀσπασίαν Ἀσπασίας πόρνα δύο σὲ πόρ-
νας δύο.

Athenæus reads πόρνας, but the reading πόρνα δύο appears in the received text of Aristophanēs. Critics differ whether Ἀσπασίας is the genitive case singular of Ἀσπασία, or the accusative plural of the adjective ἀσπασίως. I believe that it is the latter; but intended as a play on the word, capable of being understood either as a substantive or as an adjective—ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο or Ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο. There is a similar play on the word, in a line of Kratinus, quoted by Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 24.

At the time, if ever, when this theft of the Megarian youth took place, Aspasia must have been the beloved

mistress and companion of Periklēs; and it is inconceivable that she should have kept slave-girls for hire *then*, whatever she may have done before.

That reading and construction of the verse above cited, which I think the less probable of the two, has been applied by the commentators of Thucydides to explain a line of his history, and applied in a manner which I am persuaded is erroneous. When the Lacedæmonians desired the Athenians to repeal the decree excluding the Megarians from their ports, the Athenians refused, alleging that the Megarians had appropriated some lands which were disputed between the two countries, and some which were even sacred property—and also that “they had received runaway slaves from Athens.”—καὶ ἀδραπέδων ἐπιδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων (i. 139). The Scholiast gives a perfectly just explanation of these last words—ὡς ἐπὶ δούλους αὐτῶν ἀποφύγοντας ἐδέχοντο. But Wasse puts a note to the passage to this effect:—“Aspasia servus, v. Athenæum, p. 570; Aristoph. Acharn. 525, et Schol.” This note of Wasse is adopted and transcribed by the three best and most recent commentators on Thucydides—Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold. Yet with all respect to their united authority, the supposition is neither natural as applied to the words, nor admissible as regards the matter of fact. Ἀδραπέδα ἀφιστά-

remarkable were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism,—that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single. Everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives : and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of a class of women called Hetærae or Courtezans, literally Female Companions, who lived a free life, managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character. The most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodotê,¹ appear to have been the only women in Greece, except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendancy.

Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory

μῆνα mean naturally (not *Aspasia servos*, or more properly *servas*, for the very gender ought to have made Wasse suspect the correctness of his interpretation—but) the runaway slaves of proprietors generally in Attica ; of whom the Athenians lost so prodigious a number after the Lacedæmonian garrison was established at Dekeleia (Thucyd. vii. 28 : compare i. 142 ; and iv. 118, about the *αἰρόμολοι*). Periklês might fairly set forth the reception of such runaway slaves as matter of complaint against the Megarians, and the Athenian public assembly would feel it so likewise : moreover the Megarians are charged not with having *stolen away* the slaves, but with *harbouring* them (*ὑποδοχόν*). But to suppose that Periklês, in defending the decree of exclusion against the Megarians, would rest the defence on the ground that some Megarian youth had run away with two girls of the *cortège* of Aspasia, argues a strange conception both of him and of the people. If such

an incident ever really happened, or was even supposed to have happened, we may be sure that it would be cited by his opponents, as a means of bringing contempt upon the real accusation against the Megarians—the purpose for which Aristophanês produces it. This is one of the many errors in respect to Grecian history arising from the practice of construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal facts.

¹ The visit of Sokratês with some of his friends to Theodotê, his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of living, are among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, on a side very imperfectly known to us (Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 11).

Compare the citations from Eubulus and Antiphanês, the comic writers, apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 571, illustrating the differences of character and behaviour between some of these Hetærae and others—and Athenæ. xiii. p. 589.

at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage having never been comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted. Periklès concurred with his wife's male relations (who formed her legal guardians) in giving her away to another husband.¹ He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Periklès his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may reasonably believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Periklès, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus,—disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment—reported abroad with exaggerated calumnies, and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Periklès, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the pretended revelations, which served them as matter for scandalous libel on the privacy of this distinguished man.²

Family relations of Periklès—his connexion with Aspasia. License of the comic writers in their attacks upon both.

While the comic writers attacked Periklès himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphalè, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklès or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held, and the opinions professed, among the society of Periklès, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydides son

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 24. *Εἶτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὐσης αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην μὲν ἐτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέ-* *δωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀσπασίαν λαβὼν ἑστέρῃ διαφερόντως.*

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 13-36.

of Melésias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instance of Diopeithès. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards fatally in the case of Sokratès, and embittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas—that Periklès did not dare to place Anaxagoras on

Prosecution of Anaxagoras the philosopher as well as of Aspasia—Anaxagoras retires from Athens—Periklès defends Aspasia before the dikastery, and obtains her acquittal.

his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.¹ But Periklès himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery. In fact the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Pheidias) was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Periklès. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears.² The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons. In Periklès, however, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled: for constant selfmastery was one of the most prominent features in his character.³ And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; inso-much that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticises the speech of Periklès as if it were simply the composition of Thucydidès, censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.⁴

It appears also, as far as we can judge amidst very imper-

¹ This seems the more probable story; but there are differences of statement, and uncertainties upon many points: compare Plutarch, Periklès, c. 16-32; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 12, 13. See also Schaubach, Fragment. Anaxagoræ, p. 47-52.

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 32.

³ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 7, 36-39.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 60, 61: compare also his striking expressions, c. 65; Dionys. Halikarn. De Thucydid. Judic. c. 44, p. 924.

fect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athênê,¹ took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Periklēs.² A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to ensure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Periklēs dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Periklēs in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Periklēs, in order that the suspicions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakon-tidēs proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Periklēs should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter pro-

Prosecution of the sculptor Pheidias for embezzlement—instituted by the political opponents of Periklēs. Charge of peculation against Periklēs himself.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31. Φειδίας — ἐργόλαβος τοῦ ἀγάλματος.

This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of embezzlement, was the story most widely in circulation against Periklēs—ἡ χειρίστη αἰτία πα-

σών, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31).

² See the Dissertation of O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, c. 17, p. 35), who lays out the facts in the order in which I have given them.

vision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1500 in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.¹

If Periklès was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honourably acquitted: for the language of Thucydidès respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanès in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Periklès, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially, that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.² We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Periklès were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydidès that the war depended upon far deeper causes—that

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 13-32.

² Aristophan. Pac. 587-603: compare Acharn. 512; Ephorus ap. Diodor. xii. 38-40; and the Scholia on the two passages of Aristophanès; Plutarch, Periklès, c. 32.

Diodorus (as well as Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7) relates another tale, that Alkibiadès once approached Periklès when he was in evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason: Periklès told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: upon which Alkibiadès advised him to consider rather, how he could evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklès plunged Athens into the Peloponnesian war: compare Aristophan. Nub. 855, with the Scholia—and Ephorus, Fragm. 118, 119, ed. Marx, with the notes of Marx.

It is probable enough that Ephorus copied the story which ascribes the

Peloponnesian war to the accusations against Pheidias and Periklès, from Aristophanès or other comic writers of the time. But it deserves remark that even Aristophanès is not to be considered as certifying it. For if we consult the passage above referred to in his comedy *Pax*, we shall find that, first, Hermès tells the story about Pheidias, Periklès, and the Peloponnesian war; upon which both Trygæus, and the Chorus, remark that *they never heard a word of it before*: that it is quite new to them.

Tryg. Ταῦτα τοῖσιν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, γὰρ
᾿πεπύσμεν οὐδένος,
Οὐδ' ὅπως αὐτῇ (Εἰρήνῃ) προσήκει Θε-
δίας ἡγεμόν.
Chorus. Οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γὰρ νυνί.

If Aristophanès had stated the story ever so plainly, his authority could only have been taken as proving that it was a part of the talk of the time: but the lines just cited make him as much a contradicting as an affirming witness.

the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it—that it was not Periklēs, but the Peloponnesians who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Periklēs was hard-pressed by the accusations of political enemies—perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection.¹ And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Periklēs and his family might be banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war:—to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honour even by the greatest Athenian families.² On this occasion, however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæonids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death—and the sanctuary of Athênê Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege—was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Periklēs.³ Probably the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem:⁴ very different from the effect of

Requisition from the Lacedæmonians, for the banishment of Periklēs—arrived when Periklēs was thus pressed by his political enemies—rejected.

Counter-requisition sent by the Athenians to Sparta for expiation of sacrilege.

¹ It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but also the musician and philosopher Damon, the personal friend and instructor of Periklēs, must have been banished at a time when Periklēs was old—perhaps somewhere near about this time. The passage in Plato, Alkibiadēs, i. c. 30, p. 118, proves that Damon was in Athens and intimate with Periklēs when the latter

was of considerable age—καὶ νῦν ἐστὶ τῆλικούτος ὃν Δάμωνι συνέστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἔνεκα.

Damon is said to have been ostracised—perhaps he was tried and condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded.

² See Thucyd. v. 43; vi. 89.

³ Thucyd. i. 128, 135, 139.

⁴ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 33.

the same manœuvre when practised before by Kleomenēs against Kleisthenēs.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—

Fresh requisitions sent from Sparta to Athens—to withdraw the troops from Potidæa—to leave Ægina free—to re-admit the Megarians to Athenian harbours.

1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But on the other hand, the party opposed to Periklês would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained however on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war, and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigences of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand if you will leave the Greeks autonomous." Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.¹

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which

¹ Thucyd. i. 139. It rather appears, from the words of Thucydides, that these various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by *one* embassy, joined by new members arriving with fresh instructions, but remaining during

a month or six weeks between January and March 431 B.C. installed in the house of the proxenus of Sparta at Athens: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. v. 4, 22.

went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favour of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such however, was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly; while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Periklēs for refusing to concede such a trifle.¹ Against this opinion Periklēs entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

Final and peremptory requisition of Sparta—public assembly held at Athens on the whole subject of war and peace.

Great difference of opinion in the assembly—important speech of Periklēs.

"I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians—though I know that men are in one mood, when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another, when actually in the contest—their judgements then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavourable; or else not to take credit for wisdom in the event of success.² For it

Periklēs strenuously urges the Athenians not to yield.

¹ Thucyd. i. 139; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31.

² Thucyd. i. 140. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἥσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου διδπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰδόμεν αἰτιῶσθαι. I could have wished in the translation to preserve the play upon the words ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι which Thucydides intro-

duces into this sentence, and which seems to have been agreeable to his taste. Ἀμαθῶς when referred to ξυμφορὰς is used in a passive sense by no means common—"in a manner which cannot be learned, departing from all reasonable calculation." Ἀμαθῶς when referred to διαβολὰς bears its usual meaning—"ignorant, deficient in learning or in reason."

is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man : such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it, when tendered. They choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion : they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians : nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war. Let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle : if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear : whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality.”¹

Periklês then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public : they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means.² In a border-war, or a single land-battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental,

His review of the comparative forces, and probable chances of success or defeat in the war.

¹ Thucyd. i. 140.

² Thucyd. i. 141. αὐτοῦργοι τε γὰρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ οὐτε ἰδίᾳ οὐτε ἐν κοινῇ χρήματα ἔστιν αὐτοῖς· ἔπειτα χρο-

νίων πολέμων καὶ διαπορντίων ἔπειροι, διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πείρας ἐπιφέρειν.

for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief ; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi.¹ For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics : she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable : Attica unfortunately was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land-battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.²

“Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator). Reserve your mourning for men : houses and lands acquire not men, but men acquire them.³ Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many farther grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks ;—for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our

¹ Thucyd. i. 143. εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίαςου ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μισθῶν μέλλονι πειρώμενοι ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων, ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινὸν ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τότε τε ὑπάρχει, καὶ, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρέσιαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.

This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been conceived by the

Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i. 121). Doubtless Periklēs would be informed of the tenor of all these public demonstrations at Sparta.

² Thucyd. i. 141, 142, 143.

³ Thucyd. i. 143. τὴν τε δόρυρσιν μὴ οἰκῶν καὶ γῆς ποιέεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμαμάτων οὐ γὰρ τότε τοὺς ἀνδρας, ἀλλ' οἱ ἀνδρες ταῦτα κτάννται.

enemy.¹ But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations : for the present let us dismiss these envoys with the answer :—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (*xenêlasy* or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other : That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made,—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta : That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable : the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack : and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them : we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors.”²

These animating encouragements of Periklès carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration—but that they would do nothing under authoritative

The assembly adopts the recommendation of Periklès—firm and determined reply sent to Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. i. 144. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἣν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους ἀβαιρέτους μὴ προστι-

θεσθαι μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφύβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

² Thucyd. i. 143, 144.

demand.¹ With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Periklēs. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydides bears out the judgement of Periklēs on this important point,² so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens, (as the Spartans³ themselves afterwards came to feel,) but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica: it was not Athens, but her enemies, who after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war.⁴ The case made out by

Views of Thucydides respecting the grounds, feelings, and projects of the two parties now about to embark in war.

¹ Thucyd. i. 145. καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεκρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ' ἑκαστὰ τε ὡς ἔφρασε, καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν οὐδὲν κελευόμενοι ποιῆσειν, δίκη δὲ κατὰ τὰς ξυνθήκας ἐτοῖμοι εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἰσῇ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ.

² In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 31: and in his comparison of Perikl. and Fab. Max. c. 3.

³ Thucyd. iv. 21. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι τσαυτὰ εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τῇ πρὶν χρόνῳ σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένων κωλύεσθαι, δεδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένως δέξε-

σθαι τε καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀποδόσειν.

See also an important passage (vii. 18) about the feelings of the Spartans. The Spartans thought, says Thucydides, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ (the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) σφέτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένον ἐν ταῖς πρότερον ξυνθήκαις ὅπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἦν δίκας θέλωσι δίδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπήκουον ἐς δίκας προκαλουμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, &c.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 126. ὅπως σφίσιν ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

Periklēs, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydidēs. And though it is perfectly true, that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the Thirty years' truce—it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklēs had not been one of foreign aggrandisement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment towards other Grecian powers. Even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce; while the circumstances, out of which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy—the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse;¹ though individuals

Equivocal
period—war
not yet pro-
claimed—
first blow
struck, not
by Athens,
but by her
enemies.

¹ Thucyd. i. 146. *ἐπεμύγγυντο δ' ὅμως ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐφοίτων, ἀκηρύ-*

who passed the borders did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Plataea, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithærôn; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (from which it was separated by the river Asôpus) on the other: the distance between Plataea and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though Bœotian by descent, the Plataeans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance (as well as qualified communion of civil rights) with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Plataea. An oligarchical faction of wealthy Plataeans espoused their cause,¹ with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town—of destroying its leaders, their political rivals—and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleidês, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes. To both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval, before watches had been placed, and the precautions of a state of war commenced. They resolved to surprise the town of Plataea in the night, during a period of religious festival, in order that the popula-

Open violation of the truce by the Thebans—they surprise Plataea in the night.

κτες μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δ' οὐ σπονδῶν γὰρ
ἐόγχυσι τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν, καὶ πρόφασιν
τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 2. βουλόμενοι ἰδίᾳς
ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν

τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διαφθεῖραι, καὶ
τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Θηβαίοις προσποιῆσαι:
also iii. 65. ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρή-
μασι καὶ γένει, &c.

tion might be most completely off their guard.¹ Accordingly on a rainy night towards the close of March 431 B.C.,² a body of rather more than 300 Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Platæa during the first sleep of the citizens. Naukleidēs and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was intended to arrive at Platæa by break of day, in order to support them.³

¹ Thucyd. iii. 56.

² Thucyd. ii. 2. *ἅμα ᾧ ἀρχομένη*—seems to indicate a period rather before than after the first of April: we may consider the bisection of the Thucydidæan year into *θέρος* and *χείμων* as marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half of the year (Thucyd. v. 20), though Poppo erroneously treats the Thucydidæan winter as only four months (Poppo, Proleg. i. c. v. p. 72, and ad Thucyd. ii. 2: see F. W. Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thucydidēs, p. 32, Hamburg, 1846).

³ Thucyd. ii. 2-5. *θήμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ δπλα . . . καὶ ἀνείκην δὲ κήρυξ, εἰς τὴν βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πύργια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ζυμμάχειν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοὺς τὰ δπλα.*

Dr. Arnold has a note upon this passage, explaining *τίθεσθαι* or *θέσθαι* τὰ δπλα to mean, "piling the arms," or getting rid of their spears and shields by piling them all in one or more heaps. He says—"The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to come and pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever there should be occasion either to march or to fight." The same explanation of the phrase had before been given by Wesseling and Larcher, ad Herodot. ix. 52; though Bähr on the passage is more satisfactory.

Both Poppo and Göller also sanction Dr. Arnold's explanation: yet I cannot but think that it is unsuitable to the passage before us, as well as to several other passages in which *τίθεσθαι* τὰ

δπλα occurs: there may be other passages in which it will suit, but as a general explanation it appears to me inadmissible. In most cases the words mean "*armati consistere*"—to ground arms—to maintain rank, resting the spear and shield (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12) upon the ground. In the incident now before us, the Theban hoplites enter Platæa, a strange town, with the population decidedly hostile, and likely to be provoked more than ever by this surprise; add to which, that it is pitch dark and a rainy night. Is it likely that the first thing which they do will be to pile their arms? The darkness alone would render it a slow and uncertain operation to resume the arms: so that when the Platæans attacked them, as they did quite suddenly and unexpectedly, and while it was yet dark, the Thebans would have been (upon Dr. Arnold's supposition) altogether defenceless and unarmed (see ii. 3, *προσέβαλον τε εὐθὺς οἱ Πλαταιῆς*) καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἦσαν κατὰ τὰ δπλα—which certainly they were not. Dr. Arnold's explanation may suit the case of the soldier in camp, but certainly not that of the soldier in presence of an enemy, or under circumstances of danger: the difference of the two will be found illustrated in Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. 4, 5, 6.

Nor do the passages referred to by Dr. Arnold himself bear out his interpretation of the phrase *τίθεσθαι τὰ δπλα*. That interpretation is moreover not conveniently applicable either to Thucyd. vii. 3, or viii. 25—decidedly inapplicable to iv. 68 (*θησόμενον τὰ δπλα*), in the description of the night attack on Megara, very analogous to this upon Platæa—and not less decidedly inapplicable to

Naukleidēs and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or despatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent. Believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large reinforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence. They wished moreover rather to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite by public proclamation all Platæans who were willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race and to the Boeotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Platæans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality : so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But finding out soon, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with—they speedily took courage and determined to attack them ; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways¹—and forming barricades with waggons across such of these ways as were suitable.

The gates of Plataea are opened by an oligarchical party within — a Theban detachment are admitted into the agora at night—at first apparently successful, afterwards overpowered and captured.

two passages of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, i. 5, 14 ; iv. 3, 7.

Schneider, in the *Lexicon* appended to his edition of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, has a long but not very distinct article upon *τίθεσθαι τὰ πλά*.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 3. *ἰδὼκει οὖν ἐπιχειρή-
τέα εἶναι, καὶ ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες
τοὺς κοινούς τοίχους παρ' ἀλλήλους,
ὅπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ᾤσιν ἴοντες,
ἀμάρτας δὲ ἀνευ τῶν ὑποστυλίων ἐς τὰς
ὁδοὺς καθίστασθαι, ἢ ἀντὶ τοίχους ᾗ, καὶ
τάλλα ἐξήρτων, &c.*

I may illustrate this by a short extract from the letter of M. Marrast, mayor of Paris, to the National Assembly, written

during the formidable insurrection of June 25, 1848, in that city, and describing the proceedings of the insurgents : " Dans la plupart des rues longues, étroites, et couvertes de barricades qui vont de l'Hôtel de Ville à la Rue St. Antoine, la garde nationale mobile, et la troupe de ligne, ont dû faire le siège de chaque maison ; et ce qui rendait l'œuvre plus périlleuse, c'est que les insurgés avaient établi, de chaque maison à chaque maison, des communications intérieures qui reliaient les maisons entre elles, en sorte qu'ils pouvaient se rendre, comme par une allée couverte, d'un point éloigné jusqu'au centre d'une

A little before daybreak, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages. Having been out all night under a heavy rain—they were enclosed in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in tracking out even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Plataëans two or three times. The attack was repeated with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Plataean citizen who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others escaped through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance of escape, and the Plataëans at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.¹

Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asôpus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty

suite de barricades qui les protégeaient." (Lettre publiée dans le journal, *Le National*, June 26, 1848.)

A similar establishment of internal communication between adjoining houses

in the street, was one of the most memorable features of the heroic defence of Saragossa against the French, in the Peninsular War.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 3, 4.

fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Plataea, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Plataean territory (no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls), in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures.

Large force intended to arrive from Thebes to support the assailants early in the morning—they are delayed by the rain and the swelling of the Asopus—they commence hostilities against the Plataean persons and property without the walls.

Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement. But the Plataeans gave a different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath—and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydides records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable; but the Plataeans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Plataeans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their moveable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were 180 in number.¹

Parley between the Plataeans and the Theban force without—the latter evacuate the territory—the Theban prisoners in Plataea are slain.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 5, 6; Herodot. vii. 233. | 1379) agrees with Thucydides in the Demosthenes (cont. Neæram, c. 25, p. | statement that the Plataeans slew their

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Plataea to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Periklês doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact; for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans afterwards, when fortune was in their favour, chose to designate it as such.¹ But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be, to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the Athenians and Plataeans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Korōneia, and by that of Sparta (hereafter to be recounted) after the taking of Sphaktēria. The Plataeans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great poli-

prisoners. From whom Diodorus borrowed his inadmissible story, that the Plataeans gave up their prisoners to the Thebans, I cannot tell (Diodor. xii. 41, 42).

The passage in this Oration against Neera is also curious, both as it agrees with Thucydides on many points and as it differs from him on several others: in some sentences, even the words agree with Thucydides (ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωνὸς ποταμὸς μέγας ἑρβώη, καὶ διαβήναι οὐ βέβαιον ἦν, &c.: compare Thucyd. ii. 2); while on other points there is discrepancy. Demosthenēs (or the Pseudo-Demosthenēs) states that Archidamus king of Sparta planned the surprise of Plataea—that the Plataeans only discovered, when

morning dawned, the small real number of the Thebans in the town—that the larger body of Thebans, when they at last did arrive near Plataea after the great delay in their march, were forced to retire by the numerous force arriving from Athens, and that the Plataeans then destroyed their prisoners in the town. Demosthenēs mentions nothing about any convention between the Plataeans and the Thebans without the town, respecting the Theban prisoners within.

On every point on which the narrative of Thucydides differs from that of Demosthenēs, the former stands out as the most coherent and credible.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 66.

tical advantage, which the more long-sighted Periklēs would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Plataea, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Plataea and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds.¹ The incident at Plataea, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up. And the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment.² A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.³

Grecian feeling, already predisposed to the war, was wound up to the highest pitch by the striking incident at Plataea.

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Plataea tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Periklēs, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations³ whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free. The latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular

¹ Thucyd. ii. 1-6.

² Thucyd. ii. 7, 8. ἡ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν. ξυνιουσῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων.

³ Thucyd. i. 23.

³ Thucyd. ii. 13. ἀπερ καὶ πρότερον, &c. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα, οἷα περ εἰώθει, Περικλῆς ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians. To the island of Kephallenia, the Athenians sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterwards.¹ With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia.

Preparations for war on the part of Athens—in-
timations sent round to her allies—
Akarnanians recently ac-
quired by Athens as
allies—re-
cent capture of the Am-
philochian Argos by the
Athenian Phormio.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternising with their fellow tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral Phormio commenced.²

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera.³ Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Periklês could make a report to his

Strength and resources of Athens and her allies—military and naval means—treasure.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 7, 22, 30.

² Thucyd. ii. 68. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely marked by Thucydides. But his words seem to imply that it was before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio was sent to Chalki-

diké about October or November 432 B.C. (i. 64); and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the naval conflict of Korkyræans and Athenians against Corinthians with their allies, Ambrakiots included—which conflict had happened in the preceding spring. ³ Thucyd. ii. 9.

countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service ; 1200 horsemen and horse-bowmen ; 1600 bowmen ; and the great force of all, not less than 29,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 13,000 in number ; while the remaining 16,000, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalêrum—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 6000 talents, or about 1,400,000*l.*, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 9700 talents, or about 2,230,000*l.*, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to 6000. Moreover the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, &c., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of the state, Periklês spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about 138,000*l.*; besides all other items,¹ making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about 230,000*l.*

To this formidable catalogue of means for war, were to be added other items not less important, but which did not admit

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13 ; Xenophon Anab. vii. 4.

of being weighed and numbered ; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Periklēs to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts ;¹ and he could guarantee success² as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable suffering ; and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home.³ But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Periklēs could promise was a successful resistance—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed ; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had never been got together—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus (except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first,

¹ Thucyd. ii. 7. ὡς βεβαίως περίξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσονται. vi. 90. περίξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον πολιορκούντες.

² Thucyd. ii. 65. τοσούτον τῷ Περικλεῖ ἐπερίσσευσε τότε ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς προέγνω,

καὶ πᾶν ἂν ῥαδίως περιγενέσθαι τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

³ Thucyd. i. 144. ἦν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαίρετους μὴ προστίθεσθαι.

though the Achæan town of Pellênê joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phokians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities however supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war—the devastation of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march—gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset—a common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, with favourable sympathies throughout Greece—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war. And the general persuasion was, that Athens, even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process.¹ Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Periklês.²

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief

¹ Thucyd. vii. 28. ὅσον κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ μὲν ἑαυτὸν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἑτῶν, οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον, ἐνδομίζον περιόισιν αὐτοὺς (the Athenians), εἰ οἱ Πελοποννησίοι ἐσβάλοιν ἐς τὴν χώραν: compare v. 14.

² Thucyd. vi. 11. διὰ τὸ παρὰ γινώ-

μην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβεῖσθε τὸ πρῶτον, περιγεγενῆσθαι, καταφρονήσαντες ἥδη καὶ τῆς Ζικελίας ἐφίσσθε. It is Nikias, who, in dissuading the expedition against Syracuse, reminds the Athenians of their past despondency at the beginning of the war.

Position and power of Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies—they are full of hope and confidence of putting down Athens speedily.

of carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of 500 triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbours.¹ Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phœnician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after the attempted surprise of Plataea. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry, were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length.² On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a

¹ Thucyd. ii. 7. Diodorus says that the Italian and Sicilian allies were required to furnish 200 triremes (xii. 41).

Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished.

² Thucyd. ii. 10-12.

discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. "We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight,¹ even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated."

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melêsippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Periklês, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melêsippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melêsippus exclaimed,² with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Cœnoê, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His

Last envoy sent to Athens—he is dismissed without being allowed to enter the town.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 11. *ὅσπερ χρὴ καὶ πάντων ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἵνα αὐτοὺς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὀρμηθῶνται, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ὀφείλωμεν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῇ ὁρῶσιν ἡμᾶς ὑποῦντας τε καὶ τὰ κείνων φθείροντας.*

These reports of speeches are of great

value as preserving a record of the feelings and expectations of actors, apart from the result of events. What Archidamus so confidently anticipated did not come to pass.

² Thucyd. ii. 12.

march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of CEnoê, which had been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain¹—and after a delay of several days before the place,—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

March of Archidamus into Attica—his fruitless siege of CEnoê.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before CEnoê—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta²—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Expectation of Archidamus that Athens would yield at the last moment—Difficulty of Periklès in persuading the Athenians to abandon their territory and see it all ravaged.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Periklès at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and moveable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory—or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. It would indeed make a favourable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was

¹ Thucyd. ii. 18. *πᾶσαν ἰδίαν περιέσσαντες οὐκ ἔδυναντο εἰλεῖν*. The situation of CEnoê is not exactly agreed upon by topographical inquirers: it was near Eleutheræ, and on one of the roads from Attica into Bœotia (Harpokration, v. *Οἰνὼν*; Herodot. v. 74). Archida-

mus marched probably from the Isthmus over Geraneia, and fell into this road in order to receive the junction of the Bœotian contingent after it had crossed Kithæron.

² Thucyd. i. 82; ii. 18.

likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate manœuvre of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Periklēs, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæonid race.¹ But though this declaration from Periklēs would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, yet the lesson which he had to inculcate—not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them—to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success—were recommendations which probably no one but Periklēs could have hoped to enforce. They were moreover the more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.² It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labour, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Periklēs against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13: compare Tacitus, *Histor. v. 23*. "*Cerealis, insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus, agros Civilis nota arte ducum, intactos sinebat.*" Also Livy, ii. 39.

Justin affirms that the Lacedæmonian

invaders actually did leave the lands of Periklēs uninjured, and that he made them over to the people (iii. 7). Thucydides does not say whether the case really occurred: see also Polyænus, i. 36.

² Thucyd. ii. 15, 16.

to be made; though, as this calculation was not realised, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis forty-nine years before—entire families with all their moveable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands.¹ Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city—always excepting the acropolis and the Eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants. But even the ground called *the Pelasgikon* immediately under the acropolis, which by an ancient and ominous tradition was interdicted to human abode,² was made use of under the present necessity. Many too placed their families in the towers and recesses of the city walls,³ or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honourable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas the march of Archidamus might perhaps now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably

¹ Thucyd. ii. 14.

² Thucyd. ii. 17. καὶ τὸ Πελασγικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, ὃ καὶ ἐπαράτῳ τε ἦν μὴ οἰκεῖν καὶ τι καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦδε διακόλυνε, λέγοντες ὅτι τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἐμείνον, ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξῆλθη.

Thucydides then proceeds to give an explanation of his own for this ancient prophecy, intended to save its credit, as well as to show that his countrymen had not, as some persons alleged, violated any divine mandate by admitting residents into the Pelasgikon. When

the oracle said,—“The Pelasgikon is better unoccupied”—these words were not meant to interdict the occupation of the spot, but to foretel that it would never be occupied until a time of severe calamity arrived. The necessity of occupying it grew only out of national suffering. Such is the explanation suggested by Thucydides.

³ Aristophanēs, Equitēs, 789. οἱ κοῦντ' ἐν ταῖς πιθάναισι καὶ γυπαρίοις καὶ πυργιδίοις. The philosopher Diogenēs, in taking up his abode in a tub, had thus examples in history to follow.

may have been by the party opposed to Periklês, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before Cœnoë without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Plataea. His army was of irresistible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch,¹ or of 100,000 according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder—even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also. But since Thucydidês, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

March of
Archidamus
into Attica.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right-hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and north-westerly from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than 3000 hoplites to the national line, and

Archidamus
advances to
Acharnæ,
within seven
miles of
Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33.

flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighbouring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanês, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable.¹ It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme—which could not have contained less than 12,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost in inflaming this temper and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.²

Intense
clamour
within the
walls of
Athens—
eagerness to
go forth and
fight.

Though his calculation was not realised, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Periklês, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Pleistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior

¹ See the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês, represented in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, v. 34, 180, 254, &c.

προσβῦται τινες
Ἀχαρνικοὶ, στυγροὶ γέροντες, πρῆντοι,
ἀτεράμονες, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφετερόδωμοι, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 20.

strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together,¹ angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklēs was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath.

He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering. He was reviled as a coward for not leading

Trying position, firmness, and sustained ascendancy of Periklēs, in dissuading them from going forth.

out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general. The rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten.² This burst of spontaneous discontent was of course fomented by the numerous political enemies of Periklēs, and particularly by Kleon,³ now rising into importance as an opposition speaker, whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgement or the firmness of Periklēs. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorised character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens.⁴ It appears that he as general, or rather the Board of the Generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the Ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting,⁵ and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in

¹ Thucyd. ii. 21. *κατὰ ξυστάσεις δὲ γιγνόμενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἐριδι ἦσαν*: compare Euripidēs, *Herakleidæ*, 416; and *Andromachē*, 1077.

² Thucyd. ii. 21. *παντί τε τρόπῳ ἀντιρρήσιστο ἡ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ὀργῇ εἶχον, καὶ ὃν παρήνευσε πρότερον ἐμέμνηντο οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπέτρεγοι, αἰτιὸν τε σφίσι ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὢν ἑπασχον.*

³ Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 33.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 22.

⁵ See Schömann, *De Comititiis*, c. iv. p. 62. The Prytanes (*i. e.* the Fifty Senators belonging to that tribe whose turn it was to preside at the time), as well as the Stratēgi, had the right of convoking the Ekklesia; see Thucyd. iv. 118, in which passage however they are represented as convoking it in conjunction with the Stratēgi: probably a discretion on the point came gradually to be understood as vested in the latter.

the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realising itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklēs should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honourable points in his political character ; but it is far less wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the Ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him ; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Periklēs, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Periklēs thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.¹ At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica.² Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilēssus and Mount Parnēs, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the north-western road

The Athenians remain within their walls : partial skirmishes only, no general action.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 22. The funeral monument of these slain Thessalians was among those seen by Pausanias near Athens, on the side of the Academy (Pausan. i. 29, 5).

² Diodorus (xii. 42) would have us

believe, that the expedition sent out by Periklēs, ravaging the Peloponnesian coast, induced the Lacedæmonians to hurry away their troops out of Attica. Thucydides gives no countenance to this—nor is it at all credible.

near Orôpus, which brought them into Bœotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens—the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.¹ It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, under Karkinus, Prôteas, and Sokratês, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methônê (Modon), on the south-western peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory.² The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards—who happened to be on guard at a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with 100 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honours bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighbourhood and 300 chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harbourless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbour of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory,

Athenian fleet is despatched to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus—first notice of the Spartan Brasidas—operations of the Athenians in Akarnania, Kephallênia, &c.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 23. The reading Γραία, belonging to Γραία, seems preferable to Πειραιή. Poppo and Gölle adopt the former, Dr. Arnold the latter. Græa was a small maritime place in the vicinity of Orôpus (Aristotel. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τάγρα)—known also now as an Attic Deme belonging to the tribe Pandionis: this has been dis-

covered for the first time by an inscription published in Professor Ross's work (Ueber die Deme von Attika, p. 3-5). Orôpus was not an Attic Deme: the Athenian citizens residing in it were probably enrolled as Γραῖς.

² Thucyd. ii. 25; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34; Justin, iii. 7, 5.

attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighbouring Akarnanian town of Palærus—as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion—with its four distinct towns or districts, Palês, Kranii, Samê, and Pronê. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September¹—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer.

The Athenians expel the Æginetans from Ægina, and people the island with Athenian kleruchs. The Æginetans settle at Thyrea in Peloponnesus.

Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alopê were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa.² It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy, and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25-30; Diodor. xii. 43, 44. ² Thucyd. ii. 26-32; Diodor. xii. 44.

district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos : some of them however found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian *kleruchs*, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.¹

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two—and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Periklês, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were 10,000 citizen hoplites, (independent of 3000 others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa,) and 3000 metic hoplites—besides a large number of light troops.²—Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian Ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the Stratêgi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office,³ that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.⁴ Not merely their corn and

The Athenians invade and ravage the Megarid: sufferings of the Megarians.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 27.

² Thucyd. ii. 31; Diodor. xii. 44.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 30.

⁴ See the striking picture in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês (685-781) of the distressed Megarian selling his

hungry children into slavery with their own consent: also Aristoph. *Pac.* 482.

The position of Megara, as the ally of Sparta and enemy of Athens, was uncomfortable in the same manner (though not to the same intense pitch of

fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, five centuries afterwards, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.¹

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity.² It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian

Measures taken by Athens for permanent defence.—Sum put by in the acropolis, against urgent need, not to be touched unless under certain defined dangers.—Capital punishment against any one who should propose otherwise.

suffering) in the war which preceded the battle of Leuktra—near fifty years after this (Demosthen. cont. Near., p. 1357, c. 12).

¹ Pausan. i. 40, 3.

² Thucyd. ii. 24.

expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the forbidden change, appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.¹

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government.² But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.³ But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an

Remarks on
this decree.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 15.

² Mitford, Hist. of Greece, ch. xiv. sect. 1, vol. iii. p. 160. "Another measure followed, which taking place at the time when Thucydides wrote and Periklēs spoke, and while Periklēs held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism, of democratical government. A decree of the people directed . . . But so little confidence was placed in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens, against whose

caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained—that the denunciation of capital punishment was proposed against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should *concur in* (?) any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances."

³ Thucyd. viii. 15. τὰ δὲ χίλια τέλαντα, ὅν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγγίχοντο μὴ ἀψέσθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένους ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι, ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν.

artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgement of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Periklēs, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Periklēs (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so

rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be for ever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade—and of the neighbouring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkês king of the Odrisian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodôrus, a citizen of Abdêra, who engaged to render him and his son Sadokus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdêra, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodôrus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Sitalkês that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honour of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus.¹ Nymphodôrus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover the town of Astakus in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both

Blockade of
Potidæa—
Sitalkês king
of the Odris-
sian Thra-
cians—
alliance
made be-
tween him
and Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 29.

upon other parts of Akarnania and upon the island of Kephallénia. In the latter they were entrapped into an ambuscade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.¹

It was towards the close of autumn also that Periklès, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos. But that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; probably heard by Thucydidès himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Periklès, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.²

The eleven chapters of Thucydidès which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian—always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind misled by a bad or an unattainable model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Periklès—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus

¹ Thucyd. ii. 33.

² Thucyd. ii. 34-45. Sometimes also the allies of Athens, who had fallen

along with her citizens in battle, had a part in the honours of the public burial (Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 13).

forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly¹ not composed for actual delivery. And it deserves, in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenês, and even Lysias, the honourable distinction which Thucydidês claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech Periklês distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues. He thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence—than when it is translated into the words of a speaker, who may easily offend either by incompetency or by apparent feebleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.²

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its

¹ The critics, from Dionysius of Halikarnassus downward, agree for the most part in pronouncing the feeble *Ἀδύος Ἐννέριδος*, ascribed to Demosthenês, to be not really his. Of those ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though upon far less grounds. The Menexenus, if it be really the work of Plato, however, does not add to his fame: but the harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered—though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.

See the general instructions, in Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, p. 258-268, Reisk., on the contents and composition of a funeral discourse—Lysias is said to have composed several—Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 836.

Compare respecting the funeral discourse of Periklês, K. F. Weber, Ueber die Standrede des Periklês (Darmstadt, 1827); Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland

und Rom, sect. 35, 63, 64; Kutzén, Perikles als Staatsmann, p. 158, sect. 12 (Grimma, 1834).

Dahlmann (Historische Forschungen, vol. i. p. 23) seems to think that the original oration of Periklês contained a large sprinkling of mythical allusions and stories out of the antiquities of Athens, such as we now find in the other funeral orations above alluded to; but that Thucydidês himself deliberately left them out in his report. There seems no foundation for this suspicion. It is much more consonant to the superior tone of dignity which reigns throughout all this oration, to suppose that the mythical narratives and even the previous historical glories of Athens never found any special notice in the speech of Periklês—nothing more than a general recognition, with an intimation that he does not dwell upon them at length because they were well-known to his audience—*μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδῶσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἔδωκε* (ii. 36).

² Thucyd. ii. 35.

businesslike, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire, and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it—Periklēs proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.¹

“We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbours,—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the Many, and not towards the Few. As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man : while in regard to public affairs, and to claims of individual influence, every man’s chance of advancement is determined not by party favour but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department. Neither poverty, nor obscure station, keep him back,² if he really has the means of benefiting the city. Moreover our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other’s diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks,³ which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are

Sketch of
Athenian
political con-
stitution, and
social life, as
conceived by
Periklēs.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 36. Ἀπὸ δὲ ὅας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλαθον ἐν’ αὐτὰ, καὶ μεθ’ ὅας πολιτείας, καὶ τρόπων ἐξ ὧν μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα θηλώσας πρῶτον εἰμι, &c.

In the Demosthenic or pseudo-Demosthenic Orat. Funebris, c. 8, p. 1397—χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων συνήθεια, τῆς δλης πολιτείας ὑπόθεσις, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 37. οὐδ’ αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων δέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανείᾳ κεκόλυται : compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 8.

³ Thucyd. ii. 37. ελευθέρως δὲ τὰ

τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδεύματων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δι’ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ’ ἡδονὴν τι δρᾷ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δέ, τῇ ὕψει ἀχθεδόνας προστιθέμενοι. Ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσομιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροᾶσαι καὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ’ ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κεῖνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἐγγραφοὶ ὄντες αἰσχύνῃν ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι.

enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments,—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort : we apply no *xenêlasy* to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our own native bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force ; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force ; partly in consequence of our large navy—partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

“ Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law—we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

“ In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated :¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 40. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἔνευ μάλα.

we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasoning about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

“In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece;¹ while viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality: and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from

κίας· πλούτῳ τε ἔργου μάλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγῳ κόμπη χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τινὶ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχίον.

The first strophe of the Chorus in Euripid. *Medea*, 824-841, may be compared with the tenor of this discourse of Periklēs: the praises of Attica are there dwelt upon, as a country too good to receive the guilty *Medea*.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 41. ξυγελών τε λέγω, τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύειν εἶναι, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδῃ καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι.

The abstract word *παιδεύειν*, in place of the concrete *παιδευτρία*, seems to soften the arrogance of the affirmation.

feeble hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior.¹ Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

“Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died²—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her.”

Periklēs pursues, at considerable additional length, the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no farther addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians—is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklēs, as well as in others afterwards—“Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full

¹ Thucyd. ii. 41. μόνη γὰρ τῶν νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείσσων ἐς πείραν ἔρχεται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ' οἷων κακοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατὰ μέμψιν ὥς οὐχ ὑπ' ἄξιων

ἔρχεται.

² Thucyd. ii. 41. περὶ τοιαύτης οὖν πόλεως οἶδε τε γενναίως, δικαιοῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτήν, μαχόμενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, &c.

greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honourable sense of shame in their actions"—¹—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklēs deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta:—it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present, I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Periklēs as negating the supposition, that exorbitant interference of the state with individual liberty was universal among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has present to his mind a com-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 43. τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὅμῳ μεγάλη δόξα εἶναι, ἐνθυμούμενους ὅτι πολλοὶ καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αἰσχυρόμενοι, ἄνδρες αὐτὰ

ἐκτήσαντο, &c.

Αἰσχυρόμενοι: compare Demosthen. Orat. Funebris, c. 7, p. 1396. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ἀλίγων δυναστεῖαι δέος μὲν ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς πολλοῖς, αἰσχυρὴν δ' οὐ παριστᾶσιν.

parison with the extreme narrowness and rigour of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual dissenters in taste and pursuit—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion, or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare everywhere, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of encouragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, individual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbours or of the public. This remarkable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokratês, and it farther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of “democratical licence.” The liberty and diversity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon,¹ Plato, and Aristotle—attached either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some

It is only true partially and in some memorable instances that the state interfered to an exorbitant degree with individual liberty in Greece.

Free play of individual taste and impulse in Athens—importance of this phenomenon in society.

¹ Compare the sentiment of Xenophon, the precise reverse of that which is here laid down by Periklês, extolling the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the laxity of Athenian life (Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 5, 15; iii.

12, 5). It is curious that the sentiment appears in this dialogue as put in the mouth of the younger Periklês (illegitimate son of the great Periklês) in a dialogue with Sokratês.

other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklês depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits—is an ideal, which if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Periklês contrasts with the xenêlasy or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of

Extraordi-
nary and
many-sided
activity of
Athens.

recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty : that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand : lastly an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgement, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher : but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken however as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklês and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenês seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, adverted to with pride by Periklês, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached : at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all—but noway surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Periklês delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, insofar as the sense of great-

ness was concerned : and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Periklēs never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded ; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripidēs had designated it in his tragedy *Medea*,¹ represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus. A picture of Athens in her social glory was well-calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country-residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city.² Such calamities might indeed be foreseen : but there was one still greater calamity, which though actually then impending, could not be foreseen : the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colours and tone of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Periklēs, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper : a contrast, to which Thucydidēs was doubtless not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

¹ Euripidēs, *Medea*, 824. *lepās χό-
pas ἀποθήτρου τ'*, &c.

² The remarks of Dionysius Halikarnassus, tending to show that the number of dead buried on this occasion was so small, and the actions in which they had been slain so insignificant, as to be unworthy of so elaborate an harangue as this of Periklēs—and finding fault with Thucydides on that ground—are by no means well-founded or justifiable. He treats Thucydides like a dramatic writer putting a speech into the mouth of one of his characters, and he considers that the occasion chosen for this speech was unworthy. But though this assumption would be correct with regard to many ancient historians, and to Dionysius himself in his Roman history—it is not correct with reference to Thucydides. The speech of Periklēs was a real speech, heard, reproduced,

and doubtless drest up, by Thucydides : if therefore more is said than the number of the dead or the magnitude of the occasion warranted, this is the fault of Periklēs, and not of Thucydides. Dionysius says that there were many other occasions throughout the war much more worthy of an elaborate funeral harangue—especially the disastrous loss of the Sicilian army. But Thucydides could not have heard any of them, after his exile in the eighth year of the war : and we may well presume that none of them would bear any comparison with this of Periklēs. Nor does Dionysius at all appreciate the full circumstances of this first year of the war—which, when completely felt, will be found to render the splendid and copious harangue of the great statesman eminently seasonable. See Dionys. H. de Thucyd. Judic. p. 849-851.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE
END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN
WAR.

AT the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus. In spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklês and of Archidamus.

430 B.C.
Barren results of the operations during the first year of war.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both the eastern and

Second invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians—more spreading and ruinous than the first.

the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.¹

In regard to this second invasion, Periklēs recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favourable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter²—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of salubrity—and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted

Commence-
ment of the
pestilence or
epidemic at
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 47-55.

² Thucyd. ii. 52; Diodor. xii. 45; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 34. It is to be remarked, that the Athenians, though their persons and moveable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighbouring islands (Thucyd. ii. 14). Hence they escaped

a serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity (see Livy, iii. 66; Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. x. 53; compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. ii. p. 90).

the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.¹

Of this plague—or (more properly) eruptive typhoid fever,² distinct from, yet analogous to, the small-pox—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydides, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations with which that notice is ushered in, deserve particular attention. "In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks

Description of the epidemic by Thucydides—his conception of the duty of exactly observing and recording.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 49. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ἐμολογεῖται, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο ἄρσεν ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐνέτρεχεν ὄν. Hippokratēs, in his description of the epidemic fever at Thasos, makes a similar remark on the absence of all other disorders at the time (Epidem. i. 8, vol. ii. p. 640, ed. Littre).

² "La description de Thucydide (observe M. Littré, in his introduction to the works of Hippokratēs, tom. i. p. 122) est tellement bonne qu'elle suffit pleinement pour nous faire comprendre ce que cette ancienne maladie a été : et il est fort à regretter que des médecins tels qu'Hippocrate et Galien n'aient rien écrit sur les grandes épidémies, dont ils ont été les spectateurs. Hippocrate a été témoin de cette peste racontée par Thucydide, et il ne nous en a pas laissé la description. Galien vit également la fièvre éruptive qui désola le monde sous Marc Aurèle, et qu'il appelle lui-même la longue peste. Cependant excepté quelques mots épars dans ses volumineux ouvrages, excepté quelques indications fugitives, il ne nous a rien transmis sur un événement médical aussi important ; à tel point que si nous n'avions pas le récit de Thucydide, il nous seroit fort difficile de nous faire une idée de celle qu'a vue Galien, et qui

est la même (comme M. Hecker s'est attaché à le démontrer) que la maladie connue sous le nom de Peste d'Athènes. C'était une fièvre éruptive, différente de la variole, et éteinte aujourd'hui. On a cru en voir les traces dans les charbons (ἀνθρακες) des livres Hippocratiques."

Both Krauss (Disquisitio de naturâ morbi Atheniensium, Stuttgart, 1831, p. 38) and Häuser (Historisch-patholog. Untersuchungen, Dresden, 1839, p. 50) assimilate the pathological phenomena specified by Thucydides to different portions of the Ἐπιδημίας of Hippokratēs. M. Littré thinks that the resemblance is not close or precise, so as to admit of the one being identified with the other. "Le tableau si frappant qu'en a tracé ce grand historien ne se reproduit pas certainement avec une netteté suffisante dans les brefs détails donnés par Hippocrate. La maladie d'Athènes avoit un type si tranché, que tous ceux qui en ont parlé ont du le reproduire dans ses parties essentielles." (Argument au 2me Livre des Épidémies, Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. v. p. 64). There appears good reason to believe that the great epidemic which prevailed in the Roman world under Marcus Aurelius (the Pestis Antoniniana) was a renewal of what is called the Plague of Athens.

respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate in addition such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur."¹ To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thucydides mentions in his preface,² as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We may infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics, and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorising from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time. But his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary Hippokratēs, and the other Asklepiads of Kos.³

¹ Thucyd. ii. 48. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἑκαστος γινώσκει, καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ' οὗτος εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτὸν, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας δοτινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἱκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ μεταστῆσαι σχεῖν' ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδόν τε ἐγγίγντο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ ἂν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστα ἂν ἔχῃ τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω, αὐτὸς τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

Demokritus, among others, connected the generation of these epidemics with his general system of atoms, atmospheric effluvia, and εἴδηλα: see Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733; Demokriti Fragment, ed. Mullach, lib. iv. p. 409.

The causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xiii. 58)—unusual

rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the Etesian winds, &c., may perhaps be true of the revival of the epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be true of its first appearance; since Thucydides states that the year in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was evidently brought from foreign parts to Peiræus.

² Thucyd. i. 22.

³ See the words of Thucydides, ii. 49. καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ὄσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὀνομασμέναι εἰσὶν, ἐπῆσαν—which would seem to indicate a familiarity with the medical terminology:—compare also his allusion to the speculations of the physicians, cited in the previous note; and c. 51—τὰ πάσθη δὲ αἰατὴ θεραπευόμενα, &c.

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydides the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished after deplorable agonies on the seventh or on the ninth day. Others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhoea afterwards: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognised their friends. No

Extensive
and terrible
suffering of
Athena.

In proof how rare the conception was in ancient times, of the importance of collecting and registering particular medical facts, I transcribe the following observations from M. Littré (*Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, tom. iv. p. 646, *Remarques Rétrospectives*).

"Toutefois ce qu'il importe ici de constater, ce n'est pas qu'Hippocrate a observé de telle ou telle manière, mais c'est qu'il a eu l'idée de recueillir et de consigner des faits particuliers. En effet, rien, dans l'antiquité, n'a été plus rare que ce soin: outre Hippocrate, je ne connois qu'Erasistrate qui se soit occupé de relater sous cette forme les résultats de son expérience clinique. Ni Galien lui-même, ni Arétée, ni Soranus, ni les autres qui sont arrivés jusqu'à nous, n'ont suivi un aussi louable exemple. Les observations consignées dans la collection Hippocratique constituent la plus grande partie, à beaucoup près, de ce que l'antiquité, a possédée en ce genre: et si, en commentant le travail d'Hippocrate, on l'avoit un peu imité, nous aurions des matériaux à l'aide desquels nous prendrions une idée bien plus précise de la pathologie de ces siècles reculés. . . . Mais tout en exprimant ce regret et en

reconnaissant cette utilité relative à nous autres modernes et véritablement considérable, il faut ajouter que l'antiquité avoit dans les faits et la doctrine Hippocratiques un aliment qui lui a suffi—et qu'une collection, même étendue, d'histoires particulières n'auroit pas alors modifié la médecine, du moins la médecine scientifique, essentiellement et au delà de la limite que comportoit la physiologie. Je pourrai montrer ailleurs que la doctrine d'Hippocrate et de l'école de Cos a été la seule solide, la seule fondée sur un aperçu vrai de la nature organisée; et que les sectes postérieures, méthodisme et pneumatisme, n'ont bâti leurs théories que sur des hypothèses sans consistance. Mais ici je me contente de remarquer, que la pathologie, en tant que science, ne peut marcher qu'à la suite de la physiologie, dont elle n'est qu'une des faces: et d'Hippocrate à Galien inclusivement, la physiologie ne fit pas assez de progrès pour rendre insuffisante la conception Hippocratique. Il en résulte, nécessairement, que la pathologie, toujours considérée comme science, n'auroit pu, par quelque procédé que ce fût, gagner que des corrections et des augmentations de détail."

treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault. While trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing. The charms and incantations,¹ to which the unhappy patient resorted, were not likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the Gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked—and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally ; while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth—"The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it."² Under the distress which suggested, and was reciprocally aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

¹ Compare the story of Thalêtas appeasing an epidemic at Sparta by his music and song (Plutarch, *De Musicâ*, p. 1146).

Some of the ancient physicians were firm believers in the efficacy of these charms and incantations. Alexander of Tralles says that having originally treated them with contempt, he had convinced himself of their value by personal observation, and altered his opinion (ix. 4)—ἐνιοι γοῦν οἴονται τοῖς τῶν γραῶν μύθοις δοικέναι τὰς ἐπιδὰς, ὥσπερ καὶ γὰρ μέχρι πολλοῦ τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ πρὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινόμενων ἐπέλσθην εἶναι δύναμιν ἐν αὐταῖς. See an interesting and valuable dissertation, *Origines Contagii*, by Dr. C. F. Marx (Stuttgart, 1824, p. 129).

The suffering Hēraklēs, in his agony under the poisoned tunic, invokes the δαιδὸς along with the χειροτέχνης ἱατροῦ (Sophoklēs, *Trachin.* 1005).

² Thucyd. ii. 54.

θάσσοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλα ζῆσθαι—
ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς αὐτῷ.

See also the first among the epistles

ascribed to the orator Æschinēs respecting a λοιμὸς in Delos.

It appears that there was a debate whether, in this Hexameter verse, λιμὸς (famine) or λοιμὸς (pestilence) was the correct reading : and the probability is, that it had been originally composed with the word λοιμὸς—for men might well fancy beforehand that *famine* would be a sequel of the Dorian war, but they would not be likely to imagine *pestilence* as accompanying it. Yet (says Thucydides) the reading λοιμὸς was held decidedly preferable, as best fitting to the actual circumstances (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἐπασχον τὴν μῆτιν ἐποιοῦντο). And "if (he goes on to say) there should ever hereafter come another Dorian war, and famine along with it, the oracle will probably be reproduced with the word λιμὸς as part of it."

This deserves notice, as illustrating the sort of admitted licence with which men twisted the oracles or prophecies, so as to hit the feelings of the actual moment.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservatives. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, “like sheep,” from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.¹ The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice; and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention²—that the dead and the dying lay piled one

Inefficacy of remedies—despair and demoralisation of the Athenians.

¹ Compare Diodor. xiv. 70, who mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, xxv. 26, respecting the epidemic at

Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcellus and the Romans.

² Thucyd. ii. 52. Οικίων γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσών, ἀλλ’ ἐν καλύβαις πυριγυραῖς ἄρα ἔτους διαττωμένων, ὁ φθόρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ’ ἀλλή-

upon another not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst—that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed, were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect were burnt or buried¹ without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also ;² or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair—was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life, and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations, in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval, short and sweet, before their doom was realised—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy ; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such

Lawless
recklessness
of conduct
engendered.

λοῖς ἀποθνήσκοντες ἕκειντο, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλινδούντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιθνήτες, τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμία. Τὰ τε ἱερὰ ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο, νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθησκόντων ὑπερβίαζόμενον γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅ, τι γένηνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίαν ἐτρέποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 50 : compare Livy, xli. 21, describing the epidemic at Rome in 174 B.C. "Cadavera, intacta à canibus et vulturibus, tabes absumebat : satisque

constabat, nec illo, nec priore anno in tantâ strage boum hominumque vulturium usquam visum."

² Thucyd. ii. 52. From the language of Thucydides, we see that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 3, p. 651).

positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honour or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralisation, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydides,¹ who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.²

Great loss of life among the citizens—blow to the power of Athens.

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of 1200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 300 died of the epidemic; besides 4400 hoplites out of the roll formally kept, and a number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation.³ No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the

¹ The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated and expanded from Thucydides—that of the plague at Florence in 1348, with which the Decameron of Boccaccio opens—and that of Defoe in his History of the Plague in London—are all well-known.

² “Carthaginienses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum

vitâ Dii rogari maximè solent” (Justin, xviii. 6).

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, see the interesting novel of Manzoni—Promessi Sposi—and the historical work of the same author—Storia della Colonna Infame.

³ Thucyd. iii. 87. τοῦ δὲ ἅλλου ἔχλου ἀνεξέυρετος ἀριθμός. Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii. 58) free-men and slaves together, which must be greatly beneath the reality.

more in their favour, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.¹ The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.²

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklês equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transport, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city, was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled

Athenian
armament
sent first
against Pello-
ponnesus,
next against
Potidæa—it
is attacked
and ruined
by the epi-
demic.

all its efforts. Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making an unavailing attempt upon the city: next they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermionê; and lastly attacked and captured

Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4000 hoplites under Agnon, no less than 1050 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought

¹ Thucyd. ii. 54. τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρώπιστα. He does not specify what places these were:—perhaps Chios, but hardly Lesbos, other-

wise the fact would have been noticed when the revolt of that island occurs.

² Thucyd. ii. 57.

back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left as before to the slow course of blockade.¹

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklēs found his countrymen almost distracted² with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory (except the Marathonian³ Tetrapolis and Dekeleia—districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy) during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death,⁴ sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree. They vented their feelings against Periklēs as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Periklēs, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively manifested.

In his capacity of Stratēgus or General, Periklēs convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydidēs; but that of Periklēs himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and

¹ Thucyd. ii. 56-58.

² Thucyd. ii. 59. ἡλλοίωντο τὰς γνώμας.

³ Diodor. xii. 45; Ister ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. 689; Herodot. ix.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 65. 'Ο μὲν δῆμος, διὰ τὸ ἐλασσόνων ὀρμώμενος, ἐστέφητο καὶ τούτων οἱ δὲ δυνατοί, καλὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χάραν οἰκοδομίαις τε καὶ πολυτελείαις κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεκότες.

the impress of actual circumstances—an impregnable mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen,¹ while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness: and he now addressed them not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). “Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgement, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity²—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged—but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the

Athenian public assembly—last speech of Periklēs—his high tone of self-esteem against the public discontent.

¹ Thucyd. i. 140.

² Thucyd. ii. 60. *καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιοῦτον εἶναι γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων.*

sorrows which have fallen upon you : yet inhabiting as ye do a great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression—that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea¹—one half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering : and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy ; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honour and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained : moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so ; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them : still less on account of this unforeseen distemper : I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune : her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen : and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred

¹ Thucyd. ii. 62. δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τόδε, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε ὅτ' αὐτοὶ πάποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περί ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν, ὅτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις οὐδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους

ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑάrawn. Οἴεσθε μὲν γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων μόνον ἀρχειν—ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνομαι δύο μέρων τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανεῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάττης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παρὰ τοὺς κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ' ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε, καὶ ἣν ἐπιπλέον βουλῇθητε.

which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress."¹

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce—together with the age and character of Periklēs—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when in the Pnyx and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklēs, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors.²

Powerful effect of his address—new resolution shown for continuing the war—nevertheless, the discontent against Periklēs still continues.

He is accused and condemned in a fine.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 60-64. I give a general summary of this memorable speech, without setting forth its full contents, still less the exact words.

² Thucyd. ii. 65; Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 515, c. 71; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 35; Diodor. xii. c. 38-45. About Simmias, as the vehement enemy of Periklēs, see Plutarch, *Reipub. Ger. Præcept.* p. 805.

Plutarch and Diodorus both state that Periklēs was not only fined, but also removed from his office of *Stratēgus*. Thucydides mentions the fine, but not the removal; and his silence leads me to doubt the reality of the latter event altogether. For with such a man as Periklēs, a vote of removal would have been a penalty more marked and cutting

The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. The event however disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favour, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklēs as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.¹

But that life, long, honourable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklēs was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering—he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this

Old age of Periklēs—his family misfortunes—and suffering.

than a fine: moreover, removal from office, though capable of being pronounced by vote of the public assembly, would hardly be inflicted as penalty by the dikastery.

I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The Stratēgi, with most other officers of the Commonwealth, were changed or re-elected at the beginning of Hekatombæon, the first month of the Attic year; that is, somewhere about Midsummer. Now the Peloponnesian army, invading Attica about the end of March or beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the country about the first week in May. Periklēs returned from his expedition against Peloponnesus shortly after they left Attica; that is, about the middle of May (Thucyd. ii. 57): there still remained therefore a month or six weeks before his office of Stratēgus naturally expired, and required renewal.

It was during this interval (which Thucydides expresses by the words *ἐν τῷ ἐσπαρτίῳ*, ii. 59) that he convoked the assembly and delivered the harangue recently mentioned.

But when the time for a new election of Stratēgi arrived, the enemies of Periklēs opposed his re-election, and brought a charge against him in that trial of accountability to which every magistrate at Athens was exposed, after his period of office. They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference to the public money—and the dikastery visited him with a fine. His re-election was thus prevented, and with a man who had been so often re-elected, this might be loosely called "taking away the office of general"—so that the language of Plutarch and Diodorus, as well as the silence of Thucydides, would on this supposition be justified.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65.

train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.¹

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiadēs and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election to the office of Stratēgus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps indeed the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law²—in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Periklēs singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Periklēs, one branch of the great Alkmæonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune pain-

He is re-elected Stratēgus—restored to power and to the confidence of the people.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 36.
² See Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 27, about the manner of bringing about such an evasion of a fine: compare also

the letter of M. Boeckh, in Meineke, Fragment. Comic. Græcor. ad Fragment. Eupolid. ii. 527.

fully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their post-humous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Periklēs to legitimise, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.¹

It was thus that Periklēs was reinstated in his post of Stratēgus as well as in his ascendancy over the public counsels—seemingly about August or September—Last moments and death of Periklēs. 430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever,² which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Periklēs replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking—"What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune—and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine."³

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or His life and character. hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 37.

² Plutarch (Perik. c. 38) treats the slow disorder under which he suffered as one of the forms of the epidemic: but

this can hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of the latter, as described by Thucydides.

³ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 38.

parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other :¹ Telekleidês, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanês, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Heraklês and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience : while Plato the philosopher,² who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy—"his majestic intelligence"—in language not less decisive than Thucydidês. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted : throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklês towards opponents was always mild and liberal.³ The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him,⁴ contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon—though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydidês will at once recognise in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favour.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4, 8, 13, 16 ; Eupolis. *Δῆμοι*, *Fragm.* vi. p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (*De Orator.* iii. 34 ; Brutus, 9-11) and Quintilian (ii. 16, 19 ; x. 1, 82) count only as witnesses at second-hand.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, c. 71, p. 516 ; *Phædrus*, c. 54, p. 270. *Περικλέα, τὸν οὐτῶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς σοφὸν ἔνδρα*. Plato, *Meno*. p. 94 B.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10-39.

⁴ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 5.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. “He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch’s words¹) and shaped his administration for their immediate favour, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill.”

Now the charge here made against Periklēs, and supported by allegations in themselves honourable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydidēs in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Periklēs with his successors in the express circumstance that *they* did so, while *he* did not. The language of the contemporary historian² well deserves to be cited—“Periklēs, powerful from dignity of character as

Judgement
of Thucy-
didēs re-
specting
Periklēs.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11. Διὸ καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνείλς ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν—ἀεὶ μὴν τινα θέαν πανηγυρικὴν ἢ ἐστίασιν ἢ πομπὴν εἶναι μηχανώμενος ἐν ὅσῃ, καὶ διαπαύωντων οὐκ ἀμοιβοῖσι ἡδοναῖς τὴν πόλιν—ἐξήκουτα δὲ τριήρεις καθ’ ἑκαστον ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπλεον ὀκτώ μηνάς ἐμμισθοί, μελετῶντες ἅμα καὶ μαθάνοντες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

Compare c. 9, where Plutarch says that Periklēs, having no other means of contending against the abundant private largesses of his rival Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence; acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend Demonidēs, according to the statement of Aristotle.

² Thucyd. ii. 65. Ἐκείνος μὲν (Περικλῆς) δυνατὸς ὦν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνῶμῃ, χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωροτάτος γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὅπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἦγε,

διὰ τὸ μὴ κτῶμενος ἐξ οὗ προσηκόντων τὴν δύναμιν πρὸς ἡδονὴν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ’ ἔχων ἐπ’ ἀξιώσει καὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν τι ἀντειπεῖν. Ὅποτε γοῦν αἰσθητοῦ τι αὐτοῦ παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσύνοντας, λέγων κατέπλησσαν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ δεδιδότας αὐτὸν ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν. Ἐγγίγντο δὲ λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. Οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου ἑκαστος γίγνεσθαι, ἐτράποντο καθ’ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι. Ἐξ ὧν, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὥς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς ὅς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνῶμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3.

Ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα, as used by Thucydides, seem to differ in this respect: Ἀξίωσις signifies, a man’s dignity, or pretensions to esteem and influence, as felt and measured by himself; *his sense of dignity*; Ἀξίωμα means his *dignity*, properly so called; as felt and appreciated by others. See i. 37, 41, 69.

well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favour, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down : when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence : so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favour of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition," &c.

Earlier and later political life of Periklès—how far the one differed from the other.

It will be seen that the judgement here quoted from Thucydides contradicts, in an unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Periklès of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities—self-judgement, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Periklès began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power ; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgement of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well-founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exer-

cised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydides exclusively to the later life of Periklēs, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Periklēs. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Periklēs and his political ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the Ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the Diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking it as it then stood, &c.—did not appear to Thucydides mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Periklēs.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Periklēs was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterwards belonged to him (Ephialtēs in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Periklēs, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination)—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Periklēs was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Periklēs on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is eminently favourable. He represents the presidency

Accusation
against
Periklēs of
having cor-
rupted the
Athenian
people—un-
true, and not
believed by
Thucydides.

of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Periklēs (which Thucydides, since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman), we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Periklēs, of Athens “as the schoolmistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce not less than of public citizenship and soldiership,—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Periklēs, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgement of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Periklēs of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city,—yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honour. It cannot be shown of Periklēs that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy—assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat

of the Athenian Tolmidês at Korôneia in Bœotia would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Periklês is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularised, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgement, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Periklês found it and as he left it, is unquestionably, the pacific and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil,—extension of Athenian trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Phormio)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural,—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklês, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Periklês in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh,¹ that Periklês sacri-

Great progress and improvement of the Athenians under Periklês.

¹ Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, 169-200), has collected and inserted a list of various characters of Periklês, from twenty different authors, English, Kutzen, in the second Beilage to his treatise, Periklês als Staatsmann (p. French, and German. That of Wach-

ficed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh therefore depends upon the question, how far Periklēs contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydidēs, we shall see that, in the judgement of that historian, not only Periklēs did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. Moreover we shall see, that the calculations on which Periklēs grounded his hopes of success if driven to war, were (in the opinion of the historian) perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Periklēs during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation" (to use the words of Thucydidēs¹) dictated chiefly by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war. If in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidæa, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta—we must recollect that these were demands essentially insincere, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without ensuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydidēs, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors in speaking of Periklēs are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Periklēs did not bring on, and could not

muth is the best of the collection—though even he appears to think that Periklēs is to blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but himself could work well.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. μετρίως ἐξηγεῖτο. i. 144. δίκας δὲ δτι θόβλομεν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνοήκας, πολέμου δὲ οὐκ ἀρξόμεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀμυνόμεθα.

have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These proprietors might indeed be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Periklēs seriously to amend; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.¹ We hear that he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;² but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they as well as Athens and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall

¹ Herodotus (i. 170) mentions that previous to the conquest of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Croesus, Thalēs had advised them to consolidate themselves all into one single city-government at Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere demes or constituent,

fractional, municipalities—*τὰς δὲ ἅλλας πόλεις οἰκεσμέναις μηδὲν ἦσαν νομίζεσθαι κατὰ πρὶν εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν*. It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his unqualified commendation on this idea.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 17.

find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes, with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island; and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilochian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Ambrakia; which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phormio and restored to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavoured to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire.¹ This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus (now inhabited by the Messenians) as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf.² We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbour of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce³—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number

Operations of war languid under the pressure of the epidemic. Attack of the Ambrakiots on the Amphilochian Argos; the Athenian Phormio is sent with a squadron to Naupaktus.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 68.

² Thucyd. ii. 69.

³ Thucyd. iii. 51.

of prisoners, were thus captured.¹ Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians,—even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians,—were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity. But to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns; so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence.²

Injury done to Athenian commerce by Peloponnesian privateers. The Lacedæmonians put to death all their prisoners taken at sea, even neutrals.

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the south-western coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phasêlis and Phœnicia to Athens; to protect which the Athenians despatched in the course of the autumn a squadron of six triremes under Melêsander. He was farther directed to ensure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.³

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great

Lacedæmonian envoys seized in their way to Persia and put to death by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 67-69; Herodot. vii. 137. Respecting the Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare Thucyd. v. 115; compare also Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 29.

² Thucyd. ii. 67. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι σπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὐδ' ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἐνυμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλείοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. Πάντας γὰρ δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, θύσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ, ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων ξυμ-

πολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μὴδὲ μὲθ' ἑτέρων.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas slew all the prisoners taken on board merchantmen, off the coast of Ionia, in the ensuing year (Thucyd. iii. 32). Even this was considered extremely rigorous, and excited strong remonstrance; yet the mariners slain were not neutrals, but belonged to the subject-allies of Athens; moreover Alkidas was in his flight, and obliged to make choice between killing his prisoners, or setting them free. ³ Thucyd. ii. 69.

King aids of money and troops against Athens ; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the *Ægean*. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont. Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa. On being refused, they lastly applied to him for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniadês, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkês, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 67. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. iii. ch. 20, p. 129) says that "the envoys were sacrificed chiefly to give a decent colour to the baseness" of killing Aristeus, from whom the Athenians feared subsequent evil, in consequence of his ability and active spirit. I do not think this is fairly contained in the words of Thucydides. He puts in the foreground of Athenian motive, doubtless, fear from the future energy of Aristeus ; but if that had been the only motive, the Athenians would probably have slain him singly without the rest : they would hardly think it necessary to provide themselves with "any decent colour" in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydides names the special

feeling of the Athenians against Aristeus (in my judgement), chiefly in order to explain the extreme haste of the Athenian sentence of execution—*αὐθιγέρον—ἀκρίτως*, &c. : they were under the influence of combined motives—fear, revenge, retaliation.

The envoys here slain were sons of Sperthiês and Bulis, former Spartan heralds who had gone up to Xerxes at Susa to offer their heads as atonement for the previous conduct of the Spartans in killing the heralds of Darius. Xerxes dismissed them unhurt,—so that the anger of Talthybius (the heroic progenitor of the family of heralds at Sparta) remained still unsatisfied : it was only satisfied by the death of their

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine to such a degree, that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon son of Euripidēs and his two colleagues, admitted them to favourable terms of capitulation—allowing the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighbourhood. These terms were singularly favourable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 2000 talents; since the assailant force had never been lower than 3000 hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmas *per diem*. The Athenians

B.C. 429,
January.
Surrender of
Potidæa—
indulgent
capitulation
granted by
the Athenian
generals.

two sons now slain by the Athenians. The fact that the two persons now slain were sons of those two (Sperthiēs and Bulis) who had previously gone to Susa to tender their lives,—is spoken of as a "romantic and tragical coincidence." But there surely is very little to wonder at. The functions of herald at Sparta were the privilege of a particular gens or family: every herald therefore was *ex officio* the son of a herald. Now when the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning of this Peloponnesian war, were looking out for two members of the Heraldic Gens to send up to Susa, upon whom would they so naturally fix as upon the sons of those two men who had been to Susa before? These sons had doubtless heard their fathers talk a great deal about it—probably with interest and satisfaction, since they derived great glory from the unaccepted offer of their lives in atonement. There

was a particular reason why these two men should be taken, in preference to any other heralds, to fulfil this dangerous mission: and doubtless when they perished in it, the religious imagination of the Lacedæmonians would group all the series of events as consummation of the judgement inflicted by Talthybius in his anger (Herodot. vii. 135—*ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι*).

It appears that Anēristus, the herald here slain, had distinguished himself personally in that capture of fishermen on the coast of Peloponnesus by the Lacedæmonians, for which the Athenians were now retaliating (Herodot. vii. 137). Though this passage of Herodotus is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it is the natural one—and clearer (in my judgement) than that which O. Müller would propose instead of it (Dorians, ii. p. 437).

at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good by selling the prisoners as slaves—and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.¹ A body of 1000 colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.²

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thebans on Plataea.

B.C. 429.

Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace (contrary to the advice of Periklês) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there—but still more, by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory, than the Plataean heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms:—"Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your

Third year
of the war—
king Archi-
damus
marches to
the invasion
of Attica.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 70; iii. 17. However, the displeasure of the Athenians against the commanders cannot have been very

serious, since Xenophon was appointed to command against the Chalkidians in the ensuing year. ² Diodor. xii. 46.

fathers, in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius in the market-place of Plataea; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plataeans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valour and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies the Thebans to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Plataean territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed."¹

Remonstrance of the Plataeans to Archidamus—his reply—he summons Plataea in vain.

Whereunto Archidamus replied—"Ye speak fairly, men of Plataea, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied."

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned; that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Plataeans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71, 72.

neutral. At what time this took place,¹ we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harboured at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—"Well then—hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received—in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."²

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiescé. They obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Plataea bearing the following answer—"Men of Plataea, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians.

The Platæans resolve to stand out and defy the Lacedæmonian force.

¹ This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on occasion of the slaughter of the Platæan prisoners (iii. 68); διότι τόν τε ἄλλον χρόνον ἤξιουν δεῖσθαι, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 73, 74.

Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Plataea counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Plataeans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. Invocation and excuse of Archidamus on hearing the refusal of the Plataeans. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations,—apparently with very sincere reluctance, attested in the following invocation emphatically pronounced:—

“Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Plataean territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully—not until these Plataeans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks to fight in: nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—may those who are aiming to inflict penalty righteously, obtain their object.”

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavoured to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate,¹ so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Plataean people, but only to the Plataean territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing antipathy

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71-75.

of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise ; for the conquest of Plataea was of no avail towards the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a resolute garrison of 400 native citizens, with eighty Athenians.¹ There was no one else in the town, except 110 female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to enclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labour at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose ; and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Plataeans were not idle on their side : they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall, so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound ; sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighbouring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the wood-work against fire-carrying arrows.² And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Plataeans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound ; which then fell in at

Commence-
ment of the
siege of
Plataea.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 68.

² Thucyd. ii. 75.

the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled weeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and thus carried away unseen its earthly foundation ; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Platæans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed ; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Platæans against the mound ; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defence were

Operations of attack and defence—the besiegers make no progress, and are obliged to resort to blockade.

used. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways ; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft : so that at the proper moment when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak.¹ However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the

¹ The various expedients, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are noticed and discussed in the *Æneas Poliorhetic.* c. 33, *seq.*

process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.¹

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly-built crescent wall—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favourable. There was indeed a further story of an opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydidēs does not seem to credit.² In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.³ Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were moreover two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside towards Platæa, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent

Wall of circumvallation built round Platæa—the place completely beleaguered and a force left to maintain the blockade.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 76.

² Thucyd. ii. 77.

³ Thucyd. ii. 78. *καὶ ἐπειδὴ τῶν ἡμερῶν γαστο περὶ Ἀρκτοῦρου ἐπιτολὰς, &c.*, at the period of the year when the star Arcturus rises immediately before sunrise—that is, some time between the 12th and 17th of September: see Göller's note on the passage. Thucydidēs does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate the various periods of the year, as we find here done. The Greek months were all lunar months, or

nominally so: the names of months, as well as the practice of intercalation to rectify the calendar, varied from city to city; so that if Thucydidēs had specified the day of the Attic month Boëdromion (instead of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly understood him. Hippokratēs also, in indications of time for medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other stars.

quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.¹

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataea, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of 2000 hoplites and 200 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripidês (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless to convoy and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the deserted site of Potidæa. Moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartôlus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligences within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the

Athenian
armament
sent to
Potidæa and
Chalkidic
Thrace—it
is defeated
and returns.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 78; iii. 21. From this description of the double wall and covered quarters provided for what was foreknown as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the Athenian

troops (who probably had no double wall) in the two years' blockade of Potidæa—and their readiness to grant an easy capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above.

retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force, together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonour to Athens.¹

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Ambrakiots, exasperated by their repulse from the Amphilochian Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence: so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus (Zante), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbours and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with 1000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen

Operations on the coast of Akarnania.—Joint attack upon Akarnania, by land and sea, concerted between the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians.

Assemblage of the Ambrakiots, Peloponnesians, and Epirotic allies—divisions of Epirots.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 79.

from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and Atintānes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Parauæi, from the banks of the river Aôus, under their king Orœdus, together with 1000 Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however arrived too late to be of any use.¹ This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phenomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knêmus, finding the land-force united and ready near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Limnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilo-
They march to attack the Akarnanian town of Stratus.
 chian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre—the Leukadians

¹ Thucyd. ii. 80.

and Anaktorians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept proper scouts on the look out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory

Rashness of
the Epirots
—defeat and
repulse of
the army.

would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit—the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knêmus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were pre-eminently skilful. Knêmus did not choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well-aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Æniadæ (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought

shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.¹

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to co-operate with Knêmus off the coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board, and with accompanying store-vessels—it departed from the harbour of Corinth, and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat—and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.²

The Peloponnesian fleet comes from Corinth to Akarnania—movements of the Athenian Phormio to oppose it.

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially—the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority—but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarised his men with the conviction that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success.³ Accordingly the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian

¹ Thucyd. ii. 83; Diodor. xii. 48.

² Thucyd. ii. 83. οὐχ ὥς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Knêmus, c. 87. The unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84).

³ Thucyd. ii. 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε (Phormio) καὶ προπαρασκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὥς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσούτων, ἣν ἐπιπλέρ, ὅ, τι οὐχ ὀνομενετόν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀξίωσιν ταύτην εἰλήφεσαν,

μηδὲνα ὄχλον Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὀποχωρεῖν.

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen—so strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratês, Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 30.

squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their progress until they should get out of the Corinthian Gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the north-west in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus; and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by the incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the Gulf, where it was near the strait and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them. And if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea. But he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in mid-channel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning.¹ On seeing his approach, the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντι-
παρπλέοντας τε ἑώραν αὐτοὺς (that is,
when the Corinthians saw the Athenian
ships) παρὰ γῆν σφῶν κοιζομένων, καὶ
ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαΐας πρὸς τὴν ἀντιέ-
ρας ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνα-
νίας κατείδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς
Χάλκιδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσ-
πλέοντας σφίσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον
νυκτὸς ὑφορμισσάμενοι, οὕτω δὲ
ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν
πορθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισσάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as if the nominative case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the natural structure

of the sentence, as well as the probabilities of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast, however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold (whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Göller) says, "The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the opposite shores of the Corinthian Gulf. But even when they had sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still so near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians as to the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them either to stop

Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward—like the spokes of a wheel. The circle

too soon, or to advance too far, that they might not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept them when they should endeavour to run across to Acarnania. But the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding farther to the westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half way across, before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy."

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched from thence across the Gulf to the mouth of the Euenus—the natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation—going in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας). While they were thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them; and as they wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive Phormio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they "slipped anchor and put to sea during the night" (as Mr. Bloomfield says), in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favour of darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel *very little after day-break* (we learn this from what Thucydides says about the gulf-breeze; for which Phormio waited before he would commence his attack—*ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εἰδότες γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ νύκτι*). If Phormio had returned to Chal-

kis, they would probably have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain determined not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately after day broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydides together, we may be convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But of the precise sense of *ὑπορριμώμενοι*, I confess I do not feel certain: Haack says it means "clam appellere ad littus," but here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in Patræ—which is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a bend to the south-west (forming the Gulf of Patras), so that the distance from the northern (or Ætolian and Akarnanian) side of the Gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a battle. But *ὑπορριμώμενοι* may reasonably be supposed to mean (especially in conjunction with *ὅκ' ἔλαθον*) "taking up a simulated or imperfect night-station," in which they did not really intend to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and with ease. The preposition *ὑπὸ* in composition would thus have the sense not of *secrecy* (*clam*), but of *sham performance*, or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of making a false impression (like *ὑποφέρειν*, Xenoph. Hell. iv. 72). Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally *ὑπορριμώμενοι*, meaning "that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:" I place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians *did actually* slip their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took place *κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν*. Now we need not under-

was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the manœuvre of the diekplus,¹ and the interior space was sufficient not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen triremes, who were kept as a reserve to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailers, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows. Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favourable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the

Naval battle
between
Phormio and
the Pelopon-
nesian fleet
—his com-
plete victory.


stand this expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the strait, strictly and precisely; that is the line of seven stadia between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it to mean a portion of sea not far westward of the strait, where the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself, is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward from Patræ. We cannot understand *πορθμός* (as Mr. Bloomfield and Poppo do—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean *trajectus* simply—that is to say, the passage across even the widest portion of the Gulf of Patras: nor does the passage cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. *Πορθμός* in Thucydides means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo himself admits that Thucydides always uses it so: nor would it be reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across the Gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of

the Euenus, a *πορθμός*. See the note of Göller on this point.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 86. *μη διδόντες διέκπλουν*. The great object of the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against some weak part of the adversary's ship; the stern, the side, or the oars—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as well for defence as for offence. The Athenian therefore, rowing through the intervals of the adversary's line, and thus getting in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was called the *diekplus*. The success of it of course depended upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary, not only in the better construction of the ship, but the excellence of rowers and steersmen.

PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE ATHENIAN FLEET (UNDER PHORMIO) AND THE PELOPONNESIAN FLEET.

DESCRIBED IN THUCYDIDES II. 90, 92.



A. First station of Phormio and the Athenian Fleet.

B. First station of the Peloponnesian Fleet.

C. Position of the Athenian Fleet in course towards Naupaktus at the moment before the battle.

D. Position of the Peloponnesian Fleet at the moment before the battle (in apparent course towards Naupaktus).

steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way ; and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or became entangled with the store-vessels : so that in every ship the men on board were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbours on each side with poles—not without loud clamour and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the *keleustês* animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost command over their vessels.¹ The critical

¹ See Dr. Arnold's note upon this passage of Thucydides, respecting the *Keleustês* and his functions : to the passages which he indicates as reference, I will add two more of Plautus, *Mercat.* iv. 2, 5, and *Asinaria*, iii. 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trireme, we shall at once see, first, how essential the *keleustês* was, to keep the rowers in harmonious action—next, how immense the difference must have been between practised and unpractised rowers. The trireme had, in all, 170 rowers, distributed into three tiers. The upper tier, called *Thranitæ*, were sixty-two in number, or thirty-one on each side : the middle tier, or *Zygitæ*, as well as the lowest tier, or *Thalamitæ*, were each fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (*κάραι περιεῖναι*), to be used by the *epibatæ*, or soldiers serving on board, in case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it ; but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact perpendicular line above the lower. Of course the oars of the *thranitæ*, or uppermost tier, were the longest : those of the *thalamitæ*, or lowest tier, the shortest : those of the *zygitæ*, of a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The *thranitæ*, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and most highly paid. What the length of

the oars was, belonging to either tier, we do not know ; but some of the supplementary oars appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and from the instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by M. Boeckh, *See-wesen der Athener*, ch. ix. p. 94, 104, 115. But there is a great deal still respecting the equipment of an ancient trireme unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the *keleustês* to keep these 170 rowers all to good time with their strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this must have been no easy matter ; and apparently quite impossible, unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference between those who were so trained and those who were not, must have been immense. (Compare Xenophon, *Economic.* viii. 8.) We may imagine the difference between the ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of the latter in contending with the swell of the sea—when we read this description of the ancient trireme.

About 200 men, that is to say, 170 rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly *epibatæ* or *hoplites* serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship's bow, the *keleustês*, &c., probably some half-dozen officers—formed the crew of a trireme : compare Herodot. viii. 17 ; vii. 184—where he calculates the thirty *epibatæ* over and

moment was now come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes—carried away almost the entire crews—and sailed off with them to Molykreium or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.¹

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details—the repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of co-operation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of.

Reflections upon these two defeats of the Peloponnesians.

above the 200. Dr. Arnold thinks that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the epibatæ on board an Athenian trireme were no more than ten; but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd. iii. 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by about the same number of men. "Les galères Vén-

tiennes du convoi de Flandre devaient être montées par deux cents hommes libres, dont 180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent prescrits en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées" (Depping, Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe, vol. i. p. 163).

¹ Thucyd. ii. 84.

the Athenians over their opponents ; a superiority, indeed, noway inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians under Peter the Great learnt the art of war from the Swedes under Charles XII.—while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse ; and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians.

They had heard indeed of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant ; so that they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kyllênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonour.

Indignation of the Lacedæmonians at the late naval defeat : they collect a larger fleet under Knêmus to act against Phormio.

Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. By this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbour of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet.

Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him. Yet they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town

of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favour to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia ; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfil it : nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away.¹ This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen,² was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy—seventy-seven triremes with a large force on land to back them : the latter no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium as it was called—the northern headland, opposite to the other headland also called Rhium, on the coast of Achaia. The line between these two capes, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring ; while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.³ If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of

Inferior
numbers of
Phormio—
his ma-
nœuvring.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 85.

² Thucyd. i. 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἣν ἐθέλητε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολέμοις, καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ

προστίθεσθαι· μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφύβημαι τὰς οἰκέας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.

³ Thucyd. ii. 86-89 ; compare vii. 36-49.

manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Phormio trying to entice the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.¹ To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance prevailing among their seamen—many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat—that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favourable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honour, the laggards would assuredly be punished:² a topic rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous commands of Sparta. To such reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially

The Peloponnesian fleet forces Phormio to a battle on the line of coast near Naupaktus. Dispositions and harangues on both sides.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 86.

² Thucyd. ii. 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν ἡμῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδύσομεν

πρόφασιν οὐδενὶ κακῷ γενέσθαι· ἦν δέ τις ἄρα καὶ βουληθῇ, κολασθήσεται τῇ πρεπούσῃ ζημίᾳ, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμῆσονται τοῖς προσήκουσιν ἀθλοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle¹—useful in all matters of war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly fronting the breadth of it—opposite to Phormio, who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the Inner Gulf. The right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês, was in the van, according to its natural position,² and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,³ was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line

¹ Thucyd. ii. 89. Καὶ ἐν τῇ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστον ἡγεῖσθε, ὅ ἐς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν ὑμφέρει, καὶ ναυμαχία οὐχ ἥκιστα, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ in his Grammar (sect. 584) states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means

"four deep," and cites this passage of Thucydides as an instance of it. But the words certainly mean here *four abreast*; though it is to be recollected that a column four abreast, when formed into line, becomes four deep.

³ Thucyd. iii. 102.

of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land toward Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point—the Athenian close along shore—the Peloponnesian somewhat farther off.¹ The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,² before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.³

¹ In reference to the description of this movement, see the Appendix to the present chapter, with the Plan annexed.

² Thucyd. ii. 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in the words of the historian—*τῶν δὲ ἑνδεκά μιν αἰπερ ἤγουντο ὅπερ κφεύγουσι τὸ κέρας τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφήν, εἰ τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν.*

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, and the reflections of the historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36).

³ Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv. 14).

The Peloponnesian fleet at first successful, but afterwards defeated.

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbour of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant-vessel, at the entrance of the harbour of Naupaktus. The Athenian captain in his flight observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her, amidships, with an impact so violent as to disable her at once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timokratês, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbour. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbour were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy; whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on the right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Panormus.¹ Not only did the eleven

¹ Thucyd. ii. 92. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and | drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the right or pursuing

Athenian ships thus break, terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited—and farther so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf to Corinth; all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Presently the reinforcement arrived, after that untoward detention which had well nigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400 Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile,

Retirement of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet. Phormio is reinforced—his operations in Akarnania—he returns to Athens.

wing—but also the left and centre. Otherwise they would not have been able to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle. Thucydides indeed does not expressly mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume that they partially did

so, probably careless of much order, as being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. They were probably therefore thrown into confusion without much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten and driven back upon them—even though the victorious Athenian triremes were no more than eleven in number.

while a chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was to besiege and take the powerful town of Cœniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But as the great spread of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.¹

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbour. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man carrying his seat-cloth,² and his oar, together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side and thus prevented from slipping.

There lay forty triremes in Nisæa the harbour of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for

¹ Thucyd. ii. 102, 103.

² Thucyd. ii. 93. ἔδωκε δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τὴν κάπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν τροπῶτήρα, &c. On these words there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop's published in the Appendix to Dr. Arnold's Thucydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon τροπῶτήρ. Whether the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch on the gunwale, or by a perforation in the ship's side, there must in both cases have been required (since it seems to

have had nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a *nut*) a thong to prevent it from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of the Thranitæ or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an elevation (comparatively speaking) above the water. Dr. Arnold's explanation of τροπῶτήρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that the explanation of the purpose of the ὑπηρέσιον, given by the Scholiast, is not the true one.

so short a trip; and the seamen, immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. Yet such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbour of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war.¹ Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity by the Lacedæmonian captain Teleutias.²

As, during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians—so during the autumn the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from the powerful barbaric prince before mentioned, Sitalkês king of the Odrysian Thracians.

Alliance of the Athenians with the Odrysian king Sitalkês.

Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odry-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 94.

² Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19.

sian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue¹ and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra or the mouth of the Nestus in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axios and the Strymon.² Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes (under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. Even Grecian cities, not in Thrace, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.³ The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days' journey inland from Byzantium,⁴ in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and north-east of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince

¹ Thucyd. ii. 29, 95, 96.

² Thucyd. ii. 99.

³ See Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 3, 16;

4. 2. Diodorus (xii. 50) gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than 1000 talents annually. This sum is not materially different from that which Thucydides states to be the annual receipt of

Seuthês successor of Sitalkês—revenue properly so called, and presents, both taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king Mêdokus (Xenophon, *ut supra*).

⁴ Xenoph. *Anab.* l. c.

Ariapeithês¹ had married the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgement of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydidês considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydidês describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed, and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkês had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodôrus, a Greek of Abdêra; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens. He had farther been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,²—his ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas king of Macedonia had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodôrus in procuring for Perdikkas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikkas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the upper course of the Axios, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkês. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Sitalkês, never-

Power of the Odrysians in Thrace—their extensive dominion over the other Thracian tribes.

Sitalkês, at the instigation of Athens, undertakes to attack Perdikkas and the Chalkidians of Thrace.

¹ Herodot. iv. 80.

² Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 2, 31; Thucyd. ii. 29; Aristophan. *Aves*, 366. Thucydidês goes out of his way to refute

this current belief—a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to the convenience of present politics.

theless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements, for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to co-operate. In treating with Sitalkês, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,¹ and the Athenians were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas: the Getæ between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians (their neighbours on the other side of the river) with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Læxi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion. Lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to 150,000 men—one-third of it

¹ Thucyd. ii. 97. Φόρος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ὅσον προσήξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὕστερον Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλείστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων μάλιστα δύναμις, ἃ χρυσὸς καὶ ἀργυρος εἴη· καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ὕφαντά τε καὶ λεία, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσι καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοῦναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὅντα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Θερσί, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, καὶ αἰσχίον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν· ὅμως δὲ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐχρήσαντο· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρᾶξι οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα· ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἤλθεν ἰσχύος.

This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyreian army with the Thracian prince Seuthes, described in the Anabasis, vii. chap-

ters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time (B.C. 401) the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the neighbourhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own time—καὶ οὐκ ἦν τι πρᾶξι παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ διδόντα χρήματα· ὅπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις. The Scholiast here tells us that the venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500-600 A.D.

The contrast which Thucydides here draws between the Thracians and the Persians is illustrated by what Xenophon says respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus (Anabasis, i. 9, 22): compare also the romance of the Cyropaedia, viii. 14, 31, 32.

cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodopê. The whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkinë, which divided the Pæonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he reached the Pæonian town or district called Dobêrus;¹ it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axios, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia which lies along the higher Axios, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip. The presence in his army of Amyntas, son of Philip, induced some of the fortified places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain attacked. From hence he passed still farther southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axios even to the neighbourhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus: and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Farther south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axios and the head of the Strymonic Gulf,—Mygdonia, Krestônia, and Anthemus—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of forti-

He invades
and ravages
Macedonia
and Chalki-
dikê.

¹ See Gatterer (*De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ*), sect. 44-57; Poppo (*Prolegom. ad Thucydidem*), vol. ii. ch. 31, about the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known, even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality for these ancient names.

Thucydides, in his brief statements respecting this march of Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (*Thucyd. ii. 100*; *Herodot. v. 16*).

fied places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta or small shield,—but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.¹

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch any force of their own to the spot.² Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the co-operating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who moreover gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia; during eight of which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantes, Drôî and Dersæi) in the plains on the north-east of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangærus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them. On the other side, the Thessalians, Mag-

He is forced to retire by the severity of the season and want of Athenian co-operation.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 2.

² Thucyd. ii. 101. *ἔπειδ' ὁι Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ παρήσαν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτὸν μὴ ἤξειν, &c.*

nêtes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion farther south, began to organise means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkês.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 101.

APPENDIX.

Thucyd. ii. 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενὰ, βουλόμενοι ἀκοντας ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἀναγόμενοι ἅμα ἔφ' ἔπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξέμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξίῳ κέρα ἡγουμένῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὄρμουρ ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ εἰκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἀριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα νομίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύτακτον πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλεόντα τὸν ἐπὶ πλοῦν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ αὐτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ αἱ νῆες περικλησείαν.

The above passage forms the main authority for my description (given above of the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet, previous to the second battle against Phormio. The annexed plan will enable my reasoning to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of τὴν αὐτῶν γῆν? Does it mean the land of the Peloponnesians, south of the Gulf—or the land of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous editions, I adduced several examples of the use of the pronoun αὐτοῦ, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of criticism, my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now reprint the illustrative passages. As to the facts, however, my conviction remains unchanged. The land here designated by Thucydides must be "the land of the Athenians north of the Strait:" it cannot be "the land of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait." The pronoun αὐτῶν must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into αὐτῶν, as Mr. Bloomfield proposes, or ἐκείνων.

The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν is here equivalent to παρὰ τὴν γῆν. Dr. Arnold, thoroughly approving the description of Mitford, who states that the Peloponnesian fleet were "moving eastward *along the Achaic coast*," says, "The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρὰ. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a place and neighbourhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians sailed towards their own land (i. e. towards Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellênê, to which places the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close *upon* their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case."

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν is one which cannot be admitted without examples to justify it. No two propositions can be

more distinct than the two, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν—and πλεῖν παρὰ τὴν γῆν? The Peloponnesian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moored close upon its own land—at the headland Rhium near Panormus where its land-force stood (Thucyd. ii. 86). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Peloponnesian coast, or along the Peloponnesian coast: and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the words πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

To obviate this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of ἐπὶ, Dr. Arnold changes that of τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν; which words, according to him, denote, not the Peloponnesian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Phormio, but Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellênê; to which places (he says) the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a sense altogether unnatural. Corinth and Sicyon are so far off, that any allusion to them here is most improbable. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Strait. The *own land* of the Peloponnesians was that southern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land-force was encamped: it is distinguished from the *enemies' land*, on the opposite side of the Strait. If Thucydides had wished to intimate that the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in the direction of Corinth and Sicyon, he would hardly have used such words as ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

Professor Dunbar (in an article among the Critical Remarks annexed to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon) has contested my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says, "The Peloponnesian fleet must have *proceeded along their own coast*—ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. In this passage we find ἐπὶ with two cases: the first with the accusative, the other with the genitive. The first appears to me to indicate *the locality to which they were sailing*: and that evidently was, the headland on the Achæan coast, nearly opposite Naupactus."

The headland, to which Mr. Dunbar alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked Drepanum. It is sufficiently near, not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of Corinth and Sicyon. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in Thucydides. On Mr. Dunbar's interpretation, the Peloponnesians must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now if Thucydides had meant to affirm this, he surely would not have used such words as ἐπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as in c. 86 παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ 'Ρίον)—or if he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded *along* their own coast," he would have said παρὰ instead of ἐπὶ.

Thus far I have been discussing simply the verbal interpretation of ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, for the purpose of showing, that though these words be admitted to mean the land of the Peloponnesians,—still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly improbable, and even to identify ἐπὶ with παρὰ. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the Peloponnesian fleet *must have been* towards the Athenian coast and towards Naupaktus. Therefore, since ἑαυτῶν cannot have that meaning, ἑαυτῶν must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the Peloponnesians in effecting the movement, was to make Phormio believe that they were going to attack Naupaktus; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if Phormio did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for manœuvring. This was what the Peloponnesians not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now I ask, how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of Peloponnesus from the headland of Rhium to the headland of Drepanum,—which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce Phormio to think that the Peloponnesians were going to attack Naupaktus, or throw him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at Drepanum, they would hardly be nearer to Naupaktus than they were at Rhium: they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us however suppose that their movement towards Drepanum did really induce

Phormio to come into the Gulf for the protection of Naupaktus. If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from Drepanum towards Naupaktus, they would expose themselves to be attacked by Phormio midway in the open sea; the very contingency which he desired, and which they were manœuvring to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thucydides, that the actual attack of the Peloponnesians upon Phormio, in which they cut off nine out of his twenty ships, took place on the *northern coast of the Gulf*, at some spot between the headland Antirrhium and Naupaktus; somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the Messenian soldiers (who had come out from Naupaktus to assist Phormio, and who waded into the water to save the captured ships) would of itself place this beyond a doubt—if indeed any doubt could arise. It is farther certain, that when the Peloponnesian fleet wheeled from column into line to attack Phormio, they were so near to this northern land, that Phormio was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore: only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now I ask, how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Peloponnesian fleet, on quitting their moorings at Rhium, coasted along their own land towards Drepanum? If they did so, how did they afterwards get across the Gulf, to the place where the battle was fought? Every yard that they moved in the direction of Drepanum, only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterwards. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from Rhium along their own coast in the direction of Drepanum would have been absurd. Supposing however that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction, across the Gulf. But of this second movement, Thucydides says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Peloponnesians is contained in this phrase—*ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιὰ κέρα ἡγουμένῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ὄρμουν*. If these words really designate a movement along the southern coast, we must assume, first that the historian has left unnoticed the second movement across the Gulf, which nevertheless must have followed—next, that the Peloponnesians made a first move for no purpose except to increase the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering therefore the facts of the case, the localities and the purpose of the Peloponnesians, all of which are here clear—I contend that *ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου* must denote a movement of the Peloponnesian fleet towards the land of the Athenians, or the northern shore of the Gulf; and that as *ἑαυτῶν* will not bear that sense, it must be altered to *αὐτῶν* or *ἐκείνων*.

It remains to explain *ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου*, which bear a very distinct and important meaning. The land of the Athenians, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antirrhium with both the lines of coast which there terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting inside towards the Corinthian Gulf*—the other, *fronting outside towards the Gulf of Patras*. The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now when Thucydides says that the Peloponnesians sailed "*upon the land of the Athenians inwards fronting the Gulf*,"—these last words are essential to make us understand towards which of the two Athenian lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail towards that outer side of the headland where Phormio was moored, but towards the inner side of it, on the line which conducted to Naupaktus.

CHAPTER L.

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE FOURTH YEAR OF
THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR DOWN TO THE REVOLU-
TIONARY COMMOTIONS AT KORKYRA.

THE second and third years of the war had both been years of great suffering with the Athenians, from the continuance of the epidemic, which did not materially relax until the winter of the third year (B.C. 429-428). It is no wonder that under the pressure of such a calamity their military efforts were enfeebled, although the victories of Phormio had placed their maritime reputation at a higher point than ever. To their enemies, the destructive effects of this epidemic—effects still felt, although the disorder itself was suspended during the fourth year of the war—afforded material assistance as well as encouragement to persevere. The Peloponnesians, under Archidamus, again repeated during this year their invasion and ravage of Attica, which had been intermitted during the year preceding. As before, they met with no serious resistance. Entering the country about the beginning of May, they continued the process of devastation until their provisions were exhausted.¹ To this damage the Athenians had probably now accustomed themselves: but they speedily received, even while the invaders were in their country, intelligence of an event far more embarrassing and formidable—the revolt of Mitylênê and of the greater part of Lesbos.

This revolt, indeed, did not come even upon the Athenians wholly unawares. Yet the idea of it was of longer standing than they suspected, for the Mitylenæan oligarchy had projected it before the war, and had made secret application to Sparta for aid, but without success. Some time after hostilities broke out, they resumed the design, which was warmly promoted by the

B.C. 428.
Revolt of
Mitylênê
and most
part of Les-
bos from
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 1.

Bœotians, kinsmen of the Lesbians in Æolic lineage and dialect. The Mitylenæan leaders appear to have finally determined on revolt during the preceding autumn or winter. But they thought it prudent to make ample preparations before they declared themselves openly; and moreover they took measures for constraining three other towns in Lesbos,—Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha,—to share their fortunes, to merge their own separate governments, and to become incorporated with Mitylênê. Methymna, the second town in Lesbos, situated on the north of the island, was decidedly opposed to them and attached to Athens. The Mitylenæans built new ships,—put their walls in an improved state of defence,—carried out a mole in order to narrow the entrance of their harbour, and render it capable of being closed with a chain,—despatched emissaries to hire Scythian bowmen and purchase corn in the Euxine—and took such other measures as were necessary for an effective resistance.

Though the oligarchical character of their government gave them much means of secrecy, and, above all, dispensed with the necessity of consulting the people beforehand,—still, measures of such importance could not be taken without provoking attention. Intimation was sent to the Athenians by various Mitylenæan citizens, partly from private feeling, partly in their capacity of *proxeni* (or *consuls*, to use a modern word which approaches to the meaning) for Athens—especially by a Mitylenæan named Doxander, incensed with the government for having disappointed his two sons of marriage with two orphan heiresses.¹ Not less communicative were the islanders of Tenedos, animated by ancient neighbourly jealousy towards Mitylênê; so that the Athenians were thus forewarned both of the intrigues between Mitylênê and the Spartans, and of her certain impending revolt unless they immediately interfered.²

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v. 2, 3. The fact respecting Doxander here mentioned is stated by Aristotle, and there is no reason to question its truth. But Aristotle states it in illustration of a general position—that the private quarrels of principal citizens are often the cause of great misfortune to the commonwealth. He represents Doxander and his private quarrel as having brought upon Mity-

lênê the resentment of the Athenians and the war with Athens—Δόξανδρος—ἦρξε τῆς στάσεως, καὶ παρέχονε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πρόξενος ὢν τῆς πόλεως.

Having the account of Thucydides before us, we are enabled to say that this is an incorrect conception, so far as concerns the *cause* of the war—though the fact in itself may be quite true.

² Thucyd. iii. 2.

This news seems to have become certain about February or March 428 B.C. But such was then the dispirited condition of the Athenians—arising from two years' suffering under the epidemic, and no longer counteracted by the wholesome remonstrances of Periklês—that they could not at first bring themselves to believe what they were so much afraid to find true. Lesbos, like Chios, was their ally upon an equal footing, still remaining under those conditions which had been at first common to all the members of the confederacy of Delos. Mitylênê paid no tribute to Athens: it retained its walls, its large naval force, and its extensive landed possessions on the opposite Asiatic continent: its government was oligarchical, administering all internal affairs without reference to Athens. Its obligations as an ally were, that in case of war, it was held bound to furnish armed ships, whether in determinate number or not, we do not know. It would undoubtedly be restrained from making war upon Tenedos, or any other subject-ally of Athens: and its government or its citizens would probably be held liable to answer before the Athenian dikasteries, in case of any complaint of injury from the government or citizens of Tenedos or of any other ally of Athens—these latter being themselves also accountable before the same tribunals under like complaints from Mitylênê. That city was thus in practice all but independent, and so extremely powerful, that the Athenians, fearful of coping with it in their actual state of depression, were loath to believe the alarming intelligence which reached them. They sent envoys with a friendly message to persuade the Mitylenæans to suspend their proceedings, and it was only when these envoys returned without success, that they saw the necessity of stronger measures. Ten Mitylenæan triremes, serving as contingent in the Athenian fleet, were seized, and their crews placed under guard; while Kleippidês, then on the point of starting (along with two colleagues) to conduct a fleet of forty triremes round Peloponnesus, was directed to alter his destination and to proceed forthwith to Mitylênê.¹ It was expected that he would reach that town about the time of the approaching festival of Apollo Maloeis, celebrated in its neighbourhood—on which occasion the whole Mitylenæan population was in

Proceedings
of Athens—
powerful
condition of
Mitylênê—
fleet sent
thither under
Kleippidês.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 3.

the habit of going forth to the temple : so that the town, while thus deserted, might easily be surprised and seized by the fleet. In case this calculation should be disappointed, Kleippidēs was instructed to require that the Mitylenæans should surrender their ships of war, and raze their fortifications, and in the event of refusal to attack them immediately.

But the publicity of debate at Athens was far too great to allow such a scheme to succeed. The Mitylenæans had their spies in the city, and the moment the resolution was taken, one of them set off to communicate it at Mitylénē. Crossing over to Geræstus in Eubœa, and getting aboard a merchantman on the point of departure, he reached Mitylénē with a favourable wind on the third day from Athens : so that when Kleippidēs arrived shortly afterwards, he found the festival adjourned and the government prepared for him. The requisition which he sent in was refused, and the Mitylenæan fleet even came forth from the harbour to assail him, but was beaten back with little difficulty : upon which, the Mitylenæan leaders, finding themselves attacked before their preparations were completed, and desiring still to gain time, opened negotiations with Kleippidēs, and prevailed on him to suspend hostilities until ambassadors could be sent to Athens—protesting that they had no serious intention of revolting. This appears to have been about the middle of May, soon after the Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica.

Kleippidēs fails in surprising Mitylénē—carries on an imperfect blockade.

Kleippidēs was induced, not very prudently, to admit this proposition, under the impression that his armament was not sufficient to cope with a city and island so powerful. He remained moored off the harbour at the north of Mitylénē until the envoys (among whom was included one of the very citizens of Mitylénē who had sent to betray the intended revolt, but who had since changed his opinion) should return from Athens. Meanwhile the Mitylenæan government, unknown to Kleippidēs, and well-aware that the embassy would prove fruitless, took advantage of the truce to send secret envoys to Sparta imploring immediate aid. And on the arrival of the Lacedæmonian Meleas and the Theban Hermæondas (who had been despatched to Mitylénē earlier, but had only come in by stealth since the arrival of Kleippidēs), a second trireme was sent along with them, carrying additional

envoys to reiterate the solicitation. These arrivals and despatches were carried on without the knowledge of the Athenian admiral ; chiefly in consequence of the peculiar site of the town, which had originally been placed upon a little islet, divided from Lesbos by a narrow channel or *euripus*, and had subsequently been extended across into the main island—like Syracuse and so many other Grecian settlements. It had consequently two harbours, one north, the other south of the town : Kleppidēs was anchored off the former, but the latter remained unguarded.¹

During the absence of the Mitylenæan envoys at Athens, reinforcements reached the Athenian admiral from Lemnos, Imbros, and some other allies, as well as from the Lesbian town of Methymna : so that when the envoys returned, as they presently did with an unfavourable reply, war was resumed with increased vigour. The Mitylenæans, having made a general sally with their full military force, gained some advantage in the battle ; yet not feeling bold enough to maintain the field, they retreated back behind their walls. The news of their revolt, when first spread abroad, had created an impression unfavourable to the stability of the Athenian empire. But when it was seen that their conduct was irresolute and their achievements disproportionate to their supposed power, a reaction of feeling took place. The Chians and other allies came in with increased zeal, in obedience to the summons of Athens for reinforcements. Kleppidēs soon found his armament large enough to establish two separate camps, markets for provision, and naval stations, north and south of the town, so as to watch and block up both the harbours at once.² But he commanded little beyond the area of his camp, and was unable to invest the city by land ; especially as the Mitylenæans had received reinforcements from Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresus, the other towns of Lesbos which acted with them. They were even sufficiently strong to march

¹ Thucyd. iii. 3, 4 : compare Strabo, xiii. p. 617 ; and Plehn, Lesb., p. 12-18.

Thucydides speaks of the spot at the mouth of the northern harbour as being called Malea, which was also undoubtedly the name of the south-eastern promontory of Lesbos. We must therefore

presume that there were two places on the seaboard of Lesbos which bore that name.

The easternmost of the two southern promontories of Peloponnesus was also called Cape Malea.

² Thucyd. iii. 6.

against Methymna, in hopes that it would be betrayed to them by a party within. But this expectation was not realised, nor could they do more than strengthen the fortifications, and confirm the Mitylenæan supremacy, in the other three subordinate towns; in such manner that the Methymnæans, who soon afterwards attacked *Antissa*, were repulsed with considerable loss. In this undecided condition, the island continued, until (somewhere about the month of August B.C. 428) the Athenians sent Pachês to take the command, with a reinforcement of 1000 hoplites, who rowed themselves thither in triremes. The Athenians were now in force enough not only to keep the Mitylenæans within their walls, but also to surround the city with a single wall of circumvallation, strengthened by separate forts in suitable positions. By the beginning of October, Mitylênê was thus completely blockaded, by land as well as by sea.¹

Meanwhile the Mitylenæan envoys, after a troublesome voyage, had reached Sparta a little before the Olympic festival, about the middle of June. The Spartans directed them to come to Olympia at the festival, where all the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy would naturally be present—and there to set forth their requests, after the festival was concluded, in presence of all.²

Thucydides has given us, at some length, his version of the speech wherein this was done—a speech not a little remarkable. Pronounced, as it was, by men who had just revolted from Athens, having the strongest interest to raise indignation against her as well as sympathy for themselves, and before an audience exclusively composed of the enemies of Athens, all willing to hear, and none present to refute, the bitterest calumnies against her, we should have expected a confident sense of righteous and well-grounded, though perilous effort, on the part of the Mitylenæans, and a plausible collection of wrongs and oppressions alleged against the common enemy. Instead of which the speech is apologetic and embarrassed. The speaker not only does not allege any extortion or severe dealing from Athens towards the Mitylenæans, but even admits the fact that they had been treated by her with

The Mitylenæan envoys address themselves to the Spartans at the Olympic festival, entreating aid.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 18.

² Thucyd. iii. 9.

marked honour;¹ and that too, throughout a long period of peace, during which she stood less in awe of her allies generally, and would have had much more facility in realising any harsh purposes towards them, than she could possibly enjoy

now that the war had broken out, when their discontents would be likely to find powerful protectors.²

According to his own showing, the Mitylenæans, while they had been perfectly well treated by Athens during the past, had now acquired, by the mere fact of war, increased security for continuance of the like treatment during the future. It is upon the necessity of acquiring security for the future, nevertheless, that he rests the justification of the revolt, not pretending to have any subject of positive complaint. The Mitylenæans (he contends) could have no prospective security against Athens: for she had successively and systematically brought into slavery all her allies, except Lesbos and Chios, though all had originally been upon an equal footing: and there was every reason for fearing that she would take the first convenient opportunity of reducing the two last remaining to the same level—the rather as their position was now one of privilege and exception, offensive to her imperial pride and exaggerated ascendancy. It had hitherto suited the policy of Athens to leave these two exceptions, as a proof that the other allies had justly incurred their fate, since otherwise Lesbos and Chios, having equal votes, would not have joined forces in reducing them.³ But this policy was now no longer necessary, and the Mitylenæans, feeling themselves free only in name, were imperatively called upon by regard for their own safety to seize the earliest opportunity

¹ Thucyd. iii. 10. μηδὲ τῷ χείρους δόξωμεν εἶναι, εἰ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τιμώμενοι ὅπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀφίσταμεθα.

The language in which the Mitylenæan envoys describe the treatment which their city had received from Athens, is substantially as strong as that which Kleon uses afterwards in his speech at Athens, when he reproaches them with their ingratitude—Kleon says (iii. 39), αὐτόνομοι τε οἰκοῦντες, καὶ τιμώμενοι ἐς τὰ πρῶτα ὅφ' ὤμῳν, τοιαῦτα εἰργάσαντο, &c.

² Thucyd. iii. 12. οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ πολὺ γ' ἂν ἔδοκούμεν δυνηθῆναι (περιγίγνεσθαι),

εἰ μὴ ὁ πόλεμος ὅδε κατέστη, παραδείγμασι χράμενοι τοῖς ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους. Τίς οὖν αὐτῇ ἡ φιλία ἐγγίγνεται ἡ ἐλευθερία πιστῇ, ἐν ᾗ παρὰ γνώμην ἀλλήλους ὕπερδεχόμεθα, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείλους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιούμεν.

³ Thucyd. iii. 11. Αὐτόνομοι δὲ ἐλείφθημεν οὐ δι' ἄλλο τι ἢ ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐπρεπεῖα τε λόγου, καὶ γνώμης μᾶλλον ἐφόδῳ ἢ ἰσχύος, τὰ πράγματα ἐφαίμετο καταληπτὰ. Ἄμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίᾳ ἐχρῶντο, μὴ δὲ τοὺς γε ἰσοψηφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν.

for emancipating themselves in reality. Nor was it merely regard for their own safety ; but a farther impulse of Panhellenic patriotism ; a desire to take rank among the opponents, and not among the auxiliaries, of Athens, in her usurpation of sovereignty over so many free Grecian states.¹ The Mitylenæans had however been compelled to revolt with preparations only half completed, and had therefore a double claim upon the succour of Sparta—the single hope and protectress of Grecian autonomy. And Spartan aid—if now lent immediately and heartily, in a renewed attack on Attica during this same year, by sea as well as by land—could not fail to put down the common enemy, exhausted as she was by pestilence as well as by the cost of three years' war, and occupying her whole maritime force either in the siege of Mitylênê or round Peloponnesus. The orator concluded by appealing not merely to the Hellenic patriotism and sympathies of the Peloponnesians, but also to the sacred name of the Olympic Zeus, in whose precinct the meeting was held, that his pressing entreaty might not be disregarded.²

In following the speech of the orator, we see the plain confession that the Mitylenæans had no reason whatever to complain of the conduct of Athens towards themselves. She had respected alike their dignity, their public force, and their private security. This important fact helps us to explain, first, the indifference which the Mitylenæan people will be found to manifest in the revolt ; next, the barbarous resolution taken by the Athenians after its suppression.

Practical grounds of complaint on the part of the Mitylenæans against Athens—few or none.

The reasons given for the revolt are mainly two. 1. The Mitylenæans had no security that Athens would not degrade them into the condition of subject-allies like the rest. 2. They did not choose to second the ambition of Athens and to become parties to a war for the sake of maintaining an empire essentially offensive to Grecian political instincts.

In both these two reasons there is force ; and both touch the sore point of the Athenian empire. That empire undoubtedly contradicted one of the fundamental instincts of the Greek mind—the right of every separate town to administer its own political affairs apart from external control.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 13.

² Thucyd. iii. 13, 14.

The Peloponnesian alliance recognised this autonomy in theory, by the general synod and equal voting of all the members at Sparta, on important occasions ; though it was quite true ¹ (as Periklēs urged at Athens) that in practice nothing more was enjoyed than an autonomy confined by Spartan leading-strings—and though Sparta held in permanent custody hostages for the fidelity of her Arcadian allies, summoning their military contingents without acquainting them whither they were destined to march. But Athens proclaimed herself a despot, effacing the autonomy of her allies not less in theory than in practice. Far from being disposed to cultivate in them any sense of a real common interest with herself, she did not even cheat them with those forms and fictions which so often appease discontent in the absence of realities. Doubtless the nature of her empire, at once widely extended, maritime, and unconnected (or only partially connected) with kindred of race, rendered the forms of periodical deliberation difficult to keep up ; at the same time that it gave to her as naval chief an ascendancy much more despotic than could have been exercised by any chief on land. It is doubtful whether she could have overcome—it is certain that she did not try to overcome—these political difficulties ; so that her empire stood confessed as a despotism, opposed to the political instinct of the Greek mind ; and the revolts against it, like this of Mitylênê, —insofar as they represented a genuine feeling and were not merely movements of an oligarchical party against their own democracy—were revolts of this offended instinct, much more than consequences of actual oppression. The Mitylenæans might certainly affirm that they had no security against being one day reduced to the common condition of subject-allies like the rest. Yet an Athenian speaker, had he been here present, might have made no mean reply to this portion of their reasoning. He would have urged, that had Athens felt any dispositions towards such a scheme, she would have taken advantage of the Fourteen years' truce to execute it ; and he would have shown that the degradation of the allies by

¹ Thucyd. i. 144. Καὶ ὅταν κἀκεῖνοι
(the Lacedæmonians) ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀπο-
δῶσι πόλεσι, μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακε-
δαίμονσι ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἀπονομεύ-
σθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἐκδύοις, ὥς

βούλονται.

About the hostages detained by Sparta for the fidelity of her allies, see Thucyd. v. 54, 61.

Athens, and the change in her position from president to despot, had been far less intentional and systematic than the Mitylenæan orator affirmed.

To the Peloponnesian auditors, however, the speech of the latter proved completely satisfactory. The Lesbians were declared members of the Peloponnesian alliance, and a second attack upon Attica was decreed. The Lacedæmonians, foremost in the movement, summoned contingents from their various allies, and were early in arriving with their own at the Isthmus. They there began to prepare carriages or trucks, for dragging across the Isthmus the triremes which had fought against Phormio, from the harbour of Lechæum into the Saronic Gulf, in order to employ them against Athens. But the remaining allies did not answer to the summons, remaining at home occupied with their harvest : while the Lacedæmonians, sufficiently disappointed with this languor and disobedience, were still farther confounded by the unexpected presence of 100 Athenian triremes off the coast of the Isthmus.

The Peloponnesians promise assistance to Mitylênê—energetic demonstration of the Athenians.

The Athenians, though their own presence at the Olympic festival was forbidden by the war, had doubtless learned more or less thoroughly the proceedings which had taken place there respecting Mitylênê. Perceiving the general belief entertained of their depressed and helpless condition, they determined to contradict this by a great and instant effort. They accordingly manned forthwith 100 triremes, requiring the personal service of all men, citizens as well as metics, and excepting only the two richest classes of the Solonian census, *i. e.*, the Pentakosio-medimni, and the Hippeis or Horsemen. With this prodigious fleet they made a demonstration along the Isthmus in view of the Lacedæmonians, and landed in various parts of the Peloponnesian coast to inflict damage. At the same time thirty other Athenian triremes, despatched some time previously to Akarnania under Asôpius son of Phormio, landed at different openings in Laconia for the same purpose. This news reached the Lacedæmonians at the Isthmus, while the other great Athenian fleet was parading before their eyes.¹ Amazed at so unexpected a demonstration of strength, they began to feel how much they had been misled respecting the exhaustion of

¹ Thucyd. iii. 7-16.

Athens, and how incompetent they were, especially without the presence of their allies, to undertake any joint effective movement by sea and land against Attica. They therefore returned home, resolving to send an expedition of forty triremes under Alkidas to the relief of Mitylênê itself; at the same time transmitting requisitions to their various allies, in order that these triremes might be furnished.¹

Meanwhile Asôpius with his thirty triremes had arrived in Akarnania, from whence all the ships except twelve were sent home. He had been nominated commander as the son of Phormio, who appears either to have died, or to have become unfit for service, since his victories of the preceding year. The Akarnanians had preferred a special request that a son, or at least some relative, of Phormio, should be invested with the command of the squadron; so beloved was his name and character among them. Asôpius however accomplished nothing of importance, though he again undertook conjointly with the Akarnanians a fruitless march against Cœniadæ. Ultimately he was defeated and slain, in attempting a disembarkation on the territory of Leukas.²

The sanguine announcement made by the Mitylenæans at Olympia, that Athens was rendered helpless by the epidemic, had indeed been strikingly contradicted by her recent display; since, taking numbers and equipment together, the maritime force which she had put forth this summer, manned as it was by a higher class of seamen, surpassed all former years; although, in point of number only, it was inferior to the 250 triremes which she had sent out during the first summer of the war.³ But the assertion that Athens was impoverished

¹ Thucyd. iii. 15, 16.

² Thucyd. iii. 7.

³ Thucyd. iii. 17. Καὶ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τούτων, ὃν αἱ νῆες ἐπλεον, ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις δὴ νῆς αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοὶ κἀλλεῖ ἐγένοντο, παρακλήσιναι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ πλείους ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου. Τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὐβοίαν καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἐκατὸν ἐφύλασσον, καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἑτεραὶ ἐκατὸν ἦσαν, χωρὶς δὲ αἱ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις χωρίοις, ὥστε αἱ πᾶσαι ἅμα ἐγίνοντο ἐν ἐνὶ θέρει διακόσιαι καὶ πεντήκοντα. Καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῦτο μάλιστα ὑπανάλωσε μετὰ Ποτίδαιας, &c.

I have endeavoured to render as well

as I can this obscure and difficult passage; difficult both as to grammar and as to sense, and not satisfactorily explained by any of the commentators—if indeed it can be held to stand now as Thucydides wrote it. In the preceding chapter, he had mentioned that this fleet of 100 sail was manned largely from the hoplite class of citizens (iii. 16). Now we know from other passages in his work (see v. 8; vi. 31) how much difference there was in the appearance and efficiency of an armament, according to the class of citizens who served on it. We may then refer the word κἀλλος to the excellence of outfit hence

in finances was not so destitute of foundation : for the whole treasure in the acropolis, 6000 talents at the commencement of the war, was now consumed, with the exception of that reserve of 1000 talents which had been solemnly set aside against the last exigencies of defensive resistance. This is not surprising when we learn that every hoplite engaged for near two years and a half in the blockade of Potidæa received two drachmas per day, one for himself and a second for an attendant. There were during the whole time of the blockade 3000 hoplites engaged there,—and for a considerable portion of the time, 4600; besides the fleet, all the seamen of which received one drachma per day per man. Accordingly, the Athenians were now for the first time obliged to raise a direct contribution among themselves, to the amount of 200 talents, for the purpose of prosecuting the siege of Mitylênê: and they at the same time despatched Lysiklês (with four colleagues) in command of twelve triremes to collect money. What relation these money-gathering ships bore to the regular tribute paid by the subject-allies, or whether they were allowed to visit these latter, we do not know. In the present case, Lysiklês landed at Myus near the mouth of the Mæander, and marched up the country to levy contributions on the Karian villages in the plain of that river: but he was surprised by the Karians, perhaps aided by the active Samian exiles at Anæa in the neighbourhood, and slain with a considerable number of his men.¹

The accumulated treasure of Athens exhausted by her efforts—necessity for her to raise a direct contribution.

While the Athenians thus held Mitylênê under siege, their faithful friends the Platæans had remained closely blockaded by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians for more than a year, without any possibility of relief. At length provisions began to fail, and the general Eupompidês, backed by the prophet Theænetus (these pro-

Outbreak of the Platæans from their blockaded town.

arising : I wish indeed that any instance could be produced of κάλλος in this sense, but we find the adjective κάλλιστος (Thucyd. v. 60) στρατόπεδον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο κάλλιστον Ἑλληνικὸν τῶν μέχρι τοῦδε ἐνηλθεν. In v. 8 Thucydides employs the word ἀξίωμα to denote the same meaning: and in vi. 31 he says, παρασκευὴ γὰρ αὐτῇ πρώτη ἐκπλεόσασα μιᾷ πόλεως δυνάμει Ἑλληνικῇ

πολυτελεστάτῃ δὴ καὶ εὐπρεπεστάτῃ τῶν ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον ἐγένετο. It may be remarked that in that chapter too, he contrasts the expedition against Sicily with two other Athenian expeditions, equal to it in number but inferior in equipment: the same comparison which I believe he means to take in this passage.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 19.

phets¹ were often among the bravest soldiers in the army), persuaded the garrison to adopt the daring, but seemingly desperate, resolution of breaking out over the blockading wall and in spite of its guards. So desperate, indeed, did the project seem, that at the moment of execution, one half of the garrison shrank from it as equivalent to certain death: the other half, about 212 in number, persisted and escaped. Happy would it have been for the remainder had they even perished in the attempt, and thus forestalled the more melancholy fate in store for them!

It has been already stated that the circumvallation of Plataea was accomplished by a double wall and a double ditch, one ditch without the encircling walls, another between them and the town; the two walls being sixteen feet apart, joined together, and roofed all round, so as to look like one thick wall, and to afford covered quarters for the besiegers. Both the outer and inner circumference were furnished with battlements, and after every ten battlements came a roofed tower, covering the whole breadth of the double wall—allowing a free passage inside, but none outside. In general, the entire circuit of the roofed wall was kept under watch night and day; but on wet nights the besiegers had so far relaxed their vigilance as to retire under cover of the towers, leaving the intermediate spaces unguarded: and it was upon this omission that the plan of escape was founded. The Plataeans prepared ladders of a proper height to scale the blockading double wall, ascertaining its height by repeatedly counting the ranges of bricks, which were near enough for them to discern, and not effectually covered with whitewash. On a cold and dark December night, amidst rain, sleet, and a roaring wind, they marched forth from the gates, lightly armed, some few with shields and spears, but most of them with breastplates, javelins, and bows and arrows. The right foot was naked, but the left foot shod, so as to give to it a more assured footing on the muddy ground.² Taking care to sally out with the wind in their

Their plan of escape—its extraordinary difficulty and danger.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 20. Compare Xenophon, Hellen. ii. 4, 19; Herodot. ix. 37; Plutarch, Aratus, c. 25.

² Thucyd. iii. 22. Dr. Arnold, in his note, construes this passage as if the right or bare foot were the *least* likely

to slip in the mud, and the left or shod foot the *most* likely. The Scholiast and Wasse maintain the opposite opinion, which is certainly the more obvious sense of the text, though the sense of Dr. Arnold would also be admissible.

faces and at such a distance from each other as to prevent any clattering of arms, they crossed the inner ditch and reached the foot of the wall without being discovered. The ladders, borne in the van, were immediately planted, and Ammeas son of Korœbus, followed by eleven others armed only with a short sword and breastplate, mounted the wall: others armed with spears followed him, their shields being carried and handed to them when on the top by comrades behind. It was the duty of this first company to master and maintain the two towers right and left, so as to keep the intermediate space free for passing over. This was successfully done, the guards in both towers being surprised and slain, without alarming the remaining besiegers. Many of the Plataeans had already reached the top of the wall, when the noise of a tile accidentally knocked down by one of them betrayed what was passing. Immediately a general clamour was raised, alarm was given, and the awakened garrison rushed up from beneath to the top of the wall, yet not knowing where the enemy was to be found; a perplexity farther increased by the Plataeans in the town, who took this opportunity of making a false attack on the opposite side. Amidst such confusion and darkness, the blockading detachment could not tell where to direct their blows, and all remained at their posts, except a reserve of 300 men, kept constantly in readiness for special emergencies, who marched out and patrolled the outside of the ditch to intercept any fugitives from within. At the same time, fire-signals were raised to warn their allies at Thebes. But here again, the Plataeans in the town had foreseen and prepared fire-signals on their part, which they hoisted forthwith in order to deprive this telegraphic communication of all special meaning.¹

The naked foot is very liable to slip in the mud, and might easily be rendered less liable, by sandals or covering particularly adapted to that purpose. Besides, Wasse remarks justly, that the warrior who is to use his *right* arm requires to have his *left* foot firmly planted.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 22. *φρουροί τε ἤροντο ἐς τὰς θήβας πολέμιοι*, &c. It would seem by this statement that the blockaders must have been often in the habit of transmitting intelligence to Thebes by means of fire-signals; each particular

combination of lights having more or less of a special meaning. The Plataeans had observed this, and foresaw that the same means would be used on the night of the outbreak, to bring assistance from Thebes forthwith. If they had not observed it *before*, they could not have prepared for the moment when the new signal would be hoisted, so as to confound its meaning—*ὅπως ἀσαφὴ τὰ σημεῖα βί.* . . .

Compare iii. 80. I agree with the general opinion stated in Dr. Arnold's

Half of the
garrison of
Platæa
escapes to
Athens.

Meanwhile the escaping Platæans, masters of the two adjoining towers—on the top of which some of them mounted, while others held the doorway through, so as to repel with spears and darts all approach of the blockaders—prosecuted their flight without interruption over the space between, shoving down the battlements in order to make it more level and plant a greater number of ladders. In this manner they all successively got over and crossed the outer ditch. Every man, immediately after crossing, stood ready on the outer bank with bow and javelin to repel assailants and maintain safe passages for his comrades in the rear. At length, when all had descended, there remained the last and greatest difficulty—the escape of those who occupied the two towers and kept the intermediate portion of wall free: yet even this was accomplished successfully and without loss. The outer ditch was found embarrassing—so full of water from the rain as to be hardly fordable, yet with thin ice on it also, from a previous frost: for the storm, which in other respects was the main help to their escape, here retarded their passage of the ditch by an unusual accumulation of water. It was not however until all had crossed except the defenders of the towers—who were yet descending and scrambling through—that the Peloponnesian reserve of 300 were seen approaching the spot with torches. Their unshielded right side being turned towards the ditch, the Platæans, already across and standing on the bank, immediately assailed them with arrows and javelins—in which the torches enabled them to take tolerable aim, while the Peloponnesians on their side could not distinguish their enemies in the dark, and had no previous knowledge of their position. They were thus held in check until the rearmost Platæans had surmounted the difficulties of the passage: after which the whole body stole off as speedily as they could, taking at first the road towards Thebes, while their pursuers were seen with their torch-lights following the opposite direction, on the road which led by the heights called Dryos-Kephalæ to Athens.

note respecting these fire-signals, and even think that it might have been sustained more strongly.

“Non enim (observes Cicero in the fifth oration against Verres, c. 36), sicut erat nuper consuetudo, prædonum ad-

ventum significabat *ignis à specula sublatus aut tumulo*; sed flamma ex ipso incendio navium et calamitatem acceptam et periculum reliquum nuntiabat.”

After having marched about three-quarters of a mile on the road to Thebes (leaving the chapel of the Hero Androkratēs on their right hand), the fugitives quitted it, and striking to the eastward towards Erythræ and Hysiaë, soon found themselves in safety among the mountains which separate Bœotia from Attica at that point ; from whence they passed into the glad harbour and refuge of Athens.¹

Two hundred and twelve brave men thus emerged to life and liberty, breaking loose from that impending fate which too soon overtook the remainder, and preserving for future times the genuine breed and honourable traditions of Plataea. One man alone was taken prisoner at the brink of the outer ditch, while a few, who had enrolled themselves originally for the enterprise, lost courage and returned in despair even from the foot of the inner wall ; telling their comrades within that the whole band had perished. Accordingly, at day-break, the Plataeans within sent out a herald to solicit a truce for burial of the dead bodies, and it was only by the answer made to this request, that they learnt the actual truth. The description of this memorable outbreak exhibits not less daring in the execution than skill and foresight in the design, and is the more interesting, inasmuch as the men who thus worked out their salvation were precisely the bravest men who best deserved it.

Meanwhile Pachēs and the Athenians kept Mitylênê closely blocked up, the provisions were nearly exhausted, and the besieged were already beginning to think of capitulation—when their spirits were raised by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian envoy Salæthus, who had landed at Pyrrha on the west of Lesbos, and contrived to steal in 'through a ravine which obstructed the continuity of the blockading wall (about February 427 B.C.). He encouraged the Mitylenæans to hold out, assuring them that a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas was on the point of setting out to assist them, and that Attica would be forthwith invaded by the general Peloponnesian army. His own arrival, also, and his stay in the town, was in itself no small encouragement : we shall see hereafter, when we come to the siege of Syracuse

B.C. 427.
Blockade of
Mitylênê
closely carried on by
the Athenian
general
Pachēs—the
Mitylenæans
are encouraged to
hold out by
the Lacedæmonians,
who send
thither Salæthus.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 24. Diodorus (xii. 56) gives a brief summary of these facts, without either novelty or liveliness.

by the Athenians, how much might depend upon the presence of one single Spartan. All thought of surrender was accordingly abandoned, and the Mitylenæans awaited with impatience the arrival of Alkidas, who started from Peloponnesus at the beginning of April, with forty-two triremes; while the Lacedæmonian army at the same time invaded Attica, in order to keep the attention of Athens fully employed. Their ravages on this occasion were more diligent, searching, and destructive to the country than before, and were continued the longer because they awaited the arrival of news from Lesbos. But no news reached them, their stock of provisions was exhausted, and the army was obliged to break up.¹

The tidings which at length arrived proved very unsatisfactory.

Salæthus and the Mitylenæans had held out until their provisions were completely exhausted, but neither relief nor encouragement reached them from Peloponnesus. At length even Salæthus became convinced that no relief would come; he projected, therefore, as a last hope, a desperate attack upon the Athenians and their wall of blockade. For this purpose he distributed full panoplies among the mass of the people or commons, who had hitherto been without them, having at best nothing more than bows or javelins.²

But he had not sufficiently calculated the consequences of this important step. The Mitylenæan multitude, living under an oligarchical government, had no interest in the present contest, which had been undertaken without any appeal to their opinion. They had no reason for aversion to Athens, seeing that they suffered no practical grievance from the Athenian alliance: and (to repeat what has been before remarked) we find that even among the subject-allies (to say nothing of a privileged ally like Mitylênè), the bulk of the citizens were never forward, sometimes positively reluctant, to revolt. The Mitylenæan oligarchy had revolted, in spite of the absence of practical wrongs, because they desired an uncontrolled town-autonomy as well as security for its continuance. But this was a feeling to which the

¹ Thucyd. iii. 25, 26.

² Thucyd. iii. 27. ὁ Σάλαυθος, καὶ ὅπλιζει τὸν δῆμον, πρότερον ψιλὸν ὄντα, ὡς ἐπεξίων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις.
αὐτοὺς οὐ προσδεχόμενος ἔτι τὰς ναῦς,

people were naturally strangers, having no share in the government of their own town, and being kept dead and passive, as it was the interest of the oligarchy that they should be, in respect to political sentiment. A Grecian oligarchy might obtain from its people quiet submission under ordinary circumstances; but if ever it required energetic effort, the genuine devotion under which alone such effort could be given, was found wanting. The Mitylenæan Demos, so soon as they found themselves strengthened and ennobled by the possession of heavy armour, refused obedience to the orders of Salæthus for marching out and imperiling their lives in a desperate struggle. They were under the belief—not unnatural under the secrecy of public affairs habitually practised by an oligarchy, but which assuredly the Athenian Demos would have been too well-informed to entertain—that their governors were starving them, and had concealed stores of provision for themselves. Accordingly, the first use which they made of their arms was, to demand that these concealed stores should be brought out and fairly apportioned to all; threatening unless their demand was complied with at once, to enter into negotiations with the Athenians and surrender the city. The ruling Mitylenæans, unable to prevent this, but foreseeing that it would be their irretrievable ruin, preferred the chance of negotiating themselves for a capitulation. It was agreed with Pachês, that the Athenian armament should enter into possession of Mitylênê; that the fate of its people and city should be left to the Athenian assembly, and that the Mitylenæans should send envoys to Athens to plead their cause: until the return of these envoys, Pachês engaged that no one should be either killed, or put in chains, or sold into slavery. Nothing was said about Salæthus, who hid himself as well as he could in the city. In spite of the guarantee received from Pachês, so great was the alarm of those Mitylenæans who had chiefly instigated the revolt, that when he actually took possession of the city, they threw themselves as suppliants upon the altars for protection. But being induced by his assurances to quit their sanctuary, they were placed in the island of Tenedos until answer should be received from Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. iii. 28.

The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrives off the coast of Ionia—astonishment and alarm which its presence creates.

Having thus secured possession of Mitylênê, Pachês sent round some triremes to the other side of the island, and easily captured Antissa. But before he had time to reduce the two remaining towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, he received news which forced him to turn his attention elsewhere.

To the astonishment of every one, the Peloponnesian fleet of Alkidas was seen on the coast of Ionia. It ought to have been there much earlier, and had Alkidas been a man of energy, it would have reached Mitylênê even before the surrender of the city. But the Peloponnesians, when about to advance into the Athenian waters and brave the Athenian fleet, were under the same impression of conscious weakness and timidity (especially since the victories of Phormio in the preceding year) as that which beset land-troops when marching up to attack the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.¹ Alkidas, though unobstructed by the Athenians, who were not aware of his departure—though pressed to hasten forward by Lesbian and Ionian exiles on board, and aided by expert pilots from those Samian exiles who had established themselves at Anæa² on the Asiatic continent, and acted as zealous enemies of Athens—nevertheless instead of sailing straight to Lesbos lingered first near Peloponnesus, next at the island of Delos, making capture of private vessels with their crews: until at length, on reaching the islands of Ikarus and Mykonus, he heard the unwelcome tidings that the besieged town had capitulated. Not at first crediting the report, he sailed onward to Embaton, in the Erythræan territory on the coast of Asia Minor, where he found the news confirmed. As only seven days had elapsed since the capitulation had been concluded, Teutiaplus, an Eleian captain in the fleet, strenuously urged the daring project of sailing on forthwith, and surprising Mitylênê by night in its existing unsettled condition: no preparation would have been made for receiving them, and there was good chance that the Athenians might be suddenly overpowered, the Mitylenæans again armed, and the town recovered.

Such a proposition, which was indeed something more than

¹ Thucyd. iv. 34. τῇ γνώμῃ δεδολωμένοι ὡς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους.

² Thucyd. iv. 75.

daring, did not suit the temper of Alkidas. Nor could he be induced by the solicitation of the exiles to fix and fortify himself either in any port of Ionia, or in the Æolic town of Kymê, so as to afford support and countenance to such subjects of the Athenian empire as were disposed to revolt; though he was confidently assured that many of them would revolt on his proclamation, and that the satrap Pissuthnês of Sardis would help him to defray the expense. Having been sent for the express purpose of relieving Mitylênê, Alkidas believed himself interdicted from any other project. He determined to return to Peloponnesus at once, dreading nothing so much as the pursuit of Pachês and the Athenian fleet. From Embaton accordingly he started on his return, coasting southward along Asia Minor as far as Ephesus. But the prisoners taken in his voyage were now an encumbrance to his flight; and their number was not inconsiderable, since all the merchant-vessels in his route had approached the fleet without suspicion, believing it to be Athenian: a Peloponnesian fleet near the coast of Ionia was as yet something unheard of and incredible. To get rid of his prisoners, Alkidas stopped at Myonnêsus near Teos, and there put to death the greater number of them—a barbarous proceeding which excited lively indignation among the neighbouring Ionic cities to which they belonged; insomuch that when he reached Ephesus, the Samian exiles dwelling at Anæa, who had come forward so actively to help him, sent him a spirited remonstrance, reminding him that the slaughter of men neither engaged in war, nor enemies, nor even connected with Athens except by constraint, was disgraceful to one who came forth as the liberator of Greece—and that if he persisted, he would convert his friends into enemies, not his enemies into friends. So keenly did Alkidas feel this animadversion, that he at once liberated the remainder of his prisoners, several of them Chians; and then departed from Ephesus, taking his course across sea towards Krete and Peloponnesus. After much delay off the coast of Krete from stormy weather, which harassed and dispersed his fleet, he at length reached in safety the harbour of Kyllênê in Elis, where his scattered ships were ultimately reunited.¹

Thus inglorious was the voyage of the first Peloponnesian

¹ Thucyd. iii. 32, 33-69.

admiral who dared to enter that *Mare clausum* which passed for a portion of the territory of Athens.¹ But though he achieved little, his mere presence excited everywhere not less dismay, than astonishment: for the Ionic towns were all unfortified, and Alkididas might take and sack any one of them by sudden assault, even though unable to hold it permanently. Pressing messages reached Pachês from Erythræ and from several other places, while the Athenian triremes called Paralus and Salaminia (the privileged vessels which usually carried public and sacred deputations) had themselves seen the Peloponnesian fleet anchored at Ikarus, and brought him the same intelligence. Pachês, having his hands now free by the capture of Mitylênê, set forth immediately in pursuit of the intruder, whom he chased as far as the island of Patmos. It was there ascertained that Alkididas had finally disappeared from the eastern waters, and the Athenian admiral, though he would have rejoiced to meet the Peloponnesian fleet in the open sea, accounted it fortunate that they had not taken up a position in some Asiatic harbour—in which case it would have been necessary for him to undertake a troublesome and tedious blockade,² besides all the chances of revolt among the Athenian dependencies. We shall see how much, in this respect, depended upon the personal character of the Lacedæmonian commander, when we come hereafter to the expedition of Brasidas.

On his return from Patmos to Mitylênê, Pachês was induced to stop at Notium by the solicitations of some exiles. Notium was the port of Kolophon, from which it was at some little distance, as Peiræus was from Athens.³ About three years before, a violent internal dissension had taken place in Kolophon, and one of the parties, invoking the aid of the Persian Itamanes (seemingly one of the generals of the satrap Pissuthnês), had

Pachês, after the capture of Mitylênê, pursues the fleet of Alkididas, which returns to Peloponnesus without having done anything.

Pachês at Notium—he captures the place—his perfidy towards Hippias, the leader of the garrison.

¹ Thucyd. v. 65. 'Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἐλθόντες παρ' Ἀθηναίους ἐπεκάλουν ὅτι γεγραμμένον ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐκδόσεως μὴ εἶναι πολεμίους διέναι, ἑάσειαν κατὰ θάλασσαν (Λακεδαιμονίους) παραπλεῦσαι.

We see that the sea is here reckoned as a portion of the Athenian territory;

and even the portion of sea near to Peloponnesus—much more than on the coast of Ionia.

² Thucyd. iii. 33.

³ The dissensions between Notium and Kolophon are noticed by Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 2.

placed him in possession of the town ; whereupon the opposite party, forced to retire, had established itself separately and independently at Notium. But the Kolophonians who remained in the town soon contrived to procure a party in Notium, whereby they were enabled to regain possession of it, through the aid of a body of Arcadian mercenaries in the service of Pissuthnês. These Arcadians formed a standing garrison at Notium, in which they occupied a separate citadel or fortified space, while the town became again attached as harbour to Kolophon. A considerable body of exiles, however, expelled on that occasion, now invoked the aid of Pachês to reinstate them, and to expel the Arcadians. On reaching the place, the Athenian general prevailed upon Hippias the Arcadian captain to come forth to a parley, under the promise that, if nothing mutually satisfactory could be settled, he would again replace him "safe and sound" in the fortification. But no sooner had the Arcadian come forth to this parley, than Pachês, causing him to be detained under guard but without fetters or ill-usage, immediately attacked the fortification while the garrison were relying on the armistice, carried it by storm, and put to death both the Arcadians and the Persians who were found within. Having got possession of the fortification, he next brought Hippias again into it—"safe and sound," according to the terms of the convention, which was thus literally performed—and then immediately afterwards caused him to be shot with arrows and javelins. Of this species of fraud, founded on literal performance and real violation, of an agreement, there are various examples in Grecian history ; but nowhere do we read of a more flagitious combination of deceit and cruelty than the behaviour of Pachês at Notium. How it was noticed at Athens, we do not know : yet we remark, not without surprise, that Thucydidês recounts it plainly and calmly, without a single word of comment.¹

Notium was now separated from Kolophon, and placed in possession of those Kolophonians who were opposed to the Persian supremacy in the upper town. But as it had been, down to this time, a mere appendage of Kolophon and not a separate town, the Athenians soon afterwards sent Ækists and performed for it the cere-

Notium re-colonized from Athens as a separate town.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 34.

monies of colonization according to their own laws and customs, inviting from every quarter the remaining exiles of Kolophon.¹ Whether any new settlers went from Athens itself, does not appear. But the step was intended to confer a sort of Hellenic citizenship, and recognised collective personality, on the new-born town of Notium; without which, neither its Theôry or solemn deputation would have been admitted to offer public sacrifice, nor its private citizens to contend for the prize at Olympic and other great festivals.

Having cleared the Asiatic waters from the enemies of Athens, Pachês returned to Lesbos, reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresus, and soon found himself so completely master both of Mitylênê and the whole island as to be able to send home the larger part of his force; carrying with them as prisoners those Mitylenæans who had been deposited in Tenedos, as well as others prominently implicated in the late revolt, to the number altogether of rather more than a thousand. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, being recently detected in his place of concealment, was included among the prisoners transmitted.

Upon the fate of these prisoners the Athenians had now to pronounce. They entered upon the discussion in a temper of extreme wrath and vengeance. As to Salæthus, their resolution to put him to death was unanimous and immediate. They turned a deaf ear to his promises, assuredly delusive, of terminating the blockade of Plataea, in case his life was spared. What to do with Mitylênê and its inhabitants, was a point more doubtful, and was submitted to formal debate in the public assembly.

It is in this debate that Thucydidês first takes notice of Kleon, who is however mentioned by Plutarch as rising into importance some few years earlier, during the lifetime of Periklês. Under the great increase of trade and population in Athens and Peiræus during the last forty years, a new class of politicians seems to have grown up; men engaged in various descriptions of trade and manufacture, who began to rival more or less in

Pachês sends to Athens about a thousand Mitylenæan prisoners, the persons chiefly concerned in the late revolt, together with Salæthus.

Important debate in the Athenian assembly upon the treatment of the prisoners.

First mention of Kleon by Thucydides—new class of politicians to which he belonged.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 34; C. A. Pertz, Colophoniaca, p. 36. (Göttingen, 1848.)

importance the ancient families of Attic proprietors. This change was substantially analogous to that which took place in the cities of Mediæval Europe, when the merchants and traders of the various guilds gradually came to compete with, and ultimately supplanted, the patrician families in whom the supremacy had originally resided. In Athens, persons of ancient family and station enjoyed at this time no political privilege—since through the reforms of Ephialtēs and Periklēs, the political constitution had become thoroughly democratical. But they still continued to form the two highest classes in the Solonian census founded on property—the Pentakosiomedimni, and the Hippeis or Knights. New men enriched by trade doubtless got into these classes, but probably only in minority, and imbibed the feeling of the class as they found it, instead of bringing into it any new spirit. Now an individual Athenian of this class, though without any legal title to preference, yet when he stood forward as candidate for political influence, continued to be decidedly preferred and welcomed by the social sentiment at Athens, which preserved in its spontaneous sympathies distinctions effaced from the political code.¹ Besides this place ready prepared for him in the public sympathy, especially advantageous at the outset of political life—he found himself farther borne up by the family connexions, associations and political clubs, &c., which exercised very great influence both on the politics and the judicature of Athens, and of which he became a member as a matter of course. Such advantages were doubtless only auxiliary, carrying a man up to a certain point of influence, but leaving him to achieve the rest by his own personal qualities and capacity. But their effect was nevertheless very real, and those who, without possessing them, met and buffeted him in the public assembly contended against great disadvantages. A person of such low or middling station obtained no favourable presumptions or indulgence on the part of the public to meet him half-way; nor did he possess established connexions to encourage first successes, or help him out of early scrapes. He found others already in possession of ascendancy, and well-disposed to keep down new competitors; so that he had to win his own way unaided,

¹ Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλλεῖβιδης—ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὅν ἔτι τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἑλληνικῇ πόλει, ἐξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος. Compare Xenophon, Memorabil. i. 2, 25; iii. 6, 1.

from the first step to the last, by qualities personal to himself; by assiduity of attendance—by acquaintance with business—by powers of striking speech—and withal by unflinching audacity, indispensable to enable him to bear up against that opposition and enmity which he would incur from the high-born politicians and organised party-clubs, as soon as he appeared to be rising into importance.

The free march of political and judicial affairs raised up several such men, during the years beginning and immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. Even during the lifetime of Periklēs, they appear to have risen in greater or less numbers. But the personal ascendancy of that great man—who combined an aristocratical position with a strong and genuine democratical sentiment, and an enlarged intellect rarely found attached to either—impressed a peculiar character on Athenian politics. The Athenian world was divided into his partisans and his opponents, among each of whom there were individuals high-born and low-born—though the aristocratical party properly so called, the majority of wealthy and high-born Athenians, either opposed or disliked him. It is about two years after his death that we begin to hear of a new class of politicians—Eukratēs, the rope-seller—Kleon, the leather-seller—Lysiklēs, the sheep-seller—Hyperbolus, the lamp-maker;¹ the two first of whom must, however, have been already well-known as speakers in the Ekklesia even during the life-time of Periklēs. Among them all, the most distinguished was Kleon, son of Kleænetus.

Kleon acquired his first importance among the speakers against Periklēs, so that he would thus obtain for himself, during his early political career, the countenance of the numerous and aristocratical anti-Perikleans. He is described by Thucydidēs in general terms as a person of the most violent temper and character in Athens—as being dishonest in his calumnies, and virulent in his invective and accusation.² Aristophanēs, in his comedy of the Knights,

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 130 *seq.*, and Scholia; Eupolis, *Demi*, *Fragm.* xv. p. 466, ed. Meineke. See the remarks in Ranke, *Commentat. de Vitâ Aristophanis*, p. cccxxiv. *seq.*

² Thucyd. iii. 36. Κλέων—ὁν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἄλλα βιωτότατος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ

τῷ δήμῳ παραπολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανότατος.

He also mentions Kleon a second time two years afterwards, but in terms which also seem to imply a first introduction—μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ' ἐκεί-

reproduces these features with others new and distinct, as well as with exaggerated details, comic, satirical, and contemptuous. His comedy depicts Kleon in the point of view in which he would appear to the knights of Athens—a leather-dresser, smelling of the tan-yard—a low-born brawler, terrifying opponents by the violence of his criminations, the loudness of his voice, the impudence of his gestures—moreover as venal in his politics—threatening men with accusations and then receiving money to withdraw them—a robber of the public treasury—persecuting merit as well as rank—and courting the favour of the assembly by the basest and most guilty cajolery. The general attributes set forth by Thucydides (apart from Aristophanes, who does not profess to write history) we may reasonably accept—the powerful and violent invective of Kleon, often dishonest—together with his self-confidence and audacity in the public assembly. Men of the middling class, like Kleon and Hyperbolus, who persevered in addressing the public assembly and trying to take a leading part in it, against persons of greater family pretension than themselves, were pretty sure to be men of more than usual audacity. Without this quality, they would never have surmounted the opposition made to them. It is probable enough that they had it to a displeasing excess—and even if they had not, the same measure of self-assumption which in Alkibiades would be tolerated from his rank and station, would in them pass for insupportable impudence. Unhappily we have no specimens to enable us to appreciate the invective of Kleon. We cannot determine whether it was more virulent than that of Demosthenes and Æschines, seventy years afterwards; each of those eminent orators imputing to the other the grossest impudence, calumny, perjury, corruption, loud voice, and revolting audacity of manner, in language which Kleon can hardly have surpassed in intensity of vituperation, though he doubtless fell immeasurably short of it in classical finish. Nor can we even tell in what degree Kleon's denunciations of the veteran Perikles were fiercer than those memorable invectives against the old age of Sir Robert Walpole, with which Lord Chatham's political career opened. The talent for invective possessed

ἐν τῶν χρόνων ὧν καὶ τῷ πληθει πιθανώ- | —νομίζων καταφανέστερος ἂν εἶναι κα-
 τας, iv. 21-28; also v. 16: Κλέων | κουργῶν, καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων, &c.

by Kleon, employed first against Periklēs would be counted as great impudence by the partisans of that illustrious statesman, as well as by impartial and judicious citizens. But among the numerous enemies of Periklēs, it would be applauded as a burst of patriotic indignation, and would procure for the orator that extraneous support at first, which would sustain him until he acquired his personal hold on the public assembly.¹

By what degrees or through what causes that hold was gradually increased, we do not know. At the time when the question of Mitylênê came on for discussion, it had grown into a sort of ascendancy which Thucydidês describes by saying that Kleon was "at that time by far the most persuasive speaker in the eyes of the people." The fact of Kleon's great power of speech and his capacity of handling public business in a popular manner, is better attested than anything else respecting him, because it depends upon two witnesses both hostile to him—Thucydidês and Aristophanês. The assembly and the dikastery were Kleon's theatre and holding-ground: for the Athenian people taken collectively in their place of meeting—and the Athenian people taken individually—were not always the same person and had not the same mode of judgement: Demos sitting in the Pnyx was a different man from Demos sitting at home.² The lofty combination of qualities possessed by Periklēs exercised influence over both one and the other; but Kleon swayed considerably the former, without standing high in the esteem of the latter.

When the fate of Mitylênê and its inhabitants was submitted to the Athenian assembly, Kleon took the lead in the discussion. There never was a theme more perfectly suited to his violent temperament and power of fierce invective. Taken collectively, the case of Mitylênê presented a revolt as inexcusable and aggravated as any revolt could be. Indeed we have only to read the grounds of it, as set forth by the Mitylenæan speakers themselves

Indignation of the Athenians against Mitylênê—proposition of Kleon to put to death the whole male population of military age is carried and passed.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 33: 'Ἐπεφύετο δὲ καὶ Κλέων, ἥδη διὰ τῆς πρὸς ἐκείνον ὀργῆς τῶν πολιτῶν κορευόμενος εἰς τὴν δημαγωγίαν.

Periklēs was *δηχθεὶς αἰῶνι Κλέωνι*—in the words of the comic author Hermippus.

² Aristophan. Equit. 750.

before the Peloponnesians at Olympia, to be satisfied that such a proceeding, when looked at from the Athenian point of view, would be supposed to justify, and even to require, the very highest pitch of indignation. The Mitylenæans admit not only that they have no ground of complaint against Athens, but that they have been well and honourably treated by her, with special privilege. But they fear that she may oppress them in future: they hate the very principle of her empire, and eagerly instigate, as well as aid, her enemies to subdue her: they select the precise moment in which she has been worn down by a fearful pestilence, invasion, and cost of war. Nothing more than this would be required to kindle the most intense wrath in the bosom of an Athenian patriot. But there was yet another point which weighed as much as the rest, if not more. The revolvers had been the first to invite a Peloponnesian fleet across the Ægean, and the first to proclaim, both to Athens and her allies, the precarious tenure of her empire.¹ The violent Kleon would on this occasion find in the assembly an audience hardly less violent than himself, and would easily be able to satisfy them that anything like mercy to the Mitylenæans was treason to Athens. He proposed to apply to the captive city the penalties tolerated by the custom of war, in their harshest and fullest measure: to kill the whole Mitylenæan male population of military age, probably about 6000 persons—and to sell as slaves all the women and children.² The proposition, though strongly opposed by Diodotus and others, was sanctioned and passed by the assembly, and a trireme was forthwith despatched to Mitylénê, enjoining Pachês to put it in execution.³

Such a sentence was, in principle, nothing more than a very rigorous application of the received laws of war. Not merely the reconquered rebel, but even the prisoner of war (apart from any special convention) was at the mercy of his conqueror to be slain, sold, or admitted to ransom. We shall find the Lacedæmonians carrying out the maxim without the

Repentance of the Athenians after the decree is passed. A fresh assembly is convened to reconsider the decree.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 36. προσξυνεβάλετο οὐκ ἐλάχιστον τῆς ὀμῆς, &c.

² I infer this total number from the fact that the number sent to Athens by Pachês, as foremost instigators, was

rather more than 1000 (Thucyd. iii. 50). The total of ἡβῶντες or males of military age must have been (I imagine) six times this number.

³ Thucyd. iii. 36.

smallest abatement towards the Platæan prisoners in the course of a very short time. And doubtless the Athenian people—so long as they remained in assembly, under that absorbing temporary intensification of the common and predominant sentiment which springs from the mere fact of multitude—and so long as they were discussing the principle of the case,—What had Mitylênê deserved?—thought only of this view. Less than the most rigorous measure of war (they would conceive) would be inadequate to the wrong done by the Mitylenæans.

But when the assembly broke up—when the citizen, no longer wound up by sympathising companions and animated speakers in the Pnyx, subsided into the comparative quiescence of individual life—when the talk came to be, not about the propriety of passing such a resolution, but about the details of executing it—a sensible change, and marked repentance became presently visible. We must also recollect—and it is a principle of no small moment in human affairs, especially among a democratical people like the Athenians, who stand charged with so many resolutions passed and afterwards unexecuted—that the sentiment of wrath against the Mitylenæans had been really in part discharged by the mere *passing* of the sentence, quite apart from its execution; just as a furious man relieves himself from overboiling anger by imprecations against others, which he would himself shrink from afterwards realising. The Athenians, on the whole the most humane people in Greece (though humanity, according to our ideas, cannot be predicated of any Greeks), became sensible that they had sanctioned a cruel and frightful decree. Even the captain and seamen¹ to whom it was given to carry, set forth on their voyage with mournful repugnance. The Mitylenæan envoys present in Athens (who had probably been allowed to speak in the assembly and plead their own cause), together with those Athenians who had been proxeni and friends of Mitylênê, and the minority generally of the previous assembly—soon discerned, and did their best to

¹ Thucyd. iii. 36. Καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετὰ τοιαῦτα τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισμὸς, ὥμῶν τὸ βούλευμα καὶ μέγα ἐγγασθαι, πόλιν ὅλην διαφθεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους.

The feelings of the seamen, in the

trireme appointed to carry the order of execution, are a striking point of evidence in this case: τῆς προτέρας νεὸς οὐ σπουδῇ πλεούσης ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον, &c. (iii. 50).

foster, this repentance; which became during the course of the same evening so powerful as well as so wide-spread, that the Stratēgi acceded to the prayer of the envoys, and convoked a fresh assembly for the morrow to reconsider the proceeding. By so doing, they committed an illegality, and exposed themselves to the chance of impeachment. But the change of feeling among the people was so manifest as to overbear any such scruples.¹

Though Thucydides has given us only a short summary without any speeches, of what passed in the first assembly—yet as to this second assembly, he gives us at length the speeches both of Kleon and Diodotus—the two principal orators of the first also. We may be sure that this second assembly was in all points one of the most interesting and anxious of the whole war; and though we cannot certainly determine what were the circumstances which determined Thucydides in his selection of speeches, yet this cause, as well as the signal defeat of Kleon whom he disliked, may probably be presumed to have influenced him here.

Account of
the second
assembly
given by
Thucydides
—speech of
Kleon in sup-
port of the
resolution
already
passed.

That orator, coming forward to defend his proposition passed on the preceding day, denounced in terms of indignation the unwise tenderness and scruples of the people, who could not bear to treat their subject-allies, according to the plain reality, as men held only by naked fear. He dwelt upon the mischief and folly of reversing on one day what had been decided on the day preceding; also upon the guilty ambition of orators, who sacrificed the most valuable interests of the commonwealth, either to pecuniary gains, or to the personal credit of speaking with effect, triumphing over rivals, and setting up their own fancies in place of fact and reality. He deprecated the mistaken encouragement given to such delusions by a public “wise beyond what was written,” who came to the assembly, not to apply their good sense in judging of public matters, but merely for the delight of hearing speeches.² He re-stated the heinous and unprovoked

¹ Thucyd. iii. 36. As to the illegality, see Thucyd. vi. 14—which I think is good evidence to prove that there was illegality. I agree with Schömann on this point, in spite of the

doubts of Dr. Arnold.

² Thucyd. iii. 37. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι, τῶν τε ἀεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι . . . οἱ δ' ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ

wrong committed by the Mitylenæans—and the grounds for inflicting upon them that maximum of punishment which “justice” enjoined. He called for “justice” against them, nothing less, but nothing more; warning the assembly that the imperial necessities of Athens essentially required the constant maintenance of a sentiment of fear in the minds of unwilling subjects, and that they must prepare to see their empire pass away if they suffered themselves to be guided either by compassion for those who, if victors, would have no compassion on them¹—or by unseasonable moderation towards those who would neither feel nor requite it—or by the mere impression of seductive discourses. Justice against the Mitylenæans, not less than the strong political interests of Athens, required the infliction of the sentence decreed on the day preceding.²

The harangue of Kleon is in many respects remarkable.

Remarks on
the speech
of Kleon.

If we are surprised to find a man, whose whole importance resided in his tongue, denouncing so severely the licence and the undue influence of speech in the public assembly, we must recollect that Kleon had the advantage of addressing himself to the intense prevalent sentiment of the moment: that he could therefore pass off the dictates of this sentiment as plain, downright, honest sense and patriotism—while the opponents, speaking against the reigning sentiment and therefore driven to collateral argument, circumlocution, and more or less of manœuvre, might be represented as mere clever sophists, showing their talents in making the worse appear the better reason—if not actually bribed, at least unprincipled and without any sincere moral conviction. As this is a mode of dealing with questions, both of public concern and of private morality, not less common at present than it was in the time of the Peloponnesian war—to seize upon some strong and tolerably wide-spread sentiment among the public, to treat the dictates of that sentiment as

ταυτῶν ξυνέσει ἀμαθέστεροι μὲν τῶν νόμων ἀξιοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀδυνατώτεροι δὲ τοῦ καλῶς εἰπόντος μέμψασθαι λόγον.

Compare the language of Archidamus at Sparta in the congress, where he takes credit to the Spartans for being ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, &c. (Thucyd. i. 84)—very similar in spirit to the remarks of Kleon

about the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 40. μηδὲ τρισὶ τοῖς ἐξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτῳ, καὶ ἥδονῃ λόγων, καὶ ἐπικεικίᾳ, ἀμαρτάνειν.

² Thucyd. iii. 40. πειθόμενοι δὲ ἐμοὶ τὰ τε δίκαια ἐς Μιτυληναίους καὶ τὰ ἐξυμφορὰ ἅμα ποιήσετε· ἄλλως δὲ γνόντες τοῖς μὲν οὐ χαριεῖσθε, ὑμᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον δικαιοῦσθε.

plain common sense and obvious right, and then to shut out all rational estimate of coming good and evil as if it were unholy or immoral, or at best mere uncandid subtlety—we may well notice a case in which Kleon employs it to support a proposition now justly regarded as barbarous.

Applying our modern views to this proposition, indeed, the prevalent sentiment would not only not be in favour of Kleon, but would be irresistibly in favour of his opponents. To put to death in cold blood some six thousand persons, would so revolt modern feelings, as to overbalance all considerations of past misconduct in the persons to be condemned. Nevertheless the speech of Diodotus, who followed and opposed Kleon, not only contains no appeal to any such merciful predispositions, but even positively disclaims appealing to them: the orator deprecates, not less than Kleon, the influence of compassionate sentiment, or of a spirit of mere compromise and moderation.¹ He farther discards considerations of justice or the analogies of criminal judicature²—and rests his opposition

Speech of
Diodotus in
opposition to
Kleon—
second de-
cree miti-
gating the
former.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 48: compare the speech of Kleon, iii. 40. *ὅμοις δὲ γόνυτες ἀμείνω τάδε εἶναι, καὶ μήτε οἴκτω πλεονεῖμας μήτε ἐπιεικέα, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγὼ εὖ προσάγεσθαι, ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παραινούμενων, &c.*

Dr. Arnold distinguishes *οἴκτος* (or *ἔλεος*) from *ἐπιεικέα*, by saying that "the former is a feeling, the latter, a habit: *οἴκτος*, pity or compassion, may occasionally touch those who are generally very far from being *ἐπιεικεῖς*—mild or gentle. *Ἐπιεικέα* relates to all persons—*οἴκτος*, to particular individuals." The distinction here taken is certainly in itself just, and *ἐπιεικής* sometimes has the meaning ascribed to it by Dr. Arnold: but in this passage I believe it has a different meaning. The contrast between *οἴκτος* and *ἐπιεικέα* (as Dr. Arnold explains them) would be too feeble, and too little marked, to serve the purpose of Kleon and Diodotus. *Ἐπιεικέα* here rather means the disposition to stop short of your full rights; a spirit of fairness and adjustment; an abatement on your part likely to be requited by abatement on the part of your adversary: compare Thucyd. i. 76; iv. 19; v. 86; viii. 93.

² Thucyd. iii. 44. *ἐγὼ δὲ παρήλθον οὔτε ἀντερῶν περὶ Μιτυληναίων οὔτε*

κατηγορήσαν' οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἐκείνων ἀδικίας ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν, εἰ σωφρονούμεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας εὐβουλίας . . . δίκαιοτερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ (Κλέωνος) ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὴν νῦν ὁμετέραν ὀργὴν ἐς Μιτυληναίους, τάχα ἂν ἐπισπῶσατο' ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ δικάζομεθα πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ὥστε τῶν δικαίων δεῖν, ἀλλὰ βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως χρησίμως ἐξουσιν.

So Mr. Burke, in his speech on Conciliation with America (Burke's Works, vol. iii. p. 69-74), in discussing the proposition of prosecuting the acts of the refractory colonies as criminal, "The thing seems a great deal too big for my ideas of jurisprudence. It should seem, to my way of conceiving such matters, that there is a wide difference in reason and policy, between the mode of proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals, or even of bands of men who disturb order within the state—and the civil dissensions which may from time to time agitate the several communities which compose a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic, to apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great public contest. I do not know the method of drawing up an in-

altogether upon reasons of public prudence, bearing upon the future welfare and security of Athens.

He begins by vindicating¹ the necessity of reconsidering the resolution just passed, and insists on the mischief of deciding so important a question in haste or under strong passion. He enters a protest against the unwarrantable insinuations of corruption or self-conceit by which Kleon had sought to silence or discredit his opponents;² and then, taking up the question on the ground of public wisdom and prudence, he proceeds to show that the rigorous sentence decreed on the preceding day was not to be defended. That sentence would not prevent any other among the subject-allies from revolting, if they saw, or fancied that they saw, a fair chance of success: but it might perhaps drive them,³ if once embarked in revolt, to persist even to desperation, and bury themselves under the ruins of their city. While every means ought to be employed to prevent them from revolting, by precautions beforehand—it was a mistaken reckoning to try to deter them by enormity of punishment, inflicted afterwards upon such as were reconquered. In developing this argument, the speaker gives some remarkable views on the theory of punishment generally, and on the small addition obtained in the way of preventive effect, even by the greatest aggravation of the suffering inflicted upon the condemned criminal—views which might have passed as rare and profound even down to the last century.⁴ And he farther supports his argument by emphatically setting forth the impolicy of confounding the Mitylenæan Demos in the same punishment with their oligarchy: the revolt had been the act exclusively of the latter, and the former had not only taken no part in it, but as soon as they obtained posses-

dictment against a whole people," &c. —"My consideration is narrow, confined, and wholly limited to the policy of the question."

¹ Thucyd. iii. 42.

² Thucyd. iii. 43.

³ Thucyd. iii. 45, 46.

⁴ Compare this speech of Diodotus with the views of punishment implied by Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, where he is describing the government of Cyrus the younger:

"Nor can any man contend, that Cyrus suffered criminals and wrong-doers to laugh at him: he punished

them with the most unmeasured severity (*ἀπειδίοντα πάντων ἐπιμύπειν*). And you might often see along the frequented roads men deprived of their eyes, their hands and their feet: so that in his government, either Greek or barbarian, if he had no criminal purpose, might go fearlessly through and carry whatever he found convenient." (*Anabasis*, i. 9, 13.)

The severity of the punishment is in Xenophon's mind the measure both of its effects in deterring criminals, and of the character of the ruler inflicting it.

sion of arms, had surrendered the city spontaneously. In all the allied cities, it was the commons who were well-affected to Athens, and upon whom her hold chiefly depended against the doubtful fidelity of the oligarchies:¹ but this feeling could not possibly continue, if it were now seen that all the Mitylenæans indiscriminately were confounded in one common destruction. Diodotus concludes by recommending that those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent to Athens as chiefs of the revolt, should be put upon their trial separately; but that the remaining population should be spared.²

This speech is that of a man who feels that he has the reigning and avowed sentiment of the audience against him, and that he must therefore win his way by appeals to their reason. The same appeals however might have been made, and perhaps had been made, during the preceding discussion, without success. But Diodotus knew that the reigning sentiment, though still ostensibly predominant, had been silently undermined during the last few hours, and that the reaction towards pity and moderation, which had been growing up under it, would work in favour of his arguments, though he might disclaim all intention of invoking its aid. After several other discourses, both for and against,—the assembly came to a vote, and the proposition of Diodotus was adopted; but adopted by so small a majority, that the decision seemed at first doubtful.³

The trireme carrying the first vote had started the day before, and was already twenty-four hours on its way to Mitylênê. A second trireme was immediately put to sea bearing the new decree; yet nothing short of superhuman exertions could enable it to reach the condemned city, before the terrific sentence now on its way might be actually in course of execution. The Mitylenæan envoys stored the vessel well with provisions, promising large rewards to the crew if they arrived in time. An intensity of effort was manifested, without parallel in the history of Athenian seamanship. The oar was

Rapid
voyage of
the trireme
which
carries the
second de-
cree to Mity-
lênê—it
arrives just
in time to
prevent the
execution of
the first.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὐνοῦς ἐστὶ, καὶ ἂ οὐ ξυναφίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῇ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασσι πολέμιος εὐθὺς, καὶ τῆς ἀντικαθισ-
ταμένης πόλεως τὸ πλῆθος ξύμμαχον

ἐχούσας ἐς πόλεμον ἐπέρχεσθαι.

² Thucyd. iii. 48.

³ Thucyd. iii. 49. ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δ' ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου.

never once relaxed between Athens and Mitylênê—the rowers merely taking turns for short intervals of rest, with refreshment, of barley-meal steeped in wine and oil, swallowed on their seats. Luckily there was no unfavourable wind to retard them: but the object would have been defeated, if it had not happened that the crew of the first trireme were as slow and averse in the transmission of their rigorous mandate as those of the second were eager for the delivery of the reprieve in time. And after all, it came only just in time. The first trireme had arrived, the order for execution was actually in the hands of Pachês, and his measures were already preparing. So near was the Mitylenæan population to this wholesale destruction:¹ so near was Athens to the actual perpetration of an enormity which would have raised against her throughout Greece a sentiment of exasperation more deadly than that which she afterwards incurred even from the proceedings at Melos, Skiône and elsewhere. Had the execution been realised, the person who would have suffered most by it, and most deservedly, would have been the proposer Kleon. For if the reaction in Athenian sentiment was so immediate and sensible after the mere passing of the sentence, far more violent would it have been when they learnt that the deed had been irrevocably done, and when all its painful details were presented to their imaginations: and Kleon would have been held responsible as the author of that which had so disgraced them in their own eyes. As the case turned out, he was fortunate enough to escape this danger; and his proposition, to put to death those Mitylenæans whom Pachês had sent home as the active revolting party, was afterwards adopted and executed. It doubtless appeared so moderate, after the previous decree passed but rescinded, as to be adopted with little resistance, and to provoke no after-repentance: yet the men so slain were rather more than one thousand in number.²

Those Mitylenæans, whom Pachês had sent to Athens, are put to death—treatment of Mitylênê by the Athenians.

Besides this sentence of execution, the Athenians razed the fortifications of Mitylênê, and took possession of all her ships of war. In lieu of tribute, they farther established a new

¹ Thucyd. iii. 49. *παρὰ τοσούτων μὲν ἡ Μιτυλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου.*

² Thucyd. iii. 50.

permanent distribution of the land of the island ; all except Methymna, which had remained faithful to them. They distributed it into 3000 lots, of which 300 were reserved for consecration to the gods, and the remainder assigned to Athenian kleruchs, or proprietary settlers, chosen by lot among the citizens ; the Lesbian proprietors still remaining on the land as cultivating tenants, and paying to the Athenian kleruch an annual rent of two minæ (about seven pounds sixteen shillings sterling) for each lot. We should have been glad to learn more about this new land-settlement than the few words of the historian suffice to explain. It would seem that 2700 Athenian citizens with their families must have gone to reside, for the time at least, in Lesbos—as kleruchs : that is, without abnegating their rights as Athenian citizens, and without being exonerated either from Athenian taxation, or from personal military service. But it seems certain that these men did not continue long to reside in Lesbos. We may even suspect that the kleruchic allotment of the island must have been subsequently abrogated. There was a strip on the opposite mainland of Asia, which had hitherto belonged to Mitylênê ; this was now separated from that town, and henceforward enrolled among the tributary subjects of Athens.¹

¹ Thucyd. iii. 50 ; iv. 52. About the Lesbian kleruchs, see Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, B. iii. c. 18 ; Wachsmuth, *Hell. Alt.* i. 2, p. 36. These kleruchs must originally have gone thither as a garrison, as M. Boeckh remarks ; and may probably have come back, either all or a part, when needed for military service at home, and when it was ascertained that the island might be kept without them. Still however there is much which is puzzling in this arrangement. It seems remarkable that the Athenians, at a time when their accumulated treasure had been exhausted and when they were beginning to pay direct contributions from their private property, should sacrifice 5400 minæ (90 talents) annual revenue capable of being appropriated by the state, unless that sum were required to maintain the kleruchs as resident garrison for the maintenance of Lesbos. And as it turned out afterwards that their residence was not necessary, we may doubt whether the state did not

convert the kleruchic grants into a public tribute, wholly or partially.

We may farther remark, that if the kleruch be supposed a citizen resident at Athens, but receiving rent from his lot of land in some other territory—the analogy between him and the Roman colonist fails. The Roman colonists, though retaining their privileges as citizens, were sent out to reside on their grants of land, and to constitute a sort of resident garrison over the prior inhabitants, who had been despoiled of a portion of territory to make room for them.

See—on this subject and analogy—the excellent Dissertation of Madwig—*De jure et conditione coloniarum Populi Romani quæstio historica*—Madwig, *Opuscul.* Copenhag. 1834. Diss. viii. p. 246.

M. Boeckh and Dr. Arnold contend justly that at the time of the expedition of Athens against Syracuse and afterwards (Thucyd. vii. 57 ; viii. 23), there could have been but few, if any, Athe-

To the misfortunes of Mitylênê belongs, as a suitable appendix, the fate of Pachês the Athenian commander, whose perfidy at Notium has been recently recounted. It appears that having contracted a passion for two beautiful free women at Mitylênê, Hellânis and Lamaxis, he slew their husbands, and got possession of them by force. Possibly they may have had private friends at Athens, which must of course have been the case with many Mitylenæan families. At all events they repaired thither, bent on obtaining redress for this outrage, and brought their complaint against Pachês before the Athenian dikastery, in that trial of accountability to which every officer was liable at the close of his command. So profound was the sentiment which their case excited, in this open and numerous assembly of Athenian citizens, that the guilty commander, not waiting for sentence, slew himself with his sword in open court.¹

nian kleruchs resident in Lesbos. We might even push this argument farther, and apply the same inference to an earlier period, the eighth year of the war (Thucyd. iv. 75), when the Mitylenæan exiles were so active in their aggressions upon Antandrus and the other towns, originally Mitylenæan possessions, on the opposite mainland. There was no force near at hand on the part of Athens to deal with these exiles except the ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες. But had there been kleruchs at Mitylênê, they would probably have been able to defeat the exiles in their first attempts, and would certainly have been among the most important forces to put them down afterwards—whereas Thucydides makes no allusion to them.

Farther, the oration of Antipho (De Cæde Herod. c. 13) makes no allusion to Athenian kleruchs, either as resident in the island, or even as absentees receiving the annual rent mentioned by Thucydides. The Mitylenæan citizen, father of the speaker of that oration, had been one of those implicated (as he says, unwillingly) in the past revolt of the city against Athens: since the deplorable termination of that revolt, he had continued possessor of his Lesbian property, and continued also to discharge his obligations as well (choregic obligations—χορηγίας) towards Mitylênê as (his obligations of pecuniary payment

—τέλη) towards Athens. If the arrangement mentioned by Thucydides had been persisted in, this Mitylenæan proprietor would have paid nothing towards the city of Athens, but merely a rent of two minæ to some Athenian kleruch or citizen; which can hardly be reconciled with the words of the speaker as we find them in Antipho.

¹ See the Epigram of Agathias, 57, p. 377. Agathias ed. Bonn.

Ἑλλάνης τριμέλαιρα, καὶ ἁ χάρισσα Λάμαξι,
ἦσθην μὲν πάτρας φέγγα Λεσβιάδος.
Ὅκα δ' Ἀθηναίῳ σὺν ὀλεασιν ἐνθάδε πέλωσ
τὰν Μιτυληναίων γὰρ ἀλάπαζε Πάχης.
Τὰν κοῦρὰν ἀδίκως ἤρασσάτο, τοὺς δὲ συνεύοντες
ἔκτανεν, ὡς τήνας τῆδε βηρομένους.
Τοὶ δὲ κατ' Αἰγαίου ῥέου πλατὺ λαῖτμα φερίσθη.
καὶ ποτὶ τὰν κραναῇ Μοῖρῳν δραμέτην,
δάμψ δ' ἀγγέλεην ἀλιττήμονος ἔργα Πάχηςτος
μέσφα μιν εἰς ὀλῆην κτῆρα συνηλασάτην.
Τοια μὲν, ὦ κοῦρα, πεπονθήκατον· ἂψ δ' ἐπὶ πάτραν
ἦκετον, ἐν δ' αὐτῇ κείσθον ἀποφθιμένα.
Εἰς δὲ πόλιν ἀπὸνῆσθον, ἐπεὶ ποτὶ σάμα συνεύοντες
εὐτέον, ἐς κλεινὰς μῆμας σαφροσύνας.
Υμνεύουσιν δ' ἐπὶ πάντες ὁμόφρονες ἡρώϊας,
πάτρας καὶ ποσσὶν πῆματα τισαμένας.

Plutarch (Nikias, 6; compare Plutarch Aristeidês, c. 26) states the fact of Pachês having slain himself before the dikastery on occasion of this trial of accountability. Πάχητα τὸν ἔλοντα Λέσβον, δς, εὐθύνας δίδους τῆς στρατηγίας, ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δικαστηρίῳ σπασάμενος ἑλφος ἀνείλεν αὐτόν, &c.

The statement in Plutarch, and that in the Epigram hang together so per-

The surrender of Platæa to the Lacedæmonians took place not long after that of Mitylênê to the Athenians—somewhat later in the same summer. Though the escape of one-half of the garrison had made the provisions last longer for the rest, still their whole stock had now come to be exhausted, so that the remaining defenders were enfeebled and on the point of perishing by starvation. The Lacedæmonian commander of the blockading force, knowing their defenceless condition, could easily have taken the town by storm, had he not been forbidden by express orders from Sparta. For the Spartan government, calculating that peace might one day be concluded with Athens on terms of mutual cession of places acquired by war, wished to acquire Platæa, not by force but by capitulation and voluntary surrender, which would serve as an excuse for not giving it up: though such a distinction, between capture by force and by capitulation, not admissible in modern diplomacy, was afterwards found to tell against the Lacedæmonians quite as much as in their favour.¹ Acting upon these orders, the Lacedæmonian commander sent in a herald, summoning the Platæans to surrender voluntarily, and submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians as judges—with a stipulation “that the wrongdoers² should be punished, but that none should be punished unjustly.” To the besieged, in their state of hopeless starvation, all terms were nearly alike, and they accordingly surrendered the city. After a few days’ interval, during which they received nourishment from the blockading army, five

Surrender of
Platæa to the
Lacedæmo-
nians.

fectly well, that each lends authority to the other, and I think there is good reason for crediting the Epigram. The suicide of Pachês, and that too before the dikasts, implies circumstances very different from those usually brought in accusation against a general on trial. It implies an intensity of anger in the numerous dikasts greater than that which acts of peculation would be likely to raise, and such as to strike a guilty man with insupportable remorse and humiliation. The story of Lamaxis and Hellânis would be just of a nature to produce this vehement emotion among the Athenian dikasts. Moreover the words of the Epigram—*μέσφα μιν εἰς ὁλοὴν κῆρα συνηλασάτην*—are precisely applicable to a self-inflicted death. It

would seem by the Epigram, moreover, that even in the time of Agathias (A.D. 550—the reign of Justinian) there must have been preserved at Mitylênê a sepulchral monument commemorating this incident.

Schneider (ad Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 2) erroneously identifies this story with that of Doxander and the two *ἐπικληροί* whom he wished to obtain in marriage for his two sons.

¹ Thucyd. v. 17.

² Thucyd. iii. 32. *προστέμνεται δ' αὐτοῖς κήρυκα λέγοντα, εἰ βούλονται παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ἑκάστας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ δικασταῖς ἑκείνοις χρῆσασθαι, τοὺς τε ἀδίκους κολάζειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα.*

persons arrived from Sparta to sit in judgement upon their fate—one Aristomenidas, a Herakleid of the regal family.¹

The five Spartans having taken their seat as judges, doubtless in full presence of the blockading army, and especially with the Thebans, the great enemies of Plataea, by their side—the prisoners taken, 200 Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians, were brought up for trial or sentence. No accusation was preferred against them by any one: but the simple question was put to them by the judges—"Have you during the present war rendered any service to the Lacedæmonians or to their allies?" The Plataeans were confounded at a question alike unexpected and preposterous. It admitted but of one answer—but before returning any categorical answer at all, they entreated permission to plead their cause at length. In spite of the opposition of the Thebans,² their request was granted. Astymachus and Lakon (the latter, proxenus of Sparta at Plataea) were appointed to speak on behalf of the body. Possibly both these delegates may have spoken: if so, Thucydides has blended the two speeches into one.

A more desperate position cannot be imagined. The interrogatory was expressly so framed as to exclude allusion to any facts preceding the Peloponnesian war. But the speakers, though fully conscious how slight was their chance of success, disregarded the limits of the question itself, and while upholding with unshaken courage the dignity of their little city, neglected no topic which could touch the sympathies of their judges. After remonstrating against the mere mockery of trial and judgement to which they were submitted, they appealed to the Hellenic sympathies, and lofty reputation for commanding virtue, of the Lacedæmonians. They adverted to the first alliance of Plataea with Athens, concluded at the recommendation of the Lacedæmonians themselves, who had then declined, though formally solicited, to undertake the protection of the town against Theban oppression. They next turned to the Persian war, wherein Plataean patriotism towards Greece

Speech of the Plataean deputies to these judges on behalf of themselves and their comrades.

¹ Pausan. iii. 9, 1.

² Thucyd. iii. 60. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐκείνοις ἂν ἀποκρίσεως. αὐτῶν here means the Thebans.

was not less conspicuous than Theban treason¹—to the victory gained over the Persians on their soil, whereby it had become hallowed under the promises of Pausanias and by solemn appeals to the local gods. From the Persian war they passed on to the flagitious attack made by the Thebans on Platæa, in the midst of the truce. They did not omit to remind the judges of an obligation personal to Sparta—the aid which they had rendered, along with the Athenians, to Sparta, when pressed by the revolt of the Helots at Ithômè. This speech is as touching as any which we find in Thucydides; the skill of it consisting in the frequency with which the hearers are brought back, time after time, and by well-managed transitions, to these same topics.² And such was the impression which it seemed to make on the five Lacedæmonian judges, that the Thebans near at hand found themselves under the necessity of making a reply to it: although we see plainly that the whole scheme of proceeding—the formal and insulting question, as well as the sentence destined to follow upon answer given—had been settled beforehand between them and the Lacedæmonians.

The Theban speakers contended that the Platæans had deserved, and brought upon themselves by their own fault, the enmity of Thebes—that they had stood forward earnestly against the Persians, only because Athens had done so too—and that the merit, whatever it might be, which they had thereby acquired, was counterbalanced and cancelled by their having allied themselves with Athens afterwards for the oppression and enslavement of the Æginetans, and of other Greeks equally conspicuous for zeal against Xerxes, and equally entitled to protection under the promises

Reply of the
Thebans.

¹ See this point emphatically set forth in Orat. xiv. called *Λόγος Πλαταικός*, of Isokratēs, p. 308, sect. 62.

The whole of that oration is interesting to be read in illustration of the renewed sufferings of the Platæans near fifty years after this capture.

² Thucyd. iii. 54-59. Dionysius of Halikarnassus bestows especial commendation on the speech of the Platæan orator (De Thucyd. Hist. Judic. p. 921). Concurring with him as to its merits, I do not concur in the opinion which he expresses, that it is less artistically put

together than those other harangues which he considers inferior.

Mr. Mitford doubts whether these two orations are to be taken as approximating to anything really delivered on the occasion. But it seems to me that the means possessed by Thucydides for informing himself of what was actually said at this scene before the captured Platæa, must have been considerable and satisfactory: I therefore place full confidence in them, as I do in most of the other harangues in his work, so far as the substance goes.

of Pausanias. The Thebans went on to vindicate their nocturnal surprise of Plataea, by maintaining that they had been invited by the most respectable citizens of the town,¹ who were anxious only to bring back Plataea from its alliance with a stranger to its natural Bœotian home—and that they had abstained from anything like injurious treatment of the inhabitants, until constrained to use force in their own defence. They then reproached the Plataeans, in their turn, with that breach of faith whereby ultimately the Theban prisoners in the town had been put to death. And while they excused their alliance with Xerxes, at the time of the Persian invasion, by affirming that Thebes was then under a dishonest party-oligarchy, who took this side for their own factious purposes, and carried the people with them by force—they at the same time charged the Plataeans with permanent treason against the Bœotian customs and brotherhood.² All this was farther enforced by setting forth the claims of Thebes to the gratitude of Lacedæmon, both for having brought Bœotia into the Lacedæmonian alliance at the time of the battle of Korôneia, and having furnished so large a portion of the common force in the war then going on.³

The discourse of the Thebans, inspired by bitter and as yet unsatisfied hatred against Plataea, proved effectual: or rather it was superfluous—the minds of the Lacedæmonians having before been made up. After the proposition twice made by Archidamus to the Plataeans, inviting them to remain neutral and even offering to guarantee their neutrality—after the solemn apologetic protest tendered by him upon their refusal, to the gods, before he began the siege—the Lacedæmonians conceived themselves exonerated from all obligation to respect the sanctity of the place;⁴ looking upon the inhabitants as having

The Plataeans are sentenced to death by the Lacedæmonian judges, and all slain.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 65.

² Thucyd. iii. 66. τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πατρία—iii. 62. ἔξω τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πατρία.

³ Thucyd. iii. 61-68. It is probable that the slaughter of the Theban prisoners taken in the town of Plataea was committed by the Plataeans in breach of a convention concluded with the Thebans: and on this point therefore the Thebans had really ground to complain.

Respecting this convention, however, there were two conflicting stories, between which Thucydides does not decide: see Thucyd. ii. 3, 4, and this History, above, chap. xlviii.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 68; ii. 74. To construe the former of these passages (iii. 68) as it now stands, is very difficult, if not impossible: we can only pretend to give what seems to be its substantial meaning.

voluntarily renounced their inviolability and sealed their own ruin. Hence the importance attached to that protest, and the emphatic detail with which it is set forth in Thucydidēs. The five judges, as their only reply to the two harangues, again called the Platæans before them, and repeated to every one of them individually the same question which had before been put. Each of them, as he successively replied in the negative,¹ was taken away and killed, together with the twenty-five Athenian prisoners. The women captured were sold as slaves: and the town and territory of Platæa were handed over to the Thebans, who at first established in them a few oligarchical Platæan exiles, together with some Megarian exiles—but after a few months, recalled this step, and blotted out Platæa,² as a separate town and territory, from the muster-roll of Hellas. Having pulled down all the private buildings, they employed the materials to build a vast barrack all round the Heræum or temple of Hêrê, 200 feet in every direction, with apartments of two stories above and below; partly as accommodation for visitors to the temple, partly as an abode for the tenant-farmers or graziers who were to occupy the land. A new temple, of 100 feet in length, was also built in honour of Hêrê, and ornamented with couches prepared from the brass and iron furniture found in the private houses of the Platæans.³ The Platæan territory was let out for ten years, as public property belonging to Thebes, and was hired by private Theban cultivators.

Such was the melancholy fate of Platæa, after sustaining a blockade of about two years.⁴ Its identity and local traditions

¹ Diodorus (xii. 56) in his meagre abridgement of the siege and fate of Platæa, somewhat amplifies the brevity and simplicity of the question as given by Thucydidēs.

² Thucyd. iii. 57. *θμᾶς δὲ (you Spartans) καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ πανοικησίᾳ διὰ Θεβαίων (Πλάταιαν) ἐξῆλασαν.*

³ Thucyd. iii. 69.

⁴ Demosthenēs (or the Pseudo-Demosthenēs), in the oration against Neæra (p. 1380, c. 25), says that the blockade of Platæa was continued for *ten* years before it surrendered—*ἐπολιόρουν αὐτοὺς διπλῇ τείχει περιτειχίσαντες δέκα ἔτη*. That the real duration of the blockade was only *two* years, is most certain: accordingly several eminent

critics—Palmerius, Wasse, Duker, Taylor, Auger, &c., all with one accord confidently enjoin us to correct the text of Demosthenēs from *δέκα* to *δύο*. “*Re-pone fidenter δύο*”—says Duker.

I have before protested against corrections of the text of ancient authors grounded upon the reason which all these critics think so obvious and so convincing; and I must again renew the protest here. It shows how little the principles of historical evidence have been reflected upon, when critics can thus concur in forcing dissentient witnesses into harmony, and in substituting a true statement of their own in place of an erroneous statement which one of these witnesses gives them. And in the present instance, the principle adopted

were extinguished, and the sacrifices, in honour of the deceased victors who had fought under Pausanias, suspended—which the Platæan speakers had urged upon the Lacedæmonians as an impiety not to be tolerated,¹ and which perhaps the latter would hardly have consented to under any other circumstances, except from an anxious desire of conciliating the Thebans in their prominent antipathy. It is in this way that Thucydides explains the conduct of Sparta, which he pronounces to have been rigorous in the extreme.² And in truth it was more rigorous, considering only the principle of the case and apart from the number of victims, than even the first unexecuted sentence of Athens against the Mitylenæans. For neither Sparta, nor even Thebes, had any fair pretence for considering Platæa as a revolted town, whereas Mitylênê was a city which had revolted under circumstances peculiarly offensive to Athens. Moreover Sparta promised trial and justice to the Platæans on their surrender: Pachês promised nothing to the Mitylenæans except that their fate should be reserved for the decision of the Athenian people. This little city—interesting from its Hellenic patriotism, its grateful and tenacious attachments, and its unmerited suffering—now existed only in the persons of its citizens harboured at Athens. We shall find it hereafter restored, destroyed again, and finally again restored: so chequered was the fate of a little Grecian state swept away by the contending politics of greater neighbours. The slaughter of the twenty-five Athenian prisoners like that of Salæthus by the Athenians, was not beyond the rigour admitted and tolerated, though not always practised on both sides—towards prisoners of war.

We have now gone through the circumstances, painfully illustrating the manners of the age, which followed on the surrender of Mitylênê and Platæa. We next pass to the west of Greece—the island of Korkyra—where we shall find scenes not less bloody, and even more revolting.

by these critics is the less defensible, because the Pseudo-Demosthenês introduces a great many other errors and inaccuracies respecting Platæa, besides his mistake about the duration of the siege. The ten years' siege of Troy was constantly present to the imagination of these literary Greeks.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 59.

² Thucyd. iii. 69. σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν περὶ Πλαταιῶν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὕτως ἀποτετραμμένοι ἐγένοντο Θεβαίων ἕνεκα, νομίζοντες ἐς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἔρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι.

It has been already mentioned,¹ that in the naval combats between the Corinthians and Korkyræans during the year before the Peloponnesian war, the former had captured 250 Korkyræan prisoners, men of the first rank and consequence in the island. Instead of following the impulse of blind hatred in slaughtering their prisoners, the Corinthians displayed, if not greater humanity, at least a more long-sighted calculation. They had treated the prisoners well, and made every effort to gain them over, with a view of employing them on the first opportunity to effect a revolution in the island—to bring it into alliance with Corinth,² and disconnect it from Athens. Such an opportunity appears first to have occurred during the winter or spring of the present year, while both Mitylênê and Platæa were under blockade; probably about the time when Alkidas departed for Ionia, and when it was hoped that not only Mitylênê would be relieved, but the neighbouring dependencies of Athens excited to revolt, and her whole attention thus occupied in that quarter. Accordingly the Korkyræan prisoners were then sent home from Corinth, nominally under a heavy ransom of 800 talents, for which those Korkyræan citizens who acted as proxeni to Corinth made themselves responsible.³ The proxeni, lending themselves thus to the deception, were doubtless participant in the entire design.

Circumstances of Korkyra—the Korkyræan captives are sent back from Corinth, under agreement to effect a revolution in the government and foreign politics of the island.

But it was soon seen in what form the ransom was really to be paid. The new-comers, probably at first heartily welcomed after so long a detention, employed all their influence, combined with the most active personal canvass, to bring about a complete rupture of alliance with Athens. Intimation being sent to Athens of what was going on, an Athenian trireme arrived with envoys to try and defeat these manœuvres; while a Corinthian trireme also brought envoys from Corinth to aid the views of the opposite party. The mere presence of Corinthian envoys indicated a change in the political feeling of the island. But still more conspicuous did this change become, when a formal public assembly, after hearing both envoys, decided—that Korkyra would maintain her alliance with

¹ See above, chap. xlvii.

² Thucyd. i. 55.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70: compare Diodor. xii. 57.

Athens according to the limited terms of simple mutual defence originally stipulated ;¹ but would at the same time be in relations of friendship with the Peloponnesians, as she had been before the Epidamnian quarrel. Since that event, however, the alliance between Athens and Korkyra had become practically more intimate, and the Korkyræan fleet had aided the Athenians in the invasion of Peloponnesus.² Accordingly, the resolution now adopted abandoned the present to go back to the past—and to a past which could not be restored.

Looking to the war then raging between Athens and the Peloponnesians, such a declaration was self-contradictory. It was intended by the oligarchical party only as a step to a more complete revolution, both foreign and domestic. They followed it up by a political prosecution against Peithias, the citizen of greatest personal influence among the people, who acted by his own choice as proxenus to the Athenians. They accused him of practising to bring Korkyra into slavery to Athens. What were the judicial institutions of the island, under which he was tried, we do not know : but he was acquitted of the charge. He then revenged himself by accusing in his turn five of the richest among his oligarchical prosecutors, of the crime of sacrilege—of having violated the sanctity of the sacred grove of Zeus and Alkinous, by causing stakes, for their vine-props, to be cut in it.³ This was an act distinctly forbidden by law, under a penalty of a stater or four drachms for every stake so cut. But it is no uncommon phenomenon, even in societies

Their attempts to bring about a revolution—they prosecute the democratical leader Peithias—he prosecutes five of them in revenge—they are found guilty.

¹ Thucyd. i. 44.

² Thucyd. ii. 25.

³ Thucyd. iii. 70. φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τεμένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνοῦ ζημία δὲ καθ' ἐκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ.

The present tense, *τέμνειν*, seems to indicate that they were going on habitually making use of the trees in the grove for this purpose. Probably it is this cutting and fixing of stakes to support the vines, which is meant by the word *χαρακισμός* in Pherekratēs, Pers. ap. Athenæum. vi. p. 269.

The Oration of Lysias (Or. vii.) against Nikomachus, ὑπὲρ τοῦ σηκοῦ

ἀπολογία, will illustrate this charge made by Peithias at Korkyra. There were certain ancient olive trees near Athens, consecrated and protected by law, so that the proprietors of the ground on which they stood were forbidden to grub them up, or to dig so near as to injure the roots. The speaker in that oration defends himself against a charge of having grubbed up one of these and sold the wood. It appears that there were public visitors whose duty it was to watch over these old trees : see the note of Markland on that oration, p. 270.

politically better organised than Korkyra, to find laws existing and unrepealed, yet habitually violated, sometimes even by every one, but still oftener by men of wealth and power, whom most people would be afraid to prosecute. Moreover in this case, no individual was injured by the act, so that any one who came forward to prosecute would incur the odium of an informer—which probably Peithias might not have chosen to brave under ordinary circumstances, though he thought himself justified in adopting this mode of retaliation against those who had prosecuted him. The language of Thucydides implies that the fact was not denied : nor is there any difficulty in conceiving that these rich men may have habitually resorted to the sacred property for vine-stakes. On being found guilty and condemned, they cast themselves as suppliants at the temples, and entreated the indulgence of being allowed to pay the fine by instalments. But Peithias, then a member of the (annual) senate, to whom the petition was referred, opposed it, and caused its rejection, leaving the law to take its course. It was moreover understood that he was about to avail himself of his character of senator—and of his increased favour, probably arising from the recent judicial acquittal—to propose in the public assembly a reversal of the resolution recently passed ; together with a new resolution, to recognise only the same friends and the same enemies as Athens.

Pressed by the ruinous fine upon the five persons condemned, as well as by the fear that Peithias might carry his point and thus completely defeat their project of Corinthian alliance, the oligarchical party resolved to carry their point by violence and murder. They collected a party armed with daggers, burst suddenly into the senate-house during full sitting, and there slew Peithias with sixty other persons, partly senators, partly private individuals. Some others of his friends escaped the same fate by getting aboard the Attic trireme which had brought the envoys, and which was still in the harbour, but now departed forthwith to Athens. These assassins, under the fresh terror arising from their recent act, convoked an assembly, affirmed that what they had done was unavoidable to guard Korkyra against being made the slave of Athens, and proposed a resolution of full neutrality both towards Athens and towards the Pelo-

They assassinate Peithias and several other senators, and make themselves masters of the government—they decree neutrality—their unavailing mission to Athens.

ponnesians—permitting no visit from either of the belligerents, except of a pacific character and with one single ship at a time. And this resolution the assembly was constrained to pass—it probably was not very numerous, and the oligarchical partisans were at hand in arms.¹ At the same time they sent envoys to Athens, to communicate the recent events with such colouring as suited their views, and to dissuade the fugitive partisans of Peithias from provoking any armed Athenian intervention, such as might occasion a counter-revolution in the island.² With some of the fugitives, representations of this sort, or perhaps the fear of compromising their own families left behind, prevailed. But most of them, and the Athenians along with them, appreciated better both what had been done and what was likely to follow. The oligarchical envoys, together with such of the fugitives as had been induced to adopt their views, were seized by the Athenians as conspirators, and placed in detention at Ægina; while a fleet of sixty Athenian triremes under Eurymedon was immediately fitted out to sail for Korkyra—for which there was the greater necessity, as the Lacedæmonian fleet under Alkidas, lately mustered at Kyllênê after its return from Ionia, was understood to be on the point of sailing thither.³

But the oligarchical leaders at Korkyra having little faith in the chances of this mission to Athens, proceeded in the execution of their conspiracy with that rapidity which was best calculated to ensure its success. On the arrival of a Corinthian trireme—which brought ambassadors from Sparta, and probably also brought news that the fleet of Alkidas would shortly appear—they organised their force, and attacked the people and the democratical authorities. The Korkyræan Demos were at first vanquished and dispersed. But during the night they collected together and fortified themselves in the upper parts of the town near the acropolis, and from thence down to the Hyllaic harbour—one of the two harbours which the town possessed; while the other harbour and the chief arsenal, facing the mainland of Epirus, was held by the

The oligarchical party at Korkyra attack the people—obstinate battle in the city—victory of the people—arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 71. ὡς δὲ εἶπον, καὶ ἐπικυρώσαι ἡνάρκασαν τὴν γνώμην.
² Thucyd. iii. 71. καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ κατα-

πέφυγόντας πείσοντας μὴδὲν ἀνεκτιθέων πράσσειν, ὅπως μὴ τις ἐπιστροφή γένηται.
³ Thucyd. iii. 80.

oligarchical party, together with the market-place near to it, in and around which the wealthier Korkyræans chiefly resided. In this divided state the town remained throughout the ensuing day, during which the Demos sent emissaries round the territory soliciting aid from the working slaves, and promising to them emancipation as a reward; while the oligarchy also hired and procured 800 Epirotic mercenaries from the mainland. Reinforced by the slaves, who flocked in at the call received, the Demos renewed the struggle on the morrow more furiously than before. Both in position and numbers they had the advantage over the oligarchy, and the intense resolution with which they fought communicated itself even to the women, who, braving danger and tumult, took active part in the combat, especially by flinging tiles from the housetops. Towards the afternoon the people became decidedly victorious, and were even on the point of carrying by assault the lower town, together with the neighbouring arsenal. The oligarchy had no other chance of safety except the desperate resource of setting fire to that part of the town, with the market-place, houses, and buildings all around it, their own among the rest. This proceeding drove back the assailants, but destroyed much property belonging to merchants in the warehouses, together with a large part of the town; indeed had the wind been favourable, the entire town would have been consumed. The people being thus victorious, the Corinthian trireme, together with most of the Epirotic mercenaries, thought it safer to leave the island; while the victors were still farther strengthened on the ensuing morning by the arrival of the Athenian admiral Nikostratus, with twelve triremes from Naupaktus,¹ and 500 Messenian hoplites.

Nikostratus did his best to allay the furious excitement prevailing, and to persuade the people to use their victory with moderation. Under his auspices a convention of amnesty and peace was concluded between the contending parties, save only ten proclaimed individuals, the most violent oligarchs, who were to be tried as ringleaders. These men of course soon disappeared, so that there would have been no trial at all, which seems to have been what Nikostratus desired. At the same time an

Moderation
of Niko-
stratus—
proceedings
of the
people to-
wards the
vanquished
oligarchs.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 74, 75.

alliance offensive and defensive was established between Korkyra and Athens, and the Athenian admiral was then on the point of departing, when the Korkyræan leaders entreated him to leave with them, for greater safety, five ships out of his little fleet of twelve—offering him five of their own triremes instead. Notwithstanding the peril of this proposition to himself, Nikostratus acceded to it; and the Korkyræans, preparing the five ships to be sent along with him, began to enroll among the crews the names of their principal enemies. To the latter this presented the appearance of sending them to Athens, which they accounted a sentence of death. Under such impression they took refuge as suppliants in the temple of the Dioskuri, where Nikostratus went to visit them, and tried to reassure them by the promise that nothing was intended against their personal safety. But he found it impossible to satisfy them, and as they persisted in refusing to serve, the Korkyræan Demos began to suspect treachery. They took arms again, searched the houses of the recusants for arms, and were bent on putting some of them to death, if Nikostratus had not taken them under his protection. The principal men of the defeated party, to the number of about 400, now took sanctuary in the temple and sacred ground of Hêrê; upon which the leaders of the people, afraid that in this inviolable position they might still cause farther insurrection in the city, opened a negotiation and prevailed upon them to be ferried across to the little island immediately opposite to the Heræum; where they were kept under watch, with provisions regularly transmitted across to them for four days.¹

At the end of these four days, while the uneasiness of the popular leaders still continued, and Nikostratus still adjourned his departure, a new phase opened in this melancholy drama. The Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas arrived at the road of Sybota on the opposite mainland—fifty-three triremes in number, since the forty triremes brought back from Ionia had been reinforced by thirteen more from Leukas and Ambrakia. Moreover the Lacedæmonians had sent down Brasidas as advising companion—himself worth more than

Arrival of the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, with a fleet of fifty-three triremes. Renewed terror and struggle in the island.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 75, 76.

the new thirteen triremes, if he had been sent to supersede Alkidas, instead of bringing nothing but authority to advise.¹ Despising the small squadron of Nikostratus, then at Nau-paktus, the Spartans were only anxious to deal with Korkyra before reinforcements should arrive from Athens; but the repairs necessary for the ships of Alkidas, after their disastrous voyage home, occasioned an unfortunate delay. When the Peloponnesian fleet was seen approaching from Sybota at break of day, the confusion in Korkyra was unspeakable. The Demos and the newly emancipated slaves were agitated alike by the late terrible combat and by fear of the invaders—the oligarchical party, though defeated, was still present, forming a considerable minority—and the town was half-burnt. Amidst such elements of trouble, there was little authority to command, and still less confidence or willingness to obey. Plenty of triremes were indeed at hand, and orders were given to man sixty of them forthwith—while Nikostratus, the only man who preserved the cool courage necessary for effective resistance, entreated the Korkyræan leaders to proceed with regularity, and to wait till all were manned, so as to sail forth from the harbour in a body. He offered himself with his twelve Athenian triremes to go forth first alone, and occupy the Peloponnesian fleet, until the Korkyræan sixty triremes could all come out in full array to support him. He accordingly went forth with his squadron, but the Korkyræans, instead of following his advice, sent their ships out one by one and without any selection of crews. Two of them deserted forthwith to the enemy, while others presented the spectacle of crews fighting among themselves: even those which actually joined battle came up by single ships, without the least order or concert.

The Peloponnesians soon seeing that they had little to fear from such enemies, thought it sufficient to set twenty of their ships against the Korkyræans, while with the remaining thirty-three they moved forward to contend with the twelve Athenians. Nikostratus, having plenty of sea-room, was not afraid of this numerical superiority; the more so as two of his twelve triremes were the picked vessels of the Athenian navy—the Salaminia and

Naval battle
off Korkyra
between
Nikostratus
and
Alkidas.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 69-76.

the Paralus.¹ He took care to avoid entangling himself with the centre of the enemy, and to keep rowing about their flanks; and as he presently contrived to disable one of their ships, by a fortunate blow with the beak of one of his vessels, the Peloponnesians, instead of attacking him with their superior numbers, formed themselves into a circle and stood on the defensive, as they had done in the first combat with Phormio in the middle of the Gulf at Rhium. Nikostratus (like Phormio) rowed round this circle, trying to cause confusion by feigned approach, and waiting to see some of the ships lose their places or run foul of each other, so as to afford him an opening for attack. And he might perhaps have succeeded, if the remaining twenty Peloponnesian ships, seeing the proceeding and recollecting with dismay the success of a similar manœuvre in the former battle, had not quitted the Korkyræan ships, whose disorderly condition they despised, and hastened to join their comrades. The whole fleet of fifty-three triremes now again took the aggressive, and advanced to attack Nikostratus, who retreated before them, but backing astern and keeping the head of his ships towards the enemy. In this manner he succeeded in drawing them away from the town, so as to leave to most of the Korkyræan ships opportunity for getting back to the harbour; while such was the superior manœuvring of the Athenian triremes, that the Peloponnesians were never able to come up with him or force him to action. They returned back in the evening to Sybota, with no greater triumph than their success against the Korkyræans, thirteen of whose triremes they carried away as prizes.²

It was the expectation in Korkyra, that they would on the morrow make a direct attack (which could hardly have failed of success) on the town and harbour. We may easily believe (what report afterwards stated) that Brasidas advised Alkidas to this decisive proceeding. The Korkyræan leaders, more terrified than ever, first removed their prisoners from the little island to the Heræum, and then tried to come to a compromise with the oligarchical party generally, for

Confusion and defenceless state of Korkyra—Alkidas declines to attack it—arrival of the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon—flight of Alkidas.

¹ These two triremes had been with Pachês at Lesbos (Thucyd. iii. 33): immediately on returning from thence, they must have been sent round to join Niko-

stratus at Naupaktus. We see in what constant service they were kept.

² Thucyd. iii. 77, 78, 79.

the purpose of organising some effective and united defence. Thirty triremes were made ready and manned, wherein some even of the oligarchical Korkyræans were persuaded to form part of the crews.

But the slackness of Alkidas proved their best defence. Instead of coming straight to the town, he contented himself with landing in the island at some distance from it, on the promontory of Leukimnê: after ravaging the neighbouring lands for some hours, he returned to his station at Sybota. He had lost an opportunity which never again returned: for on the very same night the fire signals of Leukas telegraphed to him the approach of the fleet under Eurymedon from Athens—sixty triremes. His only thought was now for the escape of the Peloponnesian fleet, which was in fact saved by this telegraphic notice. Advantage was taken of the darkness to retire close along the land as far as the isthmus which separates Leukas from the mainland—across which isthmus the ships were dragged by hand or machinery, so that they might not fall in with, or be descried by, the Athenian fleet in sailing round the Leukadian promontory. From hence Alkidas made the best of his way home to Peloponnesus, leaving the Korkyræan oligarchs to their fate.¹

That fate was deplorable in the extreme. The arrival of Eurymedon opens a third unexpected transition in this chequered narrative—the Korkyræan Demos passing, abruptly and unexpectedly, from intense alarm and helplessness to elate and irresistible mastery. In the bosom of Greeks, and in a population seemingly amongst the least refined of all Greeks—including too a great many slaves just emancipated against the will of their masters, and of course the fiercest and most discontented of all the slaves in the island—such a change was but too sure to kindle a thirst for revenge almost ungovernable, as the only compensation for foregone terror and suffering.

Vengeance
of the vic-
torious
Demos in
Korkyra
against the
prostrate
oligarchs—
fearful
bloodshed.

As soon as the Peloponnesian fleet was known to have fled and that of Eurymedon was seen approaching, the Korkyræan leaders brought into the town the 500 Messenian hoplites who had hitherto been encamped without; thus providing a

¹ Thucyd. iii. 80.

resource against any last effort of despair on the part of their interior enemies. Next, the thirty ships recently manned—and held ready in the harbour facing the continent, to go out against the Peloponnesian fleet, but now no longer needed—were ordered to sail round to the other or Hyllaic harbour. Even while they were thus sailing round, some obnoxious men of the defeated party, being seen in public, were slain. But when the ships arrived at the Hyllaic harbour, and the crews were disembarked, a more wholesale massacre was perpetrated, by putting to death those individuals of the oligarchical faction who had been persuaded on the day before to go aboard as part of the crews.¹ Then came the fate of those suppliants, about 400 in number, who had been brought back from the islet opposite, and were still under sanctuary in the sacred precinct of the Heræum. It was proposed to them to quit sanctuary and stand their trial. Fifty of them accepted the proposition, were put on their trial—all condemned, and all executed. Their execution took place, as it seems, immediately on the spot, and within actual view of the unhappy men still remaining in the sacred ground;² who, seeing that their lot was desperate, preferred dying by their own hands to starvation or the sword of their enemies. Some hung themselves on branches of the trees surrounding the temple, others helped their friends in the work of suicide, and in one way or another the entire band thus perished. It was probably a consolation to them to believe, that this desecration of the precinct would bring down the anger of the gods upon their surviving enemies.

Eurymedon remained with his fleet for seven days, during all which time the victorious Korkyræans carried on a sanguinary persecution against the party who had been concerned in the late oligarchical revolution. Five hundred of this party

¹ Thucyd. iii. 80, 81. καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν, ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι, ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπεχάρησαν. It is certain that the reading ἀπεχάρησαν here must be wrong: no satisfactory sense can be made out of it. The word substituted by Dr. Arnold is ἀνεχρῶντο—that preferred by Gölter is ἀπεχρῶντο—others recommend ἀπεχρήσαντο—Hermann adopts ἀπεχάρισαν—and Dionysius in his copy reads ἀνεχάρησαν. I follow the meaning of the words proposed by Dr. Ar-

nold and Gölter, which appear to be both equivalent to ἐκτείνον. This meaning is at least plausible and consistent; though I do not feel certain that we have the true sense of the passage.

² Thucyd. iii. 81. οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὥς ἑσθίων τὰ γινόμενα, διέφθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, &c. The meagre abridgement of Diodorus (xii. 57), in reference to these events in Korkyra, is hardly worth notice.

contrived to escape by flight to the mainland : while those who did not, or could not, flee, were slain wherever they could be found. Some received their death-wounds even on the altar itself—others shared the same fate, after having been dragged away from it by violence.

Lawless and
ferocious
murders—
base con-
nivance
of Eury-
medon.

In one case a party of murderers having pursued their victims to the temple of Dionysus, refrained from shedding their blood, but built up the doorway and left them to starve ; as the Lacedæmonians had done on a former occasion respecting Pausanias. Such was the ferocity of the time, that in one case a father slew his own son. It was not merely the oligarchical party who thus suffered : the flood-gates of private feud were also opened, and various individuals, under false charges of having been concerned in the oligarchical movements, were slain by personal enemies or debtors. This deplorable suspension of legal, as well as moral restraints, continued during the week of Eurymedon's stay—a period long enough to satiate the fierce sentiment out of which it arose ;¹ yet without any apparent effort on his part to soften the victors or protect the vanquished. We shall see farther reason hereafter to appreciate the baseness and want of humanity in his character. Had Nikostratus remained in command, we may fairly presume, judging by what he had done in the earlier part of the sedition with very inferior force, that he would have set much earlier limits to the Korkyræan butchery ; unfortunately, Thucydidēs tells us nothing at all about Nikostratus, after the naval battle of the preceding day.²

¹ Thucyd. iii. 85. *Οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς Ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο, &c.*

² In reading the account of the conduct of Nikostratus, as well as that of Phormio in the naval battles of the preceding summer, we contract a personal interest respecting both of them. Thucydidēs does not seem to have anticipated that his account would raise such a feeling in the minds of his readers, otherwise he probably would have mentioned something to gratify it. Respecting Phormio, his omission is the more remarkable ; since we are left to infer, from the request made by the Akarnanians to have his son sent as commander, that he must have died or

become disabled : yet the historian does not distinctly say so (iii. 7).

The Scholiast on Aristophanēs (Pac. 347) has a story that Phormio was asked by the Akarnanians, but that he could not serve in consequence of being at that moment under sentence for a heavy fine, which he was unable to pay : accordingly the Athenians contrived a means of evading the fine, in order that he might be enabled to serve. It is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with the story of Thucydidēs, who says that the son of Phormio went instead of his father.

Compare Meineke, *Hist. Critic. Comic. Græc.* vol. i. p. 144, and *Fragment. Eupolid.* vol. ii. p. 527. Phormio was introduced as a chief character in

Band of oligarchical fugitives escape to the mainland—afterwards land again on the island, and establish themselves on Mount Istônê.

We should have been glad to hear something about the steps taken in the way of restoration or healing, after this burst of murderous fury, in which doubtless the newly emancipated slaves were not the most backward—and after the departure of Eurymedon. But here again Thucydidês disappoints our curiosity. We only hear from him, that the oligarchical exiles who had escaped to the mainland were strong enough to get possession of the forts and most part of the territory there belonging to Korkyra; just as the exiles from Samos and Mitylênê became more or less completely masters of the Peræa or mainland possessions belonging to those islands. They even sent envoys to Corinth and Sparta, in hopes of procuring aid to accomplish their restoration by force; but their request found no favour, and they were reduced to their own resources. After harassing for some time the Korkyræans in the island by predatory incursions, so as to produce considerable dearth and distress, they at length collected a band of Epirotic mercenaries, passed over to the island, and there established a fortified position on the mountain called Istônê, not far from the city. Having burnt their vessels in order to cut off all hopes of retreat, they maintained themselves for near two years by a system of ravage and plunder which inflicted great misery on the island.¹ This was a frequent way whereby, of old, invaders wore out and mastered a city, the walls of which they found impregnable. The ultimate fate of these occupants of Istônê, which belongs to a future chapter, will be found to constitute a close suitable to the bloody drama yet unfinished in Korkyra.

Political reflections introduced by Thucydidês on occasion of the Korkyræan massacre.

Such a drama could not be acted, in an important city belonging to the Greek name, without producing a deep and extensive impression throughout all the other cities. And Thucydidês has taken advantage of it to give a sort of general sketch of Grecian politics during the Peloponnesian war; violence of civil discord in each city, aggravated by foreign war, and by the contending efforts of Athens and Sparta,—the former espousing the democratical party everywhere; the latter, the oligarchi-

the Ταλαρχοί of Eupolis; as a brave, rough, straightforward soldier, something like Lamachus in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 85.

cal. The Korkyræan sedition was the first case in which these two causes of political antipathy and exasperation were seen acting with full united force, and where the malignity of sentiment and demoralisation flowing from such a union was seen without disguise. The picture drawn by Thucydidēs of moral and political feeling under these influences, will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher. He has conceived and described the perverting causes with a spirit of generalisation which renders these two chapters hardly less applicable to other political societies far distant both in time and place (especially, under many points of view, to France between 1789 and 1799) than to Greece in the fifth century before the Christian æra. The deadly bitterness infused into intestine party contests by the accompanying dangers of foreign war and intervention of foreign enemies—the mutual fears between political rivals, where each thinks that the other will forestal him in striking a mortal blow, and where constitutional maxims have ceased to carry authority either as restraint or as protection—the superior popularity of the man who is most forward with the sword, or who runs down his enemies in the most unmeasured language, coupled with the disposition to treat both prudence in action and candour in speech as if it were nothing but treachery or cowardice—the exclusive regard to party ends, with the reckless adoption, and even admiring preference, of fraud or violence as the most effectual means—the loss of respect for legal authority as well as of confidence in private agreement, and the surrender even of blood and friendship to the overruling ascendancy of parties—the perversion of ordinary morality, bringing with it altered signification of all the common words importing blame or approbation—the unnatural predominance of the ambitious and contentious passions, overpowering in men's minds all real public objects, and equalising for the time the better and the worse cause, by taking hold of democracy on one side, and aristocracy on the other, as mere pretences to sanctify personal triumph—all these gloomy social phænomena, here indicated by the historian, have their causes deeply seated in the human mind, and are likely, unless the bases of constitutional morality shall come to be laid more surely and firmly than they have hitherto been, to recur from time to time,

under diverse modifications, "so long as human nature shall be the same as it is now," to use the language of Thucydides himself.¹ He has described, with fidelity not inferior to his sketch of the pestilence at Athens, the symptoms of a certain morbid political condition, wherein the vehemence of intestine conflict, instead of being kept within such limits as consists with the maintenance of one society among the contending parties, becomes for the time inflamed and poisoned with all the unscrupulous hostility of foreign war, chiefly from actual alliance between parties within the state and foreigners without. In following the impressive description of the historian, we have to keep in mind the general state of manners in his time, especially the cruelties tolerated by the laws of war, as compared with that greater humanity and respect for life which has grown up during the last two centuries in modern Europe. And we have farther to recollect that if he had been describing the effects of political fury among Carthaginians and Jews, instead of among his contemporary Greeks, he would have added, to his list of horrors, mutilation, crucifixion, and other refinements on simple murder.

The language of Thucydides is to be taken rather as a generalisation and concentration of phænomena which he had observed among different communities, than as belonging altogether to any one of them. I do not believe—what a superficial reading of his opening words might at first suggest—that the bloodshed in Korkyra was only the earliest, but by no means the worst, of a series of similar horrors spread over the Grecian world. The facts stated in his own history suffice to show that though the same causes, which worked upon this unfortunate island, became disseminated and produced analogous mischiefs throughout many other communities—yet the case of Korkyra, as it was the first, so it was also the worst and most aggravated in point of intensity. Fortunately the account of Thucydides enables us to understand it from beginning

The political enormities of Korkyra were the worst that occurred in the whole war.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 82. γυγνόμενα μὲν καὶ δεῖ ἐσόμενα ὥς ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὥς ἂν ἑκασταὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντοχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται, &c.

The many obscurities and perplexi-

ties of construction which pervade these memorable chapters, are familiar to all readers of Thucydides, ever since Dionysius of Halikarnassus, whose remarks upon them are sufficiently severe (Judic. de Thucyd. p. 883).

to end, and to appreciate the degree of guilt of the various parties implicated, which we can seldom do with certainty ; because when once the interchange of violence has begun, the feelings arising out of the contest itself presently overpower in the minds of both parties the original cause of dispute, as well as all scruples as to fitness of means. Unjustifiable acts in abundance are committed by both, and in comparing the two, we are often obliged to employ the emphatic language which Tacitus uses respecting Otho and Vitellius—"deteriorum fore, quisquis vicisset"—of two bad men all that the Roman world could foresee was, that the victor, whichever he was, would prove the worst.

But in regard to the Korkyræan revolution, we can arrive at a more discriminating criticism. We see that it is from the beginning the work of a selfish oligarchical party, playing the game of a foreign enemy, and the worst and most ancient enemy, of the island,—aiming to subvert the existing democracy and acquire power for themselves—and ready to employ any measure of fraud or violence for the attainment of these objects. While the democracy which they attack is purely defensive and conservative, the oligarchical movers, having tried fair means in vain, are the first to employ foul means, which latter they find retorted with greater effect against themselves. They set the example of judicial prosecution against Peithias, for the destruction of a political antagonist ; in the use of this same weapon, he proves more than a match for them, and employs it to their ruin. Next, they pass to the use of the dagger in the senate-house against him and his immediate fellow-leaders, and to the wholesale application of the sword against the democracy generally. The Korkyræan Demos are thus thrown upon the defensive. Instead of the affections of ordinary life, all the most intense anti-social sentiments—fear, pugnacity, hatred, vengeance,—obtain unqualified possession of their bosoms ; exaggerated too through the fluctuations of victory and defeat, successively brought by Nikostratus, Alkidas, and Eurymedon. Their conduct as victors is such as we should expect under such maddening circumstances, from coarse men mingled with liberated slaves. It is vindictive and murderous in the extreme, not without faithless breach of

How these enormities began and became exaggerated. Conduct of the opposing parties.

assurances given. But we must remember that they are driven to stand upon their defence, and that all their energies are indispensable to make that defence successful. They are provoked by an aggression no less guilty in the end than in the means—an aggression, too, the more gratuitous, because, if we look at the state of the island at the time when the oligarchical captives were restored from Corinth, there was no pretence for affirming that it had suffered, or was suffering, any loss, hardship, or disgrace, from its alliance with Athens. These oligarchical insurgents find the island in a state of security and tranquillity—since the war imposed upon it little necessity for effort. They plunge it into a sea of blood, with enormities as well as suffering on both sides, which end at length in their own complete extermination. Our compassion for their final misery must not hinder us from appreciating the behaviour whereby it was earned.

In the course of a few years from this time, we shall have occasion to recount two political movements in Athens similar in principle and general result to this Korkyræan revolution; exhibiting oligarchical conspirators against an existing and conservative democracy—with this conspiracy at first successful, but afterwards put down and the Demos again restored. The contrast between Athens and Korkyra under such circumstances will be found highly instructive, especially in regard to the Demos, both in the hours of defeat and in those of victory. It will then be seen how much the habit of active participation in political and judicial affairs,—of open, conflicting discussion, discharging the malignant passions by way of speech, and followed by appeal to the vote—of having constantly present, to the mind of every citizen in his character of *Dikast* or *Ekklesiast*, the conditions of a pacific society, and the paramount authority of a constitutional majority—how much all these circumstances, brought home as they were at Athens more than in any other democracy to the feelings of individuals, contributed to soften the instincts of intestine violence and revenge, even under very great provocation.

Contrast
between the
bloody
character of
revolutions
at Korkyra
and the
mild char-
acter of
analogous
phenomena
at Athens.

But the case of Korkyra, as well as that of Athens, different in so many respects, conspire to illustrate another truth, of much importance in Grecian history. Both of them show how

false and impudent were the pretensions set up by the rich and great men of the various Grecian cities, to superior morality, superior intelligence, and greater fitness for using honourably and beneficially the powers of government, as compared with the mass of the citizens. Though the Grecian oligarchies, exercising powerful sway over fashion, and more especially over the meaning of words, bestowed upon themselves the appellation of "the best men, the honourable and good, the elegant, the superior," &c., and attached to those without their own circle epithets of a contrary tenor, implying low moral attributes—no such difference will be found borne out by the facts of Grecian history.¹ Abundance of infirmity, with occasional bad passions, was doubtless liable to work upon the people generally, often corrupting and misguiding even the Athenian democracy, the best apparently of all the democracies in Greece. But after all, the rich and great men were only a part of the people, and taking them as a class (apart from honourable individual exceptions) by no means the best part. If exempted by their position from some of the vices which beset smaller and poorer men, they imbibed from that same position an unmeasured self-importance—and an excess of personal ambition as well as of personal appetite—peculiar to themselves, not less anti-social in tendency, and operating upon a much grander scale. To the prejudices and superstitions belonging to the age, they were noway superior, considering them as a class; while their animosities among one another, virulent and unscrupulous, were among the foremost causes of misfortune in Grecian commonwealths. Indeed, many of the most exceptionable acts committed by the democracies, consisted in their allowing themselves to be made the tools of one aristocrat for the ruin of another. Of the intense party-selfishness which characterized them as a body, sometimes exaggerated into the strongest anti-popular antipathy, as we see in the famous oligarchical oath cited by Aristotle,²—we shall find many illustrations as we advance in the history, but none more striking than this Korkyræan revolution.

Bad morality
of the
rich and
great men
throughout
the Grecian
cities.

¹ See the valuable preliminary discourse, prefixed to Welcker's edition of Theognis, page xxi. sect. 9 seq.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 7, 19. Καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλευέσω δ, τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM THE TROUBLES IN KORKYRA, IN THE FIFTH YEAR
OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE END OF
THE SIXTH YEAR.

ABOUT the same time as the troubles of Korkyra occurred, Nikias, the Athenian general, conducted an armament against the rocky island of Minôa, which lay at the mouth of the harbour of Megara, and was occupied by a Megarian fort and garrison. The narrow channel, which separated it from the Megarian port of Nisæa and formed the entrance of the harbour, was defended by two towers projecting out from Nisæa, which Nikias attacked and destroyed by means of battering machines from his ships. He thus cut off Minôa from communication on that side with the Megarians, and fortified it on the other side, where it communicated with the main land by a lagoon bridged over with a causeway. Minôa thus becoming thoroughly insulated was more completely fortified and made an Athenian possession; since it was eminently convenient to keep up an effective blockade against the Megarian harbour, which the Athenians had hitherto done only from the opposite shore of Salamis.¹

Though Nikias, son of Nikeratus, had been for some time conspicuous in public life, and is said to have been more than once Stratêgus along with Periklês, this is the first occasion on which Thucydidês introduces him to our notice. He was now one of the Stratêgi or generals of the commonwealth, and appears to have enjoyed, on the whole, a greater and more constant personal esteem than any citizen of Athens, from the present time down to his death. In wealth and in family, he ranked among the first class of Athenians: in political

¹ Thucyd. iii. 51. See the note of Dr. Arnold, and the plan embodied in his work, for the topography of Minôa, which has now ceased to be an island, and is a hill on the mainland near the shore.

character Aristotle placed him, together with Thucydides son of Melêsias and Theramenês, above all other names in Athenian history—seemingly even above Periklês.¹

Such a criticism, from Aristotle, deserves respectful attention, though the facts before us completely belie so lofty an estimate. It marks, however, the position occupied by Nikias in Athenian politics, as the principal person of what may be called the oligarchical party, succeeding Kimon and Thucydides, and preceding Theramenês. In looking to the conditions under which this party continued to subsist, we shall see that during the interval between Thucydides (son of Melêsias) and Nikias, the democratical forms had acquired such confirmed ascendancy, that it would not have suited the purpose of any politician to betray evidence of positive hostility to them, prior to the Sicilian expedition and the great embarrassment in the foreign relations of Athens which arose out of that disaster. After that change, the Athenian oligarchs became emboldened and aggressive, so that we shall find Theramenês among the chief conspirators in the revolution of the Four Hundred. But Nikias represents the oligarchical party in its previous state of quiescence and torpidity, accommodating itself to a sovereign democracy, and existing in the form of common sentiment rather than of common purposes. And it is a remarkable illustration of the real temper of the Athenian people, that a man of this character, known as an oligarch but not feared as such, and doing his duty sincerely to the democracy, should have remained until his death the most esteemed and influential man in the city.

Varying circumstances and condition of the oligarchical party at Athens.

Nikias was a man of even mediocrity, in intellect, in education, and in oratory: forward in his military duties, and not only personally courageous in the field, but hitherto found competent as a general under ordinary circumstances:² assiduous, too, in the discharge of all political duties at home, especially in the post of Stratêgus or one of the ten generals of the state, to which he was frequently chosen and re-chosen.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 2, 3.

² Καίτοι ἔγωγε καὶ τιμῶμαι ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτου (says Nikias in the Athenian assembly, Thucyd. vi. 9) καὶ ἥσσαν ἐτέρων περὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ σώματι ὁρῶντων νομίζων ὁμοίως ἀγαθὸν πολί-

την εἶναι, ὅς ἂν καὶ τοῦ σώματός τι καὶ τῆς οὐσίας προνοήται.

The whole conduct of Nikias before Syracuse, under the most trying circumstances, more than bears out this boast.

Of the many valuable qualities combined in his predecessor Periklēs, the recollection of whom was yet fresh in the Athenian mind, Nikias possessed two, on which, most of all, his influence rested,—though, properly speaking, that influence belongs to the sum total of his character, and not to any special attributes in it: First, he was thoroughly incorruptible as to pecuniary gains—a quality so rare in Grecian public men of all the cities, that when a man once became notorious for possessing it, he acquired a greater degree of trust than any superiority of intellect could have bestowed upon him: next, he adopted the Periklean view as to the necessity of a conservative or stationary foreign policy for Athens, avoiding new acquisitions at a distance, adventurous risks, or provocation to fresh enemies. With this important point of analogy there were at the same time material differences between them even in regard to foreign policy. Periklēs was a conservative, resolute against submitting to loss or abstraction of empire, but at the same time refraining from aggrandisement: Nikias was in policy faint-hearted, averse to energetic effort for any purpose whatever, and disposed not only to maintain peace, but even to purchase it by considerable sacrifices. Nevertheless, he was the leading champion of the conservative party of his day, always powerful at Athens: and as he was constantly familiar with the details and actual course of public affairs, capable of giving full effect to the cautious and prudential point of view, and enjoying unqualified credit for honest purposes—his value as a permanent counsellor was steadily recognised, even though in particular cases his counsel might not be followed.

Besides these two main points, which Nikias had in common with Periklēs, he was perfect in the use of minor and collateral modes of standing well with the people, which that great man had taken but little pains to practise. While Periklēs attached himself to Aspasia, whose splendid qualities did not redeem in the eyes of the public either her foreign origin or her unchastity, the domestic habits of Nikias appear to have been strictly conformable to the rules of Athenian decorum. Periklēs was surrounded by philosophers, Nikias by prophets—whose advice was necessary both as a consolation to his tem-

Points of analogy between Nikias and Periklēs—material differences.

Care of Nikias in maintaining his popularity and not giving offence; his very religious character.

perament and a guide to his intelligence under difficulties. One of them was constantly in his service and confidence, and his conduct appears to have been sensibly affected by the difference of character between one prophet and another,¹ just as the government of Louis XIV. and other Catholic princes has been modified by the change of confessors. To a life thus rigidly decorous and ultra-religious—both eminently acceptable to the Athenians—Nikias added the judicious employment of a large fortune with a view to popularity. Those liturgies (or expensive public duties undertaken by rich men each in his turn, throughout other cities of Greece as well as in Athens) which fell to his lot were performed with such splendour, munificence, and good taste, as to procure for him universal encomiums; and so much above his predecessors as to be long remembered and extolled. Most of these liturgies were connected with the religious service of the state, so that Nikias, by his manner of performing them, displayed his zeal for the honour of the gods at the same time that he laid up for himself a store of popularity. Moreover the remarkable caution and timidity—not before an enemy, but in reference to his own fellow-citizens—which marked his character, rendered him pre-eminently scrupulous as to giving offence or making personal enemies. While his demeanour towards the poorer citizens generally was equal and conciliating, the presents which he made were numerous, both to gain friends and to silence assailants. We are not surprised to hear, that various bullies, whom the comic writers turn to scorn, made their profit out of this susceptibility. But most assuredly Nikias as a public man, though he might occasionally be cheated out of money, profited greatly by reputation thus acquired.

The expenses unavoidable in such a career, combined with strict personal honesty, could not have been defrayed except by another quality, which ought not to count as discreditable to Nikias, though in this too he stood distinguished from Periklês. He was a careful and diligent money-getter, a speculator in the silver-mines of Laurium, and proprietor of

¹ Thucyd. vii. 50; Plutarch, Nikias, *μονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει μισθὸν ἐμπροσθεν*. This is suggested by c. 4, 5, 23. *Τῷ μάλιστα Νικίᾳ συνεγένετο τότε μηδὲ μάλιστα εἶναι ἐμπειρὸν· ὁ γὰρ συνέφησεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ πολὺ τῆς δεισιδαι-*

μονίας ἀφαιρῶν Στιλβίδης ἐτεθνήκει μισθὸν ἐμπροσθεν. This is suggested by Plutarch as an excuse for mistakes on the part of Nikias.

one thousand slaves, whom he let out for work in them, receiving a fixed sum per head for each. The superintending slaves who managed the details of this business were men of great ability and high pecuniary value.¹ Most of the wealth of Nikias was held in this form, and not in landed property. Judging by what remains to us of the comic authors, this must have been considered as a perfectly gentlemanlike way of making money: for while they abound with derision of the leather-dresser Kleon, the lamp-maker Hyperbolus, and the vegetable-selling mother to whom Euripidēs owes his birth, we hear nothing from them in disparagement of the slave-letter Nikias.

The degree to which the latter was thus occupied with the care of his private fortune, together with the general moderation of his temper, made him often wish to abstract himself from public duty. But such unambitious reluctance, rare among the public men of the day, rather made the Athenians more anxious to put him forward and retain his services. In the eyes of the Pentakosiomedimni and the Hippeis, the two richest classes in Athens, he was one of themselves—and on the whole the best man, as being so little open to reproach or calumny, whom they could oppose to the leather-dressers and lamp-makers, who often out-talked them in the public assembly. The hoplites who despised Kleon—and did not much regard even the brave, hardy, and soldierlike Lamachus, because he happened to be poor²—respected in Nikias the union of wealth and family with honesty, courage, and carefulness in command. The maritime and trading multitude esteemed him as a decorous, honest, religious gentleman, who gave splendid choregies, treated the poorest men with consideration, and never turned the public service into a job for his own profit—who moreover, if he possessed no commanding qualities, so as to give to his advice imperative and irresistible authority, was yet always worthy of being consulted, and a steady safeguard against public mischief. Before the fatal Sicilian expedition, he had never commanded on any very

¹ Xenophon. Memorab. ii. 5, 2; Xenophon, de Vectigalibus, iv. 14.

² Thucyd. v. 7; Plutarch, Alkibiadēs, c. 21. 'Ο γὰρ Λάμαχος ἦν μὲν πολεμ-

κὸς καὶ ἀνδράδης, ἀξίωμα δ' οὐ προσήν οὐδ' ὄγκος αὐτῷ διὰ πένιαν: compare Plutarch, Nikias, c. 15.

serious or difficult enterprise ; but what he had done had been accomplished successfully ; so that he enjoyed the reputation of a fortunate as well as a prudent commander.¹ He appears to have acted as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians at Athens ; probably by his own choice and among several others.

The first half of the political life of Nikias,—after the time when he rose to enjoy full consideration in Athens, being already of mature age—was in opposition to Kleon ; the last half, in opposition to Alkibiadēs. To employ terms which are not fully suitable to the Athenian democracy, but which yet bring to view the difference intended to be noted better than any others, Nikias was a minister or ministerial man, often actually exercising, and always likely to exercise, official functions—Kleon was a man of the opposition, whose province it was to supervise and censure official men for their public conduct. We must divest these words of that accompaniment which they are understood to carry in English political life—a standing parliamentary majority in favour of one party : Kleon would often carry in the public assembly resolutions, which his opponents Nikias and others of like rank and position—who served in the posts of Stratēgus, ambassador, and other important offices designated by the general vote—were obliged against their will to execute.

Nikias first opposed to Kleon—next to Alkibiadēs. Oligarchical clubs or Hetæries at Athens, for political and judicial purposes.

In attaining such offices they were assisted by the political clubs, or established *conspiracies* (to translate the original literally) among the leading Athenians to stand by each other both for acquisition of office and for mutual insurance under judicial trial. These clubs, or Hetæries, must have played an important part in the practical working of Athenian politics, and it is much to be regretted that we are possessed of no details respecting them. We know that in Athens they were thoroughly oligarchical in disposition²—while equality,

¹ Thucyd. v. 16. Νικίας πλείστα τὸν τότε εὐ φερόμενος ἐν στρατηγίαις—Νικίας μὲν βουλόμενος, ἐν ᾧ ἀπαθὴς ἦν καὶ ἡξιούτο, διασώσασθαι τὴν εὐτυχίαν, &c.—vi. 17. ἕως ἡγὰρ τε (Alkibiadēs) ἔτι ἀκμάζω μετ' αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας εὐτυχὴς δοκεῖ εἶναι, &c.

² Thucyd. viii. 54. Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας, ἅσπερ ἐτύγγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ

ἀρχαῖς, ἀπώσας ἐπελθὼν, καὶ παρακλευσάμενος ὥπως ξυστραφέντες καὶ κοινῇ βουλευσάμενοι καταλύσουσι τὸν δῆμον, καὶ τὰλλα παρασκευάσας, &c.

After having thus organised the Hetæries, and brought them into co-operation for his revolutionary objects against the democracy, Peisander departed from Athens to Samos : on his return he finds that these Hetæries have been very

or something near to it, in rank and position, must have been essential to the social harmony of the members. In some towns, it appears that such political associations existed under the form of *gymnasia*¹ for the mutual exercise of the members, or of *syssitia* for joint banquets. At Athens they were numerous, and doubtless not habitually in friendship with each other; since the antipathies among different oligarchical men were exceedingly strong, and the union brought about between them at the time of the Four Hundred, arising only out of common desire to put down the democracy, lasted but a little while. But the designation of persons to serve in the capacity of *Stratēgus* and other principal offices greatly depended upon them—as well as the facility of passing through that trial of accountability to which every man was liable after his year of office. *Nikias*, and men generally of his rank and fortune, helped by these clubs and lending help in their turn, composed what may be called the ministers, or executive individual functionaries of Athens: the men who acted, gave orders as to specific acts, and saw to the execution of that which the senate and the public assembly resolved. Especially in regard to the military and naval force of the city, so large and so actively employed at this time, the powers of detail possessed by the *Stratēgi* must have been very great, and essential to the safety of the state.

While *Nikias* was thus in what may be called ministerial function, *Kleon* was not of sufficient importance to attain the

actively employed, and had made great progress towards the subversion of the democracy: they had assassinated the demagogue *Androklēs* and various other political enemies—*οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πείσανδρον—ἦλθον ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, καὶ καταλαμβάνουσι τὰ πλείστα τοῖς ἑταίροις προεργασμένα, &c. (viii. 65).*

The political *ἑταίρεια* to which *Alkibiadēs* belonged is mentioned in *Isokratēs*, *De Bigis*, Or. xvi. p. 348, sect. 6. λέγοντες ὡς ὁ πατήρ συνάγοι τὴν ἑταιρείαν ἐπὶ νεωτέροις πράγμασι. Allusions to these *ἑταιρείαι* and to their well-known political and judicial purposes (unfortunately they are only allusions) are found in *Plato*, *Theætet.* c. 79, p. 173. σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς, &c.: also *Plato*, *Legg.* ix. c. 3, p. 856; *Plato*, *Republic.* ii. c. 8, p. 365, where they are men-

tioned in conjunction with *συννομῆσαι*—ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαμβάνειν συννομῆσας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάγομεν—also in *Pseudo-Andokidēs* cont. *Alkibiad.* c. 2, p. 112. Compare the general remarks of *Thucydides*, iii. 82, and *Demosthenēs* cont. *Stephan.* ii. p. 1157.

Two Dissertations, by Messrs. *Vischer* and *Büttner*, collect the scanty indications respecting these *Hetæries*, together with some attempts to enlarge and speculate upon them, which are more ingenious than trustworthy (*Die Oligarchische Partei und die Hetairien in Athen*, von W. Vischer. Basel, 1836; *Geschichte der politischen Hetairien zu Athen*, von Hermann Büttner. Leipsic, 1840).

¹ About the political workings of the *Syssitia* and *Gymnasia*, see *Plato*, *Legg.* i. p. 636; *Polybius*, xx. 6.

same, but was confined to the inferior function of opposition. We shall see in the coming chapter how he became as it were promoted, partly by his own superior penetration, partly by the dishonest artifice and mis-judgement of Nikias and other opponents, in the affair of Sphakteria. But his vocation was now to find fault, to censure, to denounce; his theatre of action was the senate, the public assembly, the dikasteries; his principal talent was that of speech, in which he must unquestionably have surpassed all his contemporaries. The two gifts which had been united in Periklês—superior capacity for speech, as well as for action—were now severed, and had fallen, though both in greatly inferior degree, the one to Nikias, the other to Kleon. As an opposition-man, fierce and violent in temper, Kleon was extremely formidable to all acting functionaries; and from his influence in the public assembly, he was doubtless the author of many important positive measures, thus going beyond the functions belonging to what is called opposition. But though the most effective speaker in the public assembly, he was not for that reason the most influential person in the democracy. His powers of speech in fact stood out the more prominently, because they were found apart from that station and those qualities which were considered, even at Athens, all but essential to make a man a leader in political life.

Kleon—his
real function
that of
opposition
—real
power in-
ferior to
Nikias.

To understand the political condition of Athens at this time, it has been necessary to take this comparison between Nikias and Kleon, and to remark, that though the latter might be a more victorious speaker, the former was the more guiding and influential leader. The points gained by Kleon were all noisy and palpable, sometimes however, without doubt, of considerable moment—but the course of affairs was much more under the direction of Nikias.

It was during the summer of this year (the fifth of the war—B.C. 427) that the Athenians began operations on a small scale in Sicily; probably contrary to the advice both of Nikias and Kleon, neither of them seemingly favourable to these distant undertakings. I reserve however the series of Athenian measures in Sicily—which afterwards became the turning-point of the fortunes of the state—for a department by themselves. I shall take them up separately.

B.C. 427.

and bring them down to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, when I reach the date of that important event.

During the autumn of the same year, the epidemic disorder, after having intermitted for some time, resumed its ravages at Athens, and continued for one whole year longer, to the sad ruin both of the strength and the comfort of the city. And it seems that this autumn, as well as the ensuing summer, were distinguished by violent atmospheric and terrestrial disturbance. Numerous earthquakes were experienced at Athens, in Eubœa, in Bœotia, especially near Orchomenus. Sudden waves of the sea and unexampled tides were also felt on the coast of Eubœa and Lokris, and the islands of Atalantê and Peparêthus: the Athenian fort and one of the two guard-ships at Atalantê were partially destroyed. The earthquakes produced one effect favourable to Athens. They deterred the Lacedæmonians from invading Attica. Agis king of Sparta had already reached the isthmus for that purpose; but repeated earthquakes were looked upon as an unfavourable portent, and the scheme was abandoned.¹

These earthquakes however were not considered sufficient to deter the Lacedæmonians from the foundation of Herakleia, a new colony near the strait of Thermopylæ. On this occasion, we hear of a branch of the Greek population not before mentioned during the war. The coast north-west of the strait of Thermopylæ was occupied by the three subdivisions of the Malians—Paralii, Hierês, and Trachinians. These latter, immediately adjoining Mount Ceta on its north side—as well as the Dorians (the little tribe properly so called, which was accounted the primitive hearth of the Dorians generally) who joined the same mountain range on the south—were both of them harassed and plundered by the predatory mountaineers, probably Ætolians, on the high lands between them. At first the Trachinians were disposed to throw themselves on the protection of Athens. But not feeling sufficiently assured as to the way in which she would deal with them, they joined with the Dorians in claiming aid from Sparta: in fact, it does not appear that Athens,

Revival of the epidemic disorder at Athens for another year—atmospheric and terrestrial disturbances in Greece. Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica suspended for this year.

Foundation of the colony of Herakleia by the Lacedæmonians, near Thermopylæ—its numerous settlers, great promise and unprosperous career.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 87, 89, 90.

possessing naval superiority only and being inferior on land, could have given them effective aid.

The Lacedæmonians, eagerly embracing the opportunity, determined to plant a strong colony in this tempting situation. There was wood in the neighbouring regions for ship-building,¹ so that they might hope to acquire a naval position for attacking the neighbouring island of Eubœa, while the passage of troops against the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be facilitated; the impracticability of such passage had forced them, three years before, to leave Potidæa to its fate. A considerable body of colonists, Spartans and Lacedæmonian Perioeki, was assembled under the conduct of three Spartan Ēkists—Leon, Damagon, and Alkidas; the latter (we are to presume, though Thucydides does not say so) the same admiral who had met with such little success in Ionia and at Korkyra. Proclamation was farther made to invite the junction of all other Greeks as colonists, excepting by name Ionians, Achæans, and some other tribes not here specified. Probably the distinct exclusion of the Achæans must have been rather the continuance of ancient sentiment than dictated by any present reasons; since the Achæans were not now pronounced enemies of Sparta. A number of colonists, stated as not less than 10,000, flocked to the place, having confidence in the stability of the colony under the powerful protection of Sparta. The new town, of large circuit, was built and fortified under the name of Herakleia;² not far from the site of Trachis, about two miles and a quarter from the nearest point of the Maliac Gulf, and about double that distance from the strait of Thermopylæ. Near to the latter, and for the purpose of keeping effective possession of it, a port with dock and accommodation for shipping was constructed.

A populous city, established under Lacedæmonian protection in this important post, alarmed the Athenians, and created much expectation in every part of Greece. But the Lacedæmonian Ēkists were harsh and unskilful in their

¹ Respecting this abundance of wood, as well as the site of Herakleia generally, consult Livy, xxxvi. 22.

² Diodor. xii. 59. Not merely was Hēraklēs the mythical progenitor of the

Spartan kings, but the whole region near Ceta and Trachis was adorned by legends and heroic incidents connected with him: see the drama of the Trachiniæ by Sophoklēs.

management ; while the Thessalians, to whom the Trachinian territory was tributary, considered the colony as an encroachment upon their soil. Anxious to prevent its increase, they harassed it with hostilities from the first moment. The Cætan assailants were also active enemies ; so that Herakleia, thus pressed from without and misgoverned within, dwindled down from its original numbers and promise, barely maintaining its existence.¹ We shall find it in later times, however, revived, and becoming a place of considerable importance.

The main Athenian armament of this summer, consisting of sixty triremes under Nikias, undertook an expedition against the island of Melos. Melos and Thera, both inhabited by ancient colonists from Lacedæmon, had never been from the beginning, and still refused to be, members of the Athenian alliance or subjects of the Athenian empire. They thus stood out as exceptions to all the other islands in the Ægean, and the Athenians thought themselves authorised to resort to constraint and conquest ; believing themselves entitled to command over all the islands. They might indeed urge, and with considerable plausibility, that the Melians now enjoyed their share of the protection of the Ægean from piracy, without contributing to the cost of it : but considering the obstinate reluctance and strong philo-Laconian prepossessions of the Melians, who had taken no part in the war and given no ground of offence to Athens, the attempt to conquer them by force could hardly be justified even as a calculation of gain and loss, and was a mere gratification to the pride of power in carrying out what, in modern days, we should call the principle of maritime empire. Melos and Thera formed awkward corners, which defaced the symmetry of a great proprietor's field ;² and the former ultimately entailed upon Athens the heaviest of all losses—a deed of blood which deeply dishonoured her annals. On this occasion, Nikias visited the island with his fleet, and after vainly summoning the inhabitants, ravaged the lands, but retired without undertaking a siege. He then sailed away, and came to Orôpus,

¹ Thucyd. iii. 92, 93 ; Diodor. xi. 49 ;
xii. 59. ² Horat. Sat. ii. 6, 8—

O ! si angulus iste
Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum !

on the north-east frontier of Attica bordering on Bœotia. The hoplites on board his ships, landing in the night, marched into the interior of Bœotia to the vicinity of Tanagra. They were here met, according to signal raised, by a military force from Athens which marched thither by land; and the joint Athenian army ravaged the Tanagræan territory, gaining an insignificant advantage over its defenders. On retiring, Nikias re-assembled his armament, sailed northward along the coast of Lokris with the usual ravages, and returned home without effecting anything farther.¹

About the same time that he started, thirty other Athenian triremes, under Demosthenês and Proklês, had been sent round Peloponnesus to act upon the coast of Akarnania. In conjunction with the whole Akarnanian force, except the men of Cœniadæ—with fifteen triremes from Korkyra and some troops from Kephallenia and Zakynthus—they ravaged the whole territory of Leukas, both within and without the isthmus, and confined the inhabitants to their town, which was too strong to be taken by anything but a wall of circumvallation and a tedious blockade. And the Akarnanians, to whom the city was especially hostile, were urgent with Demosthenês to undertake this measure forthwith, since the opportunity might not again recur, and success was nearly certain.

But this enterprising officer committed the grave imprudence of offending them on a matter of great importance, in order to attack a country of all others the most impracticable—the interior of Ætolia. The Messenians of Naupaktus, who suffered from the depredations of the neighbouring Ætolian tribes, inflamed his imagination by suggesting to him a grand scheme of operations,² more worthy of the large force which he commanded than the mere reduction of Leukas. The various tribes of Ætolians—rude, brave, active, predatory, and unrivalled in the use of the javelin, which they rarely laid out of their hands—stretched across the country from between Parnassus and Cœta to the eastern bank of the Achelôus. The

Proceedings
of the
Athenians
under De-
mosthenês
in Akar-
nania.

Expedition
of Demo-
sthenês
against
Ætolia—his
large plans.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 91.

² Thucyd. iii. 95. Δημοσθένης δ' ἀνα-
τείνεται κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ὑπὸ

Μεσσηνίων ὥς καλὸν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς
τοσαύτης ξυνηλεγήμενης, &c.

scheme suggested by the Messenians was that Demosthenês should attack the great central Ætolian tribes—the Apodôti, Ophioneis, and Eurytânes:—if they were conquered, all the remaining continental tribes between the Ambrakian Gulf and Mount Parnassus might be invited or forced into the alliance of Athens—the Akarnanians being already included in it. Having thus got the command of a large continental force,¹ Demosthenês contemplated the ulterior scheme of marching at the head of it on the west of Parnassus through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians—inhabiting the north of the Corinthian Gulf, friendly to Athens, and enemies to the Ætolians, whom they resembled both in their habits and in their fighting—until he arrived at Kitynium in Doris, in the upper portion of the valley of the river Kephissus. He would then easily descend that valley into the territory of the Phokians, who were likely to join the Athenians if a favourable opportunity occurred, but who might at any rate be constrained to do so. From Phokis the scheme was to invade from the northward the conterminous territory of Bœotia, the great enemy of Athens; which might thus perhaps be completely subdued, if assailed at the same time from Attica. Any Athenian general, who could have executed this comprehensive scheme would have acquired at home a high and well-merited celebrity. But Demosthenês had been ill-informed both as to the invincible barbarians, and the pathless country, comprehended under the name of Ætolia. Some of the tribes spoke a language scarcely intelligible to Greeks, and even ate their meat raw; while the country has even down to the present time remained not only unconquered, but untraversed by an enemy in arms.

Demosthenês accordingly retired from Leukas, in spite of the remonstrance of the Akarnanians, who not only could not be induced to accompany him, but went home in visible disgust. He then sailed with his other forces—Messenians, Kephallenians, and Zakynthians—to Cœneon in the territory

¹ Thucyd. iii. 95. τὸ ἄλλο ἡπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτην. None of the tribes, properly called Epirots, would be comprised in this expression: the name ἡπειρωταί is here a general name (not a proper name), as Poppo and Dr. Arnold remark. Demosthenês would calculate

on getting under his orders the Akarnanians and Ætolians, and some other tribes besides; but *what* other tribes it is not easy to specify: perhaps the Agræi, east of Amphilochia, among them.

of the Ozolian Lokrians, a maritime township on the Corinthian Gulf, not far eastward of Naupaktus—where his army was disembarked, together with 300 epibatæ (or marines) from the triremes—including on this occasion, what was not commonly the case on ship-board,¹ some of the choice hoplites, selected all from young men of the same age, on the Athenian muster-roll. Having passed the night in the sacred precinct of Zeus Nemeus at Ceneon, memorable as the spot where the poet Hesiod was said to have been slain, he marched early in the morning under the guidance of the Messenian Chromon, into Ætolia. On the first day he took Potidania, on the second Krokyλείum, and on the third Teichium—all of them villages unfortified and undefended, for the inhabitants abandoned them and fled to the mountains above. He was here inclined to halt and await the junction of the Ozolian Lokrians, who had engaged to invade Ætolia at the same time, and were almost indispensable to his success, from their familiarity with Ætolian warfare, and their similarity of weapons. But the Messenians again persuaded him to advance without delay into the interior, in order that the villages might be separately attacked and taken before any collective force could be gathered together: and Demosthenês was so encouraged by having as yet encountered no resistance, that he advanced to Ægítium, which he also found deserted, and captured without opposition.

March of Demosthenês—impracticability of the territory of Ætolia—rudeness and bravery of the inhabitants.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 98. The Epibatæ, or soldiers serving on shipboard (marines), were more usually taken from the Thetes, or the poorest class of citizens, furnished by the state with a panoply for the occasion—not from the regular hoplites on the muster-roll. Maritime soldiery is therefore usually spoken of as something inferior: the present triremes of Demosthenês are noticed in the light of an exception (*παιρικῆς καὶ παύλου στρατίας*, Thucyd. vi. 21).

So among the Romans, service in the legions was accounted higher and more honourable than that of the *classarii* milites (Tacit. *Hist.* i. 87).

The Athenian Epibatæ, though not forming a corps permanently distinct, correspond in function to the English marines, who seem to have been first

distinguished permanently from other foot-soldiers about the year 1684. "It having been found necessary on many occasions to embark a number of soldiers on board our ships of war, and mere landmen being at first extremely unhealthy—and at first, until they had been accustomed to the sea, in a great measure unserviceable—it was at length judged expedient to appoint certain regiments for that service, who were trained to the different modes of sea-fighting, and also made useful in some of those manœuvres of a ship where a great many hands were required. These from the nature of their duty were distinguished by the appellation of *maritime soldiers* or marines."—Grose's *Military Antiquities of the English Army*, vol. i. p. 186. (London, 1786.)

He is completely beaten and obliged to retire with loss.

Here however was the term of his good fortune. The mountains round Ægitium were occupied not only by the inhabitants of that village, but also by the entire force of Ætolia, collected even from the distant tribes Bomiës and Kalliës, who bordered on the Maliac Gulf. The invasion of Demosthenës had become known beforehand to the Ætolians, who not only forewarned all their own tribes of the approaching enemy, but also sent ambassadors to Sparta and Corinth to ask for aid.¹ However they showed themselves fully capable of defending their own territory without foreign aid. Demosthenës found himself assailed in his position at Ægitium, on all sides at once by these active highlanders, armed with javelins, pouring down from the neighbouring hills. Not engaging in any close combat, they retreated when the Athenians advanced forward to charge them—resuming their aggression the moment that the pursuers, who could never advance far in consequence of the ruggedness of the ground, began to return to the main body. The small number of bowmen along with Demosthenës for some time kept their unshielded assailants at bay. But the officer commanding the bowmen was presently slain; the stock of arrows became nearly exhausted; and what was still worse, Chromon the Messenian, the only man who knew the country and could serve as guide, was slain also. The bowmen became thus either ineffective or dispersed; while the hoplites exhausted themselves in vain attempts to pursue and beat off an active enemy, who always returned upon them and in every successive onset thinned and distressed them more and more. At length the force of Demosthenës was completely broken and compelled to take flight; without beaten roads, without guides, and in a country not only strange to them, but impervious, from continual mountain,

¹ Thucyd. iii. 100. Προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἐς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἐς Λακεδαιμόνα πρέσβεις—πεῖθουσιν ὥστε σφίσι πέμψαι στρατὸν ἐπὶ Ναύπακτον διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴν.

It is not here meant, I think (as Götter and Dr. Arnold suppose), that the Ætolians sent envoys to Lacedæmon before there was any talk or thought of the invasion of Ætolia, simply in prosecution of the standing antipathy which they bore to Naupaktus; but that they

had sent envoys immediately when they heard of the preparations for invading Ætolia—yet before the invasion actually took place. The words διὰ τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπαγωγὴν show that this is the meaning.

The word ἐπαγωγὴ is rightly construed by Haack, against the Scholiast—"because the Naupaktians were bringing in the Athenians to invade Ætolia."

rock, and forest. Many of them were slain in the flight by pursuers, superior not less in rapidity of movement than in knowledge of the country : some even lost themselves in the forest, and perished miserably in flames kindled around them by the Ætolians. The fugitives were at length reassembled at Ceneon near the sea, with the loss of Periklès the colleague of Demosthenès in command, as well as of 120 hoplites, among the best armed and most vigorous in the Athenian muster-roll.¹ The remaining force was soon transported back from Naupaktus to Athens, but Demosthenès remained behind, being too much afraid of the displeasure of his countrymen to return at such a moment. It is certain that his conduct was such as justly to incur their displeasure ; and that the expedition against Ætolia, alienating an established ally and provoking a new enemy, had been conceived with a degree of rashness which nothing but the unexpected favour of fortune could have counterbalanced.

The force of the new enemy, whom his unsuccessful attack had raised into activity, soon made itself felt. The Ætolian envoys who had been despatched to Sparta and Corinth, found it easy to obtain the promise of a considerable force to join them in an expedition against Naupaktus. About the month of September, a body of 3000 Peloponnesian hoplites, including 500 from the newly founded colony of Herakleia, was assembled at Delphi, under the command of Eurylochus, Makarius, and Menedemus. Their road of march to Naupaktus lay through the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians, whom they proposed either to gain over or to subdue. With Amphissa, the largest Lokrian township and in the immediate neighbourhood of Delphi, they had little difficulty—for the Amphissians were in a state of feud with their neighbours on the other side of Parnassus, and were afraid that the new armament might become the instrument of Phokian antipathy against them. On the first application they joined the Spartan alliance, and gave hostages for their fidelity to it : moreover they persuaded many other Lokrian petty villages—among others the Myoneis, who were masters of the most difficult pass on the road—to do the same. Eurylochus received from these various townships reinforce-

Attack of
Ætolians
and Peloponnesians
under
Eurylochus
upon Nau-
paktus.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 98.

ments for his army, as well as hostages for their fidelity, whom he deposited at Kytinium in Doris : and he was thus enabled to march through all the territory of the Ozolian Lokrians without resistance ; except from Cēneon and Eupalion, both which places he took by force. Having arrived in the territory of Naupaktus, he was there joined by the full force of the Ætolians. Their joint efforts, after laying waste all the neighbourhood, captured the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, which had become subject to the Athenian empire.¹

Naupaktus, with a large circuit of wall and thinly defended, was in the greatest danger, and would certainly have been taken, had it not been saved by the efforts of the Athenian Demosthenēs, who had remained there ever since the unfortunate Ætolian expedition. Apprised of the coming march of Eurylochus, he went personally to the Akarnanians, and persuaded them to send a force to aid in the defence of Naupaktus. For a long time they turned a deaf ear to his solicitations in consequence of the refusal to blockade Leukas—but they were at length induced to consent. At the head of 1000 Akarnanian hoplites, Demosthenēs threw himself into Naupaktus, and Eurylochus, seeing that the town had been thus placed out of the reach of attack, abandoned all his designs upon it—marching farther westward to the neighbouring territories of Ætolia—Kalydon, Pleuron and Proschium, near the Achelōus and the borders of Akarnania.

The Ætolians, who had come down to join him for the common purpose of attacking Naupaktus, here abandoned him and retired to their respective homes. But the Ambrakiots, rejoiced to find so considerable a Peloponnesian force in their neighbourhood, prevailed upon him to assist them in attacking the Amphilochian Argos as well as Akarnania ; assuring him that there was now a fair prospect of bringing the whole of the population of the mainland, between the Ambrakian and Corinthian Gulfs, under the supremacy of Lacedæmon. Having persuaded Eurylochus thus to keep his forces together and ready, they themselves with 3000 Ambrakiot hoplites invaded the territory of the Amphilochian Argos, and captured the fortified hill of Olpæ immediately bordering on the Ambrakian Gulf, about

Naupaktus
is saved by
Demos-
thenēs and
the Akar-
nanians.

Eurylochus,
repulsed
from Nau-
paktus,
concerts
with the
Ambrakiots
an attack
on Argos.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 101, 102.

three miles from Argos itself; a hill employed in former days by the Akarnanians as a place for public judicial congress of the whole nation.¹

This enterprise, communicated forthwith to Eurylochus, was the signal for movement on both sides. The Akarnanians, marching with their whole force to the protection of Argos, occupied a post called Krênæ in the Amphiloichian territory, to prevent Eurylochus from effecting his junction with the Ambrakiots at Olpæ. They at the same time sent urgent messages to Demosthenês at Naupaktus, and to the Athenian guard-squadron of twenty triremes under Aristotelês and Hierophon, entreating their aid in the present need, and inviting Demosthenês to act as their commander. They had forgotten their displeasure against him arising out of his recent refusal to blockade at Leukas—for which they probably thought that he had been sufficiently punished by his disgrace at Ætolia; while they knew and esteemed his military capacity. In fact, the accident whereby he had been detained at Naupaktus now worked fortunately for them as well as for him. It secured to them a commander whom all of them respected, obviating the jealousies among their own numerous petty townships—it procured for him the means of retrieving his own reputation at Athens. Demosthenês, not backward in seizing this golden opportunity, came speedily into the Ambrakian Gulf with the twenty triremes, conducting 200 Mesenian hoplites and sixty Athenian bowmen. Finding the whole Akarnanian force concentrated at the Amphiloichian Argos, he was named general, nominally along with the Akarnanian generals, but in reality enjoying the whole direction of operations.

He found also the whole of the enemy's force, both the 3000 Ambrakiot hoplites and the Peloponnesian division under Eurylochus, already united and in position at Olpæ, about three miles off. For Eurylochus, as soon as he was apprised that the Ambrakiots had reached Olpæ, broke up forthwith his camp at Proschium in Ætolia, knowing that his best chance of traversing the hostile territory of Akarnania consisted in celerity:

Demosthenês and the Athenians, as well as the Akarnanians, come to the protection of Argos.

March of Eurylochus across Akarnania to join the Ambrakiots.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 102-105.

the whole Akarnanian force however had already gone to Argos, so that his march was unopposed through that country. He crossed the Achelôus, marched westward of Stratus, through the Akarnanian townships of Phytia, Medeon, and Limnæa, then quitting both Akarnania and the direct road from Akarnania to Argos, he struck rather eastward into the mountainous district of Thyamus in the territory of the Agræans, who were enemies of the Akarnanians. From hence he descended at night into the territory of Argos, and passed unobserved, under cover of the darkness, between Argos itself and the Akarnanian force at Krênæ, so as to join in safety the 3000 Ambrakiots at Olpæ, to their great joy. They had feared that the enemy at Argos and Krênæ would have arrested his passage; and believing their force inadequate to contend alone, they had sent pressing messages home to demand large reinforcements for themselves and their own protection.¹

Demosthenês, thus finding a united and formidable enemy, superior in number to himself, at Olpæ, conducted his troops from Argos and Krênæ to attack them. The ground was rugged and mountainous, and between the two armies lay a steep ravine, which neither liked to be the first to pass; so that they lay for five days inactive. If Herodotus had been our historian, he would probably have ascribed this delay to unfavourable sacrifices (which may indeed have been the case), and would have given us interesting anecdotes respecting the prophets on both sides; but the more positive practical genius of Thucydides merely acquaints us, that on the sixth day both armies put themselves in order of battle—both probably tired of waiting. The ground being favourable for ambuscade, Demosthenês hid in a bushy dell 400 hoplites and light-armed, so that they might spring up suddenly in the midst of the action upon the Peloponnesian left, which outflanked his right. He was himself on the right with the Messenians and some Athenians, opposed to Eurylochus on the left of the enemy: the Akarnanians with the Amphilochian akontists or darters occupied his left, opposed to the Ambrakiot hoplites: Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians were however intermixed in the line of Eury-

Their
united army
is defeated
by Demo-
sthenês at
Olpæ—
Eurylochus
slain.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 105, 106, 107.

lochus, and it was only the Mantineans who maintained a separate station of their own towards the left centre. The battle accordingly began, and Eurylochus with his superior numbers was proceeding to surround Demosthenês, when on a sudden the men in ambush rose up and set upon his rear. A panic seized his men, who made no resistance worthy of their Peloponnesian reputation: they broke and fled, while Eurylochus, doubtless exposing himself with peculiar bravery in order to restore the battle, was early slain. Demosthenês, having near him his best troops, pressed them vigorously, and their panic communicated itself to the troops in the centre, so that all were put to flight and pursued to Olpæ. On the right of the line of Eurylochus, the Ambrakiots, the most warlike Greeks in the Epirotic regions, completely defeated the Akarnanians opposed to them, and carried their pursuit even as far as Argos. So complete however was the victory gained by Demosthenês over the remaining troops, that these Ambrakiots had great difficulty in fighting their way back to Olpæ, which was not accomplished without severe loss, and late in the evening. Among all the beaten troops, the Mantineans were those who best maintained their retreating order.¹ The loss in the army of Demosthenês was about 300; that of the opponents much greater, but the number is not specified.

Of the three Spartan commanders, two, Eurylochus and Makarius, had been slain: the third, Menedæus, found himself beleaguered both by sea and land—the Athenian squadron being on guard along the coast. It would seem indeed that he might have fought his way to Ambrakia, especially as he would have met the Ambrakiot reinforcement coming from the city. But whether this were possible or not, the commander, too much dispirited to attempt it, took advantage of the customary truce granted for burying the dead, to open negotiations with Demosthenês and the Akarnanian generals, for the purpose of obtaining an unmolested retreat. This was peremptorily refused: but Demosthenês (with the consent of the Akarnanian leaders) secretly intimated to the Spartan commander and those immediately around him, together with the Mantineans and other Peloponnesian troops—that if they

The surviving Spartan commander makes a separate capitulation for himself and the Peloponnesians, deserting the Ambrakiots.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 107, 108: compare Polyænus, iii. 1.

chose to make a separate and surreptitious retreat, abandoning their comrades, no opposition would be offered. He designed by this means not merely to isolate the Ambrakiots, the great enemies of Argos and Akarnania, along with the body of miscellaneous mercenaries who had come under Eurylochus—but also to obtain the more permanent advantage of disgracing the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the eyes of the Epirotic Greeks, as cowards and traitors to military fellowship. The very reason which prompted Demosthenēs to grant a separate facility of escape, ought to have been imperative with Menedæus and the Peloponnesians around him, to make them spurn it with indignation. Yet such was their anxiety for personal safety, that this disgraceful convention was accepted, ratified, and carried into effect forthwith. It stands alone in Grecian history, as an example of separate treason in officers to purchase safety for themselves and their immediate comrades, by abandoning the general body under their command. Had the officers been Athenian, it would have been doubtless quoted as evidence of the pretended faithlessness of democracy. But as it was the act of a Spartan commander in conjunction with many leading Peloponnesians, we will only venture to remark upon it as a farther manifestation of that intra-Peloponnesian selfishness, and carelessness of obligation towards extra-Peloponnesian Greeks, which we found so lamentably prevalent during the invasion of Xerxes; in this case indeed heightened by the fact, that the men deserted were fellow-Dorians and fellow-soldiers who had just fought in the same ranks.

As soon as the ceremony of burying the dead had been completed, Menedæus, and the Peloponnesians who were protected by this secret convention, stole away slyly and in small bands under pretence of collecting wood and vegetables. On getting to a little distance, they quickened their pace and made off—much to the dismay of the Ambrakiots, who ran after them trying to overtake them. The Akarnanians pursued, and their leaders had much difficulty in explaining to them the secret convention just concluded. It was not without some suspicions of treachery, and even personal hazard from their own troops, that they at length caused the fugitive Peloponnesians to be respected; while the Ambrakiots, the most obnoxious of the two to Akarnanian feeling, were pursued

The Ambrakiots sustain much loss in their retreat.

without any reserve, and 200 of them were slain before they could escape into the friendly territory of the Agræans.¹ To distinguish Ambrakiots from Peloponnesians, similar in race and dialect, was however no easy task. Much dispute arose in individual cases.

Unfairly as this loss fell upon Ambrakia, a far more severe calamity was yet in store for her. The large reinforcement from the city, which had been urgently invoked by the detachment at Olpæ, started in due course as soon as they could be got ready, and entered the territory of Amphilochia about the time when the battle of Olpæ was fought; but ignorant of that misfortune, and hoping to arrive soon enough to stand by their friends. Their march was made known to Demosthenês, on the day after the battle, by the Amphilochians; who at the same time indicated to him the best way of surprising them in the rugged and mountainous road along which they had to march, at the two conspicuous peaks called Idomenê, immediately above a narrow pass leading farther on to Olpæ. It was known beforehand, by the line of march of the Ambrakiots, that they would rest for the night at the lower of these two peaks, ready to march through the pass on the next morning. On that same night a detachment of Amphilochians, under direction from Demosthenês, seized the higher of the two peaks; while that commander himself, dividing his forces into two divisions, started from his position at Olpæ in the evening after supper. One of these divisions, having the advantage of Amphilochian guides in their own country, marched by an unfrequented mountain road to Idomenê; the other, under Demosthenês himself, went directly through the pass leading from Idomenê to Olpæ. After marching all night, they reached the camp of the Ambrakiots a little before daybreak—Demosthenês himself with his Messenians in the van. The surprise was complete. The Ambrakiots were found still lying down and asleep, while even the sentinels, uninformed of the recent battle—hearing themselves accosted in the Doric dialect by the Messenians, whom Demosthenês had placed in front for that express purpose—and not seeing very clearly in the

Another large body of Ambrakiots, coming from the city as a reinforcement, is intercepted by Demosthenês at Idomenê, and cut to pieces.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 111.

morning twilight—mistook them for some of their own fellow-citizens coming back from the other camp. The Akarnanians and Messenians thus fell among the Ambrakiots sleeping and unarmed, and without any possibility of resistance. Large numbers of them were destroyed on the spot, and the remainder fled in all directions among the neighbouring mountains, none knowing the roads and the country. It was the country of the Amphilochians—subjects of Ambrakia, but subjects averse to their condition, and now making use of their perfect local knowledge and light-armed equipment, to inflict a terrible revenge on their masters. Some of the Ambrakiots became entangled in ravines—others fell into ambuscades laid by the Amphilochians. Others again, dreading most of all to fall into the hands of the Amphilochians—barbaric in race as well as intensely hostile in feeling—and seeing no other possibility of escaping them—swam off to the Athenian ships cruising along the shore. There were but a small proportion of them who survived to return to Ambrakia.¹

The complete victory of Idomenê, admirably prepared by Demosthenês, was achieved with scarce any loss. The Akarnanians, after erecting their trophy and despoiling the enemy's dead, prepared to carry off the arms thus taken to Argos.

On the morrow, however, before this was done, they were visited by a herald, coming from those Ambrakiots who had fled into the Agræan territory, after the battle of Olpæ and the subsequent pursuit. He came with the customary request from defeated soldiers, for permission to bury their dead who had fallen in that pursuit. Neither he, nor those from whom he came, knew anything of the destruction of their brethren at Idomenê—just as these latter had been ignorant of the defeat at Olpæ; while, on the other hand, the Akarnanians in the camp, whose minds were full of the more recent and capital advantage at Idomenê, supposed that the message referred to the men slain in that engagement. The numerous panoplies just acquired at Idomenê lay piled up in the camp, and the herald, on seeing them, was struck with amazement at the size of the heap, so much exceeding the number of those who were

Despair of the Ambrakiot herald on seeing the great number of slain.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 112.

missing in his own detachment. An Akarnanian present asked the reason of his surprise, and inquired how many of his comrades had been slain—meaning to refer to the slain at Idomenê. “About two hundred,” the herald replied.—“Yet these arms here show, not that number, but more than a thousand men.”—“Then they are not the arms of those who fought with us.”—“Nay—but they are—if ye were the persons who fought yesterday at Idomenê.”—“We fought with no one yesterday: it was the day before yesterday, in the retreat.”—“O, then—ye have to learn, that *we* were engaged yesterday with these others, who were on their march as reinforcement from the city of Ambrakia.”

The unfortunate herald now learnt for the first time that the large reinforcement from his city had been cut to pieces. So acute was his feeling of mingled anguish and surprise, that he raised a loud cry of woe, and hurried away at once, without saying another word; not even prosecuting his request about the burial of the dead bodies—which appears on this fatal occasion to have been neglected.¹

His grief was justified by the prodigious magnitude of the calamity, which Thucydides considers to have been the greatest that afflicted any Grecian city during the whole war prior to the peace of Nikias; so incredibly great, indeed, that though he had learnt the number slain, he declines to set it down, from fear of not being believed—a scruple which we his readers have much reason to regret. It appears that nearly the whole adult military population of Ambrakia was destroyed, and Demosthenês was urgent with the Akarnanians to march thither at once. Had they consented, Thucydides tells us positively that the city would have surrendered without a blow.² But they refused

Defenceless
and feeble
condition
of Ambrakia
after
this ruinous
loss.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 113.

² Thucyd. iii. 113. πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μὲν πόλει Ἑλληνίδι μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τότε ἐγένετο. Καὶ ἀριθμὸν οὐκ ἔγραψα τῶν ἀποθανόντων, διότι ἀπιστον τὸ πλῆθος λέγεται ἀπολέσθαι, ὥς πρὸς τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως. Ἀμπρακίαν μὲντοι οἶδα ὅτι εἰ ἐβουλήθησαν Ἀκαρῶνες καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Δημοσθένει πειθόμενοι, ἐξελεῖν, αὐτοβοῇ ἂν εἶλον· τὸν δὲ εἶσαν, μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπότεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ᾖσι.

We may remark that the expression κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τότε—when it occurs in the first, second, third, or first half of the fourth Book of Thucydides—seems to allude to the first ten years of the Peloponnesian war, which ended with the peace of Nikias.

In a careful dissertation, by Franz Wolfgang Ullrich, analysing the structure of the history of Thucydides, it is made to appear that the first, second, and third Books, with the first half of the fourth—were composed during the

to undertake the enterprise, fearing (according to the historian) that the Athenians at Ambrakia would be more troublesome neighbours to them than the Ambrakiots. That this reason was operative we need not doubt: but it can hardly have been either the single, or even the chief reason; for had it been so, they would have been equally afraid of Athenian co-operation in the blockade of Leukas, which they had strenuously solicited from Demosthenês, and had quarrelled with him for refusing. Ambrakia was less near to them than Leukas—and in its present exhausted state, inspired less fear: but the displeasure arising from the former refusal of Demosthenês had probably never been altogether appeased, nor were they sorry to find an opportunity of mortifying him in a similar manner.

In the distribution of the spoil, three hundred panoplies were first set apart as the perquisite of Demosthenês: the remainder were then distributed, one-third for the Athenians, the other two-thirds among the Akarnanian townships. The immense reserve personally appropriated to Demosthenês enables us to make some vague conjecture as to the total loss of Ambrakiots. The fraction of one-third, assigned to the Athenian people, must have been, we may imagine, six times as great, and perhaps even in larger proportion, than the reserve of the general. For the latter was at that time under the displeasure of the people, and anxious above all things to regain their favour—an object which would be frustrated rather than promoted, if his personal share of the arms were not greatly disproportionate to the collective claim of the city. Reasoning upon this supposition, the panoplies assigned to Athens would be 1800, and the total of Ambrakiots slain whose arms became public property would be 5400. To which must be added some Ambrakiots

interval between the peace of Nikias and the beginning of the last nine years of the war, called the Dekeleian war; allowing for two passages in these early books which must have been subsequently introduced.

The later books seem to have been taken up by Thucydides as a separate work, continuing the former. And a sort of separate preface is given for them (v. 26), *γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα δ*

αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ἐξῆς, &c. It is in this later portion that he first takes up the view peculiar to him, of reckoning the whole twenty-seven years as one continued war only nominally interrupted (Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thukydides, pp. 85, 125, 138, &c. Hamburg, 1846).

Compare *ἐν τῷ παλαιῷ τῷδε* (iii. 98), which in like manner means the war prior to the peace of Nikias.

killed in their flight from Idomenê by the Amphilocheians, in dells, ravines, and by-places : probably those Amphilocheians, who slew them, would appropriate the arms privately, without bringing them into the general stock. Upon this calculation, the total number of Ambrakiots slain in both battles and both pursuits, would be about 6000; a number suitable to the grave expressions of Thucydides, as well as to his statements, that the first detachment which marched to Olpæ was 3000 strong—and that the message sent home invoked as reinforcement the total force of the city. How totally helpless Ambrakia had become, is still more conclusively proved by the fact that the Corinthians were obliged shortly afterwards to send by land a detachment of 300 hoplites for its defence.¹

The Athenian triremes soon returned to their station at Naupaktus, after which a convention was concluded between the Akarnanians and Amphilocheians, on the one side, and the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians (who had fled after the battle of Olpæ into the territory of Salynthius and the Agræi) on the other—ensuring a safe and unmolested egress to both of the latter.² With the Ambrakiots a more permanent pacification was effected : the Akarnanians and Amphilocheians concluded with them a peace and alliance for 100 years, on condition that they should surrender all the Amphilocheian territory and hostages in their possession, and should bind themselves to furnish no aid to Anaktorium, then in hostility to the Akarnanians. Each party however maintained its separate alliance—the Ambrakiots with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the Akarnanians with Athens. It was stipulated that the Akarnanians should not be required to assist the Ambrakiots

Convention concluded between Ambrakia on one side, and the Akarnanians and Amphilocheians on the other.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 114. Diodorus (xii. 60) abridges the narrative of Thucydides.

² Thucyd. iii. 114. 'Ακαρῶνες δὲ καὶ Ἀμφίλοχοι, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων καὶ Δημοσθένους, τοῖς ὡς Σαλύνθιον καὶ Ἀγραιούς καταφυγούσιν Ἀμβρακίαις καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ἀναχώρησιν ἐπέειπαντο ἐξ Οἰνιδῶν, ὅτε καὶ μετανόησαν παρὰ Σαλύνθιον.

This is a very difficult passage. Hermann has conjectured, and Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, all approve, the reading παρὰ Σαλυνθίου instead of the two last words of the sentence.

The passage might certainly be construed with this emendation, though there would still be an awkwardness in the position of the relative ὅτε with regard to its antecedent, and in the position of the particle καὶ, which ought then properly to come after μετανόησαν and not before it. The sentence would then mean, that "the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians, who had originally taken refuge with Salynthius, had moved away from his territory to Eniadæ," from which place they were now to enjoy safe departure.

against Athens, nor the Ambrakiots to assist the Akarnanians against the Peloponnesian league ; but against all other enemies, each engaged to lend aid to the other.¹

To Demosthenês personally, the events on the coast of the Ambrakian Gulf proved a signal good fortune, well-earned indeed by the skill which he had displayed. He was enabled to atone for his imprudence in the Ætolian expedition, and to re-establish himself in the favour of the Athenian people. He sailed home in triumph to Athens, during the course of the winter, with his reserved present of 300 panoplies, which acquired additional value from the accident, that the larger number of panoplies, reserved out of the spoil for the Athenian people, were captured at sea, and never reached Athens. Accordingly, those brought by Demosthenês were the only trophy of the victory, and as such were deposited in the Athenian temples, where Thucydidês mentions them as still existing at the time when he wrote.²

It was in this same autumn that the Athenians were induced by an oracle to undertake the more complete purification of the sacred island of Delos. This step was probably taken to propitiate Apollo, since they were under the persuasion that the terrible visitation of the epidemic was owing to his wrath. And as it was about this period that the second attack of the epidemic, after having lasted a year, disappeared—many of them probably ascribed this relief to the effect of their pious cares at Delos. All the tombs in the island were opened ; the dead bodies were then exhumed and re-interred in the neighbouring island of Rheneia : and orders were given that for the future neither deaths nor births should take place in the sacred island. Moreover the ancient Delian festival—once the common point of meeting and solemnity for the whole Ionic race, and celebrated for its musical contests, before the Lydian and Persian conquests had subverted the freedom and prosperity of Ionia—was now renewed. The Athenians celebrated the festival with its accompanying matches, even the chariot-

¹ Thucyd. iii. 114.

² Thucyd. iii. 114. Τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνα-
κείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικαῖς ἱεροῖς
Δημοσθένει ἐξηρέθησαν, τριακόσιαι πανο-

πλῆαι, καὶ ἄγων αὐτὰς κατέπλευσε. Καὶ
ἐγένετο ἕμα αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν τῆς Αἰτωλίας
ξυμφορὰν ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς πράξεως ὁδε-
στέρα ἢ κάδοδος.

race, in a manner more splendid than had ever been known in former times. They appointed a similar festival to be celebrated every fourth year. At this period they were excluded both from the Olympic and the Pythian games, which probably made the revival of the Delian festival more gratifying to them. The religious zeal and munificence of Nikias were strikingly displayed at Delos.¹

¹ Thucyd. iii. 104 ; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 3, 4 ; Diodor. xii. 58.

CHAPTER LII.

SEVENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.—CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA.

THE invasion of Attica by the Lacedæmonians had now become an ordinary enterprise, undertaken in every year of the war except the third and sixth, and then omitted only from accidental causes: though the same hopes were no longer entertained from it as at the commencement of the war. During the present spring, Agis king of Sparta conducted the Peloponnesian army into the territory, seemingly about the end of April, and repeated the usual ravages.

Seventh
year of the
war—in-
vasion of
Attica.
B.C. 425.

It seemed however as if Korkyra were about to become the principal scene of the year's military operations. For the exiles of the oligarchical party, having come back to the island and fortified themselves on Mount Istônê, carried on war with so much activity against the Korkyræans in the city, that distress and even famine reigned there. Sixty Peloponnesian triremes were sent thither to assist the aggressors. As soon as it became known at Athens how hardly the Korkyræans in the city were pressed, orders were given to an Athenian fleet of forty triremes, about to sail for Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, to halt in their voyage at Korkyra, and to lend whatever aid might be needed.¹ But during the course of this voyage, an incident occurred elsewhere, neither foreseen nor imagined by any one, which gave a new character and promise to the whole war—illustrating forcibly the observations of Periklês and Archidamus before its commencement, on the impossibility of calculating what turn events might take.²

So high did Demosthenês stand in the favour of his countrymen after his brilliant successes in the Ambrakian Gulf,

Distress in
Korkyra
from the
attack of
the oligar-
chical
exiles. A
Peloponne-
sian fleet,
and an
Athenian
fleet, are
both sent
thither.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 2, 3.

² Thucyd. i. 140; ii. 11.

that they granted him permission at his own request to go aboard and to employ the fleet in any descent which he might think expedient on the coast of Peloponnesus. The attachment of this active officer to the Messenians at Naupaktus inspired him with the idea of planting a detachment of them on some well-chosen maritime post in the ancient Messenian territory, from whence they would be able permanently to harass the Lacedæmonians and provoke revolt among the Helots—the more so from their analogy of race and dialect. The Messenians, active in privateering, and doubtless well-acquainted with the points of this coast, all of which had formerly belonged to their ancestors, had probably indicated to him Pylus on the south-western shore.

*Demo-
sthenês goes
on board
the Athe-
nian fleet
with a
separate
command.*

That ancient and Homeric name was applied specially and properly to denote the promontory which forms the northern termination of the modern bay of Navarino opposite to the island of Sphagia or Sphakteria; though in vague language the whole neighbouring district seems also to have been called Pylus. Accordingly, in circumnavigating Laconia, Demosthenês requested that the fleet might be detained at this spot long enough to enable him to fortify it, engaging himself to stay afterwards and maintain it with a garrison. It was an uninhabited promontory—about forty-five miles from Sparta, that is, as far distant as any portion of her territory—presenting rugged cliffs, and easy of defence both by sea and land. But its great additional recommendation, with reference to the maritime power of Athens, consisted in its overhanging the spacious and secure basin now called the bay of Navarino. That basin was fronted and protected by the islet called Sphakteria or Sphagia, untrodden, untenanted and full of wood: which stretched along the coast for about a mile and three quarters, leaving only two narrow entrances; one at its northern end, opposite to the position fixed on by Demosthenês, so confined as to admit only two triremes abreast—the other at the southern end about four times as broad; while the inner water approached by these two channels was both roomy and protected. It was on the coast of Peloponnesus, a little within the northern or narrowest of the two channels, that Demo-

*He fixes
upon Pylus
in Laconia
for erection
of a fort.
Locality of
Pylus and
Sphakteria.*

sthenês proposed to plant his little fort—the ground being itself eminently favourable, with a spring of fresh water¹ in the centre of the promontory.²

¹ Thucyd. iv. 26.

² Topography of Sphakteria and Pylus. The description given by Thucydides, of the memorable incidents in or near Pylus and Sphakteria, is perfectly clear, intelligible, and consistent with itself, as to topography. But when we consult the topography of the scene as it stands now, we find various circumstances which cannot possibly be reconciled with Thucydides. Both Colonel Leake (*Travels in the Morea*, vol. i. pp. 402-415) and Dr. Arnold (*Appendix to the second and third volume of his Thucydides*, p. 444) have given plans of the coast, accompanied with valuable remarks.

The main discrepancy, between the statement of Thucydides and the present state of the coast, is to be found in the breadth of the two channels between Sphakteria and the mainland. The southern entrance into the bay of Navarino is now between 1300 and 1400 yards, with a depth of water varying from 5, 7, 28, 33 fathoms; whereas Thucydides states it as having only a breadth adequate to admit eight or nine triremes abreast. The northern entrance is about 150 yards in width, with a shoal or bar of sand lying across it on which there are not more than eighteen inches of water: Thucydides tells us that it afforded room for no more than two triremes, and his narrative implies a much greater depth of water, so as to make the entrance for triremes perfectly unobstructed.

Colonel Leake supposes that Thucydides was misinformed as to the breadth of the southern passage; but Dr. Arnold has on this point given a satisfactory reply—that the narrowness is not merely affirmed in the numbers of Thucydides, but is indirectly implied in his narrative, where he tells us that the Lacedæmonians intended to choke up both of them by triremes closely packed. Obviously this expedient could not be dreamt of, except for a very narrow mouth. The same reply suffices against the doubts which Bloomfield and Poppo (*Comment*, p. 10) raise about the genuineness of the numerals *ὀκτώ* or *ἑννέα* in Thucydides; a doubt which merely transfers the supposed error from Thucydides to the writer of the MS.

Dr. Arnold has himself raised a still graver doubt; whether the island now called Sphagia be really the same as Sphakteria, and whether the bay of Navarino be the real harbour of Pylus. He suspects that the Pale-Navarino, which has been generally understood to be Pylus, was in reality the ancient Sphakteria, separated from the mainland in ancient times by a channel at the north as well as by another at the south-east—though now it is not an island at all. He farther suspects that the lake or lagoon called Lake of Osmyn Aga, north of the harbour of Navarino, and immediately under that which he supposes to have been Sphakteria—was the ancient harbour of Pylus, in which the sea-fight between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians took place. He does not indeed assert this as a positive opinion, but leans to it as the most probable—admitting that there are difficulties either way.

Dr. Arnold has stated some of the difficulties which beset this hypothesis (p. 447) but there is one which he has not stated, which appears to me the most formidable of all, and quite fatal to the admissibility of his opinion. If the Paleokastro of Navarino was the real ancient Sphakteria, it must have been a second island situated to the northward of Sphagia. There must therefore have been *two* islands close together off the coast and near the scene. Now if the reader will follow the account of Thucydides, he will see that there certainly was no more than *one* island—Sphakteria, without any other near or adjoining to it: see especially c. 13: the Athenian fleet under Eurymedon, on first arriving, was obliged to go back some distance to the island of Prôte, because the *island* of Sphakteria was full of Lacedæmonian hoplites: if Dr. Arnold's hypothesis were admitted, there would have been nothing to hinder them from landing on Sphagia itself—the same inference may be deduced from c. 8. The statement of Pliny (*H. N.* iv. 12) that there were *tres Sphagiz* off Pylus, unless we suppose with Hardouin that two of them were mere rocks, appears to me inconsistent with the account of Thucydides.

I think that there is no alternative

But Eurymedon and Sophoklès decidedly rejected all proposition of delay ; and with much reason, since they had been informed (though seemingly without truth) that the Peloponnesian fleet had actually reached Korkyra. They might well have remembered the mischief which had ensued three years before, from the delay of the reinforcement sent to Phormio in some desultory operations on the coast of Krete. The fleet accordingly passed by Pylus without stopping : but a terrible storm drove them back and forced them to seek shelter in the very harbour which Demosthenès had fixed upon—the only harbour anywhere near. That officer took advantage of this accident to renew his proposition, which however appeared to the commanders chimerical. There were plenty of desert capes round Peloponnesus (they said), if he chose to waste the resources of the city in occupying them.¹ They remained unmoved by his reasons in reply. Finding himself thus unsuccessful, Demosthenès presumed upon the undefined permission granted to him by the Athenian people, to address himself first to the soldiers, last of all to the taxiarchs or inferior officers—and to persuade them to second his project, even against the will of the commanders. Much inconvenience might well have arisen from such clashing of authority : but it happened that both the soldiers and the taxiarchs took the same view of the case as their commanders, and refused compliance. Nor can we be surprised at such reluctance, when we reflect upon the seeming improbability of being able to maintain such a post against the great, real, and still greater supposed, superiority of Lacedæmonian land-force. It happened however that the fleet was detained there for some days by stormy weather ; so that the soldiers, having nothing to do, were seized with the spontaneous impulse of

Eurymedon the admiral of the fleet insists upon going on to Korkyra, without stopping at Pylus. The fleet are driven into Pylus by a storm.

except to suppose that a great alteration has taken place in the two passages which separate Sphagia from the mainland, during the interval of 2400 years which separates us from Thucydides. The mainland to the south of Navarino must have been much nearer than it is now to the southern portion of Sphagia, while the northern passage also must have been then both narrower and clearer. To suppose a change in the

configuration of the coast to this extent, seems noway extravagant : any other hypothesis which may be started will be found involved in much greater difficulty.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 3. The account, alike meagre and inaccurate, given by Diodorus of these interesting events in Pylus and Sphacteria, will be found in Diodor. xii. 61-64.

occupying themselves with the fortification, and crowded around to execute it with all the emulation of eager volunteers. Having contemplated nothing of the kind on starting from Athens, they had neither tools for cutting stone, nor hods for carrying mortar.¹ Accordingly they were compelled to build their wall by collecting such pieces of rock or stones as they found, and putting them together as each happened to fit in : whenever mortar was needed, they brought it up on their bended backs, with hands joined behind them to prevent it from slipping away. Such deficiencies were made up, however, partly by the unbounded ardour of the soldiers, partly by the natural difficulties of the ground; which hardly required fortification except at particular points ; the work was completed in a rough way in six days, and Demosthenès was left in garrison with five ships, while Eurymedon with the main fleet sailed away to Korkyra. The crews of the five ships (two of which, however, were sent away to warn Eurymedon afterwards) would amount to about 1000 men in all. But there presently arrived two armed Messenian privateers, from which Demosthenès obtained a reinforcement of forty Messenian hoplites, together with a supply of wicker shields, though more fit for show than for use, wherewith to arm his rowers. Altogether, it appears that he must have had about 200 hoplites, besides the half-armed seamen.²

Intelligence of this attempt to plant, even upon the Lacedæmonian territory, the annoyance and insult of a hostile post, was soon transmitted to Sparta. Yet no immediate measures were taken to march to the spot ; as well from the natural slowness of the Spartan character, strengthened by a festival which happened to be then going on, as from the confidence entertained that, whenever attacked, the expulsion of the enemy was certain. A stronger impression however was made by the news upon the Lacedæmonian army invading Attica, who were at the same time suffering from want of provisions (the corn not being yet ripe), and from an unusually cold spring : accordingly

Demosthenès fortifies the place, through the voluntary zeal of the soldiers. He is left there with a garrison while the fleet goes on to Korkyra.

Slow march of the Lacedæmonians to recover Pylus.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 4.
² Thucyd. iv. 9. Demosthenès placed the greater number (τοὺς πολλοὺς) of his hoplites round the walls of his post,

and selected sixty of them to march down to the shore. This implies a total which can hardly be less than 200.

Agis marched them back to Sparta, and the fortification of Pylus thus produced the effect of abridging the invasion to the unusually short period of fifteen days. It operated in like manner to the protection of Korkyra : for the Peloponnesian fleet, recently arrived thither or still on its way, received orders immediately to return for the attack of Pylus. Having avoided the Athenian fleet by transporting the ships across the isthmus at Leukas, it reached Pylus about the same time as the Lacedæmonian land-force from Sparta, composed of the Spartans themselves and the neighbouring Periœki. For the more distant Periœki, as well as the Peloponnesian allies, being just returned from Attica, though summoned to come as soon as they could, did not accompany this first march.¹

At the last moment before the Peloponnesian fleet came in and occupied the harbour, Demosthenês detached two out of his five triremes to warn Eurymedon and the main fleet, and to entreat immediate succour : the remaining ships he hauled ashore under the fortification, protecting them by palisades planted in front, and prepared to defend himself in the best manner he could. Having posted the larger portion of his force—some of them mere seamen without arms, and many only half-armed—round the assailable points of the fortification, to resist attacks from the land-force, he himself, with sixty chosen hoplites and a few bowmen, marched out of the fortification down to the sea-shore. It was on that side that the wall was weakest, for the Athenians, confident in their naval superiority, had given themselves little trouble to provide against an assailant fleet. Accordingly, Demosthenês foresaw that the great stress of the attack would lie on the sea-side. His only safety consisted in preventing the enemy from landing ; a purpose, seconded by the rocky and perilous shore, which left no possibility of approach for ships except on a narrow space immediately under the fortification. It was here that he took post, on the water's edge, addressing a few words of encouragement to his men, and warning them that it was useless now to display acuteness in summing up perils which were but too obvious—and that the only chance of escape lay in boldly encountering the enemy before they could set foot ashore ; the difficulty of effecting a

Preparations
of Demo-
sthenês to
defend
Pylus
against
them.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 8.

landing from ships in the face of resistance being better known to Athenian mariners than to any one else.¹

With a fleet of forty-three triremes under Thrasymelidas, and a powerful land-force, simultaneously attacking, the Lacedæmonians had good hopes of storming at once a rock so hastily converted into a military post. But as they foresaw that the first attack might possibly fail, and that the fleet of Eurymedon would probably return, they resolved to occupy forthwith the island of Sphakteria, the natural place where the Athenian fleet would take station for the purpose of assisting the garrison ashore. The neighbouring coast on the mainland of Peloponnesus was both harbourless and hostile, so that there was no other spot near, where they could take station. And the Lacedæmonian commanders reckoned upon being able to stop up, as it were mechanically, both the two entrances into the harbour by triremes lashed together from the island to the mainland, with their prows pointing outwards: so that they would be able at any rate, occupying the island as well as the two channels, to keep off the Athenian fleet, and to hold Demosthenês closely blocked up² on the rock of Pylus, where his provisions would quickly fail him. With these views they drafted off by lot some hoplites from each of the Spartan lochi, accompanied as usual by Helots, and sent them across to Sphakteria; while their land-force and their fleet approached at once to attack the fortification.

Of the assault on the land-side we hear little. The Lacedæmonians were proverbially unskilful in the attack of anything like a fortified place, and they appear now to have made little impression. But the chief stress and vigour of the attack came on the sea-side, as Demosthenês had foreseen. The landing-place, even where practicable, was still rocky and difficult—and so narrow in dimensions, that the Lacedæmonian ships could only approach by small squadrons at a time; while the Athenians maintained their ground firmly to prevent a single man from setting foot on land. The assailing triremes rowed up with loud shouts and exhortations to each other, striving to

Proceedings of the Lacedæmonian army—they send a detachment to occupy the island of Sphakteria, opposite Pylus.

They attack the place by sea and land—gallant conduct of Brasidas in the attack on the sea-side.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 10.

² Thucyd. iv. 8. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρώροις βύζην κλήσειν ἱμελλον.

get so placed as that the hoplites in the bow could effect a landing: but such were the difficulties arising partly from the rocks and partly from the defence, that squadron after squadron tried this in vain. Nor did even the gallant example of Brasidas procure for them any better success. That officer, commanding a trireme, and observing that some of the pilots near him were cautious in driving their ships close in shore for fear of staving them against the rocks, indignantly called to them not to spare the planks of their vessels when the enemy had insulted them by erecting a fort in the country: Lacedæmonians (he exclaimed) ought to carry the landing by force, even though their ships should be dashed to pieces: the Peloponnesian allies ought to be forward in sacrificing their ships for Sparta, in return for the many services which she had rendered to them.¹ Foremost in performance as well as in exhortation, Brasidas constrained his own pilot to drive his ship close in, and advanced in person even on to the landing-steps, for the purpose of leaping first ashore. But here he stood exposed to all the weapons of the Athenian defenders, who beat him back and pierced him with so many wounds, that he fainted away and fell back in to the bows (or foremost part of the trireme, beyond the rowers); while his shield, slipping away from the arm, dropped down and rolled overboard into the sea. His ship was obliged to retire, like the rest, without having effected any landing. All these successive attacks from the sea, repeated for one whole day and a part of the next, were repulsed by Demosthenēs and his little band with victorious bravery. To both sides it seemed a strange reversal of ordinary relations,² that the Athenians, essentially maritime, should be fighting on land—and that too Lacedæmonian land—against the Lacedæmonians, the select land-warriors of Greece, now on ship-board, and striving in vain to compass a landing on their own shore. The Athenians, in honour of their success, erected a trophy, the chief ornament of which was the shield of Brasidas, cast ashore by the waves.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 11, 12; Diodor. xii. Consult an excellent note of Dr. Arnold on this passage, in which he contrasts the looseness and exaggeration of Diodorus with the modest distinctness of Thucydides.

² Thucyd. iv. 12. ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ ἐποίησεν τῆς δόξης ἐν τῷ τότε, τοῖς μὲν ἡπειρώταις μάλιστα εἶναι καὶ τὰ περὶ ἀκρατίστοις, τοῖς δὲ θαλασσίοις τε καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ πλεῖστον προέχων.

Return of
Eurymedon
and the
Athenian
fleet to
Pylus.

On the third day, the Lacedæmonians did not repeat their attack, but sent some of their vessels round to Asiné in the Messenian Gulf for timber to construct battering machines; which they intended to employ against the wall of Demosthenés on the side towards the harbour, where it was higher, and could not be assailed without machines, but where at the same time there was great facility in landing—for their previous attack had been made on the side fronting the sea, where the wall was lower, but the difficulties of landing insuperable.¹

But before these ships came back, the face of affairs was seriously changed by the unwelcome return of the Athenian fleet from Zakyntus under Eurymedon, reinforced by four Chian ships and some of the guard-ships at Naupaktus, so as now to muster fifty sail. The Athenian admiral, finding the enemy's fleet in possession of the harbour, and seeing both the island of Sphakteria occupied, and the opposite shore covered with Lacedæmonian hoplites²—for the allies from all parts of Peloponnesus had now arrived—looked around in vain for a place to land. He could find no other night-station except the uninhabited island of Prôtê, not very far distant. From hence he sailed forth in the morning to Pylus, prepared for a naval engagement—hoping that perhaps the Lacedæmonians might come out to fight him in the open sea, but resolved, if this did not happen, to force his way in and attack the fleet in the harbour; the breadth of sea between Sphakteria and the mainland being sufficient to admit of nautical manœuvre.³ The Lacedæmonian admirals, seemingly confounded by the

¹ Thucyd. iv. 13. ἐλπίζοντες τὸ κατὰ τὴν λιμένα τεῖχος ὕψος μὲν ἔχειν, ἀποβάσεως δὲ μάλιστα οὐσης ἐλεῖν μηχαναῖς. See Poppo's note upon this passage.

² Thucyd. iv. 14.

³ Thucyd. iv. 13. The Lacedæmonians παρεσκευάζοντο, ἦν ἐσπλήρ τις, ὥς ἐν τῷ λιμένι ὕντι οὐ μικρῷ ναυμαχῆσονται.

The expression "the harbour which was not small," to designate the spacious bay of Navarino, has excited much remark from Mr. Bloomfield and Dr. Arnold, and was indeed one of the reasons which induced the latter to suspect that the harbour meant by Thucydides was not the bay of Navarino, but the neighbouring lake of

Osmyn Aga.

I have already discussed that supposition in a former note: but in reference to the expression οὐ μικρῷ, we may observe, first, that the use of negative expressions to convey a positive idea would be in the ordinary manner of Thucydides.

But farther—I have stated in a previous note that it is indispensable, in my judgement, to suppose the island of Sphakteria to have touched the mainland much more closely in the time of Thucydides than it does now. At that time, therefore, very probably, the basin of Navarino was not so large as we now find it.

speed of the Athenian fleet in coming back, never thought of sailing out of the harbour to fight, nor did they even realise their scheme of blocking up the two entrances of the harbour with triremes closely lashed together. Leaving both entrances open, they determined to defend themselves within : but even here, so defective were their precautions, that several of their triremes were yet moored, and the rowers not fully aboard, when the Athenian admirals sailed in by both entrances at once, to attack them. Most of the Lacedæmonian triremes, afloat and in fighting trim, resisted the attack for a certain time, but were at length vanquished and driven back to the shore, many of them with serious injury.¹ Five of them were captured and towed off, one with all her crew aboard. The Athenians, vigorously pursuing their success, drove against such as took refuge on the shore, as well as those which were not manned at the moment when the attack began, and had not been able to get afloat or into action. Some of the vanquished triremes being deserted by their crews, who jumped out upon the land, the Athenians were proceeding to tow them off, when the Lacedæmonian hoplites on the shore opposed a new and strenuous resistance. Excited to the utmost pitch by witnessing the disgraceful defeat of their fleet and aware of the cruel consequences which turned upon it—they marched all armed into the water, seized the ships to prevent them from being dragged off, and engaged in a desperate conflict to baffle the assailants. We have already seen a similar act of bravery, two years before, on the part of the Messenian hoplites accompanying the fleet of Phormio near Naupaktus.² Extraordinary daring and valour was here displayed on both sides, in the attack as well as in the defence, and such was the clamour and confusion, that neither the land-skill of the Lacedæmonians, nor the sea-skill of the Athenians, were of much avail : the contest was one of personal valour, and considerable suffering, on both sides. At length the Lacedæmonians carried their point, and saved all the ships ashore ; none being carried away except those

He defeats
the Lacedæmonian
fleet in the
harbour of
Pylus.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 14. *ἔτρωσαν μὲν πολλὰς, πέντε δ' ἔλαβον*. We cannot in English speak of *wounding* a trireme—though the Greek word is both lively and accurate, to represent the blow

inflicted by the impinging beak of an enemy's ship.

² See above in this History, chap. xlix.

at first captured. Both parties thus separated: the Athenians retired to the fortress at Pylus, where they were doubtless hailed with overflowing joy by their comrades, and where they erected a trophy for their victory—giving up the enemy's dead for burial, and picking up the floating wrecks and pieces.¹

But the great prize of the victory was neither in the five ships captured, nor in the relief afforded to the besieged at Pylus. It lay in the hoplites occupying the island of Sphakteria, who were now cut off from the mainland, as well as from all supplies. The Athenians, sailing round it in triumph, already looked upon them as their prisoners; while the Lacedæmonians on the opposite mainland, deeply distressed but not knowing what to do, sent to Sparta for advice. So grave was the emergency, that the Ephors came in person to the spot forthwith. Since they could still muster sixty triremes, a greater number than the Athenians—besides a large force on land, and the whole command of the resources of the country,—while the Athenians had no footing on shore except the contracted promontory of Pylus, we might have imagined that a strenuous effort to carry off the imprisoned detachment across the narrow strait to the mainland would have had a fair chance of success. And probably, if either Demosthenês or Brasidas had been in command, such an effort would have been made. But Lacedæmonian courage was rather steadfast and unyielding than adventurous. Moreover the Athenian superiority at sea exercised a sort of fascination over men's minds analogous to that of the Spartans themselves on land; so that the Ephors, on reaching Pylus, took a desponding view of their position, and sent a herald to the Athenian generals to propose an armistice, in order to allow time for envoys to go to Athens and treat for peace.

To this Eurymedon and Demosthenês assented, and an armistice was concluded on the following terms. The Lacedæmonians agreed to surrender not only all their triremes now in the harbour, but also all the rest in their ports, altogether to the number of sixty; also to abstain from all attack upon the fortress at Pylus either by land or sea, for such time as should be necessary for the mission of envoys to Athens as

The Lacedæmonian detachment is blocked up by the Athenian fleet in the island of Sphakteria—armistice concluded at Pylus.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 13, 14.

well as for their return, both to be effected in an Athenian trireme provided for the purpose. The Athenians on their side engaged to desist from all hostilities during the like interval ; but it was agreed that they should keep strict and unremitting watch over the island, yet without landing upon it. For the subsistence of the detachment in the island, the Lacedæmonians were permitted to send over every day two chœnikes of barley-meal in cakes ready baked, two kotylæ of wine,¹ and some meat, for each hoplite—together with half that quantity for each of the attendant Helots ; but this was all to be done under the supervision of the Athenians, with peremptory obligations to send no secret additional supplies. It was moreover expressly stipulated that if any one provision of the armistice, small or great, were violated, the whole should be considered as null and void. Lastly, the Athenians engaged, on the return of the envoys from Athens, to restore the triremes in the same condition as they received them.

Such terms sufficiently attest the humiliation and anxiety of the Lacedæmonians ; while the surrender of their entire naval force, to the number of sixty triremes, which was forthwith carried into effect, demonstrates at the same time that they sincerely believed in the possibility of obtaining peace. Well aware that they were themselves the original beginners of the war, at a time when the Athenians desired peace—and that the latter had besides made fruitless overtures while under the pressure of the epidemic—they presumed that the same disposition still prevailed at Athens, and that their present pacific wishes would be so gladly welcomed as to procure without difficulty the relinquishment of the prisoners in Sphakteria.²

The Lacedæmonian envoys, conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme, appeared before the public assembly to set forth their mission, according to custom, prefacing their address with some apologies for that brevity of speech which belonged

¹ Thucyd. iv. 16. The Chœnix was equivalent to about two pints, English dry measure : it was considered as the usual daily sustenance for a slave. Each Lacedæmonian soldier had therefore double of this daily allowance, besides meat, in weight and quantity not specified : the fact that the quantity of meat is not specified seems to show that they

did not fear abuse in this item.

The Kotyla contained about half a pint, English wine measure : each Lacedæmonian soldier had therefore a pint of wine daily. It was always the practice in Greece to drink the wine with a large admixture of water.

² Thucyd. iv. 21 : compare vii. 18.

Mission of Lacedæmonian envoys to Athens, to propose peace, and solicit the release of their soldiers in Sphakteria.

to their country. Their proposition was in substance a very simple one—"Give up to us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange for this favour, peace, with the alliance of Sparta." They enforced their cause by appeals, well-turned and conciliatory, partly indeed to the generosity, but still more to the prudential calculation of Athens; explicitly admitting the high and glorious vantage-ground on which she was now placed, as well as their own humbled dignity and inferior position.¹ They, the Lacedæmonians, the first and greatest power in Greece, were smitten by adverse fortune of war—and that too without misconduct of their own, so that they were for the first time obliged to solicit an enemy for peace; which Athens had the precious opportunity of granting, not merely with honour to herself, but also in such manner as to create in their minds an ineffaceable friendship. And it became Athens to make use of her present good fortune while she had it,—not to rely upon its permanence nor to abuse it by extravagant demands. Her own imperial prudence, as well as the present circumstances of the Spartans, might teach her how unexpectedly the most disastrous casualties occurred. By granting what was now asked, she might make a peace which would be far more durable than if it were founded on the extorted compliances of a weakened enemy, because it would rest on Spartan honour and gratitude; the greater the previous enmity, the stronger would be such reactionary sentiment.² But if Athens should now refuse, and if, in the farther prosecution of the war, the men in Sphakteria should perish—a new and inexpiable ground of quarrel,³ peculiar to Sparta herself, would

¹ Thucyd. iv. 18. γνῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν συμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 19.

³ Thucyd. iv. 20. ἡμῖν δὲ καλῶς, εἴπερ πότε, ἔχει ἀμφοτέροις ἡ ἐναλλαγὴ, πρὶν τι ἀνήκεστον διὰ μέσου γενόμενον ἡμᾶς καταλαβεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη ἄλλων ὑμῖν ἐχθρὰν πρὸς τῇ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ὑμᾶς δὲ στερηθῆναι ὃν νῦν προκαλούμεθα.

I understand these words κοινῇ and ἰδία agreeably to the explanation of the Scholiast, from whom Dr. Arnold, as well as Poppo and Göller, depart, in my judgement, erroneously. The whole war had been begun in consequence of the complaints of the Peloponnesian allies, and of wrongs alleged to have

been done to *them* by Athens: Sparta herself had no ground of complaint—nothing of which she desired redress.

Dr. Arnold translates it—"we shall hate you not only nationally, for the wound you will have inflicted on Sparta; but also individually, because so many of us will have lost our near relations from your inflexibility." "The Spartan aristocracy (he adds) would feel at a personal wound to lose at once so many of its members, connected by blood or marriage with its principal families; compare Thucyd. v. 15."

We must recollect however that the Athenians could not possibly know at this time that the hoplites inclosed in Sphakteria belonged in great proportion

be added to those already subsisting, which rather concerned Sparta as the chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Nor was it only the goodwill and gratitude of the Spartans which Athens would earn by accepting the proposition tendered to her; she would farther acquire the grace and glory of conferring peace on Greece, which all the Greeks would recognize as her act. And when once the two pre-eminent powers, Athens and Sparta, were established in cordial amity, the remaining Grecian states would be too weak to resist what they two might prescribe.¹

Such was the language held by the Lacedæmonians in the assembly at Athens. It was discreetly calculated for their purpose, though when we turn back to the commencement of the war, and read the lofty declarations of the Spartan Ephors and assembly respecting the wrongs of their allies and the necessity of extorting full indemnity for them from Athens—the contrast is indeed striking. On this occasion, the Lacedæmonians acted entirely for themselves and from consideration of their own necessities; severing themselves from their allies, and soliciting a special peace for themselves, with as little scruple as the Spartan general Menedæus during the preceding year, when he abandoned his Ambrakiot confederates after the battle of Olpæ, to conclude a separate capitulation with Demosthenês.

The course proper to be adopted by Athens in reference to the proposition, however, was by no means obvious. In all probability, the trireme which brought the Lacedæmonian envoys also brought the first news of that unforeseen and instantaneous turn of events, which had rendered the Spartans in Sphakteria certain prisoners, (so it was then conceived) and placed the whole Lacedæmonian fleet in their power: thus giving a totally new character to the war. The sudden arrival of such prodigious intelligence—the astounding presence of Lacedæmonian envoys, bearing the olive-branch and in an attitude of humiliation—must

to the first families in Sparta. And the Spartan envoys would surely have the diplomatic prudence to abstain from any facts or arguments which would reveal, or even suggest, to them so important a secret.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 20. ἡμῶν γὰρ καὶ ὁμῶν ταῦτα λεγόντων τό γε ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὅστε ὅτι ὑποδεέστερον ἢ τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει.

Aristophanês, Pac. 1048. Ἐξδὺν σπεισαμένοις κοινῇ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀρχεῖν.

The Athenians, at the instance of Kleon, require the restoration of Nisæa, Pégæ, Trœzen, and Achæa, as conditions of giving up the men in Sphakteria and making peace.

have produced in the susceptible public of Athens emotions of the utmost intensity; an elation and confidence such as had probably never been felt since the re-conquest of Samos. It was difficult at first to measure the full bearings of the new situation, and even Periklēs himself might have hesitated what to recommend. But the immediate and dominant impression with the general public was, that Athens might now ask her own terms, as consideration for the prisoners in the island.¹

Of this reigning tendency Kleon² made himself the emphatic organ, as he had done three years before in the sentence passed on the Mitylenæans; a man who—like leading journals in modern times—often appeared to guide the public because he gave vehement utterance to that which they were already feeling, and carried it out in its collateral bearings and consequences. On the present occasion, he doubtless spoke with the most genuine conviction; for he was full of the sentiment of Athenian force and Athenian imperial dignity, as well as disposed to a sanguine view of future chances. Moreover, in a discussion like that now opened, where there was much room for doubt, he came forward with a proposition at once plain and decisive. Reminding the Athenians of the dishonourable truce of Thirty years to which they had been compelled by the misfortunes of the time to accede, fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—Kleon insisted that now was the time for Athens to recover what she had then lost—Nisæa, Pêgæ, Trœzen, and Achaia. He proposed that Sparta should be required to restore these to Athens, in exchange for the soldiers now blocked up in Sphakteria; after which a truce might be concluded for as long a time as might be deemed expedient.

This decree, adopted by the assembly, was communicated as the answer of Athens to the Lacedæmonian envoys, who had probably retired after their first address, and were now sent for again into the assembly to hear it. On being informed

¹ Thucyd. iv. 21.

² Thucyd. iv. 21. *μάλιστα δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐνῆγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἄνθρωπος δημογῶγος κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὃν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ πιθανότατος· καὶ ἐπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, &c.*

This sentence reads like a first introduction of Kleon to the notice of the reader. It would appear that Thucy-

didēs had forgotten that he had before introduced Kleon on occasion of the Mitylenæan surrender, and that too in language very much the same—iii. 36. *καὶ Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ὃν καὶ ἐς τὰ ἔλλα βιαίτερος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ τῷ δήμῳ παρὰ πολλὸν ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανότατος, &c.*

of the resolution, they made no comment on its substance, but invited the Athenians to name commissioners, who might discuss with them freely and deliberately suitable terms for a pacification. Here however Kleon burst upon them with an indignant rebuke. He had thought from the first (he said) that they came with dishonest purposes, but now the thing was clear—nothing else could be meant by this desire to treat with some few men apart from the general public. If they had really any fair proposition to make, he called upon them to proclaim it openly to all. But this the envoys could not bring themselves to do. They had probably come with authority to make certain concessions; but to announce these concessions forthwith, would have rendered negotiation impossible, besides dishonouring them in the face of their allies. Such dishonour would be incurred, too, without any advantage, if the Athenians should after all reject the terms, which the temper of the assembly before them rendered but too probable. Moreover, they were totally unpractised in the talents for dealing with a public assembly, such discussions being so rare as to be practically unknown in the Lacedæmonian system. To reply to the denunciation of a vehement speaker like Kleon, required readiness of elocution, dexterity, and self-command, which they had had no opportunity of acquiring. They remained silent—abashed by the speaker and intimidated by the temper of the assembly. Their mission was thus terminated, and they were reconveyed in the trireme to Pylus.¹

The envoys will not consent to these demands—Kleon prevents negotiation—they are sent back to Pylus without any result.

It is probable that if these envoys had been able to make an effective reply to Kleon, and to defend their proposition against his charge of fraudulent purpose, they would have been sustained by Nikias and a certain number of leading Athenians, so that the assembly might have been brought at least to try the issue of a private discussion between diplomatic agents on both sides. But the case was one in which it was absolutely necessary that the envoys should stand forward with some defence for themselves; which Nikias might effectively second, but could not originate: and as they were incompetent to this task,

Remarks on this assembly and on the conduct of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 22.

the whole affair broke down. We shall hereafter find other examples, in which the incapacity of Lacedæmonian envoys to meet the open debate of Athenian political life, is productive of mischievous results. In this case, the proposition of the envoys to enter into treaty with select commissioners, was not only quite reasonable, but afforded the only possibility (though doubtless not a certainty) of some ultimate pacification : and the manœuvre whereby Kleon discredited it was a grave abuse of publicity—not unknown in modern, though more frequent in ancient, political life. Kleon probably thought that if commissioners were named, Nikias, Lachês, and other politicians of the same rank and colour, would be the persons selected ; persons whose anxiety for peace and alliance with Sparta would make them over-indulgent and careless in securing the interests of Athens. It will be seen, when we come to describe the conduct of Nikias four years afterwards, that this suspicion was not ill-grounded.

Unfortunately Thucydîdês, in describing the proceedings of this assembly, so important in its consequences because it intercepted a promising opening for peace, is brief as usual—telling us only what was said by Kleon and what was decided by the assembly. But though nothing is positively stated respecting Nikias and his partisans, we learn from other sources, and we may infer from what afterwards occurred, that they vehemently opposed Kleon, and that they looked coldly on the subsequent enterprise against Sphakteria as upon his peculiar measure.¹

It has been common to treat the dismissal of the Lacedæmonian envoys on this occasion as a peculiar specimen of démocratical folly. Yet over-estimation of the prospective chances arising out of success, to a degree more extravagant than that of which Athens was now guilty, is by no means peculiar to democracy. Other governments, opposed to democracy not less in temper than in form—an able despot like the Emperor Napoleon, and a powerful aristocracy like that of England²—have found success to the full as misleading.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 7 ; Philochorus, *Fragm.* 105, ed. Didot.

² Let us read some remarks of Mr. Burke on the temper of England during

the American war.

“ You remember that in the beginning of this American war, you were greatly divided : and a very strong body, if not

That Athens should desire to profit by this unexpected piece of good fortune, was perfectly reasonable: that she should make use of it to regain advantages which former misfortunes had compelled herself to surrender, was a feeling not unnatural. And whether the demand was excessive, or by how much—is a question always among the most embarrassing for any government—kingly, oligarchical, or democratical—to determine.

We may however remark that Kleon gave an impolitic turn to Athenian feeling, by directing it towards the entire and literal reacquisition of what had been lost twenty years before. Unless we are to consider his quadruple demand as a flourish, to be modified by subsequent negotiation, it seems to present some plausibility, but little of long-sighted wisdom. For while on the one hand, it called upon Sparta to give up much which was not in her possession, and must have been extorted by force from allies—on the other hand, the situation of Athens was not the same as it had been when she concluded the Thirty years' truce; nor does it seem that the restoration of Achaia and Trœzen would have been of any material value to her. Nisæa and Pégæ—which would have been tantamount to the entire Megarid, inasmuch as Megara itself could hardly have been held with both its ports in the possession of an enemy—would indeed have been highly valuable, since she could then have protected her territory against invasion from Peloponnesus, besides possessing a port in the Corinthian Gulf. And it would seem that if able commissioners had now been named for private discussion with the

the strongest, opposed itself to the madness which every art and every power were employed to render popular, in order that the errors of the rulers might be lost in the general blindness of the nation. This opposition continued until after our great, but most unfortunate victory at Long Island. Then all the mounds and banks of our constancy were borne down at once; and the phrenzy of the American war broke in upon us like a deluge. This victory, which seemed to put an immediate end to all difficulties, perfected in us that spirit of domination which our unparalleled prosperity had but too long nurtured. We had been so very powerful, and so very prosperous, that even

the humblest of us were degraded into the vices and follies of kings. We lost all measure between means and ends; and our headlong desires became our politics and our morals. All men who wished for peace, or retained any sentiments of moderation, were overborne or silenced; and this city (Bristol) was led by every artifice (and probably with the more management, because I was one of your members) to distinguish itself by its zeal for that fatal cause." Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol previous to the election (Works, vol. iii. p. 365).

Compare Mr. Burke's Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol, p. 174 of the same volume.

Lacedæmonian envoys, under the present urgent desire of Sparta coupled with her disposition to abandon her allies—this important point might possibly have been pressed and carried, in exchange for Sphacteria. Nay, even if such acquisition had been found impracticable, still the Athenians would have been able to effect some arrangement which would have widened the breach, and destroyed the confidence, between Sparta and her allies; a point of great moment for them to accomplish. There was therefore every reason for trying what could be done by negotiation, under the present temper of Sparta; and the step, by which Kleon abruptly broke off such hopes, was decidedly mischievous.

On the return of the envoys without success to Pylus,¹ twenty days after their departure from that place, the armistice immediately terminated; and the Lacedæmonians redemanded the triremes which they had surrendered. But Eurymedon refused compliance with this demand, alleging that the Lacedæmonians had during the truce made a fraudulent attempt to surprise the rock of Pylus, and had violated the stipulations in other ways besides; while it stood expressly stipulated in the truce, that the violation by either side even of the least among its conditions should cancel all obligation on both sides. Thucydides, without distinctly giving his opinion, seems rather to imply that there was no just ground for the refusal: though if any accidental want of vigilance had presented to the Lacedæmonians an opportunity for surprising Pylus, they would be likely enough to avail themselves of it, seeing that they would thereby drive off the Athenian fleet from its only landing-place, and render the continued blockade of Sphacteria impracticable. However the truth may be, Eurymedon persisted in his refusal, in spite of loud protests of the Lacedæmonians against his perfidy. Hostilities were energetically resumed: the Lacedæmonian army on land began again to attack the fortifications of Pylus, while the Athenian fleet became doubly watchful in the blockade of Sphacteria, in which they were reinforced by twenty fresh ships from Athens, making a fleet of seventy triremes in all. Two ships were perpetually rowing round the

The armistice is terminated, and war resumed at Pylus. Eurymedon keeps possession of the Lacedæmonian fleet.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 39.

island, in opposite directions, throughout the whole day ; while at night the whole fleet were kept on watch, except on the sea-side of the island in stormy weather.¹

The blockade, however, was soon found to be more full of privation in reference to the besiegers themselves, and more difficult of enforcement in respect to the island and its occupants, than had been originally contemplated. The Athenians were much distressed for want of water. They had only one really good spring in the fortification of Pylus itself, quite insufficient for the supply of a large fleet : many of them were obliged to scrape the shingle and drink such brackish water as they could find ; while ships as well as men were perpetually afloat, since they could take rest and refreshment only by relays successively landing on the rock of Pylus, or even on the edge of Sphakteria itself, with all the chance of being interrupted by the enemy—there being no other landing place,² and the ancient trireme affording no accommodation either for eating or sleeping.

Blockade of
Sphakteria
by the
Athenian
fleet—diffi-
culty and
hardships
to the sea-
men of the
fleet.

At first, all this was patiently borne, in the hopes that Sphakteria would speedily be starved out, and the Spartans forced to renew the request for capitulation. But no such request came, and the Athenians in the fleet gradually became sick in body as well as impatient and angry in mind. In spite of all their vigilance, clandestine supplies of provisions continually reached the island, under the temptation of large rewards offered by the Spartan government. Able swimmers contrived to cross the strait, dragging after them by ropes skins full of linseed and poppy-seed mixed with honey ; while merchant-vessels, chiefly manned by Helots, started from various parts of the Laconian coast, selecting by preference the stormy nights, and encountering every risk in order to run their vessel with its cargo ashore on the sea-side of the island, at a time when the Athenian guardships could not be on the look-out.³ They cared little about damage to their vessel in landing, provided they could get the cargo on

¹ Thucyd. iv. 23.

² Thucyd. iv. 25. τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὄρυον. This does not mean (as some of the commentators seem to suppose, see Poppo's note) that the Athe-

nians had not plenty of sea-room in the harbour : it means that they had no station ashore, except the narrow space of Pylus itself.

³ Thucyd. iv. 26.

shore; for ample compensation was ensured to them, together with emancipation to every Helot who succeeded in reaching the island with a supply. Though the Athenians redoubled

Protracted duration and seeming uncertainty of the blockade—Demosthenês sends to Athens for reinforcements to attack the island.

their vigilance, and intercepted many of these daring smugglers, still there were others who eluded them. Moreover the rations supplied to the island by stipulation during the absence of the envoys in their journey to Athens had been so ample, that Epitadas the commander had been able to economise, and thus to make the stock hold out longer. Week after week passed without any symptoms of surrender.

The Athenians not only felt the present sufferings of their own position, but also became apprehensive for their own supplies, all brought by sea round Peloponnesus to this distant and naked shore. They began even to mistrust the possibility of thus indefinitely continuing the blockade, against the contingencies of such violent weather as would probably ensue at the close of summer. In this state of weariness and uncertainty, the active Demosthenês began to organise a descent upon the island, with the view of carrying it by force. He not only sent for forces from the neighbouring allies, Zakynthus and Naupaktus, but also transmitted an urgent request to Athens that reinforcements might be furnished to him for the purpose—making known explicitly both the uncomfortable condition of the armament and the unpromising chances of simple blockade.¹

¹ Thucyd. iv. 27, 29, 30.

(c. 27) 'Εν δὲ ταῖς Ἀθήναις πυνθανόμενοι περὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς ὅτι ταλαιπωρεῖται, καὶ οἷτος τοῖς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ὅτι ἐσπλεῖ, &c.

Κλέων δὲ γνοὺς αὐτῶν τὴν ἐς αὐτὸν ὑποψίαν περὶ τῆς κωλύμενης ἐμβάσεως, οὐ τάληθ' ἔφη λέγειν τοὺς ἐξαγγέλλοντας. Παραινούτων δὲ τῶν ἀφ' ἡμετέρων, εἰ μὴ σφίσι πιστεύουσι, κατασκόπους νινὰς πέμψαι, &c.

(29) Τὸν δὲ Δημοσθένην προσέλαβε πυνθανόμενος τὴν ἀπόβασιν αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν νήσον διανοεῖσθαι, &c.

(30) Δημοσθένης, τὴν ἐπιχειρήσιν παρεσκευάζετο στρατιάν τε μεταπέμψων ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς συμμάχων καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἑτοιμάζων. Κλέων δὲ, ἐκείνῳ τε προπέμψας ἀγγελὸν ὥς ἦξων, καὶ ἔχων στρατιάν ἣν ᾗτήσατο, ἀφικνεῖται ἐς Πύλον.

That these persons οἱ ἐξαγγέλλοντες

—οἱ ἀφ' ἡμετέρων—were envoys sent from Demosthenês and the other Athenian generals at Pylus, to report to the Athenian assembly—I assume with perfect confidence. The Athenian people were not left to hear from casual comers the condition of their armament and the progress of this important enterprise. That Demosthenês had asked for a reinforcement, is here expressly stated; and if it were not expressly stated, we might presume it with tolerable confidence, from the attack which he was meditating upon Sphakteria, and from the efforts which he was making in his own neighbourhood and among the allies. Besides, when it is said (c. 27) that the Athenians, on hearing the reports of the envoys, had already become inclined of themselves to send forces there (ὁρμημένους τι τὸ

The arrival of these envoys caused infinite mortification to the Athenians at home. Having expected to hear long before that Sphakteria had surrendered, they were now taught to consider even the ultimate conquest as a matter of doubt. They were surprised that the Lacedæmonians sent no fresh envoys to solicit peace, and began to suspect that such silence was founded upon well-grounded hopes of being able to hold out. But the person most of all discomposed was Kleon, who observed that the people now regretted their insulting repudiation of the Lacedæmonian message, and were displeased with him as the author of it; while on the contrary, his numerous political enemies were rejoiced at the turn which events had taken, as it opened a means of effecting his ruin. At first, Kleon contended that the envoys had misrepresented the state of facts. To which the latter replied by entreating, that if their accuracy were mistrusted, commissioners of inspection might be sent to verify it; and Kleon himself, along with Theogenês, was forthwith named for this function.

Proceedings in the Athenian assembly on receiving this news—proposition of Kleon—manœuvre of his political enemies to send him against his will as general to Pylus.

But it did not suit Kleon's purpose to go as commissioner to Pylus. His mistrust of the statement was a mere general suspicion, not resting on any positive evidence. Moreover he saw that the dispositions of the assembly tended to comply with the request of Demosthenês, and to despatch a reinforcing armament. He accordingly altered his tone at once: "If ye really believe the story (he said), do not waste time in sending commissioners, but sail at once to capture the men. It would be easy with a proper force, if our generals were *men* (here he pointed reproachfully to his enemy Nikias, then Stratêgus¹), to sail and take the soldiers in the island. That is what *I* at least would do if *I* were general." His words instantly provoked a hostile murmur from a portion of the

πλέον τῇ γνώμῃ στρατεύειν)—and when Kleon says to the people—"If you think the reports of the envoys true, send forces at once against Sphakteria"—(εἰ δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς ἀληθὴ εἶναι τὰ ἀγγελλόμενα, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας)—this is plain evidence to me, that the report as to matters of fact had been presented by the envoys as a ground for requesting reinforcements.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 27. Καὶ ἐς Νικίαν τὸν

Νικηράτου στρατηγὸν ὄντα ἀπεσθίμηνεν, ἐχθρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν—ῥῆδιον εἶναι παρασκευῇ, εἰ ἄνδρες εἴεν οἱ στρατηγοί, πλεῦσαντας λαβεῖν τοὺς ἐν τῇ νήσῳ· καὶ αὐτὸς γ' ἂν, εἰ ἤρχε, ποιῆσαι τοῦτο. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας τῶν τε Ἀθηναίων τι υποδοροβήσαντων ἐς τὸν Κλέωνα, ὅτι οὐ καὶ νῦν πλεῖ, εἰ ῥῆδιόν γε αὐτῷ φαίνεται· καὶ ἅμα ὁρῶν αὐτὸν ἐπιτιμῶντα, ἐκέλευεν ἦντινα βούλεται δύναμιν λαβόντα, τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶναι, ἐπιχειρεῖν.

assembly: "Why do you not sail then at once, if you think the matter so easy?" Nikias, taking up this murmur, and delighted to have caught his political enemy in a trap, stood forward in person and pressed him to set about the enterprise without delay; intimating the willingness of himself and his colleagues to grant him any portion of the military force of the city which he chose to ask for.

Kleon at first closed with this proposition, believing it to be a mere stratagem of debate and not seriously intended. But so soon as he saw that what was said was really meant, he tried to back out, and observed to Nikias—"it is your place to sail: *you* are general, not I."¹ Nikias only replied by repeating his exhortation, renouncing formally the command against Sphakteria, and calling upon the Athenians to recollect what Kleon had said, as well as to hold him to his engagement. The more Kleon tried to evade the duty, the louder and more unanimous did the cry of the assembly become that Nikias should surrender it to him, and that *he* should undertake it. At last, seeing that there was no possibility of receding, Kleon reluctantly accepted the charge, and came forward to announce his intention in a resolute address—"I am not at all afraid of the Lacedæmonians (he said): I shall sail without even taking with me any of the hoplites from the regular Athenian muster-roll, but only the Lemnian and Imbrian hoplites who are now here (that is, Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens who had properties in Lemnos and Imbros and habitually resided there), together with some peltasts brought from Ænos in Thrace, and 400 bowmen. With this force, added to what is already at Pylus, I engage in the space of twenty days either to bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphakteria hither as prisoners, or to kill them in the island." The Athenians (observes Thucydides) laughed somewhat at Kleon's looseness of tongue; but prudent men had pleasure in reflecting that one or other of the two advantages was now

¹ Thucyd. iv. 28. 'Ο δὲ (Κλέων) τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οἰόμενος αὐτὸν (Νικίαν) λόγῳ μόνον ἀφιέναι, ἐτοίμος ἦν, γνοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι παραδωσέοντα ἀνεχάρεϊ, καὶ οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἄλλ' ἐκείνον στρατηγεῖν, δεδιὼς ἥδη καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰόμενός οἱ αὐτὸν τολμήσαι ὑποχωρῆσαι. Αἰθὺς δὲ ὁ Νικίας ἐκέλευε, καὶ ἐξίστατο τῆς ἐπὶ Πύλῳ ἀρχῆς, καὶ μάρτυρας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους

ἐποιεῖτο. Οἱ δὲ, οἷον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ Κλέων ὑπέφηνε τὸν πλοῦν καὶ ἐξανεχάρεϊ τὰ εἰρημένα, τόσῳ ἐπεκελεύοντο τῷ Νικίᾳ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἐκείνῳ ἐπεβῶν πλεῖν. "Ὅστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅπως τῶν εἰρημένων ἐτι ἐξαπαλλαγῇ, ὀρίσταται τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ παρελθὼν οὕτε φοβεῖσθαι ἔφη Λακεδαιμόνιους, &c.

certain: either they would get rid of Kleon, which they anticipated as the issue at once most probable and most desirable—or if mistaken on this point, the Lacedæmonians in the island would be killed or taken.¹ The vote was accordingly passed for the immediate departure of Kleon, who caused Demosthenês to be named as his colleague in command, and sent intelligence to Pylus at once that he was about to start with the reinforcement solicited.

This curious scene, interesting as laying open the interior feeling of the Athenian assembly, suggests, when properly considered, reflections very different from those which have been usually connected with it. It seems to be conceived by most historians as a mere piece of levity or folly in the Athenian people, who are supposed to have enjoyed the excellent joke of putting an incompetent man against his own will at the head of this enterprise, in order that they might amuse themselves with his blunders: Kleon is thus contemptible, and the Athenian people ridiculous. Certainly, if that people had been disposed to conduct their public business upon such childish fancies as are here implied, they would have made a very different figure from that which history actually presents to us. The truth is, that in regard to Kleon's alleged looseness of tongue, which excited more or less of laughter among the persons present, there was no one really ridiculous except the laughers themselves. For the announcement which he made was so far from being extravagant, that it was realised to the letter—and realised too, let us add, without any peculiar aid from unforeseen favourable accident. To illustrate farther what is here said, we have only to contrast the jesters before the fact with the jesters after it. While the former deride Kleon as a promiser of extravagant and impossible results, we find Aristophanês (in his comedy of the Knights about six months afterwards²) laughing at him as having achieved nothing at

Reflections upon this proceeding and upon the conduct of parties at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 28. Τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνέπεσε μὲν τι καὶ γέλωτος τῇ κουφολογίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἀσμένους δ' ὅμως ἐγίγνετο τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου τεύξεσθαι—ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγῆσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμῃς Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χερῶσασθαι.

² Aristophanês, Equit. 54:—

..... καὶ πρῶτῃ γ' ἐμοῦ
Μάξαν μεμαχότος ἐν Πύλῳ Λακωνικῇ,
Πανουργάτᾳ πῶς περιέβαινον, ὑφαρπάσας
Αὐτὸς παρέθηκε τὴν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μεμαγμένην.

It is Demosthenês who speaks in reference to Kleon—termed in that comedy the Paphlagonian slave of Demos.

all—as having cunningly put himself into the shoes of Demosthenês, and stolen away from that general the glory of taking Sphakteria, after all the difficulties of the enterprise had been already got over, and “the cake ready baked”—to use the phrase of the comic poet. Both of the jests are exaggerations in opposite directions; but the last in order of time, if it be good at all against Kleon, is a galling sarcasm against those who derided Kleon as an extravagant boaster.

If we intend fairly to compare the behaviour of Kleon with that of his political adversaries, we must distinguish between the two occasions: first, that in which he had frustrated the pacific mission of the Lacedæmonian envoys; next, the subsequent delay and dilemma which has been recently described. On the first occasion, his advice appears to have been mistaken in policy, as well as offensive in manner: his opponents proposing a discussion by special commissioners, as a fair chance for honourable terms of peace, took a juster view of the public interests. But the case was entirely altered when the mission for peace (wisely or unwisely) had been broken up, and when the fate of Sphakteria had been committed to the chances of war. There were then imperative reasons for prosecuting the war vigorously, and for employing all the force requisite to ensure the capture of that island. And looking to this end, we shall find that there was nothing in the conduct of Kleon either to blame or to deride; while his political adversaries (Nikias among them) are deplorably timid, ignorant, and reckless of the public interest; seeking only to turn the existing disappointment and dilemma into a party-opportunity for ruining him.

To grant the reinforcement asked for by Demosthenês was obviously the proper measure, and Kleon saw that the people would go along with him in proposing it. But he had at the same time good grounds for reproaching Nikias and the other Stratêgi, whose duty it was to originate that proposition, with their backwardness in remaining silent, and in leaving the matter to go by default, as if it were Kleon's affair and not

Compare v. 391.

Κλεῖν' ἀνὴρ εὖδοξεν εἶναι, τὰλλότριστον ἀμείων θέρος,
&c.

and 740-1197.

So far from cunningly thrusting himself into the post of general, Kleon did

everything he possibly could to avoid the post, and was only forced into it by the artifices of his enemies. It is important to notice how little the jests of Aristophanês can be taken as any evidence of historical reality.

theirs. His taunt—"This is what *I* would have done, if *I* were general"—was a mere phrase of the heat of debate, such as must have been very often used without any idea on the part of the hearers of construing it as a pledge which the speaker was bound to realise. It was no disgrace to Kleon to decline a charge which he had never sought, and to confess his incompetence to command. The reason why he was forced into the post, in spite of his own unaffected reluctance, was not (as some historians would have us believe) because the Athenian people loved a joke, but from two feelings, both perfectly serious, which divided the assembly—feelings opposite in their nature, but coinciding on this occasion to the same result. His enemies loudly urged him forward, anticipating that the enterprise under him would miscarry, and that he would thus be ruined: his friends, perceiving this manœuvre, but not sharing in such anticipations, and ascribing his reluctance to modesty, pronounced themselves so much the more vehemently on behalf of their leader, and repaid the scornful cheer by cheers of sincere encouragement. "Why do not you try your hand at this enterprise, Kleon, if you think it so easy? you will soon find that it is too much for you"—was the cry of his enemies: to which his friends would reply—"Yes, to be sure, try, Kleon: by all means, try: do not be backward; we warrant that you will come honourably out of it, and we will stand by you." Such cheer and counter-cheer is precisely in the temper of an animated multitude (as Thucydides¹ states it) divided in feeling. Friends as well as enemies thus concurred to impose upon Kleon a compulsion not to be eluded. Of all the parties here concerned, those whose conduct is the most unpardonably disgraceful are, Nikias and his oligarchical supporters; who force a political enemy into the supreme command against his own strenuous protest, persuaded that he will fail so as to compromise the lives of many soldiers and the destinies of the state on an important emergency—but satisfying themselves with the idea that they shall bring him to disgrace and ruin.

It is to be remarked that Nikias and his fellow Stratēgi were backward on this occasion, partly because they were really afraid of the duty. They anticipated a resistance to the

¹ Thucyd. iv. 28. οἶον ὅχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖν, &c.

death at Sphakteria such as that at Thermopylæ; in which case, though victory might perhaps be won by a superior assailant force, it would not be won without much bloodshed and peril, besides an inexpiable quarrel with Sparta. If Kleon took a more correct measure of the chances, he ought to have credit for it as one "*bene ausus vana contemnere.*" And it seems probable, that if he had not been thus forward in supporting the request of Demosthenês for reinforcement—or rather, if he had not been so placed that he was compelled to be forward—Nikias and his friends would have laid aside the enterprise, and reopened negotiations for peace under circumstances neither honourable nor advantageous to Athens. Kleon was in this matter one main author of the most important success which Athens obtained throughout the whole war.

On joining Demosthenês with his reinforcement, Kleon found every preparation for attack made by that general, and the soldiers at Pylus eager to commence such aggressive measures as would relieve them from the tedium of a blockade. Sphakteria had become recently more open to assault in consequence of an accidental conflagration of the wood, arising from a fire kindled by the Athenian seamen, while landing at the skirt of the island and cooking their food. Under the influence of a strong wind, most of the wood in the island had thus caught fire and been destroyed. To Demosthenês, this was an accident especially welcome: for the painful experience of his defeat in the forest-covered hills of Ætolia had taught him how difficult it was for assailants to cope with an enemy whom they could not see, and who knew all the good points of defence in the country.¹ The island being thus stripped of its wood, he was enabled to survey the garrison, to count their number, and to lay his plan of attack on certain data. He now, too, for the first time discovered that he had underrated their real number, having before suspected that the Lacedæmonians had sent in rations for a greater total than was actually there. The island was occupied altogether by 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, out of whom more than 120 were native Spartans, belonging to the first families in the city. The commander Epitadas, with

Kleon goes to Pylus with a reinforcement—condition of the island of Sphakteria—numbers and positions of the Lacedæmonians in it.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 30.

the main body, occupied the centre of the island, near the only spring of water which it afforded :¹ an advanced guard of thirty hoplites was posted not far from the sea-shore in the end of the island farthest from Pylus : while the end immediately fronting Pylus, peculiarly steep and rugged, and containing even a rude circuit of stones of unknown origin, which served as a sort of defence—was held as a post of reserve.²

Such was the prey which Kleon and Demosthenês were anxious to grasp. On the very day of the arrival of the former, they sent a herald to the Lacedæmonian generals on the mainland, inviting the surrender of the hoplites on the island on condition of being simply detained under guard without any hardship, until a final pacification should take place. Of course the summons was refused ; after which, leaving only one day for repose, the two generals took advantage of the night to put all their hoplites aboard a few triremes, making show as if they were merely commencing the ordinary nocturnal circumnavigation, so as to excite no suspicion in the occupants of the island. The entire body of Athenian hoplites, 800 in number, were thus disembarked in two divisions, one on each side of the island, a little before daybreak : the outposts, consisting of thirty Lacedæmonians, completely unprepared, were surprised even in their sleep, and all slain.³ At the point of day, the entire remaining force from the seventy-two triremes was also disembarked, leaving on board none but the thalamii or lowest tier of rowers, and reserving only a sufficient number to man the walls of Pylus. Altogether there could not have been less than 10,000 troops employed in the attack of the island—men of all arms : 800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 bowmen ; the rest armed with javelins, slings, and stones. Demosthenês kept his hoplites in one compact body, but distributed the light-armed into separate companies of about 200 men each, with orders to occupy the rising grounds all round, and harass the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonians.⁴

Kleon and Demosthenês land their forces in the island, and attack it.

To resist this large force, the Lacedæmonian commander Epitadas had only 360 hoplites around him ; for his outlying company of thirty men had been slain, and as many more

¹ Colonel Leake gives an interesting illustration of these particulars in the topography of the island, which may even now be verified (Travels in Morea, vol. i. p. 408). ² Thucyd. iv. 31. ³ Thucyd. iv. 31. ⁴ Thucyd. iv. 32.

must have been held in reserve to guard the rocky station in his rear. Of the Helots who were with him Thucydides says nothing during the whole course of the action. As soon as he saw the numbers and disposition of his enemies, Epitadas placed his men in battle array, and advanced to encounter the main body of hoplites whom he saw before him. But the Spartan march was habitually slow : ¹ moreover the ground was rough and uneven, obstructed with stumps, and overlaid with dust and ashes, from the recently burnt wood, so that a march at once rapid and orderly was hardly possible. He had to traverse the whole intermediate space, since the Athenian hoplites remained immovable in their position. No sooner had his march commenced, than he found himself assailed both in rear and flanks, especially in the right or unshielded flank, by the numerous companies of light-armed.² Notwithstanding their extraordinary superiority of number, these men were at first awe-stricken at finding themselves in actual contest with Lacedæmonian hoplites.³ Still they began the fight, poured in their missile weapons, and so annoyed the march that the hoplites were obliged to halt, while Epitadas ordered the most active among them to spring out of their ranks and repel the assailants. But pursuers with spear and shield had little chance of overtaking men lightly clad and armed, who always retired, in whatever direction the pursuit was commenced — had the advantage of difficult ground—redoubled their annoyance against the rear of the pursuers as soon as the latter retreated to resume their place in the ranks — and always took care to get ground to the rear of the hoplites.

Distress of the Lacedæmonians—their bravery and long resistance.

After some experience of the inefficacy of Lacedæmonian pursuit, the light-armed, becoming far bolder than at first, closed upon them nearer and more universally with arrows, javelins and stones,—raising shouts and clamour that rent the air, rendering the word of command inaudible by the Lacedæmonian soldiers—who at the same time were almost blinded by the thick clouds of dust, kicked up from the recently spread wood-

¹ Thucyd. v. 71.

² Thucyd. iv. 33.

³ Thucyd. iv. 33. ὥσπερ ὅτε πρῶτον ἀπέβαινον τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένοι, ὥς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, &c.

ashes.¹ Such method of fighting was one for which the Lykurgæan drill made no provision. The longer it continued, the more painful did the embarrassment of the exposed hoplites become. Their repeated efforts to destroy or even to reach nimble and ever-returning enemies, all proved abortive, whilst their own numbers were incessantly diminishing by wounds which they could not return. Their only offensive arms consisted of the long spear and short sword usual to the Grecian hoplite, without any missile weapons whatever; nor could they even pick up and throw back the javelins of their enemies, since the points of these javelins commonly broke off and stuck in the shields, or sometimes even in the body which they had wounded. Moreover, the bows of the archers, doubtless carefully selected before starting from Athens, were powerfully drawn, so that their arrows may sometimes have pierced and inflicted wounds even through the shield or the helmet—but at any rate the stuffed doublet, which formed the only defence of the hoplite on his unshielded side, was a very inadequate protection against them.² Under this trying distress did the Lacedæmonians continue for a long time, poorly provided for defence, and in this particular case altogether helpless for aggression—without being able to approach at all nearer to the Athenian hoplites. At length

¹ Thucyd. iv. 34: compare with this the narrative of the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora near Lechæum, by Iphikratés and the Peltastæ (Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

² Thucyd. iv. 34. Τό τε ἔργον ἐν ταῦθα χαλεπὸν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις καθίστατο· οὐτε γὰρ οἱ πῖλοι ἔστεγον τὰ τοξεύματα, δοράτια τε ἐναποκέκλαστο βαλλομέναν, εἶχον δὲ οὐδὲν σφίσιιν αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, ἀποκεκλημένοι μὲν τῇ ὕψει τοῦ προορῶν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μείζονος βοῆς τῶν πολεμίων τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς παραγγελλόμενα οὐκ ἐσακούοντες, κινδύνου δὲ πανταχόθεν περιεστώτος, καὶ οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα καθ' ἃ, τι χρεὶ ἀμυνομένους σωθῆναι.

There has been doubt and difficulty in this passage, even from the time of the Scholiasts. Some commentators have translated πῖλοι *caps* or *hats*,—others, *padded cuirasses* of wool or felt, round the breast and back: see the notes of Duker, Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller. That the word πῖλος is sometimes used for the helmet or head-

piece, is unquestionable—sometimes even (with or without χαλκοῦς) for a brazen helmet (see Aristophan. Lysistr. 562; Antiphanês ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 503): but I cannot think that on this occasion Thucydides would specially indicate the head of the Lacedæmonian hoplite as his chief vulnerable part. Dr. Arnold indeed offers a reason to prove that he might naturally do so; but in my judgement the reason is insufficient.

Πῖλοι means stuffed clothing of wool or felt, whether employed to protect head, body, or feet: and I conceive, with Poppo and others, that it here indicates the body-clothing of the Lacedæmonian hoplite; his body being the part most open to be wounded, on the side undefended by the shield, as well as in the rear. That the word πῖλοι will bear this sense may be seen in Pollux, vii. 171; Plato, Timæus, p. 74; and Symposium, p. 220, c. 35: respecting πῖλος as applied to the foot-covering—Bekker, Chariklès, vol. ii. p. 376.

the Lacedæmonian commander, seeing that his position grew worse and worse, gave orders to close the ranks and retreat to the last redoubt in the rear. But this movement was not accomplished without difficulty, for the light-armed assailants became so clamorous and forward, that many wounded men, unable to move, or at least to keep in rank, were overtaken and slain.¹

A diminished remnant, however, reached the last post in safety. Here they were in comparative protection, since the ground was so rocky and impracticable that their enemies could attack them neither in flank nor rear; though the position at any rate could not have been long tenable separately, inasmuch as the only spring of water in the island was in the centre, which they had just been compelled to abandon. The light-armed being now less available, Demosthenês and Kleon brought up their 800 Athenian hoplites, who had not before been engaged. But the Lacedæmonians were here at home² with their weapons, and enabled to display their well-known superiority against opposing hoplites, especially as they had the vantage-ground against enemies charging from beneath. Although the Athenians were double in numbers, and withal yet unexhausted, they were repulsed in many successive attacks. The besieged maintained their ground in spite of all previous fatigue and suffering, harder to be borne from the scanty diet on which they had recently subsisted. The struggle lasted so long that heat and thirst began to tell even upon the assailants, when the commander of the Messenians came to Kleon and Demosthenês, and intimated that they were now labouring in vain; promising at the same time that if they would confide to him a detachment of light troops and bowmen, he would find his way round to the higher cliffs in the rear of the assailants.³ He accordingly stole away unobserved from the rear, scrambling round over pathless crags, and by an almost impracticable footing on the brink of the sea, through approaches which the Lacedæmonians had left unguarded, never imagining that they could be molested in that direction. He suddenly appeared with his detachment on the higher peak above them,

They retreat
to their last
redoubt at
the ex-
tremity of
the island.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 35.

² Thucyd. iv. 33. *τῇ σφετέρῃ ἐμπειρίᾳ χρῆσασθαι, &c.*

³ Thucyd. iv. 36.

so that their position was thus commanded, and they found themselves, as at Thermopylæ, between two fires, without any hope of escape. Their enemies in front, encouraged by the success of the Messenians, pressed forward with increased ardour, until at length the courage of the Lacedæmonians gave way, and the position was carried.¹

A few moments more, and they would have been all overpowered and slain,—when Kleon and Demosthenês, They are surrounded and forced to surrender. anxious to carry them as prisoners to Athens, constrained their men to halt, and proclaimed by herald an invitation to surrender, on condition of delivering up their arms, and being held at the disposal of the Athenians. Most of them, incapable of farther effort, closed with the proposition forthwith, signifying compliance by dropping their shields and waving their hands above their heads. The battle being thus ended, Styphon the commander—originally only third in command, but now chief; since Epitadas had been slain, and the second in command, Hippagretês, was lying disabled by wounds on the field—entered into conference with Kleon and Demosthenês, and entreated permission to send across for orders to the Lacedæmonians on the mainland. The Athenian commanders, though refusing this request, sent a messenger of their own, inviting Lacedæmonian heralds over from the mainland, through whom communications were exchanged twice or three times between Styphon and the chief Lacedæmonian authorities. At length the final message came—“The Lacedæmonians direct you to take counsel for yourselves, but to do nothing disgraceful.”² Their counsel was speedily taken; they surrendered themselves and delivered up their arms; 292 in number, the survivors of the original total of 420. And out of these no less than 120 were native Spartans, some of them belonging to the first families in the city.³ They were kept under guard during that night, and distributed on the morrow among the Athenian trierarchs to be conveyed as prisoners to Athens; while a truce was granted to the Lacedæmonians on shore in order that they might carry across the dead bodies for burial. So careful had Epitadas been in husbanding the provisions, that some food was

¹ Thucyd. iv. 37.

² Thucyd. iv. 38. *Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κελεύουσιν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν αὐτῶν βουλευέσθαι, μὴδὲν αἰσχρὸν ποιοῦντας.*

³ Thucyd. iv. 38; v. 15.

yet found in the island; though the garrison had subsisted for fifty-two days upon casual supplies, aided by such economies as had been laid by during the twenty days of the armistice, when food of a stipulated quantity was regularly furnished. Seventy-two days had thus elapsed, from the first imprisonment in the island to the hour of their surrender.¹

The best troops in modern times would neither incur reproach, nor occasion surprise, by surrendering, under circumstances in all respects similar to this gallant remnant in Sphakteria. Yet in Greece the astonishment was prodigious and universal, when it was learnt that the Lacedæmonians had consented to become prisoners.² For the terror inspired by their name, and the deepstruck impression of Thermopylæ had created a belief that they would endure any extremity of famine, and perish in the midst of any superiority of hostile force, rather than dream of giving up their arms and surviving as captives. The events of Sphakteria, shocking as they did this preconceived idea, discredited the military prowess of Sparta in the eyes of all Greece, and especially in those of her own allies. Even in Sparta itself, too, the same feeling prevailed—partially revealed in the answer transmitted to Styphon from the generals on shore, who did not venture to forbid surrender, yet discountenanced it by implication. It is certain that the Spartans would have lost less by their death than by their surrender. But we read with disgust the spiteful taunt of one of the allies of Athens (not an Athenian) engaged in the affair, addressed in the form of a question to one of the prisoners—"Have your best men then been all slain?" The reply conveyed an intimation of the standing contempt entertained by the Lacedæmonians for the bow and its chance-strokes in the line—"That would be a capital arrow which could single out the best man." The language which Herodotus puts into the mouth of Demaratus, composed in the early years of the Peloponnesian war, attests this same belief in Spartan valour—"The Lacedæmonians die, but never surrender."³ Such impression was from henceforward,

Astonishment caused throughout Greece by the surrender of Lacedæmonian hoplites—diminished lustre of Spartan arms.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 39.
² Thucyd. iv. 40. *παρὰ γνῶμην τε δὴ μάλιστα τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτο τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο, &c.*

³ To adopt a phrase, the counterpart of that which has been ascribed to the *Veille Garde* of the Emperor Napoleon's army: compare Herodot. vii. 104.

not indeed effaced, but sensibly enfeebled, nor was it ever again restored to its full former pitch.

But the general judgement of the Greeks respecting the capture of Sphakteria, remarkable as it is to commemorate, is far less surprising than that pronounced by Thucydides himself. Kleon and Demosthenës, returning with a part of the squadron and carrying all the prisoners, started from Sphakteria on the next day but one after the action, and reached Athens within twenty days after Kleon had left it. Thus "The promise of Kleon, *insane as it was*, came true"—observes the historian.¹

Judgement pronounced by Thucydides himself—reflections upon it.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 39. Καὶ τοῦ Κλέωνος καί τερ μανιώδης ὁδῶν ἢ ὑπόσχεσις ἀπέβη· ἐν τῷ γὰρ εἰκοσὶν ἡμερῶν ἦγαγε τοὺς ἀνδρας, ὅσους ἐπέστη.

Mr. Mitford, in recounting these incidents, after having said respecting Kleon—"In a *very extraordinary train of circumstances* which followed, *his impudence and his fortune* (if in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully favoured him"—goes on to observe two pages farther—

"It however soon appeared, that though for a man like Cleon, unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash and the bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined: and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far exceeded that of the man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. He had received intelligence that Demosthenës had already formed the plan and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon the spot, and in the neighbourhood. Hence his apparent moderation in the demand for troops; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He farther showed his judgement, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request which was readily granted, that Demosthenës might be joined with him in the command." (Mitford, Hist. of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xv. sect. vii. p. 250-253).

It appears as if no historian could write down the name of Kleon without attaching to it some disparaging verb or

adjective. We are here told in the same sentence that Kleon was an *impudent braggart for promising the execution of the enterprise*—and yet that the enterprise itself was *perfectly feasible*. We are told in one sentence that he was rash and ridiculous for promising this, *unversed as he was in military command*; a few words farther, we are informed that he expressly requested that the most competent man to be found, Demosthenës, might be named his colleague. We are told of the *cunning of Kleon*, and that *Kleon had received intelligence from Demosthenës*—as if this were some private communication to himself. But Demosthenës had sent no news to Kleon, nor did Kleon know anything, which was not equally known to every man in the assembly. *The folly of the people in committing the trust to Kleon* is denounced—as if Kleon had sought it himself, or as if his friends had been the first to propose it for him. If the folly of the people was thus great, what are we to say of the knavery of the oligarchical party, with Nikias at their head, who impelled the people into this folly, for the purpose of ruining a political antagonist, and who forced Kleon into the post against his own most unaffected reluctance? Against this manoeuvre of the oligarchical party, neither Mr. Mitford nor any other historian says a word. When Kleon judges circumstances rightly, as Mr. Mitford allows that he did in this case, he has credit for nothing better than *cunning*.

The truth is, that the people committed no folly in appointing Kleon—for he justified the best expectations of his friends. But Nikias and his friends committed great knavery in

Men with arms in their hands have always the option between death and imprisonment, and Grecian opinion was only mistaken in assuming as a certainty that the Lacedæmonians would choose the former. But Kleon had never promised to bring them home as prisoners: his promise was disjunctive—that they should be either so brought home, or slain, within twenty days. No sentence throughout the whole of Thucydides astonishes me so much as that in which he stigmatises such an expectation as “insane.” Here are 420 Lacedæmonian hoplites, without any other description of troops to aid them—without the possibility of being reinforced—without any regular fortification—without any narrow pass such as that of Thermopylæ—without either a sufficient or a certain supply of food—cooped up in a small open island less than two miles in length. Against them are brought 10,000 troops of divers arms, including 800 fresh hoplites from Athens, and marshalled by Demosthenês, a man alike enterprising and experienced. For the talents as well as the presence and preparations of Demosthenês are a part of the data of the case, and the personal competence of Kleon to command alone is foreign to the calculation. Now if, under such circumstances, Kleon engaged that this forlorn company of brave men should be either slain or taken prisoners, how could he be looked upon, I will not say as indulging in an insane boast, but even as overstepping a cautious and mistrustful estimate of probability? Even to doubt of this result, much more to pronounce such an opinion as that of Thucydides, implies an idea not only of superhuman power in the Lacedæmonian hoplites, but a disgraceful incapacity on the part of Demosthenês and the assailants. The interval of twenty days, named by Kleon, was not extravagantly narrow, considering the distance of Athens from Pylus. For the attack of this petty island could not possibly occupy more than one or two days at the utmost, though the blockade of it might by various accidents have been prolonged, or might even, by some terrible storm, be altogether broken off. If then we carefully consider

proposing it, since they fully believed that he would fail. And even upon Mr. Mitford's statement of the case, the opinion of Thucydides which stands at the beginning of this note is thoroughly unjustifiable; not less unjustifiable than

the language of the modern historian about the “extraordinary circumstances,” and the way in which Kleon was “favoured by fortune.” Not a single incident can be specified in the narrative to bear out these invidious assertions.

this promise, made by Kleon to the assembly, we shall find that so far from deserving the sentence pronounced upon it by Thucydides—of being a mad boast which came true by accident—it was a reasonable and even a modest anticipation of the future :¹ reserving the only really doubtful point in the case—whether the garrison of the island would be ultimately slain or made prisoners. Demosthenês, had he been present at Athens instead of being at Pylus, would willingly have set his seal to the engagement taken by Kleon.

I repeat with reluctance, though not without belief, the statement made by one of the biographers of Thucydides²—that Kleon was the cause of the banishment of the latter as a general, and has therefore received from him harder measure than was due in his capacity of historian. But though this sentiment is not probably without influence in dictating the unaccountable judgement which I have just been criticising—as well as other opinions relative to Kleon, on which I shall say more in a future chapter—I nevertheless look upon that judgement not as peculiar to Thucydides, but as common to him with Nikias and those whom we must call, for want of a better name, the oligarchical party of the time at Athens. And it gives us some measure of the prejudice and narrowness of vision which prevailed among that party at the present memorable crisis ; so pointedly contrasting with the clear-sighted and resolute calculations, and the judicious conduct in action, of Kleon, who when forced against his will into the post of general, did the very best which could be done in his situation—he selected Demosthenês as colleague and heartily seconded his operations. Though the military attack of Sphakteria, one of the ablest specimens of generalship in the

Prejudice of Thucydides in regard to Kleon. Kleon displayed sound judgement and decision, and was one of the essential causes of the success.

¹ The jest of an unknown comic writer (probably Eupolis or Aristophanês, in one of the many lost dramas) against Kleon—"that he showed great powers of prophecy after the fact"—(Κλέων Προμηνεύς ἐστὶ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα, Lucian, Prometheus, c. 2) may probably have reference to his proceedings about Sphakteria : if so, it is certainly undeserved.

In the letter which he sent to announce the capture of Sphakteria and the prisoners to the Athenians, it is

affirmed that he began with the words —Κλέων Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ χαιρεῖν. This was derided by Eupolis, and is even considered as a piece of insolence. We must therefore presume that the form was unusual in addressing the people : though it certainly seems neither insolent, nor in the least unsuitable, after so important a success (Schol. ad Aristophan. Plut. 322 ; Bergk, De Reliquiis Comœdiæ Antiquæ, p. 362).

² Vit. Thucydides, p. xv. ed. Bekker.

whole war, and distinguished not less by the dexterous employment of different descriptions of troops than by care to spare the lives of the assailants—belongs altogether to Demosthenês : yet if Kleon had not been competent to stand up in the Athenian assembly and defy those gloomy predictions which we see attested in Thucydidês, Demosthenês would never have been reinforced nor placed in condition to land on the island. The glory of the enterprise therefore belongs jointly to both. Kleon, far from stealing away the laurels of Demosthenês (as Aristophanês represents in his comedy of the Knights), was really the means of placing them on his head, though he at the same time deservedly shared them. It has hitherto been the practice to look at Kleon only from the point of view of his opponents, through whose testimony we know him. But the real fact is that this history of the events of Sphakteria, when properly surveyed, is a standing disgrace to those opponents, and no inconsiderable honour to him ; exhibiting them as alike destitute of political foresight and of straightforward patriotism—as sacrificing the opportunities of war, along with the lives of their follow-citizens and soldiers, for the purpose of ruining a political enemy. It was the duty of Nikias, as Stratêgus, to propose, and undertake in person if necessary, the reduction of Sphakteria. If he thought the enterprise dangerous, that was a good reason for assigning to it a larger military force, as we shall find him afterwards reasoning about the Sicilian expedition—but not for letting it slip or throwing it off upon others.¹

The return of Kleon and Demosthenês to Athens, within the twenty days promised, bringing with them near 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must have been by far the most triumphant and exhilarating event which had occurred to the Athenians throughout the whole war. It at once changed the prospects, position, and feelings, of both the contending parties. Such a number of Lacedæmonian prisoners, especially 120 Spartans, was a source of almost stupefaction to the general body of Greeks and a prize of inestimable value to the captors. The return of Demosthenês in the preceding year from the Ambrakian Gulf, when he brought with him 300 Ambrakian panoplies,

Effect produced at Athens by the arrival of the Lacedæmonian prisoners.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 8 ; Thucyd. v. 7.

had probably been sufficiently triumphant. But the entry into Peiræus on this occasion from Sphakteria, with 300 Lacedæmonian prisoners, must doubtless have occasioned emotions transcending all former experience. It is much to be regretted that no description is preserved to us of the scene, as well as of the elate manifestations of the people when the prisoners were marched up from Peiræus to Athens. We should be curious also to read some account of the first Athenian assembly held after this event—the overwhelming cheers heaped upon Kleon by his joyful partisans, who had helped to invest him with the duties of general, in confidence that he would discharge them well—contrasted with the silence or retraction of Nikias and the other humiliated political enemies. But all such details are unfortunately denied to us—though they constitute the blood and animation of Grecian history, now lying before us only in its skeleton.

The first impulse of the Athenians was to regard the prisoners as a guarantee to their territory against invasion.¹ They resolved to keep them securely guarded until the peace; but if at any time before that event the Lacedæmonian army should enter Attica, then to bring forth the prisoners, and put them to death in sight of the invaders. They were at the same time full of spirits in regard to the prosecution of the war, and became farther confirmed in the hope, not merely of preserving their power undiminished, but even of recovering much of what they had lost before the Thirty years' truce. Pylus was placed in an improved state of defence, with the adjoining island of Sphakteria doubtless as a subsidiary occupation. The Messenians, transferred thither from Naupaktus, and overjoyed to find themselves once more masters even of an outlying rock of their ancestral territory, began with alacrity to overrun and ravage Laconia: while the Helots, shaken by the recent events, manifested inclination to desert to them. The Lacedæmonian authorities, experiencing evils before unfelt and unknown, became sensibly alarmed lest such desertions should spread through the country. Reluctant as they were to afford obvious evidence of their embarrassments, they nevertheless brought themselves (probably

The Athenians prosecute the war with increased hopefulness and vigour. The Lacedæmonians make new advances for peace without effect.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 41.

under the pressure of the friends and relatives of the Sphakterian captives) to send to Athens several missions for peace ; but all proved abortive.¹ We are not told what they offered, but it did not come up to the expectations which the Athenians thought themselves entitled to indulge.

We, who now review these facts with a knowledge of the subsequent history, see that the Athenians could have concluded a better bargain with the Lacedæmonians during the six or eight months succeeding the capture of Sphakteria, than it was ever open to them to make afterwards : and they had reason to repent letting slip the opportunity. Perhaps indeed Periklēs, had he been still alive, might have taken a more prudent measure of the future, and might have had ascendancy enough over his countrymen to be able to arrest the tide of success at its highest point, before it began to ebb again.

But if we put ourselves back into the situation of Athens during the autumn which succeeded the return of Kleon and Demosthenēs from Sphakteria, we shall easily enter into the feelings under which the war was continued. The actual possession of the captives now placed Athens in a far better position than she had occupied when they were only blocked up in Sphakteria, and when the Lacedæmonian envoys first arrived to ask for peace. She was now certain of being able to command peace with Sparta on terms at least tolerable, whenever she chose to invite it—she had also a fair certainty of escaping the hardship of invasion. Next—and this was perhaps the most important feature of the case—the apprehension of Lacedæmonian prowess was now greatly lowered, and the prospects of success to Athens considered as prodigiously improved,² even in the estimation of impartial Greeks ; much more in the eyes of the Athenians themselves. Moreover the idea of a tide of good fortune—of the favour of the gods now begun and likely to continue—of future success as a corollary from past—was one which powerfully affected Grecian calculations generally. Why not push the present good fortune and try to regain the most important points lost before and by the Thirty years' truce, especially in Megara and

¹ Thucyd. iv. 41 ; compare Aristophan. Equit. 648, with Schol. ² Thucyd. iv. 79.

Remarks
upon the
policy of
Athens—her
chance was
now uni-
versally be-
lieved to be
most favour-
able in pro-
secuting the
war.

Bœotia—points which Sparta could not concede by negotiation, since they were not in her possession? Though these speculations failed (as we shall see in the coming chapter), yet there was nothing unreasonable in acting upon them. Probably the almost universal sentiment of Athens was at this moment warlike. Even Nikias, humiliated as he must have been by the success in Sphakteria, would forget his usual caution in the desire of retrieving his own personal credit by some military exploit. That Demosthenês, now in full measure of esteem, would be eager to prosecute the war, with which his prospects of personal glory were essentially associated (just as Thucydidês¹ observes about Brasidas on the Lacedæmonian side), can admit of no doubt. The comedy of Aristophanês called the *Acharnians* was acted about six months before the affair of Sphakteria, when no one could possibly look forward to such an event—the comedy of the *Knights* about six months after it.² Now there is this remarkable difference between the two—that while the former breathes the greatest sickness of war, and presses in every possible way the importance of making peace, although at that time Athens had no opportunity of coming even to a decent accommodation—the latter, running down the general character of Kleon with unmeasured scorn and ridicule, talks in one or two places only of the hardships of war, and drops altogether that emphasis and repetition with which peace had been dwelt upon in the *Acharnians*—although coming out at a moment when peace was within the reach of the Athenians.

To understand properly the history of this period, therefore, we must distinguish various occasions which are often confounded. At the moment when Sphakteria was first blockaded, and when the Lacedæmonians first sent to solicit peace, there was a considerable party at Athens disposed to entertain the offer. The ascendancy of Kleon was one of the main causes why it was rejected. But after the captives were brought home from Sphakteria, the influence of Kleon, though

Fluctuations in Athenian feeling for or against the war: there were two occasions on which Kleon contributed to influence them towards it.

¹ Thucyd. v. 16.

² The *Acharneis* was performed at the festival of the *Lenæa* at Athens—January, 425 B.C.; the *Knights* at the same festival in the ensuing year, 424 B.C.

The capture of Sphakteria took place about July, B.C. 425; between the two dates above. See Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, ad ann.

positively greater than it had been before, was no longer required to procure the dismissal of Lacedæmonian pacific offers and the continuance of the war. The general temper of Athens was then warlike, and there were very few to contend strenuously for an opposite policy. During the ensuing year, however, the chances of war turned out mostly unfavourable to Athens, so that by the end of that year she had become much more disposed to peace.¹ The truce for one year was then concluded. But even after that truce was expired, Kleon still continued eager (and on good grounds, as will be shown hereafter) for renewing the war in Thrace, at a time when a large proportion of the Athenian public had grown weary of it. He was one of the main causes of that resumption of warlike operations, which ended in the battle of Amphipolis, fatal both to himself and to Brasidas. There were thus two distinct occasions on which the personal influence and sanguine character of Kleon seems to have been of sensible moment in determining the Athenian public to war instead of peace. But at the moment which we have now reached—that is, the year immediately following the capture of Sphakteria—the Athenians were sufficiently warlike without him; probably Nikias himself as well as the rest.

It was one of the earliest proceedings of Nikias, immediately after the inglorious exhibition which he had made in reference to Sphakteria, to conduct an expedition, in conjunction with two colleagues, against the Corinthian territory. He took with him 80 triremes, 2000 Athenian hoplites, 200 horsemen aboard of some horse transports, and some additional hoplites from Milêtus, Andros, and Karystus.² Starting from Peiræus in the evening, he arrived a little before daybreak on a beach at the foot of the hill and village of Solygeia,³ about seven miles from Corinth, and two or three miles south of the Isthmus. The Corinthian troops, from all the territory of Corinth within the Isthmus, were already assembled at the Isthmus itself to repel him; for intelligence of the intended expedition had reached

Expedition
of Nikias
against the
Corinthian
territory.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 117; v. 14.

² Thucyd. iv. 42. Τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ θέρους μετὰ ταῦτα εὐθὺς, &c.

³ See the geographical illustrations of this descent in Dr. Arnold's plan and

note appended to the second volume of his Thucydides—and in Colonel Leake —Travels in Morea, ch. xxviii. p. 235; xxix. p. 309.

Corinth some time before from Argos, with which latter place the scheme of the expedition may have been in some way connected. The Athenians having touched the coast during the darkness, the Corinthians were only apprised of the fact by fire-signals from Solygeia. Not being able to hinder the landing, they despatched forthwith half their forces, under Battus and Lykophron, to repel the invader, while the remaining half were left at the harbour of Kenchreæ, on the northern side of Mount Oneion, to guard the port of Krommyon (outside of the Isthmus) in case it should be attacked by sea. Battus with one lochus of hoplites threw himself into the village of Solygeia, which was unfortified, while Lykophron conducted the remaining troops to attack the Athenians. The battle was first engaged on the Athenian right, almost immediately after its landing, on the point called Chersonesus. Here the Athenian hoplites, together with their Karystian allies, repelled the Corinthian attack, after a stout and warmly-disputed hand-combat of spear and shield. Nevertheless the Corinthians, retreating up to a higher point of ground, returned to the charge, and with the aid of a fresh lochus, drove the Athenians back to the shore and to their ships: from hence the latter again turned, and again recovered a partial advantage.¹ The battle was no less severe on the left wing of the Athenians. But here, after a contest of some length, the latter gained a more decided victory, greatly by the aid of their cavalry—pursuing the Corinthians, who fled in some disorder to a neighbouring hill and there took up a position.² The Athenians were thus victorious throughout the whole line, with the loss of about forty-seven men, while the Corinthians had lost 212, together with the general Lykophron. The victors erected their trophy, stripped the dead bodies and buried their own dead. The Corinthian detachment left at Kenchreæ could not see the battle, in consequence of the interposing ridge of Mount Oneium: but it was at last made known to them by the dust of the fugitives, and they forthwith hastened to afford help. Reinforcements also came both from

¹ Thucyd. iv. 43.

² Thucyd. iv. 44. *ἔθετο τὰ ὅπλα*—an expression which Dr. Arnold explains, here as elsewhere, to mean “piling the arms:” I do not think such an explanation is correct, even here;

much less in several other places to which he alludes. See a note on the surprise of Platæa by the Thebans, immediately before the Peloponnesian war.

Corinth and from Kenchreæ, and as it seems too, from the neighbouring Peloponnesian cities—so that Nikias thought it prudent to retire on board of his ships, and halt upon some neighbouring islands. It was here first discovered that two of the Athenians slain had not been picked up for burial; upon which he immediately sent a herald to solicit a truce, in order to procure these two missing bodies. We have here a remarkable proof of the sanctity attached to that duty; for the mere sending of the herald was tantamount to confession of defeat.¹

From hence Nikias sailed to Krommyon, where after ravaging the neighbourhood for a few hours he rested for the night. On the next day he re-embarked, sailed along the coast of Epidaurus, upon which he inflicted some damage in passing, and stopped at last on the peninsula of Methana, between Epidaurus and Trœzen.² On this peninsula he established a permanent garrison, drawing a fortification across the narrow neck of land which joined it to the Epidaurian peninsula. This was his last exploit. He then sailed home: but the post at Methana long remained as a centre for pillaging the neighbouring regions of Epidaurus, Trœzen, and Halieis.

While Nikias was engaged in this expedition, Eurymedon and Sophoklês had sailed forward from Pylus with a considerable portion of that fleet which had been engaged in the capture of Sphakteria, to the island of Korkyra. It has been already stated that the democratical government at Korkyra had been suffering severe pressure and privation from the oligarchical fugitives, who had come back into the island with a body of barbaric auxiliaries, and established themselves upon Mount Istônê not far from the city.³ Eurymedon and the Athenians, joining the Korkyræans in the city, attacked and stormed the post on Mount Istônê; while the vanquished, retiring first to a lofty and inaccessible peak, were forced to surrender themselves on terms to the Athenians. Abandoning altogether their mercenary auxiliaries, they only stipulated that they should themselves be sent to Athens, and left to the discretion of the Athenian people. Eurymedon, assenting to

He re-embarks—ravages Epidaurus—establishes a post on the peninsula of Methana.

Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet goes to Korkyra. Defeat and captivity of the Korkyræan exiles in the island.

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, c. 6.

² Thucyd. iv. 45.

³ Thucyd. iv. 2-45.

these terms, deposited the disarmed prisoners in the neighbouring islet of Ptychia, under the distinct condition, that if a single man tried to escape, the whole capitulation should be null and void.¹

Unfortunately for these men, the orders given to Eurymedon carried him onward straight to Sicily. It was irksome therefore to him to send away a detachment of his squadron to convey prisoners to Athens; where the honours of delivering them would be reaped, not by himself, but by the officer to whom they might be confided. And the Korkyræans in the city, on their part, were equally anxious that the men should not be sent to Athens. Their animosity against them being bitter in the extreme, they were afraid that the Athenians might spare their lives, so that their hostility against the island might be again resumed. And thus a mean jealousy on the part of Eurymedon, combined with revenge and insecurity on the part of the victorious Korkyræans, brought about a cruel catastrophe, paralleled nowhere else in Greece, though too well in keeping with the previous acts of the bloody drama enacted in this island.

The Korkyræan leaders, seemingly not without the privity of Eurymedon, sent across to Ptychia fraudulent emissaries under the guise of friends to the prisoners. These emissaries,—assuring the prisoners that the Athenian commanders, in spite of the convention signed were about to hand them over to the Korkyræan people for destruction,—induced some of them to attempt escape in a boat prepared for the purpose. By concert, the boat was seized in the act of escaping, so that the terms of the capitulation were really violated: upon which Eurymedon handed over the prisoners to their enemies in the island, who imprisoned them altogether in one vast building, under guard of hoplites. From this building they were drawn out in companies of twenty men each, chained together in couples, and compelled to march between two lines of hoplites marshalled on each side of the road. Those who loitered in the march were hurried on by whips from behind: as they advanced, their private enemies on both sides singled them out, striking and piercing them until at length they miserably perished.

The captives
are put to
death—
cruelty and
horrors in the
proceeding.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 46.

Three successive companies were thus destroyed—ere the remaining prisoners in the interior, who thought merely that their place of detention was about to be changed, suspected what was passing. As soon as they found it out, one and all refused either to quit the building or to permit any one else to enter. They at the same time piteously implored the intervention of the Athenians, if it were only to kill them and thus preserve them from the cruelties of their merciless countrymen. The latter, abstaining from attempts to force the door of the building, made an aperture in the roof, from whence they shot down arrows, and poured showers of tiles upon the prisoners within; who sought at first to protect themselves, but at length abandoned themselves to despair, and assisted with their own hands in the work of destruction. Some of them pierced their throats with the arrows shot down from the roof: others hung themselves, either with cords from some bedding which happened to be in the building, or with strips torn and twisted from their own garments. Night came on, but the work of destruction, both from above and within, was continued without intermission, so that before morning, all these wretched men had perished, either by the hands of their enemies or by their own. At daybreak the Korkyræans entered the building, piled up the dead bodies on carts, and transported them out of the city: the exact number we are not told, but seemingly it cannot have been less than 300. The women who had been taken at Istônê along with these prisoners, were all sold as slaves.¹

Thus finished the bloody dissensions in this ill-fated island: for the oligarchical party were completely annihilated, the democracy was victorious, and there were no farther violences throughout the whole war.² It will be recollected that these deadly feuds began with the return of the oligarchical prisoners from Corinth, bringing along with them projects both of treason and of revolution. They ended with the annihilation of that party, in the manner above described; the interval being filled by mutual atrocities and retaliation, wherein of course the victors had most opportunity of gratifying their vindictive passions. Eurymedon, after the termination of these events, proceeded onward with the Athenian squadron

¹ Thucyd. iv. 47, 48.

² Thucyd. iv. 48.

to Sicily. What he did there will be described in a future chapter devoted to Sicilian affairs exclusively.

The complete prostration of Ambrakia during the campaign of the preceding year had left Anaktorium without any defence against the Akarnanians and Athenian squadron from Naupaktus. They besieged and took it during the course of the present summer;¹ expelling the Corinthian proprietors, and re-peopling the town and its territory with Akarnanian settlers from all the townships in the country.

Capture of Anaktorium by the Athenians and Akarnanians.

Throughout the maritime empire of Athens matters continued perfectly tranquil, except that the inhabitants of Chios, during the course of the autumn, incurred the suspicion of the Athenians from having recently built a new wall to their city, as if it were done with the intention of taking the first opportunity to revolt.² They solemnly protested their innocence of any such designs, but the Athenians were not satisfied without exacting the destruction of the obnoxious wall. The presence on the opposite continent of an active band of Mitylenæan exiles, who captured both Rhœteium and Antandrus during the ensuing spring, probably made the Athenians more anxious and vigilant on the subject of Chios.³

Proceedings of the Athenians at Chios and Lesbos.

The Athenian regular tribute-gathering squadron, circulating among the maritime subjects, captured during the course of the present autumn a prisoner of some importance and singularity. It was a Persian ambassador, Artaphernes, seized at Eion on the Strymon, in his way to Sparta with despatches from the Great King. He was brought to Athens, where his despatches, which were at some length and written in the Assyrian character, were translated and made public. The Great King told the Lacedæmonians, in substance, that he could not comprehend what they meant; for that among the numerous envoys whom they had sent, no two told the same story. Accordingly he desired them, if they wished to make themselves understood, to send some envoys with fresh and plain instructions to accompany Artaphernes.⁴ Such was the sub-

The Athenians capture Artaphernes, a Persian envoy, on his way to Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 49.

² Thucyd. iv. 51.

³ Thucyd. iv. 52.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 50. ἐν αἷς πολλῶν ἄλ-

λων γεγραμμένων κεφάλαιον ἦν, πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅ, τι βούλονται· πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβευον οὐδένα

stance of the despatch, conveying a remarkable testimony as to the march of the Lacedæmonian government in its foreign policy. Had any similar testimony existed respecting Athens, demonstrating that her foreign policy was conducted with half as much unsteadiness and stupidity, ample inferences would have been drawn from it to the discredit of democracy. But there has been no motive generally to discredit Lacedæmonian institutions, which included kingship in double measure—two parallel lines of hereditary kings; together with an entire exemption from everything like popular discussion. The extreme defects in the foreign management of Sparta, revealed by the despatch of Artaphernes, seem traceable partly to an habitual faithlessness often noted in the Lacedæmonian character—partly to the annual change of Ephors, so frequently bringing into power men who strove to undo what had been done by their predecessors—and still more to the absence of everything like discussion or canvass of public measures among the citizens. We shall find more than one example, in the history about to follow, of this disposition on the part of Ephors not merely to change the policy of their predecessors, but even to subvert treaties sworn and concluded by them. Such was the habitual secrecy of Spartan public business, that in doing this they had neither criticism nor discussion to fear. Brasidas, when he started from Sparta on the expedition which will be described in the coming chapter, could not trust the assurances of the Lacedæmonian executive without binding them by the most solemn oaths.¹

The Athenians sent back Artaphernes in a trireme to Ephesus, and availed themselves of this opportunity B.C. 425. for procuring access to the Great King. They sent envoys along with him, with the intention that they should accompany him up to Susa: but on reaching Asia, the news met them that King Artaxerxes had recently died. Under such circumstances, it was not judged expedient to prosecute the mission, and the Athenians dropped their design.²

ταῦτα λέγειν εἰ οὐκ βούλονται σαφὲς
λέγειν, πέμψαι μετὰ τοῦ Πέρσου ἄνδρας
ὡς αὐτόν.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 86. ὅρκοις τε Λακε-
δαιμονίων καταλαβὼν τὰ τέλη τοῖς μεγί-
στοις, ἢ μὴν, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 50; Diodor. xii. 64. The Athenians do not appear to have ever before sent envoys or courted alliance with the Great King; though the idea of doing so must have been noway strange to them, as we may

Respecting the great monarchy of Persia, during this long interval of fifty-four years since the repulse of Xerxes from Greece, we have little information before us except the names of the successive kings. In the year 465 B.C., Xerxes was assassinated by Artabanus and Mithridates, through one of those plots of great household officers, so frequent in Oriental palaces. He left two sons, or at least two sons present and conspicuous among a greater number, Darius and Artaxerxes. But Artabanus persuaded Artaxerxes that Darius had been the murderer of Xerxes, and thus prevailed upon him to revenge his father's death by becoming an accomplice in killing his brother Darius : he next tried to assassinate Artaxerxes himself, and to appropriate the crown. Artaxerxes however, being apprised beforehand of the scheme, either slew Artabanus with his own hand or procured him to be slain, and then reigned (known under the name of Artaxerxes Longimanus) for forty years, down to the period at which we are now arrived.¹

Succession
of Persian
kings—
Xerxes, Ar-
taxerxes
Longimanus,
&c., Darius
Nothus.

Mention has already been made of the revolt of Egypt from the dominion of Artaxerxes, under the Libyan prince Inarus, actively aided by the Athenians. After a few years of success, this revolt was crushed and Egypt again subjugated, by the energy of the Persian general Megabyzus—with severe loss to the Athenian forces engaged. After the peace of Kallias, erroneously called the Kimonian peace, between the Athenians and the king of Persia, war had not been since resumed. We read in Ktesias, amidst various anecdotes seemingly collected at the court of Susa, romantic adventures ascribed to Megabyzus, his wife Amytis, his mother Amestris, and a Greek physician of Kos, named Apollonides. Zopyrus son of Megabyzus, after the death of his father, deserted from Persia and came as an exile to Athens.²

At the death of Artaxerxes Longimanus, the family violences incident to a Persian succession were again exhibited. His son Xerxes succeeded him but was

B.C. 425.

see by the humorous scene of Pseudartabas in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanes, acted in the year before this event.

¹ Diodor. xi. 65 ; Aristotel. Polit. v. 8, 3 ; Justin, iii. 1 ; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29, 30. It is evident that there were

contradictory stories current respecting the plot to which Xerxes fell a victim ; but we have no means of determining what the details were.

² Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-43 ; Herodot. iii. 80.

assassinated, after a reign of a few weeks or months. Another son, Sogdianus, followed, who perished in like manner after a short interval.¹ Lastly, a third son, Ochus (known under the name of Darius Nothus), either abler or more fortunate, kept his crown and life between nineteen and twenty years. By his queen the savage Parysatis, he was father to Artaxerxes Mnemon and Cyrus the younger, both names of interest in reference to Grecian history, to whom we shall hereafter recur.

¹ Diodor. xii. 64-71 ; Ktesias, Persica, c. 44-46.

CHAPTER LIII.

EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE eighth year of the war, on which we now touch, presents events of a more important and decisive character than any of the preceding. In reviewing the preceding years we observe that though there is much fighting, with hardship and privation inflicted on both sides, yet the operations are mostly of a desultory character, not calculated to determine the event of the war. But the capture of Sphakteria and its prisoners, coupled with the surrender of the whole Lacedæmonian fleet, was an event full of consequences, and imposing in the eyes of all Greece. It stimulated the Athenians to a series of operations, larger and more ambitious than anything which, they had yet conceived—directed, not merely against Sparta in her own country, but also to the reconquest of that ascendancy in Megara and Bœotia which they had lost on or before the Thirty years' truce. On the other hand, it intimidated so much both the Lacedæmonians, the revolted Chalkidic allies of Athens in Thrace, and Perdikkas king of Macedonia—that between them the expedition of Brasidas, which struck so serious a blow at the Athenian empire, was concerted. This year is thus the turning-point of the war. If the operations of Athens had succeeded, she would have regained nearly as great a power as she enjoyed before the Thirty years' truce. But it happened that Sparta, or rather the Spartan Brasidas, proved successful, gaining enough to neutralise all the advantages derived by Athens from the capture of Sphakteria.

Important
operations of
the eighth
year of the
war.

The first enterprise undertaken by the Athenians in the course of the spring was against the island of Kythëra, on the southern coast of Laconia. It was inhabited by Lacedæmonian Perioeki, and administered by a governor, and garrison of hoplites, annually sent thither. It was the usual point of landing for mer-

Capture of
Kythëra by
the Athe-
nians.
Nikias ra-
vages the
Laconian
coast.

chantmen from Libya and Egypt; and as it lay very near to Cape Malea, immediately over against the Gulf of Gythium—the only accessible portion of the generally inhospitable coast of Laconia—the chance that it might fall into the hands of an enemy was considered as so menacing to Sparta, that some politicians are said to have wished the island at the bottom of the sea.¹ Nikias, in conjunction with Nikostratus and Autoklês, conducted thither a fleet of sixty triremes, with 2000 Athenian hoplites, some few horsemen, and a body of allies, mainly Milesians.

There were in the island two towns—Kythêra, and Skandeia; the former having a lower town close to the sea fronting Cape Malea, and an upper town on the hill above; the latter seemingly on the south or west coast. Both were attacked at the same time by order of Nikias: ten triremes and a body of Milesian² hoplites disembarked and captured Skandeia; while the Athenians landed at Kythêra, and drove the inhabitants out of the lower town into the upper, where

¹ Thucyd. iv. 54; Herodot. vii. 235. The manner in which Herodotus alludes to the dangers which would arise to Sparta from the occupation of Kythêra by an enemy, furnishes one additional probability tending to show that his history was composed before the actual occupation of the island by Nikias, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. Had he been cognizant of this latter event, he would naturally have made some allusion to it.

The words of Thucydides in respect to the island of Kythêra are—the Lacedæmonians πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐποιούντο· ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τῶν τε ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου καὶ Λιβύης ὁλκάδων προσβολή, καὶ χρῆσται ἔμα τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἥσσαν ἐλέπουν ἐκ θαλάσσης, ἥπερ μόνον οἷον τ' ἦν κακουρ-γεῖσθαι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀνέχει πρὸς τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Κρητικὸν πέλαγος.

I do not understand this passage, with Dr. Arnold and Göller, to mean, that Laconia was unassailable by land, but very assailable by sea. It rather means that the only portion of the coast of Laconia where a maritime invader could do much damage, was in the interior of the Laconic Gulf, near Helos, Gythium, &c.—which is in fact the only plain portion of the coast of Laconia. The two projecting promonto-

ries, which end, the one in Cape Malea, the other in Cape Tænarus, are high, rocky, harbourless, and afford very little temptation to a disembarking enemy. "The whole Laconian coast is *high projecting cliff* where it fronts the Sicilian and Kretan seas"—πᾶσα ἀνέχει. The island of Kythêra was particularly favourable for facilitating descents on the territory near Helos and Gythium. The ἀλιμενότης of Laconia is noticed in Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 8, 7—where he describes the occupation of the island by Konon and Pharnabazus.

See Colonel Leake's description of this coast, and the high cliffs between Cape Matapan (Tænarus) and Kalamata, which front the Sicilian sea—as well as those eastward of Cape St. Angelo or Malea, which front the Kretan sea (Travels in Morea, vol. i. ch. vii. p. 261—"tempestuous, rocky, unsheltered coast of Mesamani"—ch. viii. p. 320; ch. vi. p. 205; Strabo, viii. p. 368; Pausan. iii. c. xxvi. 2).

² Thucyd. iv. 54. διαχιλοῖς Μιλησίων ὁπλίταις. It seems impossible to believe that there could have been so many as 2000 Milesian hoplites: but we cannot tell where the mistake lies.

they speedily capitulated. A certain party among them had indeed secretly invited the coming of Nikias, through which intrigue easy terms were obtained for the inhabitants. Some few men, indicated by the Kytherians in intelligence with Nikias, were carried away as prisoners to Athens; but the remainder were left undisturbed and enrolled among the tributary allies under obligation to pay four talents per annum; an Athenian garrison being placed at Kythêra for the protection of the island. From hence Nikias employed seven days in descents and inroads upon the coast, near Helos, Asinê, Aphrodisia, Kotyrta and elsewhere. The Lacedæmonian force was disseminated in petty garrisons, which remained each for the defence of its own separate post, without uniting to repel the Athenians, so that there was only one action, and that of little importance, which the Athenians deemed worthy of a trophy.

In returning home from Kythêra, Nikias first ravaged the small strip of cultivated land near Epidaurus Limêra, on the rocky eastern coast of Laconia, and then attacked the Æginetan settlement at Thyrea, the frontier strip between Laconia and Argolis. This town and district had been made over by Sparta to the Æginetans, at the time when they were expelled from their own island by Athens in the first year of the war. The new inhabitants, finding the town too distant from the sea¹ for their maritime habits, were now employed in constructing a fortification close on the shore; in which work a Lacedæmonian detachment under Tantalus, on guard in that neighbourhood, was assisting them. When the Athenians landed, both Æginetans and Lacedæmonians at once abandoned the new fortification. The Æginetans, with the commanding officer Tantalus, occupied the upper town of Thyrea, but the Lacedæmonian troops, not thinking it tenable, refused to take part in the defence, and retired to the neighbouring mountains, in spite of urgent entreaty from the Æginetans. Immediately after landing, the Athenians marched up to the

Capture of Thyrea—all the Æginetans resident there are either slain in the attack, or put to death afterwards as prisoners.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 56. He states that Thyrea was ten stadia, or about a mile and one-fifth, distant from the sea. But Colonel Leake (*Travels in the Morea*, vol. ii. ch. xxii. p. 492), who has discovered quite sufficient ruins to identify

the spot, affirms "that it is at least three times that distance from the sea."

This explains to us the more clearly why the Æginetans thought it necessary to build their new fort.

town of Thyrea, and carried it by storm, burning or destroying everything within it. All the Æginetans were either killed or made prisoners, and even Tantalus, disabled by his wounds, became prisoner also. From hence the armament returned to Athens, where a vote was taken as to the disposal of the prisoners. The Kytherians brought home were distributed for safe custody among the dependent islands: Tantalus was retained along with the prisoners from Sphakteria; but a harder fate was reserved for the Æginetans. They were all put to death, victims to the long-standing antipathy between Athens and Ægina. This cruel act was nothing more than a strict application of admitted customs of war in those days. Had the Lacedæmonians been the victors, there can be little doubt that they would have acted with equal rigour.¹

The occupation of Kythêra, in addition to Pylus, by an Athenian garrison, following so closely upon the capital disaster in Sphakteria, produced in the minds of the Spartans feelings of alarm and depression such as they had never before experienced. Within the course of a few short months their position had completely changed, from superiority and aggression abroad, to insult and insecurity at home. They anticipated nothing less than incessant foreign attacks on all their weak points, with every probability of internal defection, from the standing discontent of the Helots. It was not unknown to them probably that even Kythêra itself had been lost partly through betrayal. The capture of Sphakteria had caused peculiar emotion among the Helots, to whom the Lacedæmonians had addressed both appeals and promises of emancipation, in order to procure succour for their hoplites while blockaded in the island. If the ultimate surrender of these hoplites had abated the terrors of the Lacedæmonian prowess throughout all Greece, such effect had been produced to a still greater degree among the oppressed Helots. A refuge at Pylus, and a nucleus which presented some possibility of expanding into regenerated Messenia, were now before their eyes; while the establishment of an Athenian garrison at Kythêra opened a new channel of communication with the enemies of Sparta, so as to tempt all the Helots of daring temper to stand forward

Alarm and depression among the Lacedæmonians—their insecurity in regard to the Helots.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 58; Diodor. xii. 65.

as liberators of their enslaved race.¹ The Lacedæmonians, habitually cautious at all times, felt now as if the tide of fortune had turned decidedly against them, and acted with confirmed mistrust and dismay—confining themselves to measures strictly defensive, but organising a force of 400 cavalry, together with a body of bowmen, beyond their ordinary establishment.

The precautions which they thought it necessary to take in regard to the Helots afford the best measure of their apprehensions at the moment, and exhibit moreover a refinement of fraud and cruelty rarely equalled in history. Wishing to single out from the general body such as were most high-couraged and valiant, the Ephors made proclamation, that those Helots, who conceived themselves to have earned their liberty by distinguished services in war, might stand forward to claim it. A considerable number obeyed the call—probably many who had undergone imminent hazards during the preceding summer in order to convey provisions to the blockaded soldiers in Sphakteria.² After being examined by the government, 2000 of them were selected as fully worthy of emancipation; which was forthwith bestowed upon them in public ceremonial—with garlands, visits to the temples, and the full measure of religious solemnity. The government had now made the selection which it desired; presently every man among these newly-enfranchised Helots was made away with—no one knew how.³

They entrap, and cause to be assassinated, 2000 of the bravest Helots.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 41, 55, 56.

² Thucyd. iv. 80.

³ Thucyd. iv. 80. Καὶ προκρίναντες ἐς δυσχολίους, οἱ μὲν ἐστεφανώσαντό τε καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ περιήλθον ὡς ἡλευθερωμένοι· οἱ δὲ οὐ πολλὰ ὀσπερον ἠφάνισαν τε αὐτοὺς, καὶ οὐδεὶς ᾔσθετο ὅτι τρώει ἑκαστος διεφθάρη: compare Diodor. xii. 67.

Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiii. p. 244, 2nd edit. note) thinks that this assassination of Helots by the Spartans took place at some other time unascertained, and not at the time here indicated. I cannot concur in this opinion. It appears to me that there is the strongest probable reason for referring the incident to the time immediately following the disaster in Sphakteria, which Thucydides so especially marks (iv. 41) by the emphatic words—Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες

ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ ληστείας καὶ τοιοῦτου πολέμου, τῶν τε εἰλότων αὐτομολούντων καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ μακρότερον σφίσι τι νεωτερισθῇ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν, οὐ βολίως ἔφερον. This was just after the Messenians were first established at Pylus, and began their incursions over Laconia, with such temptations as they could offer to the Helots to desert. And it was naturally just then that the fear, entertained by the Spartans of their Helots, became exaggerated to the maximum—leading to the perpetration of the act mentioned in the text. Dr. Thirlwall observes "that the Spartan government would not order the massacre of the Helots at a time when it could employ them on foreign service." But to this it may be replied that the capture of Sphakteria took place in July or August, while the

A stratagem at once so perfidious in the contrivance, so murderous in the purpose, and so complete in the execution, stands without parallel in Grecian history—we might almost say, without a parallel in any history. It implies a depravity far greater than the rigorous execution of a barbarous customary law against prisoners of war or rebels, even in large numbers. The Ephors must have employed numerous instruments, apart from each other, for the performance of this bloody deed. Yet it appears that no certain knowledge could be obtained of the details—a striking proof of the mysterious efficiency of this Council of Five, surpassing even that of the Council of Ten at Venice—as well as of the utter absence of public inquiry or discussion.

It was while the Lacedæmonians were in this state of uneasiness at home that envoys reached them from Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Chalkidians of Thrace, entreating aid against Athens; who was considered likely, in her present tide of success, to resume aggressive measures against them. There were moreover other parties, in the neighbouring cities¹ subject to Athens, who secretly favoured the application, engaging to stand forward in open revolt as soon as any auxiliary force should arrive to warrant their incurring the hazard. Perdikkas (who had on his hands a dispute with his kinsman Arrhibæus, prince of the Lynkestæ-Macedonians, which he was anxious to be enabled to close successfully) and the Chalkidians offered at the same time to provide the pay and maintenance, as well as to facilitate the transit of the troops who might be sent to them. And—what was of still greater importance to the success of the enterprise—they specially requested that Brasidas might be invested with the command.² He had now recovered from his wounds received at Pylus, and his reputation for adventurous valour, great as it was from positive desert, stood out still more conspicuously,

Request
from the
Chalkidians
and Per-
dikkas that
Spartan aid
may be sent
to them
under Bra-
sidas.

expedition under Brasidas was not organised until the following winter or spring. There was therefore an interval of some months, during which the government had not yet formed the idea of employing the Helots on foreign service. And this interval is quite sufficient to give a full and distinct meaning to the expression *καὶ τότε* (Thucyd.

iv. 80) on which Dr. Thirlwall insists; without the necessity of going back to any more remote point of antecedent time.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 79.

² Thucyd. iv. 80. *προθυμήθησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Χαλκιδῆς ἄνδρα ἐν τε τῇ Σπάρτῃ δοκοῦντα δραστήριον εἶναι ἐς τὰ πάντα, &c.*

because not a single other Spartan had as yet distinguished himself. His other great qualities, apart from personal valour, had not yet been shown, for he had never been in any supreme command. But he burned with impatience to undertake the operation destined for him by the envoys; although at this time it must have appeared so replete with difficulty and danger, that probably no other Spartan except himself would have entered upon it with hopes of success. To raise up embarrassments for Athens in Thrace was an object of great consequence to Sparta, while she also obtained an opportunity of sending away another large detachment of dangerous Helots. Seven hundred of these latter were armed as hoplites and placed under the orders of Brasidas but the Lacedæmonians would not assign to him any of their own proper forces. With the sanction of the Spartan name—with 700 Helot hoplites, and with such other hoplites as he could raise in Peloponnesus by means of the funds furnished from the Chalkidians—Brasidas prepared to undertake this expedition, alike adventurous and important.

Brasidas is ordered to go thither with Helot and Peloponnesian hoplites.

Had the Athenians entertained any suspicion of his design, they could easily have prevented him from ever reaching Thrace. But they knew nothing of it until he had actually joined Perdikkas, nor did they anticipate any serious attack from Sparta, in this moment of her depression—much less, an enterprise far bolder than any which she had ever been known to undertake. They were now elate with hopes of conquests to come on their own part—their affairs being so prosperous and promising, that parties favourable to their interests began to revive, both in Megara and in Bœotia; while Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs, the two chief stratēgi for the year, were men of energy, well-qualified both to project and execute military achievements.

Elate and enterprising dispositions prevalent at Athens. Plan formed against Megara. Condition of Megara.

The first opportunity presented itself in regard to Megara. The inhabitants of that city had been greater sufferers by the war than any other persons in Greece. They had been the chief cause of bringing down the war upon Athens, and the Athenians revenged upon them all the hardships which they themselves endured from the Lacedæmonian invasion. Twice in every year they laid waste the Megarid, which

bordered upon their own territory ; and that too with such destructive efficacy throughout its limited extent, that they intercepted all subsistence from the lands near the town—at the same time keeping the harbour of Nisæa closely blocked up. Under such bad conditions the Megarians found much difficulty in supplying even the primary wants of life.¹ But their case had now, within the last few months, become still more intolerable by an intestine commotion in the city, ending in the expulsion of a powerful body of exiles, who seized and held possession of Pêgæ, the Megarian port in the Gulf of Corinth. Probably imports from Pêgæ had been their chief previous resource against the destruction which came on them from the side of Athens ; so that it became scarcely possible to sustain themselves, when the exiles in Pêgæ not only deprived them of this resource, but took positive part in harassing them. These exiles were oligarchical, and the government in Megara had now become more or less democratical. But the privations in the city presently reached such a height, that several citizens began to labour for a compromise, whereby the exiles in Pêgæ might be re-admitted. It was evident to the leaders in Megara that the bulk of the citizens could not long sustain the pressure of enemies from both sides—but it was also their feeling, that the exiles in Pêgæ, their bitter political rivals, were worse enemies than the Athenians, and that the return of these exiles would be a sentence of death to themselves. To prevent this counter-revolution, they opened a secret correspondence with Hippokratês and Demosthenês, engaging to betray both Megara and Nisæa to the Athenians : though Nisæa, the harbour of Megara, about one mile from the city, was a separate fortress, occupied by a Peloponnesian garrison, and by them exclusively, as well as the Long Walls—for the purpose of holding Megara first to the Lacedæmonian confederacy.²

The scheme for surprise was concerted, and what is more remarkable—in the extreme publicity of all Athenian affairs, and in a matter to which many persons must have been privy

¹ The picture drawn by Aristophanês (Acharn. 760) is a caricature, but of suffering probably but too real.

² Thucyd. iv. 66. Strabo (ix. p. 391) gives eighteen stadia as the distance

between Megara and Nisæa ; Thucydides only eight. There appears sufficient reason to prefer the latter : see Reinganum, *Das alte Megaris*, p. 121-180.

—was kept secret until the instant of execution. A large Athenian force, 4000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, was appointed to march at night by the high road through Eleusis to Megara: but Hippokratês and Demosthenês themselves went on ship-board from Peiræus to the island of Minoa, which was close against Nisæa, and had been for some time under occupation by an Athenian garrison. Here Hippokratês concealed himself with 600 hoplites, in a hollow out of which brick earth had been dug, on the mainland opposite to Minoa, and not far from the gate in the Long Wall which opened near the junction of that wall with the ditch and wall surrounding Nisæa; while Demosthenês, with some light-armed Platæans and a detachment of active young Athenians (called Peripoli, and serving as the moveable guard of Attica) in their first or second year of military service, placed himself in ambush in the sacred precincts of Arês, still closer to the same gate.

The Athenians under Hippokratês and Demosthenês, attempt to surprise Nisæa and Megara.

To procure that the gate should be opened, was the task of the conspirators within. Amidst the shifts to which the Megarians had been reduced in order to obtain supplies (especially since the blockading force had been placed at Minoa), predatory sally by night was not omitted. Some of these conspirators had been in the habit, before the intrigue with Athens was projected, of carrying out a small sculler-boat by night upon a cart, through this gate, by permission of the Peloponnesian commander of Nisæa and the Long Walls. The boat, when thus brought out, was first carried down to the shore along the hollow of the dry ditch which surrounded the wall of Nisæa—then put to sea for some nightly enterprise—and lastly, brought back again along the ditch before daylight in the morning; the gate being opened, by permission, to let it in. This was the only way by which any Megarian vessel could get to sea, since the Athenians at Minoa were complete masters of the harbour.

Conspirators within open the gate, and admit them into the Megarian Long Walls. They master the whole line of the Long Walls.

On the night fixed for the surprise, this boat was carried out and brought back at the usual hour. But the moment that the gate in the Long Wall was opened to re-admit it, Demosthenês with his comrades sprang forward to force their way in; the Megarians along with the boat at the same time setting upon and killing the guards, in order to facilitate

his entrance. This active and determined band were successful in mastering the gate, and keeping it open, until the 600 hoplites under Hippokratês came up, and got into the interior space between the Long Walls. They immediately mounted the walls on each side, every man as he came in, with little thought of order, to drive off or destroy the Peloponnesian guards; who, taken by surprise, and fancying that the Megarians generally were in concert with the enemy against them—confirmed too in such belief by hearing the Athenian herald proclaim aloud that every Megarian who chose might take his post in the line of Athenian hoplites¹—made at first some resistance, but were soon discouraged and fled into Nisæa. By a little after daybreak, the Athenians found themselves masters of all the line of the Long Walls, and under the very gates of Megara—as well as reinforced by the larger force, which having marched by land through Eleusis, arrived at the concerted moment.

Meanwhile the Megarians within the city were in the greatest tumult and consternation. But the conspirators, prepared with their plan, had resolved to propose that the gates should be thrown open and that the whole force of the city should be marched out to fight the Athenians. When once the gates should be open, they themselves intended to take part with the Athenians and facilitate their entrance—and they had rubbed their bodies over with oil in order to be visibly distinguished in the eyes of the latter. The plan was only frustrated the moment before it was about to be put in execution, by the divulcation of one of their own comrades. Their opponents in the city, apprised of what was in contemplation, hastened to the gate, and intercepted the men rubbed with oil as they were about to open it. Without betraying any knowledge of the momentous secret which they had just learned, these opponents loudly protested against opening the gate and going out to fight an enemy for whom they had never conceived themselves, even in moments of greater

The Athenians march to the gates of Megara—failure of the scheme of the party within to open them.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 68. Ευνέπεσε γὰρ καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γνώμης κηρύξαι, τὸν βουλούμενον ἵνα τοὺς Μεγαρέων μετὰ Ἀθηναίων θησόμενον τὰ δπλα.

Here we have the phrase τίθεσθαι

τὰ δπλα employed in a case where Dr. Arnold's explanation of it would be eminently unsuitable. There could be no thought of *piling arms* at a critical moment of actual fighting, with result as yet doubtful.

strength, to be a match in the open field. While insisting only on the public mischiefs of the measure, they at the same time planted themselves in arms against the gate, and declared that they would perish before they would allow it to be opened. For such obstinate resistance the conspirators were not prepared, so that they were forced to abandon their design and leave the gate closed.

The Athenian generals, who were waiting in expectation that it would be opened, soon perceived by the delay that their friends within had been baffled, and immediately resolved to make sure of Nisæa which lay behind them; an acquisition important not less in itself than as a probable means for the mastery of Megara. They set about the work with the characteristic rapidity of Athenians. Masons and tools in abundance being forthwith sent for from Athens, the army distributed among themselves the wall of circumvallation round Nisæa in distinct parts. First, the interior space between the Long Walls themselves was built across, so as to cut off the communication with Megara; next, walls were carried out from the outside of both the Long Walls down to the sea, so as completely to enclose Nisæa with its fortifications and ditch. The scattered houses, which formed a sort of ornamented suburb to Nisæa, furnished bricks for this enclosing circle, or were sometimes even made to form a part of it as they stood, with the parapets on their roofs; while the trees were cut down to supply material wherever palisades were suitable. In a day and a half the work of circumvallation was almost completed, so that the Peloponnesians in Nisæa saw before them nothing but a hopeless state of blockade. Deprived of all communication, they not only fancied that the whole city of Megara had joined the Athenians, but they were moreover without any supply of provisions, which had been always furnished to them in daily rations from the city. Despairing of speedy relief from Peloponnesus, they accepted easy terms of capitulation offered to them by the Athenian generals.¹ After delivering up their arms, each man among them was to be ransomed for a stipulated price; we are not told how much, but doubtless a moderate sum. The Lacedæmonian com-

The Athenians attack Nisæa—the place surrenders to them.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 69.

mander, and such other Lacedæmonians as might be in Nisæa, were however required to surrender themselves as prisoners to the Athenians, to be held at their disposal. On these terms Nisæa was surrendered to the Athenians, who cut off its communication with Megara, by keeping the intermediate space between the Long Walls effectively blocked up—walls, of which they had themselves, in former days, been the original authors.¹

Such interruption of communication by the Long Walls indicated in the minds of the Athenian generals a conviction that Megara was now out of their reach. But the town in its present distracted state would certainly have fallen into their hands² had it not been snatched from them by the accidental neighbourhood and energetic intervention of Brasidas. That officer, occupied in the levy of troops for his Thracian expedition, was near Corinth and Sikyon when he first learnt the surprise and capture of the Long Walls. Partly from the alarm which the news excited among these Peloponnesian towns, partly from his own personal influence, he got together a body of 2700 Corinthian hoplites, 600 Sikyonian, and 400 Phliasian, besides his own small army, and marched with this united force to Tripodiskus in the Megarid, half-way between Megara and Pêgæ, on the road over Mount Geraneia; having first despatched a pressing summons to the Bœotians, to request that they would meet him at that point with reinforcements. He trusted by a speedy movement to preserve Megara, and perhaps even Nisæa; but on reaching Tripodiskus in the night, he learnt that the latter place had already surrendered. Alarmed for the safety of Megara, he proceeded thither by a night-march without delay. Taking with him only a chosen band of 300 men, he presented himself, without being expected, at the gates of the city: entreating to be admitted, and offering to lend his immediate aid for the recovery of Nisæa. One of the two parties in Megara would have been glad to comply; but the other, knowing well that in that case

¹ Thucyd. i. 103; iv. 69. Καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη ἀποβρῆξαντες ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλεως καὶ τὴν Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες, τὰλλα παρεσκευάζοντο.

Diodorus (xii. 66) abridges Thucy-

didēs.

² Thucyd. iv. 73. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ ἔφθησαν ἐλθόντες (Brasidas with his troops) οὐκ ἂν ἐν τύχῃ γίνεσθαι σφίσι, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς ἂν ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων στερηθῆναι εὐθὺς τῆς πόλεως.

the exiles from Pégæ would be brought back upon them, was prepared for a strenuous resistance, in which case the Athenian force, still only one mile off, would have been introduced as auxiliaries. Under these circumstances the two parties came to a compromise and mutually agreed to refuse admittance to Brasidas. They expected that a battle would take place between him and the Athenians, and each calculated that Megara would follow the fortunes of the victor.¹

Returning back without success to Tripodiskus, Brasidas was joined there early in the morning by 2000 Bœotian hoplites and 600 cavalry; for the Bœotians had been put in motion by the same news as himself, and had even commenced their march before his messenger arrived, with such celerity as to have already reached Platæa.² The total force under Brasidas was thus increased to 6000 hoplites and 600 cavalry, with whom he marched straight to the neighbourhood of Megara. The Athenian light troops, dispersed over the plain, were surprised and driven in by the Bœotian cavalry: but the Athenian cavalry, coming to their aid, maintained a sharp action with the assailants, wherein, after some loss on both sides, a slight advantage remained on the side of the Athenians. They granted a truce for the burial of the Bœotian officer of cavalry, who was slain with some others. After this indecisive cavalry skirmish, Brasidas advanced with his main force into the plain between Megara and the sea, taking up a position near to the Athenian hoplites, who were drawn up in battle array hard by Nisæa and the Long Walls. He thus offered them battle if they chose it; but each party expected that the other would attack; and each was unwilling to begin the attack on his own side. Brasidas was well aware that if the Athenians refused to fight, Megara would be preserved from falling into their hands—which loss it was his main object to prevent, and which had in fact been prevented only by his arrival. If he attacked and was beaten, he would forfeit this advantage—while if victorious, he could hardly hope to gain much more. The Athenian generals on their side reflected that they had already secured a material acquisition in Nisæa, which cut off Megara from their sea: that the army

Brasidas gets together an army, and relieves Megara—no battle takes place—but the Athenians retire.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 71.

² Thucyd. iv. 72.

opposed to them was not only superior in number of hoplites, but composed of contingents from many different cities, so that no one city hazarded much in the action ; while their own force was all Athenian and composed of the best hoplites in Athens, which would render a defeat severely ruinous to the city. They did not think it worth while to encounter this risk, even for the purpose of gaining possession of Megara. With such views in the leaders on both sides, the two armies remained for some time in position each waiting for the other to attack. At length the Athenians, seeing that no aggressive movement was contemplated by their opponents, were the first to retire into Nisæa. Thus left master of the field, Brasidas retired in triumph to Megara, the gates of which were now opened without reserve to admit him.¹

The army of Brasidas, having gained the chief point for which it was collected, speedily dispersed—he himself resuming his preparations for Thrace : while the Athenians on their side also returned home, leaving an adequate garrison for the occupation both of Nisæa and of the Long Walls. But the interior of Megara underwent a complete and violent revolution. While the leaders friendly to Athens, not thinking it safe to remain, fled forthwith and sought shelter with the Athenians²—the opposite party opened communication with the exiles at Pégæ and readmitted them into the city ; binding them however by the most solemn pledges to observe absolute amnesty of the past, and to study nothing but the welfare of the common city. The newcomers only kept their pledge during the interval which elapsed until they acquired power to violate it with effect. They soon got themselves placed in the chief commands of state, and found means to turn the military force to their own purposes. A review, and examination of arms, of the hoplites in the city, having been ordered, the Megarian lochi were so marshalled and tutored as to enable the leaders to single out such victims as they thought expedient. They seized many of their most obnoxious enemies—some of them suspected as accomplices in the recent conspiracy with Athens. The men thus seized

Revolution at Megara—return of the exiles from Pégæ, under pledge of amnesty—they violate their oaths, and effect a forcible oligarchical revolution.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 73.

² We find some of them afterwards in the service of Athens, employed as light-armed troops in the Sicilian expedition (Thucyd. vi. 43).

were subjected to the forms of a public trial, before that which was called a public assembly; wherein each voter, acting under military terror, was constrained to give his suffrage openly. All were condemned to death and executed, to the number of 100.¹ The constitution of Megara was then shaped into an oligarchy of the closest possible kind, a few of the most violent men taking complete possession of the government. But they must probably have conducted it with vigour and prudence for their own purposes, since Thucydides remarks that it was rare to see a revolution accomplished by so small a party, and yet so durable. How long it lasted, he does not mention. A few months after these incidents, the Megarians regained possession of their Long Walls, by capture from the Athenians² (to whom indeed they could have been of no material service), and levelled the whole line of them to the ground: but the Athenians still retained Nisæa. We may remark, as explaining in part the durability of this new government, that the truce concluded at the beginning of the ensuing year must have greatly lightened the difficulties of any government, whether oligarchical or democratical, in Megara.

The scheme for surprising Megara had been both laid and executed with skill, and only miscarried through an accident to which such schemes are always liable, as well as by the unexpected celerity of Brasidas. It had moreover succeeded so far as to enable the Athenians to carry Nisæa—one of the posts which they had surrendered by the Thirty years' truce, and of considerable positive value to them: so that it counted on the whole as a victory, leaving the generals with increased encouragement to turn their activity elsewhere. Accordingly, very soon after the troops had been brought back from the Megarid,³ Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs concerted a still more extensive plan for the invasion of Bæotia, in conjunction with some malcontents in the Bæotian towns, who desired to

Combined plan by Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs for the invasion of Bæotia on three sides at once.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 74. οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγένοντο, καὶ ἐξέτασιν ὅσων ἐποίησαντο, διαστήσαντες τοὺς λόχους, ἐξελέξαντο τῶν τὸ ἐχθρῶν καὶ οἱ ἐδόκουν μάλιστα ξυμπράξαι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἄνδρας ὡς ἑκατὸν καὶ τούτων περὶ ἀναγκάσαντες τὸν δῆμον ψῆφον φανεράν διενεγκεῖν, ὥς

κατεγνώσθησαν, ἔκτειναν, καὶ ἐς ὀλιγαρχίαν τὰ μάλιστα κατέστησαν τὴν πόλιν. καὶ πλείστον δὴ χρόνον αὕτη ὑπ' ἐλαχίστων γενομένη ἐκ στάσεως μετὰστασις ξυνέμεινεν.

² Thucyd. iv. 109.

³ Thucyd. iv. 76. εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς Μεγαρίδος ἀναχώρησιν, &c.

break down and democratise the oligarchical governments—and especially through the agency of a Theban exile named Ptœodôrus. Demosthenês, with forty triremes, was sent round Peloponnesus to Naupaktus, with instructions to collect an Akarnanian force—to sail into the inmost recess of the Corinthian or Krissæan Gulf—and to occupy Siphæ, a maritime town belonging to the Bœotian Thespiæ, where intelligences had been already established. On the same day, determined beforehand, Hippokratês engaged to enter Bœotia, with the main force of Athens, at the south-eastern corner of the territory near Tanagra, and to fortify Delium, the temple of Apollo on the coast of the Eubœan strait; while at the same time it was concerted that some Bœotian and Phokian malcontents should make themselves masters of Chæroneia on the borders of Phokis. Bœotia would thus be assailed on three sides at the same moment, so that the forces of the country would be distracted and unable to co-operate. Internal movements were farther expected to take place in some of the cities, such as perhaps to establish democratical governments and place them at once in alliance with the Athenians.

Accordingly, about the month of August, Demosthenês sallied from Athens to Naupaktus, where he collected his Akarnanian allies—now stronger and more united than ever, since the refractory inhabitants of Cœniadæ had been at length compelled to join their Akarnanian brethren: moreover the neighbouring Agræans with their prince Salynthius, were also brought into the Athenian alliance. On the appointed day,

Demosthenês, with an Akarnanian force, makes a descent on Bœotia at Siphæ in the Corinthian Gulf—his scheme fails, and he retires.

seemingly about the beginning of October, he sailed with a strong force of these allies up to Siphæ, in full expectation that it would be betrayed to him.¹ But the execution of this enterprise was less happy than that against Megara. In the first place, there was a mistake as to the day understood between Hippokratês and

Demosthenês: in the next-place, the entire plot was discovered and betrayed by a Phokian of Phanoteus (bordering on Chæroneia) named Nikomachus—communicated first to the Lacedæmonians, and through them to the bœotarchs. Siphæ and Chæroneia were immediately placed in so good a state of defence, that Demosthenês, on arriving at the former place,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 77.

found not only no party within it favourable to him, but a formidable Bœotian force which rendered attack unavailing. Moreover Hippokratēs had not yet begun his march, so that the defenders had nothing to distract their attention from Siphæ.¹ Under these circumstances, while Demosthenēs was obliged to withdraw without striking a blow, and to content himself with an unsuccessful descent upon the territory of Sikyon²—all the expected internal movements in Bœotia were prevented from breaking out.

It was not till after the Bœotian troops, having repelled the attack by sea, had retired from Siphæ, that Hippokratēs commenced his march from Athens to invade the Bœotian territory near Tanagra. He was probably encouraged by false promises from the Bœotian exiles, otherwise it seems remarkable that he should have persisted in executing his part of the scheme alone, after the known failure of the other part. It was however executed in a manner which implies unusual alacrity and confidence. The whole military population of Athens was marched into Bœotia, to the neighbourhood of Delium, the eastern coast extremity of the territory belonging to the Bœotian town of Tanagra; the expedition comprising all classes, not merely citizens, but also metics or resident non-free-men, and even non-resident strangers then by accident at Athens. Of course this statement must be understood with the reserve of ample guards being left behind for the city: but besides the really effective force of 7000 hoplites, and several hundred horsemen, there appear to have been not less than 25,000 light-armed, half-armed, or unarmed, attendants accompanying the march.³ The number of hoplites is here prodigiously great; brought together by general and indiscriminate proclamation, not selected by a special choice of the Stratēgi out of the names on the muster-roll, as was usually the case for any distant expedition.⁴ As to light-armed, there was at this time no

Disappointment of the Athenian plans—no internal movements take place in Bœotia. Hippokratēs marches with the army from Athens to Delium in Bœotia.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 89.

² Thucyd. iv. 101.

³ Thucyd. iv. 93, 94. He states that the Bœotian *philoi* were above 10,000, and that the Athenian *philoi* were *πολλὰς ἀσπίσι τῶν ἐναντίων*. We can hardly take this number as less than 25,000,

φιλῶν καὶ σκευοφόρων (iv. 101).

The hoplites, as well as the horsemen, had their baggage and provision carried for them by attendants: see Thucyd. iii. 17; vii. 75.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 90. 'Ο δ' Ἱπποκράτης ἀναστῆσας Ἀθηναίους πανδημεῖ, αὐτοὺς

trained force of that description at Athens, except a small body of archers. No pains had been taken to organise either darters or slingers: the hoplites, the horsemen, and the seamen, constituted the whole effective force of the city. Indeed it appears that the Bœotians also were hardly less destitute than the Athenians of native darters and slingers, since those which they employed in the subsequent siege of Delium were in great part hired from the Malian Gulf.¹ To employ at one and the same time heavy-armed and light-armed was not natural to any Grecian community, but was a practice which grew up with experience and necessity. The Athenian feeling, as manifested in the Persæ of Æschylus a few years after the repulse of Xerxes, proclaims exclusive pride in the spear and shield, with contempt for the bow. It was only during this very year, when alarmed by the Athenian occupation of Pylus and Kythêra, that the Lacedæmonians, contrary to their previous custom, had begun to organise a regiment of archers.² The effective manner in which Demosthenês had employed the light-armed in Sphakteria against the Lacedæmonian hoplites, was well calculated to teach an instructive lesson as to the value of the former description of troops.

The Bœotian Delium,³ which Hippokratês now intended to occupy and fortify, was a temple of Apollo, strongly situated, overhanging the sea about five miles from Tanagra, and somewhat more than a mile from the border territory of Orôpus—a territory originally Bœotian, but at this time dependent on Athens, and even partly incorporated in the political community of Athens, under the name of the Deme of Græa.⁴ Orôpus itself was about a day's

Hippokratês
fortifies
Delium,
after which
the army
retires
homeward.

καὶ τοὺς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρήσαν, &c.: also πανστρατίας (iv. 94).

The meaning of the word πανδημει is well illustrated by Nikias in his exhortation to the Athenian army near Syracuse, immediately antecedent to the first battle with the Syracusans—levy *en masse*, as opposed to hoplites specially selected (vi. 66-68) ἄλλως τε καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημει τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς—καὶ προσέτι Σικελιώτας, &c.

When a special selection took place, the names of the hoplites chosen by the generals to take part in any particular service, were written on boards, accord-

ing to their tribes: each of these boards was affixed publicly against the statue of the Heros Eponymus of the tribe to which it referred: Aristophanês, Equites, 1369; Pac. 1184, with Scholiast; Wachsmuth, Hellen. Alterthumsk. ii. p. 312.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 100. ² Thucyd. iv. 55.

³ Thucyd. iv. 90; Livy, xxxv. 51.

⁴ Dikæarch. Βίος Ἑλλάδος. Fragm. ed. Fuhr. pp. 142-230; Pausan. i. 34, 2; Aristotle ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Ὀρωπός. See also Col. Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123; Mr. Finlay, Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38; Ross, Die Deme von Attica,

march from Athens—by the road which led through Dekeleia and Sphendalê, between the mountains Parnês and Phelleus: so that as the distance to be traversed was so inconsiderable, and the general feeling of the time was that of confidence, it is probable that men of all ages, arms, and dispositions, crowded to join the march—in part from mere curiosity and excitement. Hippokratês reached Delium on the day after he had started from Athens. On the succeeding day he began his work of fortification, which was completed—all hands aiding, and tools as well as workmen having been brought along with the army from Athens—in two days and a half. Having dug a ditch all round the sacred ground, he threw up the earth in a bank alongside of the ditch, planting stakes, throwing in fascines, and adding layers of stone and brick, to keep the work together and make it into a rampart of tolerable height and firmness. The vines¹ round the temple, together with the stakes which served as supports to them, were cut to obtain wood; the houses adjoining furnished bricks and stone: the outer temple buildings themselves also, on some of the sides, served as they stood to facilitate and strengthen the defence. But there was one side on which the annexed building, once a portico, had fallen down: and here the Athenians constructed some wooden towers as a help to the defenders. By the middle of the fifth day after leaving Athens, the work was so nearly completed, that the army quitted Delium, and began its march homeward out of Bœotia; halting, after it had proceeded about a mile and a quarter, within the Athenian territory of Orôpus. It was here that the hoplites awaited the coming of Hippokratês, who still remained at Delium stationing the garrison, and giving his final orders about future defence: while the greater number of the light-armed and un-armed, separating from the hoplites, and seemingly without

p. 6, where the Deme of Græa is verified by an Inscription, and explained for the first time.

The road taken by the army of Hippokratês in the march to Delium, was the same as that by which the Lacedæmonian army in their first invasion of Attica had retired, from Attica into Bœotia (Thucyd. ii. 23).

¹ Dikæarchus (*Βίος Ἑλλάδος*, p. 142, ed. Fuhr) is full of encomiums on the

excellence of the wine drunk at Tanagra, and of the abundant olive-plantations on the road between Orôpus and Tanagra.

Since tools and masons were brought from Athens to fortify Nisæa—about three months before (Thucyd. iv. 69)—we may be pretty sure that similar apparatus was carried to Delium—though Thucydides does not state it.

any anticipation of the coming danger, continued their return-march to Athens.¹ The position of the hoplites was probably about the western extremity of the plain of Orôpus, on the verge of the low heights between that plain and Delium.²

During these five days, however, the forces from all parts of Bœotia had time to muster at Tanagra. Their number was just completed as the Athenians were beginning their march homeward from Delium. The contingents had arrived, not only from Thebes and its dependent townships around, but also from Haliartus, Korôneia, Orchomenus, Kôpæ, and Thespiæ : that of Tanagra joined on the spot. The government of the Bœotian confederacy at this time was vested in eleven bœotarchs—two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportion by the other cities, immediate members of the confederacy—and in four senates or councils, the constitution of which is not known.

Though all the bœotarchs, now assembled at Tanagra, formed a sort of council of war, yet the supreme command was vested in Pagondas and Arianthidês, the bœotarchs from Thebes—either in Pagondas, as the senior of the two, or perhaps in both, alternating with each other day by day.³ As the Athenians were evidently in full retreat, and had already passed the border, all the other bœotarchs, except Pagondas, unwilling to hazard a battle⁴ on soil not Bœotian, were dis-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 90. That the vines round the temple had supporting-stakes, which furnished the *στραυποὶς* used by the Athenians, we may reasonably presume : the same as those *χόρακες* which are spoken of in Korkyra, iii. 70 ; compare Pollux, i. 162.

² "The plain of Oropus (observes Colonel Leake) expands from its upper angle at *Oropô* towards the mouth of the Asopus, and stretches about five miles along the shore, from the foot of the hills of Markópulo on the east, to the village of Khalkúki on the west, where begin some heights extending westward towards Dhilisi, the ancient Delium."—"The plain of Oropus is separated from the more inland plain of Tanagra by rocky gorges, through which the Asopus flows." (Leake, Athens and the Dêmi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 112).

³ Thucyd. iv. 93 ; v. 38. *Akræphise* may probably be considered as either a dependency of Thebes, or included in the general expression of Thucydídês, after the word *Κωπαιῆς*—*οἱ περὶ τὴν Ἀλυγην*. Anthêdon and Lebadeia, which are recognised as separate autonomous townships in various Bœotian inscriptions, are not here named in Thucydídês. But there is no certain evidence respecting the number of immediate members of the Bœotian confederacy : compare the various conjectures in Boeckh. ad Corp. Inscript. tom. i. p. 727 ; O. Müller, Orchomenus, p. 402 ; Kruse, Hellas, tom. ii. p. 548.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 91. *τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτάρχων, οἱ εἰσιν ἑνδεκα, οὗ ξυνεπαρουντων μάχεσθαι, &c.*

The use of the present tense *εἰσιν* marks the number *eleven* as that of *all the bœotarchs* : at this time—according

posed to let them return home without obstruction. Such reluctance is not surprising, when we reflect that the chances of defeat were considerable, and that probably some of these bæotarchs were afraid of the increased power which a victory would lend to the oppressive tendencies of Thebes. But Pagondas strenuously opposed this proposition, and carried the soldiers of the various cities along with him, even in opposition to the sentiments of their separate leaders, in favour of immediately fighting. He called them apart and addressed them by separate divisions, in order that all might not quit their arms at one and the same moment.¹ He characterized the sentiment of the other bæotarchs as an unworthy manifestation of weakness, which, when properly considered, had not even the recommendation of superior prudence. For the Athenians, having just invaded the country, and built a fort for the purpose of continuous devastation, were not less enemies on one side of the border than the other. Moreover they were the most restless and encroaching of all enemies: so that the Bæotians who had the misfortune to be their neighbours, could only be secure against them by the most resolute promptitude in defending themselves as well as in returning the blows first given. If they wished to protect their autonomy and their property against the condition of slavery under which their neighbours in Eubœa had long suffered, as well as so many other portions of Greece, their

to Boeckh's opinion, ad Corp. Inscript. I. vol. i. p. 729. The number however appears to have been variable.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 91. προσκαλὼν ἐκάστους κατὰ λόχους, ὥπως μὴ ἄνθρωποι ἐκλέποιεν τὰ ὄπλα, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι.

Here Dr. Arnold observes, "This confirms and illustrates what has been said in the note on ii. 2, 5, as to the practice of the Greek soldiers piling their arms the moment they halted in a particular part of the camp, and always attending the speeches of their general without them."

In the case here before us, it appears that the Bæotians did come by separate lochi, pursuant to command, to hear the words of Pagondas,—and also that each lochus left its arms to do so: though even here it is not absolutely

certain that τὰ ὄπλα does not mean *the military station*, as Duker interprets it. But Dr. Arnold generalises too hastily from hence to a customary practice between soldiers and their general. The proceeding of the Athenian general Hippokratēs, on this very occasion, near Delium (to be noticed a page or two forward), exhibits an arrangement totally different. Moreover the note on ii. 2, 5, to which Dr. Arnold refers, has no sort of analogy to the passage here before us, which does not include the words *τίθεςθαι τὰ ὄπλα*—whereas these words are the main matters in chapter ii. 2, 5. Whoever attentively compares the two, will see that Dr. Arnold (followed by Poppo and Gölter) has stretched an explanation which suits the passage here before us, to other passages where it is no way applicable.

only chance was to march onward and beat these invaders, following the glorious example of their fathers and predecessors in the field of Korôneia. The sacrifices were favourable to an advancing movement; while Apollo, whose temple the Athenians had desecrated by converting it into a fortified place, would lend his cordial aid to the Boeotian defence.¹

Finding his exhortations favourably received, Pagondas conducted the army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. He was anxious to fight them before they should have retreated farther; moreover the day was nearly spent—it was already late in the afternoon.

Having reached a spot where he was only separated from the Athenians by a hill, which prevented either army from seeing the other, he marshalled his troops in the array proper for fighting. The Theban hoplites, with their dependent allies, ranged in a depth of not less than twenty-five shields, occupied the right wing: the hoplites of Haliartus, Korôneia, Kôpæ, and its neighbourhood, were in the centre: those of Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, on the left; for Orchomenus, being the second city in Bœotia next to Thebes, obtained the second post of honour at the opposite extremity of the line. Each contingent adopted its own mode of marshalling the hoplites, and its own depth of files: on this point there was no uniformity—a remarkable proof of the prevalence of dissentient custom in Greece, and how much each town, even among confederates, stood apart as a separate unit.² Thucydides specifies only the prodigious depth of the Theban hoplites; respecting the rest, he merely intimates that no common rule was followed. There is another point also which he does not specify—but which, though we learn it only on the inferior authority of Diodorus, appears both true and important. The front ranks of the Theban heavily-armed were filled by 300 select warriors, of distinguished bodily strength, valour, and discipline,—who were accustomed

¹ Thucyd. iv. 92.

² Thucyd. iv. 93. ἐπ' ἀσπίδας δὲ πέντε μὲν καὶ εἴκοσι Θηβαῖοι ἐτάξαντο, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔτυχον.

What is still more remarkable—in the battle of Mantinea in 418 B.C.—between the Lacedæmonians on the one

side, and the Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, &c., on the other—the different lochi or divisions of the Lacedæmonian army were not all marshalled in the same depth of files. Each lochage, or commander of the lochus, directed the depth of his own division (Thucyd. v. 68).

to fight in pairs, each man being attached to his neighbour by a peculiar tie of intimate friendship. These pairs were termed the Heniochi and Parabataë—charioteers and companions; a denomination probably handed down from the Homeric times, when the foremost heroes really combated in chariots in front of the common soldiers—but now preserved after it had outlived its appropriate meaning.¹ This band, composed of the finest men in the various palæstræ of Thebes, was in after days placed under peculiar training (for the defence of the Kadmeia or citadel), detached from the front ranks of the phalanx, and organised into a separate regiment under the name of the Sacred Lochus or Band: we shall see how much it contributed to the short-lived military ascendancy of Thebes. On both flanks of this mass of Bœotian hoplites, about 7000 in total number, were distributed 1000 cavalry, 500 peltasts, and 10,000 light-armed or unarmed. The language of the historian seems to imply that the light-armed on the Bœotian side were something more effective than the mere multitude who followed the Athenians.

Such was the order in which Pagondas marched his army over the hill, halting them for a moment in front and sight of the Athenians, to see that the ranks were even, before he gave the word for actual charge.² Hippokratês, on his side, apprised while still at

Order of
battle of the
Athenian
army.

¹ Diodor. xii. 70. Προεμάχοντο δὲ πάντων οἱ παρ' ἐκείνοις Ἡνίοχοι καὶ Παραβάται καλούμενοι, ἄνδρες ἐπιλεκτοὶ τριακόσιοι . . . Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι διαφέροντες ταῖς τῶν σωμάτων βόμῃς, &c.

Compare Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 18, 19.

² Thucyd. iv. 93. Καὶ ἐπειδὴ καλῶς αὐτοῖς εἶχεν, ὑπερεφώνησαν (the Bœotians) τοῦ λόφου καὶ ἔθεντο τὰ δπλα τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἐμελλον, &c.

I transcribe this passage for the purpose of showing how impossible it is to admit the explanation which Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Gölter give of these words ἔθεντο τὰ δπλα (see Notes ad Thucyd. ii. 2). They explain the words to mean that the soldiers "piled their arms into a heap"—disarmed themselves for the time. But the Bœotians, in the situation here described, cannot possibly have parted with their arms,—they were just on the point of charging the enemy—immediately after-

wards, Pagondas gives the word, the pæan for charging is sung, and the rush commences. Pagondas had doubtless good reason for directing a momentary halt, to see that his ranks were in perfectly good condition before the charge began. But to command his troops to "pile their arms" would be the last thing that he would think of.

In the interpretation of τεταγμένοι ὥσπερ ἐμελλον, I agree with the Scholiast, who understands μαχεῖσθαι or μαχεῖσθαι after ἐμελλον (compare Thucyd. v. 66),—dissenting from Dr. Arnold and Gölter, who would understand τῶσσεσθαι; which, as it seems to me, makes a very awkward meaning, and is not sustained by the passage produced as parallel (viii. 51).

The infinitive verb, understood after ἐμελλον, need not necessarily be a verb actually occurring before: it may be a verb suggested by the general scope of the sentence: see ἐμέλλουσαν, iv. 123.

Delium that the Bœotians had moved from Tanagra, first sent orders to his army to place themselves in battle array, and presently arrived himself to command them ; leaving 300 cavalry at Delium, partly as garrison, partly for the purpose of acting on the rear of the Bœotians during the battle. The Athenian hoplites were ranged eight deep along the whole line—with the cavalry, and such of the light-armed as yet remained, placed on each flank. Hippokratès, after arriving on the spot and surveying the ground occupied, marched along the front of the line briefly encouraging his soldiers ; who, as the battle was just on the Oropian border, might fancy that they were not in their own country, and that they were therefore exposed without necessity. He too, in a strain similar to that adopted by Pagondas, reminded the Athenians, that on either side of the border they were alike fighting for the defence of Attica, to keep the Bœotians out of it ; since the Peloponnesians would never dare to enter the country without the aid of the Bœotian horse.¹ He farther called to their recollection the great name of Athens, and the memorable victory of Myronidès at CEnophyta, whereby their fathers had acquired possession of all Bœotia. But he had scarcely half finished his progress along the line, when he was forced to desist by the sound of the Bœotian pæan. Pagondas after a few additional sentences of encouragement, had given the word : the Bœotian hoplites were seen charging down the hill ; and the Athenian hoplites, not less eager, advanced to meet them at a running step.²

At the extremity of the line on each side, the interposition of ravines prevented the actual meeting of the two armies : but throughout all the rest of the line, the clash was formidable and the conduct of both sides resolute. Both armies, maintaining their ranks compact and unbroken, came to the closest quarters ;

Battle of
Delium—
vigorously
contested—
advantage
derived from
the depth of
the Theban
phalanx.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 95.

² Thucyd. iv. 95, 96. Καθεστάντων δ' ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων ξυνίεναι, Ἱπποκράτης ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιπαριῶν τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρεκελεύετό τε καὶ ἔλεγε τοιαῦτα Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους παρεκλευσμένου, καὶ μέχρι μὲν μέσου τοῦ στρατοπέδου ἐπελθόντος, τὸ δὲ πλέον οὐκέτι φθάσας, οἱ Βοιωτοί, παρεκλευσαμένου καὶ

σφίσι καὶ ὡς διὰ ταχέων καὶ ἐν ταῦτα Παγώνδου, παριένισαυτες ἐπῆσαν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου, &c.

This passage contradicts what is affirmed by Dr. Arnold, Poppe and Göller, to have been a *general practice*, that the soldiers "piled their arms and *αἰνῶν* attended the speeches of their generals without them." (See his note ad Thucyd. iv. 91).

to the contact and pushing of shields against each other.¹ On the left half of the Boeotian line, consisting of hoplites from Thespiæ, Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the Athenians were victorious. The Thespians, who resisted longest, even after their comrades had given way, were surrounded and sustained the most severe loss from the Athenians; who in the ardour of success, while wheeling round to encircle the enemy, became disordered and came into conflict even with their own citizens, not recognising them at the moment: some loss of life was the consequence.

While the left of the Boeotian line was thus worsted and driven to seek protection from the right, the Thebans on that side gained decided advantage. Though the resolution and discipline of the Athenians was noway inferior, yet as soon as the action came to close quarters and to propulsion with shield and spear, the prodigious depth of the Theban column (more than triple of the depth of the Athenians, twenty-five against eight) enabled them to bear down their enemies by mere superiority of weight and mass. Moreover the Thebans appear to have been superior to the Athenians in gymnastic training and acquired bodily force, as they were inferior both in speech and in intelligence. The chosen Theban warriors in the front rank were especially superior: but apart from such superiority, if we assume simple equality of individual strength and resolution on both sides,² it is plain that when the two opposing columns came into conflict, shield against shield—the comparative force of forward pressure would decide the victory. This motive is sufficient to explain the extraordinary depth of the Theban column—which was increased by Epameinondas, half a century afterwards, at the battle of Leuktra, from a depth of twenty-five men to the still more astonishing depth of fifty. We need not suspect the correctness of the text, with some critics—or suppose with others,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 96. *καταρῆ μύχῃ καὶ ἀδισμῇ ἀσπίδων ἐννεστήκει*, &c. Compare Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* vii. 1, 32.

² The proverbial expression of *Βοιωτίαν ὄν*—"the Boeotian sow"—was ancient even in the time of Pindar (*Olymp.* vi. 90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's note): compare also Ephorus, *Fragment* 67, ed. Marx: *Dikæarchus*, *Bíos Ἑλλάδος*, p. 143, ed. Fuhr; Plato,

Legg. i. p. 636; and *Symposion*, p. 182 —"pingues Thebani et valentes," *Cicero de Fato*, iv. 7.

Xenophon (*Memorab.* iii. 5, 2, 15; iii. 12, 5; compare *Xenoph. de Athen. Republ.* i. 13) maintains the natural bodily capacity of Athenians to be equal to that of Boeotians, but deprecates the want of *σωμαστικά* or bodily training.

that the great depth of the Theban files arose from the circumstance that the rear ranks were too poor to provide themselves with armour.¹ Even in a depth of eight—which was that of the Athenian column in the present engagement,² and seemingly the usual depth in a battle—the spears of the four rear ranks could hardly have protruded sufficiently beyond the first line to do any mischief. The great use of all the ranks behind the first four, was partly to take the place of such of the foremost lines as might be slain—partly, to push forward the lines before them from behind. The greater the depth of the files, the more irresistible did this propelling force become. Hence the Thebans at Delium as well as at Leuktra, found their account in deepening the column to so remarkable a degree,—a movement to which we may fairly presume that their hoplites were trained beforehand.

Defeat and
flight of the
Athenians—
Hippo-
kratēs, with
1000 hop-
lites, is slain.

The Thebans on the right thus pushed back³ the troops on the left of the Athenian line, who retired at first slowly and for a short space, maintaining their order unbroken—so that the victory of the Athenians on their own right would have restored the battle, had not Pagondas detached from the rear two squadrons of cavalry; who, wheeling unseen round the hill behind suddenly appeared to the relief of the Boeotian left, and produced upon the Athenians on that side, already deranged in their ranks by the ardour of pursuit, the intimidating effect of a fresh army arriving to reinforce the Boeotians. And thus, even on the right, the victorious portion of their line, the Athenians lost courage and gave way; while on the left, where they were worsted from the beginning, they found themselves pressed harder and harder by the pursuing Thebans: so that in the end, the whole Athenian army was broken and put to flight. The garrison of Delium, reinforced by 300 cavalry whom Hippokratēs had left there to assail the rear of the Boeotians during the action, either made no

¹ See the notes of Dr. Arnold and Poppo, ad Thucyd. iv. 96.

² Compare Thucyd. v. 68; vi. 67.

³ Thucyd. iv. 96. τὸ δὲ δεξιὸν, ἧ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν, ἐκράτει τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ὠσάμενοι κατὰ βραχὺ τὸ πρῶτον

ἐπηκολούθουν.

The word ὠσάμενοι (compare iv. 35; vi. 70) exactly expresses the forward pushing of the mass of hoplites with shield and spear.

vigorous movement, or were repelled by a Bœotian reserve stationed to watch them.

Flight having become general among the Athenians, the different parts of their army took different directions. The right sought refuge at Delium, the centre fled to Orôpus, and the left took a direction towards the high lands of Parnês. The pursuit of the Bœotians was vigorous and destructive. They had an efficient cavalry, strengthened by some Lokrian horse who had arrived even during the action : their peltasts also, and their light-armed would render valuable service against retreating hoplites.¹ Fortunately for the vanquished, the battle had begun very late in the afternoon, leaving no long period of daylight. This important circumstance saved the Athenian army from almost total destruction.² As it was, however, the general Hippokratês, together with nearly 1000 hoplites, and a considerable number of light-armed and attendants, were slain ; while the loss of the Bœotians, chiefly on their defeated left wing, was rather under 500 hoplites. Some prisoners³ seem to have been made, but we hear little about them. Those who had fled to Delium and Orôpus were conveyed back by sea to Athens.

The victors retired to Tanagra, after erecting their trophy, burying their own dead, and despoiling those of their enemies. An abundant booty of arms from the stript warriors long remained to decorate the temples of Thebes, while the spoil in other ways is said to have been considerable. Pagondas also resolved to lay siege to the newly-established fortress at Delium. But before commencing operations—which might perhaps prove tedious, since the Athenians could always reinforce the garrison by sea—he tried another means of attaining the same object. He despatched to the Athenians a herald—who, happening in his way to meet the Athenian herald coming to ask the ordinary permission for burial of the slain, warned

Interchange of heralds—remonstrance of the Bœotians against the Athenians for desecrating the temple of Delium—they refuse permission to bury the slain except on condition of quitting Delium.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 96 ; Athenæus, v. p. 215. Diodorus (xii. 70) represents that the battle began with a combat of cavalry, in which the Athenians had the advantage. This is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides.

² Diodorus (xii. 70) dwells upon this

circumstance.

³ Pyrilampês is spoken of as having been wounded and taken prisoner in the retreat by the Thebans (Plutarch, *De Genio Socratis*, c. 11. p. 581). See also Thucyd. v. 35—where allusion is made to some prisoners.

him that no such request would be entertained until the message of the Bœotian general had first been communicated, and thus induced him to come back to the Athenian commanders. The Bœotian herald was instructed to remonstrate against the violation of holy custom committed by the Athenians in seizing and fortifying the temple of Delium ; wherein their garrison was now dwelling, performing numerous functions which religion forbade to be done in a sacred place, and using as their common drink the water especially consecrated to sacrificial purposes. The Bœotians therefore solemnly summoned them in the name of Apollo and the gods inmates along with them, to evacuate the place, carrying away all that belonged to them. Finally, the herald gave it to be understood, that unless this summons were complied with, no permission would be granted to bury their dead.

Answer was returned by the Athenian herald, who now went to the Bœotian commanders, to the following effect :—The Athenians did not admit that they had hitherto been guilty of any wrong in reference to the temple, and protested that they would persist in respecting it for the future as much as possible.

Their object in taking possession of it had been no evil sentiment towards the holy place, but the necessity of avenging the repeated invasions of Attica by the Bœotians. Possession of the territory, according to the received maxims of Greece, always carried along with it possession of temples therein situated, under obligation to fulfil all customary observances to the resident god, as far as circumstances permitted. It was upon this maxim that the Bœotians had themselves acted when they took possession of their present territory, expelling the prior occupants and appropriating the temples : it was upon the same maxim that the Athenians would act in retaining so much of Bœotia as they had now conquered, and in conquering more of it, if they could. Necessity compelled them to use the consecrated water—a necessity not originating in the ambition of Athens, but in prior Bœotian aggressions upon Attica—a necessity which they trusted that the gods would pardon, since their altars were allowed as a protection to the involuntary offender, and none but he who sinned without constraint experienced their displeasure. The Bœotians were guilty of far greater impiety—

Answer of
the Athenian
herald—he
demands
permission to
bury the
bodies of the
slain.

in refusing to give back the dead, except upon certain conditions connected with the holy ground—than the Athenians, who merely refused to turn the duty of sepulture into an unseemly bargain. "Tell us unconditionally (concluded the Athenian herald) that we may bury our dead under truce, pursuant to the maxims of our forefathers. Do not tell us that we may do so, on condition of going out of Bœotia—for we are no longer in Bœotia—we are in our own territory, won by the sword."

The Bœotian generals dismissed the herald with a reply short and decisive :—"If you are in Bœotia, you may take away all that belongs to you, but only on condition of going out of it. If, on the other hand, you are in your own territory, you can take your own resolution without asking us."¹

The Bœotians persist in demanding the evacuation of Delium as a condition for granting permission to bury the dead.—
Debate on the subject.

In this debate, curious as an illustration of Grecian manners and feelings, there seems to have been special pleading and evasion on both sides. The final sentence of the Bœotians was good as a reply to the incidental argument raised by the Athenian herald, who had rested the defence of Athens in regard to the temple of Delium on the allegation that the territory was Athenian, not Bœotian—Athenian by conquest and by the right of the strongest—and had concluded by affirming the same thing about Oropia, the district to which the battle-field belonged. It was only this same argument, of actual superior force, which the Bœotians retorted when they said—"If the territory to which your application refers is yours by right of conquest (*i. e.* if you are *de facto* masters of it and are strongest within it)—you can of course do what you think best in it: you need not ask any truce at our hands: you can bury your dead without a truce."² The Bœotians knew that at this

Remarks on the debate.

¹ See the two difficult chapters, iv. 98, 99, in Thucydides.

² See the notes of Poppo, Göller, Dr. Arnold, and other commentators, on these chapters.

Neither these notes, nor the Scholiast, seem to me in all parts satisfactory, nor do they seize the spirit of the argument between the Athenian herald and the Bœotian officers, which will be found perfectly consistent as a piece of diplo-

matic interchange.

In particular, they do not take notice that it is the *Athenian* herald who first raises the question, what is Athenian territory and what is Bœotian; and that he defines Athenian territory to be that in which the force of Athens is superior. The retort of the Bœotians refers to that definition; not to the question of rightful claim to any territory, apart from actual superiority of force.

moment the field of battle was under guard by a detachment of their army,¹ and that the Athenians could not obtain the dead bodies without permission. But since the Athenian herald had asserted the reverse as a matter of fact, we can hardly wonder that they resented the production of such an argument; meeting it by a reply sufficiently pertinent in mere diplomatic fencing.

But if the Athenian herald, instead of raising the incidental point of territorial property, combined with an incautious definition of that which constituted territorial property, as a defence against the alleged desecration of the temple of Delium,—had confined himself to the main issue—he would have put the Boeotians completely in the wrong. According to principles universally respected in Greece, the victor, if solicited, was held bound to grant to the vanquished a truce for burying his dead: to grant and permit it absolutely, without annexing any conditions. On this, the main point in debate, the Boeotians sinned against the sacred international law of Greece, when they exacted the evacuation of the temple at Delium as a condition for consenting to permit the burial of the Athenian dead.² Ultimately, after they had taken Delium, we shall find that they did grant it unconditionally. We may doubt whether they would have ever persisted in refusing it, if the Athenian herald had pressed this one important principle separately and exclusively—and if he had not, by an unskilful plea in vindication of the right to occupy and live at Delium, both exasperated their feelings, and furnished them with a collateral issue as a means of evading the main demand.³

To judge this curious debate with perfect impartiality, we

¹ Thucyd. iv. 97.

² When we recollect, in connexion with this incident, and another in Xen. Hellen. iii. 5, 24, the legendary stories about the Thebans refusing burial to the bodies of slain enemies, in the cases of Polyneikes and the other Six Chiefs against Thebes—we may almost suspect that in reality the Thebans were more disposed than other Greeks to override this obligation.

³ Thucydides, in describing the state of mind of the Boeotians, does not seem to imply that they thought this a good

and valid ground, upon which they could directly take their stand; but merely that they considered it a fair diplomatic way of meeting the alternative raised by the Athenian herald; for *εὐπρεπές* means nothing more than this.

Οὐδ' αὖ ἐσπένδοντο δῆθεν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων (Ἀθηναίων) τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν (Βοιωτῶν) εὐπρεπὲς εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀπίοντας καὶ ἀπολαβεῖν ἃ ἀπαιτοῦσιν.

The adverb *δῆθεν* also marks the reference to the special question, as laid out by the Athenian herald.

ought to add, in reference to the conduct of the Athenians in occupying Delium,—that for an enemy to make special choice of a temple, as a post to be fortified and occupied, was a proceeding certainly rare, perhaps hardly admissible, in Grecian warfare. Nor does the vindication offered by the Athenian herald meet the real charge preferred. It is one thing for an enemy of superior force to overrun a country, and to appropriate everything within it, sacred as well as profane: it is another thing for a border enemy, not yet in sufficient force for conquering the whole, to convert a temple of convenient site into a regular garrisoned fortress, and make it a base of operations against the neighbouring population. On this ground, the Boeotians might reasonably complain of the seizure of Delium: though I apprehend that no impartial interpreter of Grecian international custom would have thought them warranted in requiring the restoration of the place, as a peremptory condition to their granting the burial-truce when solicited.

All negotiation being thus broken off, the Boeotian generals prepared to lay siege to Delium, aided by 2000 Corinthian hoplites, together with some Megarians and the late Peloponnesian garrison of Nisæa—who joined after the news of the battle. Though they sent for darters and slingers, probably Cætæans and Ætolians, from the Maliac Gulf, yet their direct attacks were at first all repelled by the garrison, aided by an Athenian squadron off the coast, in spite of the hasty and awkward defences by which alone the fort was protected. At length they contrived a singular piece of fire-mechanism, which enabled them to master the place. They first sawed in twain a thick beam, pierced a channel through it long-ways from end to end, sheathed most part of the channel with iron, and then joined the two halves accurately together. From the farther end of this hollowed beam they suspended by chains a large metal pot, full of pitch, brimstone, and burning charcoal; lastly, an iron tube, projected from the end of the interior channel of the beam, so as to come near to the pot. Such was the machine, which, constructed at some distance, was brought on carts and placed close to the wall, near the palisading and the wooden towers. The Boeotians then applied great bellows to their own end of

Siege and capture of Delium by the Boeotians.

the beam, blowing violently a current of air through the interior channel so as to raise an intense fire in the cauldron at the other end. The wooden portions of the wall, soon catching fire, became untenable for the defenders, who escaped in the best way they could, without attempting farther resistance. Two hundred of them were made prisoners, and a few slain ; but the greater number got safely on shipboard. This recapture of Delium took place on the seventeenth day after the battle, during all which interval the Athenian slain had remained on the field unburied. Presently however arrived the Athenian herald to make fresh application for the burial-truce ; which was now forthwith granted, and granted unconditionally.¹

Such was the memorable expedition and battle of Delium — a fatal discouragement to the feeling of confidence and hope which had previously reigned at Athens, besides the painful immediate loss which it inflicted on the city. Among the hoplites who took part in the vigorous charge and pushing of shields, the philosopher Sokratês is to be numbered. His bravery, both in the battle and the retreat, was much extolled by his friends, and doubtless with good reason. He had before served with credit in the ranks of the hoplites at Potidæa, and he served also at Amphipolis ; his patience under hardship, and endurance of heat and cold being not less remarkable than his personal courage. He and his friend Lachês were among those hoplites who, in the retreat from Delium, instead of flinging away their arms and taking to flight, kept their ranks, their arms, and their firmness of countenance ; insomuch that the pursuing cavalry found it dangerous to meddle with them, and turned to an easier prey in the disarmed fugitives. Alkibiadês also served at Delium in the cavalry, and stood by Sokratês in the retreat. The latter was thus exposing his life at Delium nearly at the same time when Aristophanês was exposing him to derision in the comedy of the Clouds, as a dreamer alike morally worthless and physically incapable.²

¹ Thucyd. iv. 100, 101.

² See Plato (Symposion, c. 36, p. 221 ; Lachês, p. 181 ; Charmidês, p. 153 ; Apolog. Sokratês, p. 28), Strabo, ix. p. 403.

Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 7. We find

it mentioned among the stories told about Sokratês in the retreat from Delium, that his life was preserved by the inspiration of his familiar dæmon or genius, which instructed him on one doubtful occasion which of two roads was the safe one to

Severe as the blow was which the Athenians suffered at Delium, their disasters in Thrace about the same time, or towards the close of the same summer and autumn, were yet more calamitous. I have already mentioned the circumstances which led to the preparation of a Lacedæmonian force intended to act against the Athenians in Thrace, under Brasidas, in concert with the Chalkidians, revolted subjects of Athens, and with Perdikkas of Macedon. Having frustrated the Athenian designs against Megara (as described above),¹ Brasidas completed the levy of his division—1700 hoplites, partly Helots, partly Dorian Peloponnesians—and conducted them, towards the close of the summer, to the Lacedæmonian colony of Herakleia, in the Trachinian territory near the Maliac Gulf.

March of
Brasidas
through
Thessaly to
Thrace and
Macedonia.

To reach Macedonia and Thrace, it was necessary for him to pass through Thessaly, which was no easy task; for the war had now lasted so long that every state in Greece had become mistrustful of the transit of armed foreigners. Moreover, the mass of the Thessalian population were decidedly friendly to Athens, and Brasidas had no sufficient means to force a passage; while, should he wait to apply for formal permission, there was much doubt whether it would be granted—and perfect certainty of such delay and publicity as would put the Athenians on their guard. But though such was the temper of the Thessalian people, yet the Thessalian governments, all oligarchical, sympathised with Lacedæmon. The federal authority or power of the tagus, which bound together the separate cities, was generally very weak. What was of still greater importance, the Macedonian Perdikkas, as well as the Chalkidians, had in every city powerful guests and partisans, whom they prevailed upon to exert themselves actively in forwarding the passage of the army.²

To these men Brasidas sent a messenger at Pharsalus, as soon as he reached Herakleia. Nikonidas of Larissa with other Thessalian friends of Perdikkas, assembling at

take (Cicero, de Divinat. i. 54; Plutarch, de Genio Sokratis, c. 11, p. 581).

The scepticism of Athenæus (v. p. 215) about the military service of Sokratēs is not to be defended—but it may probably

be explained by the exaggerations and falsehoods which he had read, ascribing to the philosopher superhuman gallantry.

¹ See above, page 289.

² Thucyd. iv. 78.

Melitæa in Achaia Phthiôtis, undertook to escort him through Thessaly. By their countenance and support, combined with his own boldness, dexterity, and rapid movements, he was enabled to accomplish the seemingly impossible enterprise of running through the country, not only without the consent, but against the feeling of its inhabitants—simply by such celerity as to forestall opposition. After traversing Achaia Phthiôtis, a territory dependent on the Thessalians, Brasidas began his march from Melitæa through Thessaly itself, along with his powerful native guides. Notwithstanding all possible secrecy and celerity, his march became so far divulged, that a body of volunteers from the neighbourhood, offended at the proceeding and unfriendly to Nikonidas, assembled to oppose his progress down the valley of the river Enipeus. Reproaching him with wrongful violation of an independent territory by the introduction of armed forces without permission from the general government, they forbade him to proceed farther. His only chance of making progress lay in disarming their opposition by fair words. His guides excused themselves by saying that the suddenness of his arrival had imposed upon them as his guests the obligation of conducting him through, without waiting to ask for formal permission: to offend their countrymen, however, was the farthest thing from their thoughts—and they would renounce the enterprise if the persons now assembled persisted in their requisition. The same conciliatory tone was adopted by Brasidas himself. “He protested his strong feeling of respect and friendship for Thessaly and its inhabitants: his arms were directed against the Athenians, not against them: nor was he aware of any unfriendly relations subsisting between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, such as to exclude either of them from the territory of the other. Against the prohibition of the parties now before them, he could not possibly march forward, nor would he think of attempting it; but he put it to their good feeling whether they ought to prohibit him.” Such conciliatory language was successful in softening the opponents and inducing them to disperse. But so afraid were his guides of renewed opposition in other parts, that they hurried him forward still more rapidly,¹ and he “passed

¹ Thucyd. iv. 78. ‘Ο δὲ, κελεύοντων τῶν ἀγωγῶν, πρὶν τι πλέον ξυστῆναι τὸ καλῶσαν, ἐχάρει οὐδὲν ἐπισχῶν ὁρόμῃ.

through the country at a running pace without halting." Leaving Melitæa in the morning he reached Pharsalus on the same night, encamping on the river Apidanus: thence he proceeded on the next day to Phakium, and on the day afterwards into Perrhæbia¹—a territory adjoining to and dependent on Thessaly, under the mountain range of Olympus. Here he was in safety, so that his Thessalian guides left him; while the Perrhæbians conducted him over the pass of Olympus (the same over which the army of Xerxes had marched), to Diûm in Macedonia, in the territory of Perdikkas, on the northern edge of the mountain.²

The Athenians were soon apprised of this stolen passage, so ably and rapidly executed, in a manner which few other Greeks, certainly no other Lacedæmonian, would have conceived to be possible. Aware of the new enemy thus brought within reach of their possessions in Thrace, they transmitted orders thither for greater vigilance, and at the same time declared open war against Perdikkas;³ but unfortunately without sending any efficient force, at a moment when timely defensive intervention was imperiously required.

Relations between Brasidas and Perdikkas—Brasidas enters into an accommodation with Arrhibæus—Perdikkas is offended.

Perdikkas immediately invited Brasidas to join him in the attack of Arrhibæus, prince of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ, or of Lynkus; a summons which the Spartan could not decline, since Perdikkas provided half the pay and maintenance of the army—but which he obeyed with reluctance, anxious as he was to commence operations against the allies of Athens. Such reluctance was still farther strengthened by envoys from the Chalkidians of Thrace—who, as zealous enemies of Athens, joined him forthwith, but discouraged any vigorous efforts to relieve Perdikkas from embarrassing enemies

¹ The geography of Thessaly is not sufficiently known to enable us to verify these positions with exactness. That which Thucydides calls the Apidanus, is the river formed by the junction of the Apidanus and Enipeus. See Kiepert's map of ancient Thessaly—Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, ch. xlii. vol. iv. p. 470; and Dr. Arnold's note on this chapter of Thucydides.

We must suppose that Brasidas was detained a considerable time in parleying with the opposing band of Thes-

sians. Otherwise, it would seem that the space between Melitæa and Pharsalus would not be a great distance to get over in an entire day's march—considering that the pace was as rapid as the troops could sustain. The much greater distance, between Larissa and Melitæa, was traversed in one night by Philip king of Macedon (the son of Demetrius), with an army carrying ladders and other aids for attacking a town, &c. (Polyb. v. 97).

² Thucyd. iv. 78. ³ Thucyd. iv. 82.

in the interior, in order that the latter might be under more pressing motives to conciliate and assist them. Accordingly Brasidas, though he joined Perdikkas and marched along with the Macedonian army towards the territory of the Lynkestæ, was not only averse to active military operations, but even entertained with favour propositions from Arrhibæus—wherein the latter expressed his wish to become the ally of Lacedæmon, and offered to refer all his differences with Perdikkas to the arbitration of the Spartan general himself. Communicating these propositions to Perdikkas, Brasidas invited him to listen to an equitable compromise admitting Arrhibæus into the alliance of Lacedæmon. But Perdikkas indignantly refused: "he had not called in Brasidas as a judge to decide disputes between him and his enemies, but as an auxiliary to put them down wherever he might point them out; and he protested against the iniquity of Brasidas in entering into terms with Arrhibæus, while the Lacedæmonian army was half paid and maintained by him" (Perdikkas).¹ Notwithstanding such remonstrance, and even a hostile protest, Brasidas persisted in his intended conference with Arrhibæus, and was so far satisfied with the propositions made, that he withdrew his troops without marching over the pass into Lynkus. Too feeble to act alone, Perdikkas loudly complained. He even contracted his allowance for the future, so as to provide for only one-third of the army of Brasidas instead of one-half.

To this inconvenience, however, Brasidas submitted, in haste to begin his march into Chalkidikê, and his operations jointly with the Chalkidians, for seducing or subduing the subject-allies of Athens. His first operation was against Akanthus, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Athos, the territory of which he invaded a little before the vintage—probably about the middle of September; when the grapes were ripe, but still out, and the whole crop of course exposed to ruin at the hands of an enemy superior in force. So important was it to Brasidas to have escaped the necessity of wasting another month in conquering the Lynkestæ. There was within the town of Akanthus a party in concert with the Chalkidians anxious to admit him and to revolt openly from

Brasidas
marches
against
Akanthus.
State of
parties in the
town.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 83.

Athens. But the mass of the citizens were averse to this step. It was only by dwelling on the terrible loss from exposure of the crop without, that the anti-Athenian party could persuade them even to grant the request of Brasidas to be admitted singly¹—so as to explain his purposes formally before the public assembly, which would take its own decision afterwards. “For a Lacedæmonian (says Thucydidēs) he was no mean speaker.” If he is to have credit for that which we find written in Thucydidēs, such an epithet would be less than his desert. Doubtless however the substance of the speech is genuine: and it is one of the most interesting in Grecian history—partly as a manifesto of professed Lacedæmonian policy—partly because it had a great practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount importance, a multitude which, though unfavourably inclined to him, was not beyond the reach of argument. I give the chief points of the speech, without binding myself to the words.

“Myself and my soldiers have been sent, Akanthians, to realise the purpose which we proclaimed on beginning the war—that we took arms to liberate Greece from the Athenians. Let no man blame us for having been long in coming, or for the mistake which we made at the outset in supposing that we should quickly put down the Athenians by operations against Attica, without exposing you to any risk. Enough, that we are now here on the first opportunity, resolved to put them down if you will lend us your aid. To find myself shut out of your town—nay, to find that I am not heartily welcomed—astonishes me. We Lacedæmonians undertook this long and perilous march, in the belief that we were coming to friends eagerly expecting us. It would indeed be monstrous if you should now disappoint us, and stand out against your own freedom as well as against that of other Greeks. Your example, standing high as you do both for prudence and power, will fatally keep back other Greeks. It will make them suspect that I am wanting either in power to protect them against Athens, or in honest purpose. Now, in

He is admitted personally into the town to explain his views—his speech before the Akanthian assembly.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 84. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν κατ’ ἀλλήλους ἐστasiaζον, οἳ τε μετὰ τῶν Χαλκιδίων ξυνεπράγοντες καὶ ὁ δῆμος.

δμως δὲ, διὰ τοῦ κάρπου τὸ δέος ἔτι ἔξω ὄντος, πεισθὲν τὸ πλῆθος ὑπὸ τοῦ Βρασίδου δέχεσθαι αὐτὸν μόνον καὶ ἀκούσαντας βουλευσασθαι, δέχεται, &c.

regard to power, my own present army was one which the Athenians, though superior in number, were afraid to fight near Nisæa ; nor are they at all likely to send an equal force hither against me by sea. And in regard to my purpose, it is not one of mischief, but of liberation—the Lacedæmonian authorities having pledged themselves to me by the most solemn oaths, that every city which joins me shall retain its autonomy. You have therefore the best assurance both as to my purposes and as to my power : you need not apprehend that I am come with factious designs, to serve the views of any particular men among you, and to remodel your established constitution to the disadvantage either of the Many or of the Few. That would be worse than foreign subjugation ; and by such dealing we Lacedæmonians should be taking trouble to earn hatred instead of gratitude. We should play the part of unworthy traitors, worse even than that high-handed oppression of which we accuse the Athenians : we should at once violate our oaths and sin against our strongest political interests. Perhaps you may say, that though you wish me well, you desire for your part to be let alone, and to stand aloof from a dangerous struggle. You will tell me to carry my propositions elsewhere, to those who can safely embrace them, but not to thrust my alliance upon any people against their own will. If this should be your language, I shall first call your local gods and heroes to witness that I have come to you with a mission of good, and have employed persuasion in vain ; I shall then proceed to ravage your territory and extort your consent, thinking myself justly entitled to do so on two grounds. First, that the Lacedæmonians may not sustain actual damage from these good wishes which you profess towards me without actually joining—damage in the shape of that tribute which you annually send to Athens. Next that the Greeks generally may not be prevented by you from becoming free. It is only on the ground of common good that we Lacedæmonians can justify ourselves for liberating any city against its own will. But as we are conscious of desiring only extinction of the empire of others, not acquisition of empire for ourselves,—we should fail in our duty if we suffered you to obstruct that liberation which we are now carrying to all. Consider well my words then : take to yourselves the glory of beginning the æra of emancipation for Greece—

save your own properties from damage—and attach an ever-honourable name to the community of Akanthus.”¹

Nothing could be more plausible or judicious than this language of Brasidas to the Akanthians—nor had they any means of detecting the falsity of the assertion (which he afterwards repeated in other places besides)² that he had braved the forces of Athens at Nisæa with the same army as that now on the outside of the walls. Perhaps the simplicity of his speech and manner may even have lent strength to his assurances. As soon as he had retired, the subject was largely discussed in the assembly, with much difference of opinion among the speakers, and perfect freedom on both sides: and the decision, not called for until after a long debate, was determined partly by the fair promises of Brasidas, partly by the certain loss which the ruin of the vine-crop would entail. The votes of the citizens present being taken secretly, a majority resolved to accede to the propositions of Brasidas and revolt from Athens.³ Exacting the renewal of his pledge and that of the Lacedæmonian authorities for the preservation of full autonomy to every city which should join him, they received his army into the town. The neighbouring city of Stageirus (a colony of Andros, as Akanthus also was) soon followed the example.⁴

Debate in the Akanthian assembly, and decision of the majority voting secretly to admit him, after much opposition.

There are few acts in history wherein Grecian political reason and morality appear to greater advantage than in this proceeding of the Akanthians. The habit of fair, free, and pacific discussion—the established respect to the vote of the majority—the care to protect individual independence of judgement by secret suffrage—the deliberate estimate of reason on both sides by each individual citizen—all these main laws and conditions of healthy political action appear as a part of the confirmed character of the Akanthians. We shall not find Brasidas entering other towns in a way so creditable or so harmonious.

Reflections upon this proceeding—good political habits of the Akanthians.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 85, 86, 87.

² Thucyd. iv. 108.

³ Thucyd. iv. 88. Οἱ δὲ Ἀκάνθιοι, πολλῶν λεχθέντων πρότερον ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρω, κρύφα διαψηφισάμενοι, διὰ τε τὸ ἐπαγωγὰ

εἰπεῖν τὸν Βράσιδαν καὶ περὶ τοῦ κάρπου φόβον, ἔγνωσαν οἱ πλείους ἀφίστασθαι Ἀθηναίων.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 88; Diodor. xii. 67.

But there is another inference which the scene just described irresistibly suggests. It affords the clearest proof that the Akanthians had little to complain of as subject-allies of Athens, and that they would have continued in that capacity if left to their own choice without the fear of having their crop destroyed. Such is the pronounced feeling of the mass of the citizens : the party who desire otherwise are in a decided minority. It is only the combined effect of severe impending loss and of tempting assurances held out by the worthiest representative whom Sparta ever sent out, which induces them to revolt from Athens. Nor even then is the resolution taken without long opposition and a large dissentient minority, in a case where secret suffrage ensured free and genuine expression of preference from every individual. Now it is impossible that the scene in Akanthus at this critical moment could have been of such a character, had the empire of Athens been practically odious and burdensome to the subject-allies as it is commonly depicted. Had such been the fact—had the Akanthians felt that the imperial ascendancy of Athens oppressed them with hardship or humiliation from which their neighbours, the revolted Chalkidians of Olynthus and elsewhere, were exempt—they would have hailed the advent of Brasidas with that cordiality which he himself expected, and was surprised not to find. The sense of present grievance, always acute and often excessive, would have stood out as their prominent impulse. They would have needed neither intimidation nor cajolery to induce them to throw open their gates to the liberator—who, in his speech within the town, finds no actual suffering to appeal to, but is obliged to gain over an audience, evidently unwilling, by alternate threats and promises.

As in Akanthus, so in most of the other Thracian subjects of Athens—the bulk of the citizens, through strongly solicited by the Chalkidians, manifest no spontaneous disposition to revolt from Athens. We shall find the party who introduce Brasidas to be a conspiring minority, who not only do not consult the majority beforehand, but act in such a manner as to leave no free option to the majority afterwards, whether they will ratify or reject ; bringing in a foreign force to over-

Evidence which this proceeding affords, that the body of citizens (among the Athenian allies) did not hate Athens, and were not anxious to revolt.

awe them and compromise them without their own consent in hostility against Athens. Now that which makes the events of Akanthus so important as an evidence, is, that the majority is not thus entrapped and compressed, but pronounces its judgement freely after ample discussion. The grounds of that judgement are clearly set forth to us, so as to show, that hatred of Athens, if even it exists at all, is in no way a strong or determining feeling. Had there existed any such strong feeling among the subject-allies of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula, there was no Athenian force now present to hinder them all from opening their gates to the liberator Brasidas by spontaneous majorities; as he himself, encouraged by the sanguine promises of the Chalkidians, evidently expected that they would do. But nothing of this kind happened.

That which I before remarked in recounting the revolt of Mitylênê, a privileged ally of Athens—is now confirmed in the revolt of Akanthus, a tributary, and subject-ally. The circumstances of both prove that imperial Athens neither inspired hatred nor occasioned painful grievance, to the population of her subject-cities generally. The movements against her arose from party-minorities, of the same character as that Plataean party which introduced the Theban assailants into Plataea at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. There are of course differences of sentiment between one town and another; but the conduct of the towns generally demonstrates that the Athenian empire was not felt by them to be such a scheme of plunder and oppression as Mr. Mitford and others would have us believe. It is indeed true that Athens managed her empire with reference to her own feelings and interest, and that her hold was rather upon the prudence than upon the affection of her allies; except in so far as those among them who were democratically governed, sympathised with her democracy. It is also true that restrictions in any form on the autonomy of each separate city were offensive to the political instincts of the Greeks: moreover Athens took less and less pains to disguise or soften the real character of her empire, as one resting simply on established fact and superior force. But this is a different thing from the endurance of practical hardship and oppression, which, had it been real, would have inspired strong positive hatred among the

subject-allies—such Brasidas expected to find universal in Thrace, but did not really find, in spite of the easy opening which his presence afforded.

The acquisition of Akanthus and Stageirus enabled Brasidas in no very long time to extend his conquests; to enter Argilus—and from thence to make the capital acquisition of Amphipolis.

Brasidas establishes intelligences in Argilus. He lays his plan for the surprise of Amphipolis.

Argilus was situated between Stageirus and the river Strymon, along the western bank of which river its territory extended. Along the eastern bank of the same river,—south of the lake which it forms under the name of Kerkinitis, and north of the town of Eion at its mouth,—was situated the town and territory of Amphipolis, communicating with the lands of Argilus by the important bridge there situated. The Argilians were colonists from Andros, like Akanthus and Stageirus. The adhesion of those two cities to Brasidas gave him opportunity to cultivate intelligences in Argilus, wherein there had existed a standing discontent against Athens, ever since the foundation of the neighbouring city of Amphipolis.¹ The latter city had been established by the Athenian Agnon, at the head of a numerous body of colonists, on a spot belonging to the Edonian Thracians called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways, about five years prior to the commencement of the war (B.C. 437); after two previous attempts to colonise it,—one by Histæus and Aristagoras at the period of the Ionic revolt, and a second by the Athenians about 465 B.C.—both of which lamentably failed. So valuable however was the site, from its vicinity to the gold and silver mines near Mount Pangæus and to large forests of ship-timber, as well as for command of the Strymon, and for commerce with the interior of Thrace and Macedonia—that the Athenians had sent a second expedition under Agnon, who founded the city and gave it the name of Amphipolis. The resident settlers there, however, were only in small proportion Athenian citizens; the rest of mixed origin, some of them Argilian—a considerable number Chalkidians. The Athenian general Euklês was governor in the town, though seemingly with no paid force under his command. His colleague Thucy-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 103. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικαῦντες καὶ δεῖ ποτε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὑποκτοὶ καὶ ἐπιβουλευόμενοι τῇ χωρίῳ (Amphipolis).

didēs the historian was in command of a small fleet on the coast.

Among these mixed inhabitants a conspiracy was organised to betray the town to Brasidas. The inhabitants of Argilus as well as the Chalkidians each tampered with those of the same race who resided in Amphipolis; while the influence of Perdikkas, not inconsiderable in consequence of the commerce of the place with Macedonia, was also employed to increase the number of partisans. Of all the instigators, however, the most strenuous as well as the most useful were the inhabitants of Argilus. Amphipolis, together with the Athenians as its founders, had been odious to them from its commencement. Its foundation had doubtless abridged their commerce and importance as masters of the lower course of the Strymon. They had been long laying snares against the city, and the arrival of Brasidas now presented to them an unexpected chance of success. It was they who encouraged him to attempt the surprise, deferring proclamation of their own defection from Athens until they could make it subservient to his conquest of Amphipolis.

Starting with his army from Arnē in the Chalkidic peninsula, Brasidas arrived in the afternoon at Aulon and Bromiskus, near the channel whereby the lake Bolbē is connected with the sea. From hence, after his men had supped, he began his night-march to Amphipolis, on a cold and snowy night of November or the beginning of December. He reached Argilus in the middle of the night, where the leaders at once admitted him, proclaiming their revolt from Athens. With their aid and guidance, he then hastened forward without delay to the bridge across the Strymon, which he reached before break of day.¹ It was guarded only by a feeble piquet—the town of Amphipolis itself being situated on the hill at some little distance higher up the river;² so that Brasidas, preceded by

B.C. 424.
Night-
march of
Brasidas
from Arnē,
through
Argilus, to
the river
Strymon and
Amphipolis.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 104. Κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἑω ἐπὶ τὴν γέφυραν τοῦ ποταμοῦ.

Bekker's reading of πρὸ ἑω appears to me preferable to πρόσω. The latter word really adds nothing to the meaning; whereas the fact that Brasidas got over the river before daylight is one both new and material: it is not neces-

sarily implied in the previous words ἐκέλευε τῇ νυκτί.

² Thucyd. iv. 104. Ἀπέχει δὲ τὸ πόλισμα πλέον τῆς διαβάσεως, καὶ οὐ καθεῖτο τείχη ὥσπερ νῦν, φυλακὴ δὲ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, &c.

Dr. Arnold, with Dobree, Poppo, and most of the commentators, translate these words—"the town (of Amphipolis)

the Argilian conspirators, surprised and overpowered the guard without difficulty. Thus master of this important communication, he crossed with his army forthwith into the territory of Amphipolis, where his arrival spread the utmost dismay and terror. The governor Euklês, the magistrates, and the citizens, were all found wholly unprepared: the lands belonging to the city were occupied by residents with their families and property around them, calculating upon undisturbed security, as if there had been no enemy within reach. Such of these as were close to the city succeeded in running thither with their families, though leaving their property exposed—but the more distant became in person as well as in property at the mercy of the invader. Even within the town, filled with the friends and relatives of these victims without, indescribable confusion reigned, of which the conspirators within tried to avail themselves in order to get the gates thrown open. And so complete was the disorganisation, that if Brasidas had marched up without delay to the gates and assaulted the town, many persons supposed that he would have carried it at once. Such a risk however was too great even for his boldness—the rather as repulse would have been probably his ruin. Moreover, confiding in the assurances of the conspirators that the gates would be thrown open, he thought it safer to seize as many persons as he could from the out-citizens, as a means of working upon the sentiments of those within the walls. Lastly, this process of seizure and plunder, being probably more to the state of his own soldiers, could not well be hindered.

But he waited in vain for the opening of the gates. The conspirators in the city, in spite of the complete success of their surprise and the universal dismay around them, found themselves unable to carry the majority along with them. As

polis is farther off (from Argilus) than the passage of the river." But this must be of course true, and conveys no new information, seeing that Brasidas had to cross the river to reach the town. Smith and Bloomfield are right, I think, in considering τῆς διαβάσεως as governed by ἀπέχει and not by πλέον—"the city is at some distance from the crossing:" and the objection which Poppo makes against them, that πλέον must neces-

sarily imply a comparison with something, cannot be sustained: for Thucydides often uses ἐκ πλεονος (iv. 103; viii. 88) as precisely identical with ἐκ πολλοῦ (i. 68; iv. 67; v. 69); also περὶ πλεονος.

In the following chapter, on occasion of the battle of Amphipolis, some farther remarks will be found on the locality, with a plan annexed.

in Akanthus, so in Amphipolis, those who really hated Athens and wished to revolt were only a party-minority. The greater number of citizens, at this critical moment, stood by Euklēs and the few native Athenians around him in resolving upon defence, and in sending off an express to Thucydidēs at Thasos (the historian), the colleague of Euklēs, as general in the region of Thrace, for immediate aid. This step, of course immediately communicated to Brasidas from within, determined him to make every effort for enticing the Amphipolitans to surrender before the reinforcement should arrive; the rather as he was apprised that Thucydidēs, being a large proprietor and worker of gold mines in the neighbouring region, possessed extensive personal influence among the Thracian tribes, and would be able to bring them together for the relief of the place, in conjunction with his own Athenian squadron. He therefore sent in propositions for surrender on the most favourable terms—guaranteeing to every citizen who chose to remain, Amphipolitan or even Athenian, continued residence with undisturbed property and equal political rights—and granting to every one who chose to depart, five days for the purpose of carrying away his effects.

He becomes master of the lands round Amphipolis, but is disappointed in gaining admission into the town.

He offers to the citizens the most favourable terms of capitulation, which they accept. Amphipolis capitulates.

Such easy conditions, when made known in the city, produced presently a sensible change of opinion among the citizens—proving acceptable both to Athenians and Amphipolitans, though on different grounds.¹ The properties of the citizens without, as well as many of their relatives, were all in the hands of Brasidas. No one counted upon the speedy arrival of reinforcement—and even if it did arrive, the city might be preserved, but the citizens without would still be either slain or made captive: a murderous battle would ensue, and perhaps after all, Brasidas, assisted by the party within, might prove victorious. The Athenian citizens in Amphipolis, knowing themselves to be exposed to peculiar danger, were perfectly well-pleased with his offer, as extricating them from a critical position and procuring for them

¹ Thucyd. iv. 106. Οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἀκούσαντες ἀλλοιότεροι ἐγένοντο τὰς γνώμας, &c.

The word ἀλλοιότεροι seems to indi-

cate both the change of view, compared with what had been before, and new divergence introduced among themselves.

the means of escape, with comparatively little loss ; while the non-Athenian citizens, partakers in the same relief from peril, felt little reluctance in accepting a capitulation which preserved both their rights and their properties inviolate, and merely severed them from Athens—towards which city they felt, not hatred, but indifference. Above all, the friends and relatives of the citizens exposed in the out-region were strenuous in urging on the capitulation, so that the conspirators soon became bold enough to proclaim themselves openly—insisting upon the moderation of Brasidas and the prudence of admitting him. Euklēs found that the tone of opinion, even among his own Athenians, was gradually turned against him. He could not prevent the acceptance of the terms, and the admission of the enemy into the city, on that same day.

No such resolution would have been adopted, had the citizens been aware how near at hand Thucydides and his forces were. The message despatched early in the morning from Amphipolis found him at Thasos with seven triremes ; with which he instantly put to sea, so as to reach Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, within three miles of Amphipolis, on the same evening. He hoped to be in time for saving Amphipolis : but the place had surrendered a few hours before. He arrived indeed only just in time to preserve Eion ; for parties in that town were already beginning to concert the admission of Brasidas, who would probably have entered it at daybreak the next morning. Thucydides, putting the place in a condition of defence, successfully repelled an attack which Brasidas made both by land and by boats on the river. He at the same time received and provided for the Athenian citizens who were retiring from Amphipolis.¹

The capture of this city, perhaps the most important of all the foreign possessions of Athens—and the opening of the bridge over the Strymon, by which even all her eastern allies became approachable by land—occasioned prodigious emotion throughout all the Grecian world. The dismay felt at Athens² was greater than had been ever before experienced.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 105, 106 ; Diodor. xii. 68. | Ἀμφιπόλεως, οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέστησαν, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 108. Ἐχουμένης δὲ τῆς | The prodigious importance of the

Hope and joy prevailed among her enemies, while excitement and new aspirations became widely spread among her subject-allies. The bloody defeat at Delium, and the unexpected conquests of Brasidas, now again lowered the *prestige* of Athenian success, sixteen months after it had been so powerfully exalted by the capture of Sphacteria. The loss of reputation, which Sparta had then incurred, was now compensated by a reaction against the unfounded terrors since conceived about the probable career of her enemy. It was not merely the loss of Amphipolis, serious as that was, which distressed the Athenians; but also their insecurity respecting the maintenance of their whole empire. They knew not which of their subject-allies might next revolt, in contemplation of aid from Brasidas, facilitated by the newly-acquired Strymonian bridge. And as the proceedings of that general counted in part to the credit of his country, it was believed that Sparta, now for the first time shaking off her languor,¹ had taken to herself the rapidity and enterprise once regarded as the exclusive characteristic of Athens.

Alarm and dismay produced at Athens by the capture of Amphipolis—increased hopes among her enemies.

But besides all these chances of evil to the Athenians, there was another yet more threatening—the personal ascendancy and position of Brasidas himself. It was not merely the boldness, the fertility of aggressive resource, the quick movements, the power of stimulating the minds of soldiers—which lent efficiency to that general; but also his incorruptible probity, his good faith, his moderation, his abstinence from party-cruelty or corruption, and from all intermeddling with the internal constitutions of the different cities—in strict adherence to that manifesto whereby Sparta had proclaimed herself the liberator of Greece. Such talents and such official worth had never before been seen combined. Set off as they were by the full brilliancy of successes, such as were deemed incredible

Extraordinary personal glory, esteem, and influence, acquired by Brasidas.

site of Amphipolis, with its adjoining bridge forming the communication between the regions east and west of Strymon—was felt not only by Philip of Macedon (as will hereafter appear), but also by the Romans after their conquest of Macedonia. Of the four regions into which the Romans distributed Macedonia, “pars prima (says Livy, xlv.

30) habet opportunitatem Amphipoleos; quæ objecta claudit omnes ab oriente sole in Macedoniam aditus.”

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, διὰ τὸ ἡδονὴν ἔχον ἐν τῇ αὐτίκῃ, καὶ διὰ τὸ πρῶτον Λακεδαιμονίων δργάντων ἐμελλον πειρᾶσθαι, κινδυνεύειν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐτοίμοι ἦσαν (the subject-allies of Athens).

before they actually occurred, they inspired a degree of confidence, and turned a tide of opinion, towards this eminent man, which rendered him personally one of the first powers in Greece. Numerous solicitations were transmitted to him at Amphipolis from parties among the subject-allies of Athens, in their present temper of large hopes from him and diminished fear of the Athenians. The anti-Athenian party in each was impatient to revolt, the rest of the population less restrained by fear.¹

Of those who indulged in these sanguine calculations, many had yet to learn by painful experience that Athens was still but little abated in power. Still her inaction during this important autumn had been such as may well explain their mistake. It might have been anticipated that on hearing the alarming news of the junction of Brasidas with the Chalkidians and Perdikkas so close upon their dependent allies, they would forthwith have sent a competent force to Thrace—which, if despatched at that time, would probably have obviated all the subsequent disasters. So they would have acted at any other time—and perhaps even then, if Periklēs had been alive. But the news arrived just at the period when Athens was engaged in the expedition against Bœotia, which ended very shortly in the ruinous defeat of Delium. Under the discouragement arising from the death of the Stratêgus Hippokratēs and 1000 citizens, the idea of a fresh expedition to Thrace would probably have been intolerable to Athenian hoplites. The hardships of a winter service in Thrace, as experienced a few years before in the blockade of Potidæa, would probably also aggravate their reluctance. In Grecian history, we must steadfastly keep in mind that we are reading about citizen soldiers, not about professional soldiers; and that the temper of the time, whether of confidence or dismay, modifies to an unspeakable degree all the calculations of military and political prudence. Even after the rapid success of Brasidas, not merely at Akanthus and Stageirus, but even at Amphipolis, they sent only a few inadequate guards² to the points most threatened

Inaction and despondency of Athens after the battle of Delium, especially in reference to arresting the conquests of Brasidas in Thrace.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108.

² Thucyd. iv. 108. Οἱ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι φυλακὰς ὥς ἐξ ὀλίγου καὶ ἐν χειμῶνι διέπεμπον ἐς τὰς πόλεις, &c.

—thus leaving to their enterprising enemy the whole remaining winter for his operations, without hindrance. Without depreciating the merits of Brasidas, we may see that his extraordinary success was in great part owing to the no less extraordinary depression which at that time pervaded the Athenian public: a feeling encouraged by Nikias and other leading men of the same party, who were building upon it their hopes of getting the Lacedæmonian proposals for peace accepted.

But while we thus notice the shortcomings of Athens in not sending timely forces against Brasidas, we must at the same time admit, that the most serious and irreparable loss which she sustained—that of Amphipolis—was the fault of her officers more than her own. Euklēs and the historian Thucydides, the two joint Athenian commanders in Thrace, to whom was confided the defence of that important town, had means amply sufficient to place it beyond all risk of capture, had they employed the most ordinary vigilance and precaution beforehand. That Thucydides became an exile immediately after this event, and remained so for twenty years, is certain from his own statement. And we hear, upon what in this case is quite sufficient authority, that the Athenians condemned him (probably Euklēs also) to banishment, on the proposition of Kleon.¹

Loss of Amphipolis was caused by the negligence of the Athenian commanders—Euklēs, and the historian Thucydides.

The Athenians banish Thucydides on the proposition of Kleon.

In considering this sentence, historians² commonly treat

¹ Thucyd. v. 26. See the biography of Thucydides by Marcellinus, prefixed to all the editions, p. 19, ed. Arnold.

² I transcribe the main features from the account of Dr. Thirlwall, whose judgement coincides on this occasion with what is generally given (Hist. of Greece, ch. xxiii. vol. iii. p. 268).

"On the evening of the same day, Thucydides, with seven galleys which he happened to have with him at Thasos, when he received the despatch from Euklēs, sailed into the mouth of the Strymon, and, learning the fall of Amphipolis, proceeded to put Eion in a state of defence. His timely arrival saved the place, which Brasidas attacked the next morning, both from the river and the land, without effect; and the refugees, who retired by virtue of the treaty from Amphipolis, found

shelter at Eion, and contributed to its security. *The historian rendered an important service to his country: and it does not appear that human prudence and activity could have accomplished anything more under the same circumstances.* Yet his unavoidable failure proved the occasion of a sentence, under which he spent twenty years of his life in exile: and he was only restored to his country in the season of her deepest humiliation by the public calamities. So much only can be gathered with certainty from his language: for he has not condescended to mention either the charge which was brought against him, or the nature of the sentence, which he may either have suffered, or avoided by a voluntary exile. A statement, very probable in itself, though resting on slight authority, attributes his banish-

Thucydides as an innocent man, and find nothing to condemn except the calumnies of the demagogue, followed by the injustice of the people. But this view of the case cannot be sustained, when we bring together all the facts even as indicated by Thucydides himself.

At the moment when Brasidas surprised Amphipolis, Thucydides was at Thasos; and the event is always discussed as if he was there by necessity or duty—as if Thasos was his special mission. Now we know from his own statement that his command was not special or confined to Thasos. He was sent as joint commander along with Euklēs generally to Thrace, and especially to Amphipolis.¹ Both of them were jointly and severally responsible for the proper defence of Amphipolis, with the Athenian empire and interests in that quarter. Such nomination of two or more officers, co-ordinate and jointly responsible, was the usual habit of Athens, wherever the scale or the area of military operations was considerable—instead of one supreme responsible commander, with subordinate officers acting under him and responsible to him. If, then, Thucydides “was stationed at Thasos” (to use the phrase of Dr. Thirlwall), this was because

ment to Kleon's calumnies: *that the irritation produced by the loss of Amphipolis should have been so directed against an innocent object, would perfectly accord with the character of the people and of the demagogue.* Posterity has gained by the injustice of his contemporaries,” &c.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 104. Οἱ δ' ἐναντίοι τοῖς προδίδουσι (that is, at Amphipolis) κρατούντες τῷ πλήθει ὥστε μὴ αὐτὰ τὰς πόλεις ἀνοίγεσθαι, πέμπουσι μετὰ Εὐκλέους τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ὃς ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηναίων παρῆν αὐτοῖς φύλαξ τοῦ χωρίου, ἐπὶ τὸν ἔτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλύβρου, ὃς τὰδε ξυνέγραψεν, ὄντα περὶ Θάσον, (ἔστι δ' ἡ νῆσος, Παρίων ἀποικία, ἀπέχουσα τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως ἡμισείας ἡμέρας μάλιστα πλοῦν) κελύοντες σφίσι βοηθεῖν.

Here Thucydides describes himself as “the other general along with Euklēs, of the region of or towards Thrace.” There cannot be a clearer designation of the extensive range of his functions and

duties. The same words τοῦ ἑτέρου στρατηγοῦ are used respecting the two joint commanders Hippokratēs and Demosthenēs (Thucyd. iv. 67 and iv. 43).

I adopt here the reading τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης (the genitive case of the well-known Thucydidean phrase τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης) in preference to τὸν ἐπὶ Θράκης; which would mean in substance the same thing, though not so precisely, nor so suitably to the usual manner of the historian. Bloomfield, Bekker, and Gölter have all introduced τῶν into the text, on the authority of various MSS.: Poppo and Dr. Arnold also both express a preference for it, though they still leave τὸν in the text.

Moreover the words of Thucydides himself in the passage where he mentions his own long exile, plainly prove that he was sent out as general, not to Thasos, but to Amphipolis—(v. 26) καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμῶν τοῦ ἔτη εἰκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν, &c.

he chose to station himself there, in the exercise of his own discretion.

Accordingly, the question which we have to put is, not whether Thucydidès did all that could be done, after he received the alarming express at Thasos (which is the part of the case that *he* sets prominently before us), but whether he and Euklès jointly took the best general measures for the security of the Athenian empire in Thrace—especially for Amphipolis, the first jewel of her empire.

They suffer Athens to be robbed of that jewel,—and how? Had they a difficult position to defend? Were they overwhelmed by a superior force? Were they distracted by simultaneous revolts in different places, or assailed by enemies unknown or unforeseen? Not one of these grounds for acquittal can be pleaded. First, their position was of all others the most defensible. They had only to keep the bridge over the Strymon adequately watched and guarded—or to retain the Athenian squadron at Eion—and Amphipolis was safe. Either one or the other of these precautions would have sufficed: both together would have sufficed so amply, as probably to prevent the scheme of attack from being formed. Next, the force under Brasidas was in no way superior—not even adequate to the capture of the inferior place Eion, when properly guarded—much less to that of Amphipolis. Lastly, there were no simultaneous revolts to distract attention, nor unknown enemies to confound a well-laid scheme of defence. There was but one enemy, in one quarter, having one road by which to approach; an enemy of surpassing merit indeed, and eminently dangerous to Athens—but without any chance of success, except from the shortcomings of the Athenian officers.

Now Thucydidès and Euklès both knew that Brasidas had prevailed upon Akanthus and Stageirus to revolt, and that too in such a way as to extend his own personal influence materially. They knew that the population of Argilus was of Andrian origin,¹ like that of Akanthus and Stageirus, and therefore peculiarly likely to be tempted by the example of those two towns. Lastly, they knew (and Thucydidès him-

¹ Compare Thucyd. iv. 84, 88, 103.

self tells us¹) that this Argilian population—whose territory bordered on the Strymon and the western foot of the bridge, and who had many connexions in Amphipolis—had been long disaffected to Athens, and especially to the Athenian possession of that city. Yet having such foreknowledge, ample warning for the necessity of a vigilant defence, Thucydides and Euklês withdraw, or omit, both the two precautions upon which the security of Amphipolis rested—precautions both of them obvious, either of them sufficient. The one leaves the bridge under a feeble guard,² and is caught so unprepared every way, that one might suppose Athens to be in profound peace; the other is found with his squadron, not at Eion, but at Thasos—an island out of all possible danger, either from Brasidas (who had no ships) or any other enemy. The arrival of Brasidas comes on both of them like a clap of thunder. Nothing more is required than this plain fact, under the circumstances, to prove their improvidence as commanders.

The presence of Thucydides on the station of Thrace was important to Athens, partly because he possessed valuable family-connexions, mining-property, and commanding influence among the continental population round Amphipolis.³ This was one main reason why he was named. The Athenian people confide much in his private influence, over and above the public force under his command—looking to him even more than to his colleague Euklês for the continued security of the town: instead of which they find that not even their own squadron under him is at hand near the vulnerable point at the moment when the enemy comes. Of the two, perhaps, the conduct of Euklês admits of conceivable explanation more easily than that of Thucydides. For it seems that

¹ Thucyd. iv. 103. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ Ἀργίλιοι, ἐγγύς τε προσοικοῦντες καὶ αἰεὶ ποτὲ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὄντες ὅποιοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες τῷ χωρίῳ (Amphipolis), ἐπειδὴ παρέτυχεν ὁ καιρὸς καὶ Βρασίδης ἦλθεν, ἐπραξάν τε ἐκ πλείονος πρὸς τοὺς ἐμπολιτευόμεντας σφῶν ἐκεῖ ὅπως ἐνδοθῆσεται ἡ πόλις, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 103. φυλακὴ δὲ τις βραχεῖα καθειστήκει, ἣν βιασάμενος ῥαδίως ὁ Βρασίδης, ἅμα μὲν τῆς προδοσίας οὐσης, ἅμα δὲ καὶ χεῖμῆρος ὄντος καὶ ἀπροσδόκητος προσπεσὼν, διέβη τὴν γέφυραν, &c.

³ Thucyd. iv. 105. καὶ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν ἡπειρωτῶν, &c.

Roscher, in his *Life of Thucydides* (*Leben des Thukydides*, Göttingen, 1842, sect. 4, pp. 97-99), admits it to be the probable truth, that Thucydides was selected for this command expressly in consequence of his private influence in the region around. Yet this biographer still repeats the view generally taken, that Thucydides did everything which an able commander could do, and was most unjustly condemned.

Euklès had no paid force in Amphipolis ; no other force than the citizen hoplites, partly Athenian, partly of other lineage. Doubtless these men found it irksome to keep guard through the winter on the Strymonian bridge. Euklès might fancy, that by enforcing a large perpetual guard, he ran the risk of making Athens unpopular. Moreover, strict constancy of watch, night after night, when no actual danger comes, with an unpaid citizen force—is not easy to maintain. This is an insufficient excuse, but it is better than anything which can be offered on behalf of Thucydidès : who had with him a paid Athenian force, and might just as well have kept it at Eion as at Thasos.¹ We may be sure that the absence of Thucydidès with his fleet, at Thasos, was one essential condition in the plot laid by Brasidas with the Argilians.

To say, with Dr. Thirlwall, that “human prudence and activity could not have accomplished more than Thucydidès did *under the same circumstances*”—is true as matter of fact, and creditable as far as it goes. But it is wholly inadmissible as a justification, and meets only one part of the case. An officer in command is responsible not only for doing most “under the circumstances,” but also for the circumstances themselves, insofar as they are under his control. Now nothing is more under his control than the position which he chooses to occupy. If the Emperor Napoleon, or the Duke of Wellington, had lost by surprise of an enemy not very numerous, a post of supreme importance which they thought adequately protected, would they be satisfied to hear from the responsible officer in command—“Having no idea that the enemy would attempt any surprise, I thought that I might keep my force half a day’s journey off from the post exposed, at another post which it was physically impossible for the enemy to reach. But the moment I was informed that the surprise had occurred, I hastened to the scene, did all that human prudence and activity could do to repel the enemy; and though I found that he had already mastered the capital post of all, yet I beat him back from a second post which he was on the point of mastering also?” Does

¹ That the recognised station of the Athenian fleet was at Eion—and that the maintenance of the passage of the Strymon was inestimable to the Athe-

nians (even apart from Amphipolis), as guarantee for the inaccessibility of her eastern empire—we see by Thucyd. iv. 108.

any one imagine that these illustrious chiefs, smarting under the loss of an inestimable position which alters the whole prospects of a campaign, would be satisfied with such a report, and would dismiss the officer with praises for his vigour and bravery "under the circumstances?" They would assuredly reply that he had done right in coming back—that his conduct after coming back had been that of a brave man—and that there was no impeachment on his courage. But they would at the same time add, that his want of judgement and foresight, in omitting to place the valuable position really exposed under sufficient guard beforehand, and leaving it thus open to the enemy, while he himself was absent in another place which was out of danger—and his easy faith that there would be no dangerous surprise, at a time when the character of the enemy's officer, as well as the disaffection of the neighbours (Argilus), plainly indicated that there *would* be, if the least opening were afforded—that these were defects meriting serious reproof, and disqualifying him from any future command of trust and responsibility. Nor can we doubt that the whole feeling of the respective armies, who would have to pay with their best blood the unhappy miscalculation of this officer, would go along with such a sentence; without at all suspecting themselves to be guilty of injustice, or of "directing the irritation produced by the loss against an innocent object."

The vehement leather-seller in the Pnyx at Athens, when he brought forward what are called "his calumnies" against Thucydides and Euklês, as having caused through culpable omission a fatal and irreparable loss to their country, might perhaps state his case with greater loudness and acrimony. But it may be doubted whether he would say anything more really galling, than would be contained in the dignified rebuke of an esteemed modern general, to a subordinate officer under similar circumstances. In my judgement, not only the accusation against these two officers (I assume Euklês to have been included) was called for on the fairest *presumptive* grounds—which would be sufficient as a justification of the leather-seller Kleon—but the positive verdict of guilty against them was fully merited. Whether the banishment inflicted was a greater penalty than the case warranted, I will not take upon me to pronounce. Every age has its own standard of feeling

for measuring what is a proper intensity of punishment : penalties which our grandfathers thought right and meet, would in the present day appear intolerably rigorous. But when I consider the immense value of Amphipolis to Athens, combined with the conduct whereby it was lost, I cannot think that there was a single Athenian, or a single Greek, who would deem the penalty of banishment too severe.

It is painful to find such strong grounds of official censure against a man who as an historian has earned the lasting admiration of posterity—my own, among the first and warmest. But in criticising the conduct of Thucydides the officer, we are bound in justice to forget Thucydides the historian. He was not known in the latter character at the time when this sentence was passed. Perhaps he never would have been so known (like the Neapolitan historian Colletta), if exile had not thrown him out of the active duties and hopes of a citizen.

It may be doubted whether he ever went home from Eion to encounter the grief, wrath, and alarm, so strongly felt at Athens after the loss of Amphipolis. Condemned, either with or without appearance, he remained in banishment for twenty years ;¹ not returning to Athens until after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. Of this long exile much is said to have been spent on his property in Thrace ; yet he also visited most parts of Greece—enemies of Athens as well as neutral states. However much we may deplore such a misfortune on his account, mankind in general has, and ever will have, the strongest reason to rejoice at it. To this compulsory leisure we owe the completion, or rather the near approach to completion, of his history. And the opportunities which an exile enjoyed of personally consulting neutrals and enemies, contributed much to form that impartial, comprehensive, Pan-hellenic, spirit, which reigns generally throughout his immortal work.

Meanwhile Brasidas, installed in Amphipolis about the beginning of December 424 B.C., employed his increased power only the more vigorously against Athens. His first care was to reconstitute Amphipolis—a task wherein the Macedonian Perdikkas, whose intrigues had contributed to

¹ Thucyd. v. 26.

the capture, came and personally assisted. That city went through a partial secession and renovation of inhabitants; being now moreover cut off from the port of Eion and the mouth of the river, which remained in the hands of the Athenians. Many new arrangements must have been required, as well for its internal polity as for its external defence. Brasidas took measures for building ships of war, in the lake above the city, in order to force the lower part of the river:¹ but his most important step was to construct a palisade work,² connecting the walls of the city with the bridge. He thus made himself permanently master of the crossing of the Strymon, so as to shut the door by which he himself had entered, and at the same time to keep an easy communication with Argilus and the western bank of the Strymon. He also made some acquisitions on the eastern side of the river. Pittakus, prince of the neighbouring Edonian-Thracian township of Myrkinus, had been recently assassinated by his wife Brauro and by some personal enemies. He had probably been the ally of Athens, and his assassins now sought to strengthen themselves by courting the alliance of the new conqueror of Amphipolis. The Thasian continental colonies of Galepsus and Œsymbê also declared their adherence to him.

While he sent to Lacedæmon, communicating his excellent position as well as his large hopes, he at the same time, without waiting for the answer, began acting for himself, with all the allies whom he could get together. He marched first against the peninsula called Aktê—the narrow tongue of land which stretches out from the neighbourhood of Akanthus to the mighty headland called Mount Athos—near thirty miles long, and between four and five miles for the most part in breadth.³ The long, rugged, woody ridge—covering this peninsula so as to leave but narrow spaces for dwelling, or cultivation, or feeding of cattle—was at this time occupied by many distinct petty communities, some of them divided in

¹ Thucyd. iv. 104-108.

² This is the *σταθρῶμα*, mentioned (v. 10) as existing a year and a half afterwards, at the time of the battle of Amphipolis. I shall say more respect-

ing the topography of Amphipolis, when I come to describe that battle.

³ See Grisebach, *Reise durch Rumelien und Brusa*, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 226.

race and language. Sanê, a colony from Andros, was situated in the interior gulf (called the Singitic Gulf) between Athos and the Sithonian peninsula, near the Xerxeian canal. The rest of the Aktê was distributed among Bisaltians, Krestônians and Edonians, all fractions of the Thracian name—Pelasgians or Tyrrhenians, of the race which had once occupied Lemnos and Imbros—and some Chalkidians. Some of these little communities spoke habitually two languages. Thyssus, Kleônê, Olophyxus, and others, all submitted on the arrival of Brasidas; but Sanê and Dion held out, nor could he bring them to terms even by ravaging their territory.

He next marched into the Sithonian peninsula, to attack Torônê, situated near the southern extremity of that peninsula—opposite to Cape Kanastræum, the extreme headland of the peninsula of Pallênê.¹

He attacks
Torônê in
the Sitho-
nian penin-
sula—he is
admitted
into the
town by an
internal
party—sur-
prises and
takes it.

Torônê was inhabited by a Chalkidic population, but had not partaken in the revolt of the neighbouring Chalkidians against Athens. A small Athenian garrison had been sent there, probably since the recent dangers, and were now defending it as well as repairing the town wall in various parts where it had been so neglected as to crumble down. They occupied as a sort of distinct citadel the outlying cape called Lêkythus, joining by a narrow isthmus the hill on which the city stood, and forming a port wherein lay two Athenian triremes as guard-ships. A small party in Torônê, without privity² or even suspicion of the rest, entered into correspondence with Brasidas, and engaged to provide for him the means of entering and mastering the town. Accordingly he advanced by a night-march to the temple of the Dioskuri (Kastor and Pollux) within about a quarter of a mile of the town-gates, which he reached a little before daybreak; sending forward 100 peltasts to be still nearer, and to rush upon the gate at the instant when signal was made from within. His Torônæan partisans, some of whom were already concealed on the spot awaiting his arrival, made their final arrangements with him, and then returned into the town—conducting with them seven

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102.

² Thucyd. iv. 110. καὶ αὐτὸν ἄνδρες
ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ ἡγὸν κρύφα, ἐτοίμοι ὄντες
τὴν πόλιν παραδούναί—iv. 113. Τῶν δὲ

Τορωνάων γενομένης τῆς ἀλώσεως τὸ
μὲν πολὺ, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς, ἐθρορυεῖ-
το, &c.

determined men from his army, armed only with daggers, and having Lysistratus of Olynthus as their chief. Twenty men had been originally named for this service, but the danger appeared so extreme, that only seven of them were bold enough to go. This forlorn hope, enabled to creep in, through a small aperture in the wall towards the sea, were conducted silently up to the topmost watch-tower on the city hill, where they surprised and slew the guards, and set open a neighbouring postern gate, looking towards Cape Kanastæum, as well as the great gate leading towards the agora. They then brought in the peltasts from without, who, impatient with the delay, had gradually stolen close under the walls. Some of these peltasts kept possession of the great gate, others were led round to the postern at the top, while the fire-signal was forthwith lighted to invite Brasidas himself. He and his men hastened forward towards the city at their utmost speed and with loud shouts—a terror-striking notice of his presence to the unprepared citizens. Admission was easy through the open gates, but some also clambered up by means of beams or a sort of scaffolding, which was lying close to the wall as a help to the workmen repairing it. And while the assailants were thus active in every direction, Brasidas himself conducted a portion of them to assure himself of the high and commanding parts of the city.

So completely were the Torônæans surprised and thunder-struck, that hardly any attempt was made to resist. Even the fifty Athenian hoplites who occupied the agora, being found still asleep, were partly slain, and partly compelled to seek refuge in the separately-garrisoned cape of Lêkythus, whither they were followed by a portion of the Torônæan population; some from attachment to Athens, others from sheer terror. To these fugitives Brasidas addressed a proclamation inviting them to return, and promising them perfect security for person, property, and political rights; while at the same time he sent a herald with a formal summons to the Athenians in Lêkythus, requiring them to quit the place as belonging to the Chalkidians, but permitting them to carry away their property. They refused to evacuate the place, but solicited a truce of one day for the purpose of burying their slain.

Some part
of the po-
pulation,
with the
small Athe-
nian
garrison,
retire to the
separate
citadel called
Lêkythus.

Brasidas granted them two days, which were employed both by them and by him, in preparations for the defence and attack of Lêkythus; each party fortifying the houses on or near the connecting isthmus.

In the meantime he convened a general assembly of the Torônæan population, whom he addressed in the same conciliating and equitable language as he had employed elsewhere. "He had not come to harm either the city or any individual citizen. Those who had let him in, ought not to be regarded as bad men or traitors—for they had acted with a view to the benefit and the liberation of their city, not in order to enslave it, or to acquire profit for themselves. On the other hand, he did not think the worse of those who had gone over to Lêkythus, for their liking towards Athens: he wished them to come back freely, and he was sure that the more they knew the Lacedæmonians, the better they would esteem them. He was prepared to forgive and forget previous hostility; but while he invited all of them to live for the future as cordial friends and fellow-citizens—he should also for the future hold each man responsible for his conduct, either as friend or as enemy."

Conciliating
address
of Brasidas
to the
assembly at
Torônæ.

On the expiration of the Two days' truce, Brasidas attacked the Athenian garrison in Lêkythus, promising a recompense of thirty minæ to the soldier who should first force his way into it. Notwithstanding very poor means of defence—partly a wooden palisade, partly houses with battlements on the roof—this garrison repelled him for one whole day. On the next morning he brought up a machine, for the same purpose as that which the Bœotians had employed at Delium to set fire to the wood-work. The Athenians on their side, seeing this fire-machine approaching, put up, on a building in front of their position, a wooden platform, upon which many of them mounted, with casks of water and large stones to break it or to extinguish the flames. At last, the weight accumulated becoming greater than the supports could bear, it broke down with a prodigious noise; so that all the persons and things upon it rolled down in confusion. Some of these men were hurt, yet the injury was not in reality serious,—had not the noise, the cries, and the strangeness of the incident alarmed those behind, who could

He attacks
Lêkythus,
and takes it
by storm.

not see precisely what had occurred, to such a degree that they believed the enemy to have already forced the defences. Many of them accordingly took to flight, while those who remained were insufficient to prolong the resistance successfully; so that Brasidas, perceiving the disorder and diminished number of the defenders, relinquished his fire-machine and again renewed his attempt to carry the place by assault, which now fully succeeded. A considerable proportion of the Athenians and others in the fort escaped across the narrow Gulf to the peninsula of Pallênê, by means of the two triremes and some merchant vessels at hand: but every man found in it was put to death. Brasidas, thus master of the fort, and considering that he owed his success to the sudden rupture of the Athenian scaffolding, regarded this incident as a divine interposition, and presented the thirty minæ (which he had promised as a reward to the first man who broke in) to the goddess Athênê for her temple at Lêkythus. He moreover consecrated to her the entire cape of Lêkythus; not only demolishing the defences, but also dismantling the private residences which it contained,¹ so that nothing remained except the temple, with its ministers and appurtenances.

What proportion of the Torônæans who had taken refuge at Lêkythus, had been induced to return by the proclamation of Brasidas, alike generous and politic—we are not informed. His language and conduct were admirably calculated to set this little community again in harmonious movement, and to obliterate the memory of past feuds. And above all, it inspired a strong sentiment of attachment and gratitude towards himself personally—a sentiment which gained strength with every successive incident in which he was engaged, and which enabled him to exercise a greater ascendancy than could ever be acquired by Sparta, and in some respects greater than had ever been possessed by Athens. It is this remarkable development of commanding individuality, animated throughout by straightforward public purposes, and binding together so many little communities who had few other feelings in common—which lends to the short career of this eminent man, a romantic, and even an heroic, interest.

Personal
ability and
concilia-
tory effi-
ciency of
Brasidas.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 114, 115. νομίσας ἄλλῃ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἢ ἀνθρωπεύειν τὴν ἄλυσιν γενέσθαι.

During the remainder of the winter Brasidas employed himself in setting in order the acquisitions already made, and in laying plans for farther conquests in the spring.¹ But the beginning of spring—or the close of the eighth year, and beginning of the ninth year, of the war, as Thucydides reckons—brought with it a new train of events, which will be recounted in the following chapter.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 116.

CHAPTER LIV.

TRUCE FOR ONE YEAR.—RENEWAL OF WAR AND BATTLE
OF AMPHIPOLIS.—PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE eighth year of the war, described in the last chapter, had opened with sanguine hopes for Athens, and with dark promise for Sparta, chiefly in consequence of the memorable capture of Sphakteria towards the end of the preceding summer. It included, not to mention other events, two considerable and important enterprises on the part of Athens—against Megara and against Bœotia; the former plan, partially successful—the latter, not merely unsuccessful, but attended with a ruinous defeat. Lastly, the losses in Thrace following close upon the defeat at Delium, together with the unbounded expectations everywhere entertained from the future career of Brasidas, had again seriously lowered the impression entertained of Athenian power. The year thus closed amidst humiliations the more painful to Athens, as contrasted with the glowing hopes with which it had begun.

It was now that Athens felt the full value of those prisoners whom she had taken at Sphakteria. With those prisoners, as Kleon and his supporters had said truly, she might be sure of making peace whenever she desired it.¹ Having such a certainty to fall back upon, she had played a bold game, and aimed at larger acquisitions during the past year. This speculation, though not in itself unreasonable, had failed: moreover a new phænomenon, alike unexpected by all, had occurred, when Brasidas broke open and cut up her empire in Thrace. Still, so great was the anxiety of the Spartans to regain their captives, who had powerful friends and relatives at home, that they considered the victories of Brasidas chiefly

Eighth year
of the war
—began
with most
favourable
promise for
Athens—
closed with
great re-
verses to her.

Desire of
Spartans to
make peace
in order to
regain the
captives—
they de-
cline send-
ing rein-
forcements
to Brasidas.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 21.

as a stepping-stone towards that object, and as a means of prevailing upon Athens to make peace. To his animated representations sent home from Amphipolis, setting forth the prospects of still farther success and entreating reinforcements—they had returned a discouraging reply, dictated in no small degree by the miserable jealousy of some of their chief men ;¹ who, feeling themselves cast into the shade, and looking upon his splendid career as an eccentric movement breaking loose from Spartan routine, were thus on personal as well as political grounds disposed to labour for peace. Such collateral motives, working upon the caution usual with Sparta, determined her to make use of the present fortune and realised conquests of Brasidas, as a basis for negotiation and recovery of the prisoners ; without opening the chance of ulterior enterprises, which, though they might perhaps end in results yet more triumphant, would unavoidably put in risk that which was now secure.² The history of the Athenians

¹ Thucyd. iv. 108. 'Ο δὲ ἐς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα ἐφίμενος στρατιᾶν τε προσαποστέλλειν ἐκέλευε Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰ μὲν καὶ φθόγγῃ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἀνδρῶν οὐχ ἀπηρέτησαν αὐτῷ, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 117. Τοὺς γὰρ δὴ ἔνδρας περὶ πλείονος ἐποιούντο κομίσασθαι, ὥς ἐτι Βρασίδας εὐτύχει· καὶ ἔμελλον, ἐπὶ μείζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος, τῶν μὲν στέρεσθαι, τοῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι κινδυνεύειν καὶ κρατήσκειν.

This is a perplexing passage, and the sense put upon it by the best commentators appears to me unsatisfactory.

Dr. Arnold observes, "the sense required must be something of this sort. If Brasidas were still more successful, the consequence would be that they would lose their men taken at Sphacteria, and after all would run the risk of not being finally victorious." To the same purpose, substantially, Haack, Poppo, Göller, &c. But surely this is a meaning which cannot have been present to the mind of Thucydides. For how could the fact, of Brasidas being *more successful*, cause the Lacedæmonians to lose the chance of regaining their prisoners? The larger the acquisitions of Brasidas, the greater chance did the Lacedæmonians stand of getting back their prisoners, because they would have more to give up in exchange for

them. And the meaning proposed by the commentators is still more excluded by the very words immediately preceding in Thucydides : "The Lacedæmonians were above all things anxious to get back their prisoners, because Brasidas was still in full success." It is impossible, immediately after this, that he can go on to say, "Yet if Brasidas became *still more successful*, they would *lose* the chance of getting the prisoners back." Bauer and Poppo, who notice this contradiction, profess to solve it by saying "that if Brasidas pushed his successes farther, the Athenians would be seized with such violence of hatred and indignation, that they would put the prisoners to death." Poppo supports this by appealing to iv. 41, which passage, however, will be found to carry no proof in the case.

Next, as to the words ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος (ἐπὶ μείζον χωρήσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος)—Göller translates these, "Postquam Brasidas in majus profecisset, et sua arma cum fortitate Atheniensium æquasset." To the same purpose also Haack and Poppo. But if this were the meaning, it would seem to imply, that Brasidas had as yet done nothing and gained nothing ; that his gains were all to be made during the future. Whereas the fact is distinctly the reverse, as Thucydides him-

during the past year might indeed serve as a warning to deter the Spartans from playing an adventurous game.

self had told us in the line preceding; Brasidas had already made immense acquisitions—so great and serious, that the principal anxiety of the Lacedæmonians was to make use of what he had already gained as a means of getting back their prisoners, before the tide of fortune could turn against him.

Again, the last part of the sentence is considered by Dr. Arnold and other commentators as corrupt. It is not agreed to what previous subject *τοῖς δὲ* is intended to refer.

So unsatisfactory, in my judgement, is the meaning assigned by the commentators to the general passage, that if no other meaning could be found in the words, I should regard the whole sentence as corrupt in some way or other. But I think another meaning may be found.

I admit that the words *ἐπὶ μείζον χρησάμενος αὐτοῦ* might signify "if he should arrive at greater success"—upon the analogy of i. 17 and i. 118—*ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεις—ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεις*. But they do not necessarily, nor even naturally, bear this signification. *Χωρεῖν ἐπὶ* (with accus. case) means to *march upon*, to *aim at*, to *go at*, or *go for* (adopting an English colloquial equivalent)—*ἐχώρουν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀντικρὺς ἐλευθερίαν* (Thucyd. viii. 64). The phrase might be used, whether the person, of whom it was affirmed, succeeded in his object or not. I conceive that in this place the words mean—"if Brasidas should go at something greater"—if he should aim at, "or march upon, greater objects;" without affirming the point, one way or the other, whether he would attain or miss what he aimed at.

Next, the words *ἀντίπαλα καταστήσαντος* do not refer, in my judgement, to the future gains of Brasidas, or to their magnitude and comparative avail in negotiation. The words rather mean—"if he should stake in open contest and hostility that which he had already acquired"—(thus exposing it to the chance of being lost)—"if he should put himself and his already acquired gains in battle-front against the enemy." The meaning would be then substantially the same as *καταστήσαντος ἐαυτὸν ἀντίπαλον*. The two words here discussed are

essentially obscure and elliptical, and every interpretation must proceed by bringing into light those ideas which they imperfectly indicate. Now the interpretation which I suggest keeps quite as closely to the meaning of the two words as that of Haack and Göller; while it brings out a general sense, making the whole sentence (of which these two words form a part) distinct and instructive. The substantive, which would be understood along with *ἀντίπαλα*, would be *τὰ πράγματα*—or perhaps *τὰ εὐτυχήματα*, borrowed from the verb *εὐτύχει*, which immediately precedes.

In the latter part of the sentence, I think that *τοῖς δὲ* refers to the same subject as *ἀντίπαλα*: in fact *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀμυνόμενοι* is only a fuller expression of the same general idea as *ἀντίπαλα*.

The whole sentence would then be construed thus:—"For they were most anxious to recover their captives, because Brasidas was still in good fortune; while they were likely, if he should go at more and put himself as he now stood into hostile contention, to remain deprived of their captives; and even in regard to their successes, to take the chance of danger or victory in equal conflict."

The sense here brought out is distinct and rational: and I think it lies fairly in the words. Thucydides does not intend to represent the Lacedæmonians as feeling, that if Brasidas should *really* gain more than he had gained already, such further acquisition would be a disadvantage to them and prevent them from recovering their captives. He represents them as preferring the *certainty* of those acquisitions which Brasidas had already made, to the *chance* and *hazard* of his aiming at greater; which could not be done without endangering that which was now secure—and not only secure, but sufficient, if properly managed, to procure the restoration of the captives.

Poppo refers *τοῖς δὲ* to the Athenians; Göller refers it to the remaining Spartan military force, apart from the captives who were detained at Athens. The latter reference seems to me improper, for *τοῖς δὲ* must signify some persons or things which have been before specified or indicated; and that which Göller

Ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the Lacedæmonians had been attempting, directly or indirectly, negotiations for peace and the recovery of the prisoners. Their pacific dispositions were especially instigated by King Pleistoanax, whose peculiar circumstances gave him a strong motive to bring the war to a close. He had been banished from Sparta, fourteen years before the commencement of the war, and a little before the Thirty years' truce, under the charge of having taken bribes from the Athenians on occasion of invading Attica. For more than eighteen years, he lived in banishment close to the temple of Zeus Lykæus in Arcadia; in such constant fear of the Lacedæmonians, that his dwelling-house was half within the consecrated ground.¹ But he never lost the hope of procuring restoration, through the medium of the Pythian priestess at Delphi, whom he and his brother Aristoklēs kept in their pay. To every sacred legation which went from Sparta to Delphi, she repeated the same imperative injunction—"They must bring back the seed of (Hēraklēs) the demi-god son of Zeus from foreign land to their own; if they did not, it would be their fate to plough with a silver ploughshare." The command of the god, thus incessantly repeated and backed by the influence of those friends who supported Pleistoanax at home, at length produced an entire change of sentiment at Sparta. In the fourth or fifth year of the Peloponnesian war, the exile was recalled; and not merely recalled, but welcomed with unbounded honours—received with the

King Pleistoanax at Sparta—eager for peace—his special reasons—his long banishment recently terminated by recall.

supposes it to mean has not been before indicated. To refer it to the Athenians, with Poppo and Haack in his second edition, we should have to look a great way back for the subject, and there is moreover a difficulty in construing *ἀνυπόνομενοι* with the dative case. Otherwise this reference would be admissible: though I think it better to refer *τοῖς δὲ* to the same subject as *ἀντίπαλα*. In the phrase *κινδυνεύειν* (or *κινδυνεύσειν*, for there seems no sufficient reason why this old reading should be altered) (*καὶ κρατήσῃ*), the particle *καὶ* has a disjunctive sense, of which there are analogous examples—see Kühner, Griechische Grammatik, sect. 726, signifying substantially the same as *ἢ*: and examples even in Thucydides, in such

phrases as *τοιαῦτα καὶ παραπλήσια* (i. 22, 143)—*τοιαῦτη καὶ οὕτως ἐγγύτατα τούτων*, v. 74—see Poppo's note on i. 22. Also i. 118. *καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἀκλήτος*—where *καὶ* must be used disjunctively, or equivalent to *ἢ*; since the two epithets expressly exclude each other.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 117. *ἤμουν τῆς οἰκίας τοῦ ἱεροῦ τότε τοῦ Διὸς οἰκούντα φόβῳ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων*.

"The reason was, that he might be in sanctuary at an instant's notice, and yet might be able to perform some of the common offices of life without profanation, which could not have been the case had the whole dwelling been within the sacred precinct." (Dr. Arnold's note.)

same sacrifices and choric shows as those which were said to have been offered to the primitive kings, on the first settlement of Sparta.

As in the case of Kleomenês and Demaratus, however, it was not long before the previous intrigue came to be detected, or at least generally suspected and believed; to the great discredit of Pleistoanax, though he could not be again banished. Every successive public calamity which befel the state—the miscarriages of Alkidas, the defeat of Eurylochus in Amphilochia, and above all, the unprecedented humiliation in Sphaktêria—were imputed to the displeasure of the gods in consequence of the impious treachery of Pleistoanax. Suffering under such an imputation, this king was most eager to exchange the hazards of war for the secure march of peace, so that he was thus personally interested in opening every door for negotiation with Athens, and in restoring himself to credit by regaining the prisoners.¹

After the battle of Delium,² the pacific dispositions of Nikias, Lachês, and the philo-Laconian party, began to find increasing favour at Athens;³ while the unforeseen losses in Thrace, coming thick upon each other—each successive triumph of Brasidas apparently increasing his means of achieving more—tended to convert the discouragement of the Athenians into positive alarm. Negotiations appear to have been in progress throughout great part of the winter. The continual hope that these might be brought to a close, combined with the impolitic aversion of Nikias and his friends to energetic military action, help to explain the unwonted apathy of Athens, under the pressure of such disgraces. But so much did her courage flag, towards the close of the winter, that she came to look upon a truce as her only means⁴ of preservation against the victorious progress of Brasidas. What the tone of Kleon now was, we are not directly informed. He would probably still continue opposed to the propositions of peace, at least indirectly, by insisting on terms more favourable than could be obtained. On this

Negotiations during the winter of 424-423 B.C. for peace

¹ Thucyd. v. 17, 18.

² Thucyd. v. 15. σφαλέντων δ' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῇ Διίῃ παραχρῆμα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, γνόντες νῦν μᾶλλον ἂν ἐνδεξομένους, ποιοῦνται τὴν ἐνιαύσιον ἐκεχειρίαν, &c.

³ Thucyd. iv. 118; v. 43.

⁴ Thucyd. iv. 117. νομίσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἐτι τὸν Βρασίδαν σφῶν προσεποστήσαι οὐδὲν πρὶν παρασκευάσαιτο καθ' ἥσυχίαν, &c.

point, his political counsels would be wrong; but on another point, they would be much sounder and more judicious than those of his rival Nikias: for he would recommend a strenuous prosecution of hostilities by Athenian force against Brasidas in Thrace. At the present moment this was the most urgent political necessity of Athens, whether she entertained or rejected the views of peace. And the policy of Nikias, who cradled up the existing depression of the citizens by encouraging them to rely on the pacific inclinations of Sparta, was ill-judged and disastrous in its results, as the future will hereafter show.

Attempts were made by the peace-party both at Athens and Sparta to negotiate at first for a definitive peace. But the conditions of such a peace were not easy to determine, so as to satisfy both parties—and became more and more difficult, with every success of Brasidas. At length the Athenians, eager above all things to arrest his progress, sent to Sparta to propose a truce for one year—desiring the Spartans to send to Athens envoys with full powers to settle the terms: the truce would allow time and tranquillity for settling the conditions of a definitive treaty. The proposition of the truce for one year,¹ together with the first two articles ready prepared, came from Athens, as indeed we might have presumed even without proof; since the interest of Sparta was rather against it, as allowing to the Athenians the fullest leisure for making preparations against farther losses in Thrace. But her main desire was, not so much to put herself in condition to make the best possible peace, as to ensure some peace which would liberate her captives. She calculated that when once the Athenians had tasted the sweets of peace for one year, they would not again voluntarily impose upon themselves the rigorous obligations of war.²

Truce for
one year
concluded,
in March
423 B.C.

In the month of March 423 B.C., on the fourteenth day of the month Elaphebolion at Athens, and on the twelfth day of the month Gerastius at Sparta, a truce for one year was concluded and sworn, between Athens on one side, and Sparta,

¹ This appears from the form of the truce in Thucyd. iv. 118; it is prepared at Sparta, in consequence of a previous proposition from Athens; in sect. 6. οἱ δὲ ἰόντες, τέλος ἔχοντες ἰόντων, ἥπερ

καὶ ὁμοῖς ἡμᾶς κελεύετε.

² Thucyd. iv. 117. καὶ γενομένης ἀνακωχῆς κακῶν καὶ ταλαιπωρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμήσειν (τοὺς Ἀθηναίους) αὐτοὺς πειρασμένους ξυναλλάττειν, &c.

Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, and Megara, on the other.¹ The Spartans, instead of merely despatching plenipotentiaries to Athens as the Athenians had desired, went a step farther. In concurrence with the Athenian envoys, they drew up a form of truce, approved by themselves and their allies, in such manner that it only required to be adopted and ratified by the Athenians. The general principle of the truce was *uti possidetis*, and the conditions were in substance as follows :—

1. Respecting the temple at Delphi, every Greek shall have the right to make use of it honestly and without fear, pursuant to the customs of his particular city.—

Conditions
of the truce.

The main purpose of this stipulation, prepared and sent verbatim from Athens, was to allow Athenian visitors to go thither, which had been impossible during the war, in consequence of the hostility of the Bœotians² and Phokians. The Delphian authorities also were in the interest of Sparta, and doubtless the Athenians received no formal invitation to the Pythian games. But the Bœotians and Phokians were no parties to the truce : accordingly the Lacedæmonians, while accepting the article and proclaiming the general liberty in principle, do not pledge themselves to enforce it by arms as far as the Bœotians and Phokians are concerned, but only to try and persuade them by amicable representations. The liberty of sacrificing at Delphi was at this moment the more welcome to the Athenians, as they seem to have fancied themselves under the displeasure of Apollo.³

2. All the contracting parties will inquire out and punish, each according to its own laws, such persons as may violate the property of the Delphian god.—This article also is prepared at Athens, for the purpose seemingly of conciliating the favour of Apollo and the Delphians. The Lacedæmonians accept the article literally, of course.

3. The Athenian garrisons at Pylus, Kythêra, Nisæa and

¹ Thucyd. iv. 119. The fourteenth of Elaphebolion, and the twelfth of Gerastius, designate the same day. The truce went ready-prepared from Sparta to Athens, together with envoys Spartan, Corinthian, Megarian, Sikyonian, and Epidaurian. The truce was accepted by the Athenian assembly, and sworn to at once by all the envoys as well as by three Athenian Stratêgi (στρατάρχαι

δὲ αὐτίκα μᾶλα τὰς πρεσβείας ἐν τῇ δῆμῳ τὰς παρόντας, iv. 118, 119); that day being fixed on as the commencement.

The lunar months in different cities were never in precise agreement.

² See Aristophan. Aves, 188.

³ Thucyd. v. 1-32. They might perhaps believe that the occupation of Delium had given offence to Apollo.

Minoa, and Methana in the neighbourhood of Trœzen, are to remain as at present. No communication to take place between Kythêra and any portion of the mainland belonging to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The soldiers occupying Pylus shall confine themselves within the space between Buphras and Tomeus; those in Nisæa and Minoa, within the road which leads from the chapel of the hero Nisus to the temple of Poseidon—without any communication with the population beyond that limit. In like manner the Athenians in the peninsula of Methana near Trœzen, and the inhabitants of the latter city, shall observe the special convention concluded between them respecting boundaries.¹

4. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall make use of the sea for trading purposes, on their own coasts, but shall not have liberty to sail in any ship of war, nor in any rowed merchant-vessel of tonnage equal to 500 talents. [All war-ships were generally impelled by oar: they sometimes used sails, but never when wanted for fighting. Merchant-vessels seem generally to have sailed, but were sometimes rowed: the limitation of size is added, to ensure that the Lacedæmonians shall not, under colour of merchantmen, get up a warlike navy.]

5. There shall be free communication by sea as well as by land, between Peloponnesus and Athens for herald or embassy, with suitable attendants, to treat for a definitive peace or for the adjustment of differences.

6. Neither side shall receive deserters from the other, whether free or slave. [This article was alike important to both parties. Athens had to fear the revolt of her subject-allies—Sparta the desertion of Helots.]

7. Disputes shall be amicably settled, by both parties, according to their established laws and customs.

Such was the substance of the treaty prepared at Sparta—seemingly in concert with Athenian envoys—and sent by the Spartans to Athens for approval, with the following addition—"If there be any provision which occurs to you, more honourable or just than these, come to Lacedæmon and tell us: for neither the Spartans nor their allies will resist any just suggestions. But let those who come, bring with them

¹ Thucyd. iv. 118: see Poppe's note.

full powers to conclude—in the same manner as you desire of us. The truce shall be for one year.”

By the resolution which Lachês proposed in the Athenian public assembly, ratifying the truce, the people farther decreed that negotiations should be opened for a definitive treaty, and directed the Stratêgi to propose to the next ensuing assembly, a scheme and principles for conducting the negotiations. But at the very moment when the envoys between Sparta and Athens were bringing the truce to final adoption, events happened in Thrace which threatened to cancel it altogether. Two days¹ after the important fourteenth of Elaphebolion, but before the truce could be made known in Thrace, Skiônê revolted from Athens to Brasidas.

Resolution
to open
negotiations
for a defini-
tive treaty.

Skiônê was a town calling itself Achæan, one of the numerous colonies which, in the want of an acknowledged mother-city, traced its origin to warriors returning from Troy. It was situated in the peninsula of Pallênê (the westernmost of those three narrow tongues of land into which Chalkidikê branches out); conterminous with the Eretrian colony Mendê. The Skiônæans, not without considerable dissent among themselves, proclaimed their revolt from Athens, under concert with Brasidas. He immediately crossed the Gulf into Pallênê, himself in a little boat, but with a trireme close at his side; calculating that she would protect him against any small Athenian vessel—while any Athenian trireme which he might encounter, would attack his trireme, paying no attention to the little boat in which he himself was. The revolt of Skiônê was, from the position of the town, a more striking defiance of Athens than any of the preceding events. For the isthmus connecting Pallênê with the mainland was occupied by the town of Potidæa—a town assigned at the period of its capture, seven years before, to Athenian settlers, though probably containing some other residents besides. Moreover the isthmus was so narrow, that the wall of Potidæa barred it across completely from sea to sea. Pallênê was therefore a quasi-island, not open to the aid of land-force from the continent, like the towns previously acquired by Brasidas.

New events
in Thrace—
revolt of
Skiônê from
Athens to
Brasidas,
two days
after the
truce was
sworn.
March 421
B.C.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 122.

The Skiônæans thus put themselves, without any foreign aid, into conflict against the whole force of Athens, bringing into question her empire not merely over continental towns, but over islands.

Even to Brasidas himself, their revolt appeared a step of astonishing boldness. On being received into the city, he convened a public assembly, and addressed to them the same language which he had employed at Akanthus and Torônê; disavowing all party preferences as well as all interference with the internal politics of the town, and exhorting them only to unanimous efforts against the common enemy. He bestowed upon them at the same time the warmest praise for their courage. "They, though exposed to all the hazards of islanders, had stood forward of their own accord to procure freedom,¹ without waiting like cowards to be driven on by a foreign force towards what was clearly their own good. He considered them capable of any measure of future heroism, if the danger now impending from Athens should be averted—and he should assign to them the very first post of honour among the faithful allies of Lacedæmon."

Brasidas crosses over to Skiônê—his judicious conduct—enthusiastic admiration for him there.

This generous, straightforward, and animating tone of exhortation—appealing to the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind, the love of complete city-autonomy, and coming from the lips of one whose whole conduct had hitherto been conformable to it—had proved highly efficacious in all the previous towns. But in Skiônê it roused the population to the highest pitch of enthusiasm.² It worked even upon the feelings of the dissentient minority, bringing them round to partake heartily in the movement. It produced a unanimous and exalted confidence which made them look forward cheerfully to all the desperate chances in which they had engaged themselves; and it produced at the same time, in still more unbounded manifestation, the same personal attachment and admiration as Brasidas inspired elsewhere. The Skiônæans not only voted to him publicly a golden crown, as the liberator of Greece, but when it was placed on his head, the burst of individual sentiment and sympathy was the strongest of which

¹ Thucyd. iv. 120. ὅντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ νησιῶται, &c.

² Thucyd. iv. 121. Καὶ οἱ μὲν Ἰκίω-

ναῖοι ἐπὶ ῥῆσιν αὐτοῦ τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ θαρσύναντες πάντες ὁμοίως, καὶ οἷς πρότερον μὴ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα, &c.

the Grecian bosom was capable. "They crowded round him individually, and encircled his head with fillets, like a victorious athlete,"¹ says the historian. This remarkable incident illustrates what I observed before—that the achievements, the self-relying march, the straightforward politics, and probity of this illustrious man—who in character was more Athenian than Spartan, yet with the good qualities of Athens predominant—inspired a personal emotion towards him such as rarely found its way into Grecian political life. The sympathy and admiration felt in Greece towards a victorious athlete was not merely an intense sentiment in the Grecian mind, but was perhaps, of all others, the most widespread and Panhellenic. It was connected with the religion, the taste, and the love of recreation, common to the whole nation—while politics tender rather to disunite the separate cities: it was farther a sentiment at once familiar and exclusively personal. Of its exaggerated intensity throughout Greece the philosophers often complained, not without good reason. But Thucydides cannot convey a more lively idea of the enthusiasm and unanimity with which Brasidas was welcomed at Skiônê, just after the desperate resolution taken by the citizens, than by using this simile.

The Lacedæmonian commander knew well how much the utmost resolution of the Skiônæans was needed, and how speedily their insular position would draw upon them the vigorous invasion of Athens. He accordingly brought across to Pallênê a considerable portion of his army, not merely with a view to the defence of Skiônê, but also with the intention of surprising both Mendê and Potidæa, in both which places there were small parties of conspirators prepared to open the gates.

It was in this position that he was found by the commissioners who came to announce formally the conclusion of the truce for one year, and to enforce its provisions: Athenæus from Sparta—one of the three Spartans who had sworn

¹ Thucyd. iv. 121. Καὶ δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέβησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ τε ἑταυρίουν τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.

Compare Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 28 :

compare also Krause (Olympia), sect. 17, p. 162 (Wien, 1838). It was customary to place a fillet of cloth or linen on the head of the victors at Olympia, before putting on the olive wreath.

to the treaty ; Aristonymus, from Athens. The face of affairs was materially altered by this communication ; much to the satisfaction of the newly-acquired allies of Sparta in Thrace, who accepted the truce forthwith—but to the great chagrin of Brasidas, whose career was thus suddenly arrested. Yet he could not openly refuse obedience, and his army was accordingly transferred from the peninsula of Pallênê to Torônê.

Commissioners from Sparta and Athens arrive in Thrace, to announce to Brasidas the truce just concluded.

The case of Skiônê however immediately raised an obstruction, doubtless very agreeable to him. The commissioners, who had come in an Athenian trireme, had heard nothing of the revolt of that place, and Aristonymus was astonished to find the enemy in Pallênê. But on inquiring into the case, he discovered that the Skiônæans had not revolted until two days after the day fixed for the commencement of the truce. Accordingly, while sanctioning the truce for all the other cities in Thrace, he refused to comprehend Skiônê in it, sending immediate news home to Athens. Brasidas, protesting loudly against this proceeding, refused on his part to abandon Skiônê, which was peculiarly endeared to him by the recent scenes ; and even obtained the countenance of the Lacedæmonian commissioners, by falsely asseverating that the city had revolted before the day named in the truce.

Dispute respecting Skiônê. The war continues in Thrace, but is suspended everywhere else.

Violent was the burst of indignation when the news sent home by Aristonymus reached Athens. It was nowise softened, when the Lacedæmonians, acting upon the version of the case sent to them by Brasidas and Athenæus, despatched an embassy thither to claim protection for Skiônê—or at any rate to procure the adjustment of the dispute by arbitration or pacific decision. Having the terms of the treaty on their side, the Athenians were least of all disposed to relax from their rights in favour of the first revolting islanders. They resolved at once to undertake an expedition for the reconquest of Skiônê ; and farther, on the proposition of Kleon, to put to death all the adult male inhabitants of that place as soon as it should have been reconquered. At the same time, they showed no disposition to throw up the truce generally. The state of feeling on both

sides tended to this result—that while the war continued in Thrace, it was suspended everywhere else.¹

Fresh intelligence soon arrived—carrying exasperation at Athens yet farther—of the revolt of Mendê, the adjoining town to Skiônê. Those Mendæans, who had laid their measures for secretly introducing Brasidas, were at first baffled by the arrival of the truce-commissioners. But they saw that he retained his hold on Skiônê, in spite of the provisions of the truce; and they ascertained that he was willing still to protect them if they revolted, though he could not be an accomplice, as originally projected, in the surprise of the town. Being moreover only a small party, with the sentiment of the population against them—they were afraid, if they now relinquished their scheme, of being detected and punished for the partial steps already taken, when the Athenians should come against Skiônê. They therefore thought it on the whole the least dangerous course to persevere. They proclaimed their revolt from Athens, constraining the reluctant citizens to obey them.² The government seems before to have been democratical, but they now found means to bring about an oligarchical revolution along with the revolt. Brasidas immediately accepted their adhesion, and willingly undertook to protect them; professing to think that he had a right to do so, because they had revolted openly after the truce had been proclaimed. But the truce upon this point was clear—which he himself virtually admitted, by setting up as justification certain alleged matters in which the Athenians had themselves violated it. He immediately made preparation for the defence both of Mendê and Skiônê against the attack which was now rendered more certain than before; conveying the women and children of those two towns across to the Chalkidic Olynthus,

¹ Thucyd. iv. 122, 123.

² Thucyd. iv. 123. Διὸ καὶ οἱ Μενδαῖοι μᾶλλον ἐτόλμησαν, τὴν τε τοῦ Βρασίδου γνῶμην ὁρῶντες ἐτοίμην, καὶ ἅμα τῶν πρᾶσσόντων σφίσιν ὀλίγων τε ὄντων, καὶ ὥς τότε ἐμέλλησαν οὐκέτι ἀνέντων, ἀλλὰ καταβιασμένων παρὰ γνῶμην τοὺς πολοὺς—iv. 130. ὁ δῆμος εὐθὺς ἀναλαβὼν τὰ πᾶσα περιοργῆς ἐχφέρει ἐπὶ τε Πελο-

ποννησίους καὶ τοὺς τὰ ἐναντία σφίσι μετ' αὐτῶν πρέξαντας, &c.

The Athenians, after the conquest of the place, desire the Mendæans πολιτεύειν ὥσπερ εἰωθέσαν.

Mendê is another case in which the bulk of the citizens were averse to revolt from Athens, in spite of neighbouring example.

and sending thither as garrison 500 Peloponnesian hoplites with 300 Chalkidic peltasts; the commander of which force, Polydamidas, took possession of the acropolis with his own troops separately.¹

Brasidas then withdrew himself with the greater part of his army, to accompany Perdikkas on an expedition into the interior against Arrhibæus and the Lynkestæ. On what ground, after having before entered into terms with Arrhibæus, he now became his active enemy, we are left to conjecture. Probably his relations with Perdikkas, whose alliance was of essential importance, were such that this step was forced upon him against his will; or he may really have thought that the force under Polydamidas was adequate to the defence of Mendê and Skiônê—an idea which the unaccountable backwardness of Athens for the last six or eight months might well foster. Had he even remained, indeed, he could hardly have saved them, considering the situation of Pallênê and the superiority of Athens at sea: but his absence made their ruin certain.²

While Brasidas was thus engaged far in the interior, the Athenian armament under Nikias and Nikostratus reached Potidæa: fifty triremes, ten of them Chian—1000 hoplites and 600 bowmen from Athens—1000 mercenary Thracians—with some peltasts from Methônê and other towns in the neighbourhood. From Potidæa they proceeded by sea to Cape Poseidonium, near which they landed for the purpose of attacking Mendê. Polydamidas, the Peloponnesian commander in the town, took post with his force of 700 hoplites, including 300 Skiônæans, upon an eminence near the city, strong and difficult of approach: upon which the Athenian generals divided their forces; Nikias, with sixty Athenian chosen hoplites, 120 Methonean peltasts, and all the bowmen, tried to march up the hill by a side path and thus turn the position—while Nikostratus with the main army attacked it in front. But such were the extreme difficulties of the ground that both were repulsed: Nikias was himself wounded, and the division of Nikostratus was thrown into great disorder, narrowly escaping a destructive

Nikias and Nikostratus arrive with an Athenian armament in Pallênê. They attack Mendê. The Lacedæmonian garrison under Polydamidas at first repulses them.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 130.

² Thucyd. iv. 123, 124.

defeat. The Mendæans however evacuated the position in the night and retired into the city; while the Athenians, sailing round on the morrow to the suburb on the side of Skiôné, ravaged the neighbouring land; Nikias on the ensuing day carried his devastations still farther, even to the border of the Skiônæan territory.

But dissensions so serious had already commenced within the walls, that the Skiônæan auxiliaries, becoming mistrustful of their situation, took advantage of the night to return home. The revolt of Mendê had been brought about against the will of the citizens, by the intrigues and for the benefit of an oligarchical faction. Moreover, it does not appear that Brasidas personally visited the town, as he had visited Skiôné and the other revolted towns. Had he come, his personal influence might have done much to soothe the offended citizens, and create some disposition to adopt the revolt as a fact accomplished, after they had once been compromised with Athens. But his animating words had not been heard, and the Peloponnesian troops, whom he had sent to Mendê, were mere instruments to sustain the newly-erected oligarchy and keep out the Athenians. The feelings of the citizens generally towards them were soon unequivocally displayed. Nikostratus with half of the Athenian force was planted before the gate of Mendê which opened towards Potidæa. In the neighbourhood of that gate, within the city, was the place of arms and the chief station both of the Peloponnesians and of the citizens. Polydamidas, intending to make a sally forth, was marshalling both of them in battle order, when one of the Mendæan Demos, manifesting with angry vehemence a sentiment common to most of them, told him "that he would not sally forth, and did not choose to take part in the contest." Polydamidas seized hold of the man to punish him, when the mass of the armed Demos, taking part with their comrade, made a sudden rush upon the Peloponnesians. The latter, unprepared for such an onset, sustained at first some loss, and were soon forced to retreat into the acropolis—the rather as they saw some of the Mendæans open the gates to the besiegers without, which induced them to suspect a preconcerted betrayal. No such concert however existed; though the besieging generals, when they saw the gates thus

Dissensions among the citizens of Mendê—mutiny of the Demos against Polydamidas—the Athenians are admitted into the town.

suddenly opened, soon comprehended the real position of affairs. But they found it impossible to restrain their soldiers, who pushed in forthwith, from plundering the town: and they had even some difficulty in saving the lives of the citizens.¹

Mendê being thus taken, the Athenian generals desired the body of the citizens to resume the former government, leaving it to them to single out and punish the authors of the late revolt. What use was made of this permission, we are not told: but probably most of the authors had already escaped into the acropolis along with Polydamidas. Having erected a wall of circumvallation, round the acropolis, joining the sea at both ends—and left a force to guard it—the Athenians moved away to begin the siege at Skiônê, where they found both the citizens and the Peloponnesian garrison posted on a strong hill, not far from the walls. As it was impossible to surround the town without being masters of this hill, the Athenians attacked it at once and were more fortunate than they had been before Mendê; for they carried it by assault, compelling the defenders to take refuge in the town. After erecting their trophy, they commenced the wall of circumvallation. Before it was finished, the garrison who had been shut up in the acropolis of Mendê got into Skiônê at night, having broken out by a sudden sally where the blockading wall around them joined the sea. But this did not hinder Nikias from prosecuting his operations, so that Skiônê was in no long time completely enclosed, and a division placed to guard the wall of circumvallation.²

The Athenians besiege and blockade Skiônê. Nikias leaves a blockading force there, and returns to Athens.

Such was the state of affairs which Brasidas found on returning from the inland Macedonia. Unable either to recover Mendê or to relieve Skiônê, he was forced to confine himself to the protection of Torônê. Nikias, however, without attacking Torônê, returned soon afterwards with his armament to Athens, leaving Skiônê under blockade.

The march of Brasidas into Macedonia had been unfortunate in every way. Nothing but his extraordinary gallantry rescued him from utter ruin. The joint force of himself and Perdikkas consisted of 3000 Grecian hoplites,—Pelo-

¹ Thucyd. iv. 130; Diodor. xii. 72.

² Thucyd. iv. 131.

ponnesian, Akanthian, and Chalkidian—with 1000 Macedonian and Chalkidian horse—and a considerable number of non-Hellenic auxiliaries. As soon as they had got beyond the mountain-pass into the territory of the Lynkestæ, they were met by Arrhibæus, and a battle ensued, in which that prince was completely worsted.

They halted here for a few days, awaiting—before they pushed forward to attack the villages in the territory of Arrhibæus—the arrival of a body of Illyrian mercenaries, with whom Perdikkas had concluded a bargain.¹ At length Perdikkas became impatient to advance without them, while Brasidas, on the contrary, apprehensive of the fate of Mendê during his absence, was bent on returning back. The dissension between them becoming aggravated, they parted company and occupied separate encampments at some distance from each other—when both received unexpected intelligence which made Perdikkas as anxious to retreat as Brasidas. The Illyrians, having broken their compact, had joined Arrhibæus, and were now in full march to attack the invaders. The untold number of these barbarians was reported as overwhelming, while such was their reputation for ferocity as well as for valour, that the Macedonian army of Perdikkas, seized with a sudden panic, broke up in the night and fled without orders; hurrying Perdikkas himself along with them, and not even sending notice to Brasidas, with whom nothing had been concerted about the retreat. In the morning, the latter found Arrhibæus and the Illyrians close upon him; the Macedonians being already far advanced in their journey homeward.

The contrast between the man of Hellas and of Macedonia—general as well as soldiers—was never more strikingly exhibited than on this critical occasion. The soldiers of Brasidas, though surprised as well as deserted, lost neither their courage nor their discipline: the commander preserved not only his presence of mind, but his full authority. His hoplites were directed to form in a hollow square or oblong, with the light-armed and attendants in the centre, for the retreating march. Youthful soldiers were posted either in the outer ranks, or in convenient stations, to run out swiftly and repel the assailing

Expedition of Brasidas along with Perdikkas into Macedonia against Arrhibæus.

Retreat of Brasidas and Perdikkas before the Illyrians.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 124.

enemy; while Brasidas himself, with 300 chosen men, formed the rear-guard.¹

The short harangue which (according to a custom universal with Grecian generals) he addressed to his troops immediately before the enemy approached, is in many respects remarkable. Though some were Akanthians, some Chalkidians, some Helots, he designates all by the honourable title of "Peloponnesians." Reassuring them against the desertion of their allies, as well as against the superior numbers of the advancing enemy—he invokes their native, homebred, courage.² "Ye do not require the presence of allies to inspire you with bravery,—nor do ye fear superior numbers of an enemy; for ye belong not to those political communities in which the larger number governs the smaller, but to those in which a few men rule subjects more numerous than themselves—having acquired their power by no other means than by superiority in battle." Next, Brasidas tried to dissipate the *prestige* of the Illyrian name. His army had already vanquished the Lynkestæ, and these other barbarians were noway better. A nearer acquaintance would soon show that they were only formidable from the noise, the gestures, the clashing of arms and the accompaniments of their onset; and that they were incapable of sustaining the reality of close combat, hand to hand. "They have no regular order (said he) such as to impress them with shame for deserting their post. Flight and attack are with them in equally honourable esteem, so that there is nothing to test the really courageous man: their battle, wherein every man fights as he chooses, is just the thing to furnish each with a decent pretence for running away."—"Repel ye their onset whenever it comes, and so soon as opportunity offers, resume your retreat in rank and order. Ye will soon arrive in a place of safety: and ye will be convinced that such crowds, when their enemy has stood to defy the first onset, keep aloof with empty menace and a parade of

Address of
Brasidas
to his sol-
diers before
the retreat.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 125.

² Thucyd. iv. 126. Ἀγαθοῖς γὰρ εἶναι ὑμῖν προσήκει τὰ πολέμια, οὐ διὰ συμμαχων παρουσίαν ἐκδύσσετε, ἀλλὰ δι' οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν, καὶ μηδὲν πλῆθος πεφοβῆσθαι ἐτέρων, οἳ γε (μηδὲ) ἀπὸ πολιτειῶν τοιού-

των ἤκετε, ἐν αἷς οὐ πολλοὶ ἐλίγων ἔρχουσιν, ἀλλὰ πλείονων μᾶλλον ἐλδούσους· οὐκ ἄλλῃ τινὶ κτησάμενοι τὴν δυναστείαν ἢ τῷ μαχόμενοι κρατεῖν.

courage which never strikes—while if their enemy gives way, they show themselves smart and bold in running after him where there is no danger.”¹

The superiority of disciplined and regimented force over disorderly numbers, even with equal individual courage, is now a truth so familiar, that we require an effort of imagination to put ourselves back into the fifth century before the Christian æra, when this truth was recognised only among the Hellenic communities; when the practice of all their neighbours, Illyrians, Thracians, Asiatics, Epirots, and even Macedonians—implied ignorance or contradiction of it. In respect to the Epirots, the difference between their military habits and those of the Greeks has been already noticed—having been pointedly manifested in the memorable joint attack on the Akarnanian town of Stratus, in the second year of the war.² Both Epirots and Macedonians however are a step nearer to the Greeks than either Thracians, or these Illyrian barbarians against whom Brasidas was now about to contend, and in whose case the contrast comes out yet more forcibly. It is not merely the contrast between two modes of fighting which the Lacedæmonian commander impresses upon his soldiers. He gives what may be called a moral theory of the principles on which that contrast is founded; a theory of large range, and going to the basis of Grecian social life, in peace as well as in war. The sentiment, in each individual man's bosom,

Contrast
between
Grecian and
barbarian
military feel-
ing.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 126. Οὐτε γὰρ τάξιν ἔχοντες ἀσχυνοῦσιν ἂν λιπεῖν τινα χώραν βιαζόμενοι· ἢ τε φυγὴ αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἐφοδος ἴσῃν ἔχουσα δόξαν τοῦ καλοῦ ἀνεξέλεγκτον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἔχει· αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ μάχῃ μάλιστα ἂν καὶ πρόφασιν τοῦ σώζεσθαι (se sauver) τινι προνότῳ πορίσει.

Σαφὲς τε πᾶν τὸ προϋπάρχον δεῖν ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτῶν ὁρᾷτε, ἔργῳ μὲν βραχὺ ὄν, βίηι δὲ καὶ ἀκοῇ κατὰσπερχον. Ὁ ὑπομείνωντες ἐπιφερόμενον, καὶ θῆνα καιρὸς ᾗ, κόσμῳ καὶ τάξει ἀδῖος ὑπαγαγόντες, ἔς τε τὸ ἀσφαλὲς θάσσον ἀφίξεσθε, καὶ γνῶσασθε τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὄχλοι τοῖς μὲν τὴν πρώτην ἐφοδὸν δεξαμένοις ἀποθὲν ἀπειλαῖς τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μελλήσει ἐπικομπέουσιν, οἳ δ' ἂν ἐξωσιν αὐτοῖς, κατὰ πόδας τὸ εὐψυχον ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεῖ ὄρεϊ ἐπιδείκνυνται.

The word μέλλῃσις which occurs twice in this chapter in regard to the Illyrians, is very expressive and at the same time difficult to translate into any other language—"what they seem on the point of doing, but never realise." See also i. 69.

The speech of the Roman consul Manlius, in describing the Gauls, deserves to be compared—"Proceræ corpora, promissæ et rutilatæ comæ, vasta scuta, prælongi gladii: ad hoc cantus ineuntium prælium, et ululatus et tripudia, et quatientium scuta in patrium quendam morem horrendus armorum crepitus: omnia de industria composita ad terrorem" (Livy, xxxviii. 17).

² Thucyd. ii. 81. See above chap. xlviii. of this History.

of a certain place which he has to fill and duties which he has to perform—combined with fear of the displeasure of his neighbours as well, as of his own self-reproach if he shrinks back—but at the same time essentially bound up with the feeling, that his neighbours are under corresponding obligations towards him—this sentiment, which Brasidas invokes as the settled military creed of his soldiers in their ranks, was not less the regulating principle of their intercourse in peace as citizens of the same community. Simple as the principle may seem, it would have found no response in the army of Xerxes, or of the Thracian Sitalkês, or of the Gaul Brennus. The Persian soldier rushes to death by order of the Great King, perhaps under terror of a whip which the Great King commands to be administered to him. The Illyrian or the Gaul scorns such a stimulus, and obeys only the instigation of his own pugnacity, or vengeance, or love of blood, or love of booty—but recedes as soon as that individual sentiment is either satisfied, or overcome by fear. It is the Greek soldier alone who feels himself bound to his comrades by ties reciprocal and indissoluble¹—who obeys neither the will of a king, nor his own individual impulse, but a common and imperative sentiment of obligation—whose honour or shame is attached to his own place in the ranks, never to be abandoned nor overstepped. Such conceptions of military duty, established in the minds of these soldiers whom Brasidas addressed, will come to be farther illustrated when we describe the memorable Retreat of the Ten Thousand. At present I merely indicate them as forming a part of that general scheme of morality, social and political as well as military, wherein the Greeks stood exalted above the nations who surrounded them.

But there is another point in the speech of Brasidas which deserves notice: he tells his soldiers—"Courage is your homebred property: for ye belong to communities wherein the small number governs the larger, simply by reason of superior prowess in

*Appeal of
Brasidas to
the right of
conquest or
superior
force.*

¹ See the memorable remarks of Hippokratês and Aristotle on the difference in respect of courage between Europeans and Asiatics, as well as between Hellens and non-Hellens (Hippokratês, De

Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 24, ed. Littré, sect. 116 *seq.* ed. Petersen; Aristotel. Politic. vii. 6, 1-5), and the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 103, 104).

spirit with which he had embarked on the enterprise against Pylus—in the blind confidence that no one would resist him.¹ Now I have already, in a former chapter, shown grounds for concluding that the anticipations of Kleon respecting the capture of Sphakteria, far from being marked by any spirit of unmeasured presumption, were sober and judicious—realised to the letter without any unlooked-for aid from fortune. The remarks, here made by Thucydides on that affair, are not more reasonable than the judgement on it in his former chapter; for it is not true (as he here implies) that Kleon expected no resistance in Sphakteria—he calculated on resistance, but knew that he had force sufficient to overcome it. His fault even at Amphipolis, great as that fault was, did not consist in rashness and presumption. This charge at least is rebutted by the circumstance, that he himself wished to make no aggressive movement until his reinforcements should arrive—and that he was only constrained, against his own will, to abandon his intended temporary inactivity during that interval, by the angry murmurs of his soldiers, who reproached him with ignorance and backwardness—the latter quality being the reverse of that with which he is branded by Thucydides.

When Kleon was thus driven to do something, his march up to the top of the hill, for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground, was not in itself ill-judged. It might have been accomplished in perfect safety, if he had kept his army in orderly array, prepared for contingencies. But he suffered himself to be out-generalled and over-reached by that simulated consciousness of impotence and unwillingness to fight, which Brasidas took care to present to him. Among all military stratagems, this has perhaps been the most frequently practised with success against inexperienced generals; who are thrown off their guard and induced to neglect precaution, not because they are naturally more rash or presumptuous than ordinary men, but because nothing except either a high order of intellect, or special practice and training, will enable a man to keep steadily present to his mind liabilities even

¹ Thucyd. v. 7. Καὶ ἐχρήσατο τῇ τρέψει φέρει καὶ ἐς τὴν Πύλον εὐτυχήσας ἐπιστευσέ τι φρονεῖν ἐς μάχην μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἠλπισάν οἱ ἐπεξίεναι οὐδένα, κατὰ

θέαν δὲ μᾶλλον ἔφη ἀναβαίνειν τοῦ χωρίου, καὶ τὴν μείζω παρασκευὴν περιέμενεν, &c.

real and serious, when there is no discernible evidence to suggest their approach—much more when there *is* positive evidence, artfully laid out by a superior enemy, to create belief in their absence. A fault substantially the same had been committed by Thucydides himself and his colleague Euklês a year and a half before, when they suffered Brasidas to surprise the Strymonian bridge and Amphipolis ; not even taking common precautions, nor thinking it necessary to keep the fleet at Eion. They were not men peculiarly rash and presumptuous, but ignorant and unpractised, in a military sense ; incapable of keeping before them dangerous contingencies which they perfectly knew, simply because there was no present evidence of approaching explosion.

This military incompetence, which made Kleon fall into the trap laid for him by Brasidas, also made him take wrong measures against the danger, when he unexpectedly discovered at last that the enemy within were preparing to attack him. His fatal error consisted in giving instant order for retreat, under the vain hope that he could get away before the enemy's attack could be brought to bear.¹ An abler officer, before he commenced the retreating march so close to the hostile walls, would have taken care to marshal his men in proper array, to warn and address them with the usual harangue, and to wind up their courage to the fighting-point. Up to that moment they had no idea of being called upon to fight ; and the courage of Grecian hoplites—taken thus unawares while hurrying to get away in disorder visible both to themselves and their enemies, without any of the usual preliminaries of battle—was but too apt to prove deficient. To turn the right or unshielded flank to the enemy, was unavoidable, from the direction of the retreating movement ; nor is it reasonable to blame Kleon for this, as some historians have done—or for causing his right wing to move too soon in following the lead of the left, as Dr. Arnold seems to think. The grand fault seems to have consisted in not waiting to marshal his men and prepare them for standing fight during their retreat. Let us add however—and the remark, if it serves to explain Kleon's idea of being able to get away before he was actually assailed, counts as a double compliment

¹ Thucyd. v. 10. Οἰόμενος φθῆσεσθαι ἀπελθόν, &c.

to the judgement as well as boldness of Brasidas—that no other Lacedæmonian general of that day (perhaps not even Demosthenés, the most enterprising general of Athens) would have ventured upon an attack with so very small a band, relying altogether upon the panic produced by his sudden movement.

But the absence of military knowledge and precaution is not the worst of Kleon's faults on this occasion. His want of courage at the moment of conflict is yet more lamentable, and divests his end of that personal sympathy which would otherwise have accompanied it. A commander who has been out-generalled is under a double force of obligation to exert and expose himself to the uttermost, in order to retrieve the consequences of his own mistakes. He will thus at least preserve his own personal honour, whatever censure he may deserve on the score of deficient knowledge and judgement.¹

What is said about the disgraceful flight of Kleon himself must be applied, with hardly less severity of criticism, to the Athenian hoplites under him. They behaved in a manner altogether unworthy of the reputation of their city; especially the left wing, which seems to have broken and run away without waiting to be attacked. And when we read in Thucydidés, that the men who thus disgraced themselves were among the best and the best-armed hoplites in Athens—that they came out unwillingly under Kleon—that they began their scornful murmurs against him before he had committed any error, despising him for backwardness when he was yet not strong enough to attempt anything serious, and was only manifesting a reasonable prudence in awaiting the arrival of expected reinforcements—when we read this, we shall be led to compare the expedition against Amphipolis with former artifices respecting the attack of Sphakteria, and to discern other causes for its failure besides the military incompetence of the commander. These hoplites brought out with them from Athens the feelings prevalent among the political adversaries of Kleon. The expedition was proposed and carried by him, contrary to the wishes of these adversaries. They could not

Disgraceful conduct of the Athenian hoplites—the defeat at Amphipolis arose partly from political feeling hostile to Kleon.

¹ Contrast the brave death of the Lacedæmonian general Anaxibius, when he found himself out-generalled and surprised by the Athenian Iphikratés (Xenophon. Hellen. iv. 8, 38).

prevent it, but their opposition enfeebled it from the beginning, kept within too narrow limits the force assigned, and was one main reason which frustrated its success.

Had Periklēs been alive, Amphipolis might perhaps still have been lost, since its capture was the fault of the officers employed to defend it. But if lost, it would probably have been attacked and recovered with the same energy as the revolted Samos had been; with the full force, and the best generals, that Athens could furnish. With such an armament under good officers, there was nothing at all impracticable in the reconquest of the place; especially as at that time it had no defence on three sides except the Strymon, and might thus be approached by Athenian ships on that navigable river. The armament of Kleon,¹ even if his reinforcements had arrived, was hardly sufficient for the purpose. But Periklēs would have been able to concentrate upon it the whole strength of the city, without being paralysed by the contentions of political party. He would have seen as clearly as Kleon, that the place could only be recovered by force, and that its recovery was the most important object to which Athens could devote her energies.

It was thus that the Athenians, partly from political intrigue, partly from the incompetence of Kleon, underwent a disastrous defeat instead of carrying Amphipolis. But the death of Brasidas converted their defeat into a substantial victory. There remained no Spartan, like or second to that eminent man, either as a soldier or a conciliating politician; none who could replace him in the confidence and affection of the allies of Athens in Thrace; none who could prosecute those enterprising plans against Athens on her unshielded side which he had first shown to be practicable. With him

Important effect of the death of Brasidas, in reference to the prospects of the war—his admirable character and efficiency.

¹ Amphipolis was actually thus attacked by the Athenians, though without success, eight years afterwards, by ships, on the Strymon—Thucyd. vii. 9. *Ἐπειὼν στρατηγὸς Ἀθηναίων, μετὰ Περδικίου στρατεύσας ἐπ' Ἀμφίπολιν θραξὶ πολλοῖς, τὴν μὲν πόλιν οὐχ εἰλον, ἐς δὲ τὸν Στρώμονα περικομίσας τρήρεις ἐκ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἐπολιόρει, δρῶμενος δὲ Ἰμραίου.* (In the eighteenth year of the war.) But the fortifications

of the place seem to have materially altered during the interval. Instead of one long wall, with three sides open to the river, it seems to have acquired a curved wall, only open to the river on a comparatively narrow space near to the lake; while this curved wall joined the bridge southerly by means of a parallel pair of long walls with road between.

the fears of Athens, and the hopes of Sparta, in respect to the future, alike disappeared. The Athenian generals Phormio and Demosthenés had both of them acquired among the Akarnanians an influence personal to themselves, apart from their post and from their country. But the career of Brasidas exhibited an extent of personal ascendancy and admiration, obtained as well as deserved, such as had never before been paralleled by any military chieftain in Greece: and Plato might well select him as the most suitable historical counterpart of the heroic Achilles.¹ All the achievements of Brasidas were his own individually, with nothing more than bare encouragement, sometimes even without encouragement, from his country. And when we recollect the strict and narrow routine in which as a Spartan he had been educated, so fatal to the development of everything like original thought or impulse, and so completely estranged from all experience of party or political discussion—we are amazed at his resource and flexibility of character, his power of adapting himself to new circumstances and new persons, and his felicitous dexterity in making himself the rallying-point of opposite political parties in each of the various cities which he acquired. The combination “of every sort of practical excellence”—valour, intelligence, probity, and gentleness of dealing—which his character presented, was never forgotten among the subject-allies of Athens; and procured for other Spartan officers in subsequent years favourable presumptions, which their conduct was seldom found to realise.² At the time when Brasidas perished, in the flower of his age, he was unquestionably the first man in Greece. And though it is not given to us to predict what he would have become had he lived, we may be sure that the future course of the war would have been sensibly modified; perhaps even to the advantage of Athens, since she might have had sufficient occupation at home to keep her from undertaking her disastrous enterprise in Sicily.

Thucydides seems to take pleasure in setting forth the gallant exploits of Brasidas, from the first at Methônê to the last at Amphipolis—not less than the dark side of Kleon; both, though in different senses, the

Feelings of
Thucydides
towards
Brasidas and
Kleon.

¹ Plato, Symposium, c. 36, p. 221.

² Thucyd. iv. 81. *δόξας εἶναι κατὰ πάντα ἀγαθός, &c.*

causes of his banishment. He never mentions the latter except in connexion with some proceeding represented as unwise or discreditable. The barbarities which the offended majesty of empire thought itself entitled to practise in ancient times against dependencies revolted and reconquered, reached their maximum in the propositions against Mitylênê and Skiônê: both of them are ascribed to Kleon by name as their author. But when we come to the slaughter of the Melians—equally barbarous, and worse in respect to grounds of excuse, inasmuch as the Melians had never been subjects of Athens—we find Thucydidês mentioning the deed without naming the proposer.¹

Respecting the foreign policy of Kleon, the facts already narrated will enable the reader to form an idea of it as compared with that of his opponents. I have shown grounds for believing that Thucydidês has forgotten his usual impartiality in criticising this personal enemy; that in regard to Sphakteria, Kleon was really one main and indispensable cause of procuring for his country the greatest advantage which she obtained throughout the whole war; and that in regard to his judgement, as advocating the prosecution of war, three different times must be distinguished—1. After the first blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria—2. After the capture of the island—3. After the expiration of the One-year truce. On the earliest of those three occasions, he was wrong, for he seems to have shut the door on all possibilities of negotiation, by his manner of dealing with the Lacedæmonian envoys. On the second occasion, he had fair and plausible grounds to offer on behalf of his opinion, though it turned out unfortunate: moreover, at that time, all Athens was warlike, and Kleon is not to be treated as the peculiar adviser of that policy. On the third and last occasion, after the expiration of the truce, the political counsel of Kleon was right, judicious, and truly Periklêan—much surpassing in wisdom that of his opponents. We shall see in the coming chapters how those opponents managed the affairs of the state after his death—how Nikias threw away the interests of Athens in the enforcement of the conditions of peace—how Nikias and Alkibiadês together shipwrecked the power of

Character of
Kleon—his
foreign po-
licy.

¹ Thucyd. v. 116.

their country on the shores of Syracuse. And when we judge the demagogue Kleon in this comparison, we shall find ground for remarking that Thucydides is reserved and even indulgent towards the errors and vices of other statesmen—harsh only towards those of his accuser.

As to the internal policy of Kleon, and his conduct as a politician in Athenian constitutional life, we have but little trustworthy evidence. There exists indeed a portrait of him drawn in colours broad and glaring—most impressive to the imagination, and hardly effaceable from the memory; the portrait in the “Knights” of Aristophanes. It is through this representation that Kleon has been transmitted to posterity, crucified by a poet who admits himself to have a personal grudge against him, just as he has been commemorated in the prose of an historian whose banishment he had proposed. Of all the productions of Aristophanes, so replete with comic genius throughout, the “Knights” is the most consummate and irresistible—the most distinct in its character, symmetry, and purpose. Looked at with a view to the object of its author, both in reference to the audience and to Kleon, it deserves the greatest possible admiration, and we are not surprised to learn that it obtained the first prize. It displays the maximum of that which wit combined with malice can achieve, in covering an enemy with ridicule, contempt, and odium. Dean Swift could have desired nothing worse, even for Ditton and Whiston. The old man Demos of Pnyx, introduced on the stage as personifying the Athenian people—Kleon, brought on as his newly-bought Paphlagonian slave, who by coaxing, lying, impudent and false denunciation of others, has gained his master’s ear, and heaps ill-usage upon every one else, while he enriches himself—the Knights or chief members of what we may call the Athenian aristocracy, forming the Chorus of the piece as Kleon’s pronounced enemies—the Sausage-seller from the market-place, who instigated by Nikias and Demosthenes along with these Knights, overdoes Kleon in all his own low arts, and supplants him in the favour of Demos—all this, exhibited with inimitable vivacity of expression, forms the masterpiece and glory of libellous comedy. The effect produced upon the Athenian audience when this piece was represented at

Internal policy of Kleon as a citizen in constitutional life. Picture in the Knights of Aristophanes.

the Lenæan festival (January B.C. 424, about six months after the capture of Sphakteria), with Kleon himself and most of the real Knights present, must have been intense beyond what we can now easily imagine. That Kleon could maintain himself after this humiliating exposure, is no small proof of his mental vigour and ability. It does not seem to have impaired his influence—at least not permanently. For not only do we see him the most effective opponent of peace during the next two years, but there is ground for believing that the poet himself found it convenient to soften his tone towards this powerful enemy.

So ready are most writers to find Kleon guilty, that they are satisfied with Aristophanês as a witness against him; though no other public man, of any age or nation, has ever been condemned upon such evidence. No man thinks of judging Sir Robert Walpole, or Mr. Fox, or Mirabeau, from the numerous lampoons put in circulation against them. No man will take measure of a political Englishman from Punch, or of a Frenchman from the Charivari. The unrivalled comic merit of the "Knights" of Aristophanês is only one reason the more for distrusting the resemblance of its picture to the real Kleon. We have means too of testing the candour and accuracy of Aristophanês by his delineation of Sokratês, whom he introduced in the comedy of "Clouds" in the year after that of the "Knights." As a comedy, the "Clouds" stands second only to the "Knights": as a picture of Sokratês, it is little better than pure fancy: it is not even a caricature, but a totally different person. We may indeed perceive single features of resemblance; the bare feet, and the argumentative subtlety, belong to both: but the entire portrait is such, that if it bore a different name, no one would think of comparing it with Sokratês, whom we know well from other sources. With such an analogy before us, not to mention what we know generally of the portraits of Periklês by these authors, we are not warranted in treating the portrait of Kleon as a likeness, except on points where there is corroborative evidence. And we may add, that some of the hits against him, where we can accidentally test their pertinence, are decidedly not founded in fact—as for example where the poet accuses Kleon of having deliberately and cunningly

Unfairness
of judging
Kleon upon
such evi-
dence—
Picture of
Sokratês by
Aristophanês
is noway re-
sembling.

robbed Demosthenês of his laurels in the enterprise against Sphakteria.¹

In the prose of Thucydidês, we find Kleon described as a dishonest politician—a wrongful accuser of others—the most violent of all the citizens.² Throughout the verse of Aristophanês, these same charges are set forth with his characteristic emphasis, but others are also superadded—Kleon practises the basest artifices and deceptions to gain favour with the people, steals the public money, receives bribes and extorts compositions from private persons by wholesale, and thus enriches himself under pretence of zeal for the public treasury. In the comedy of the *Acharnians*, represented one year earlier than the *Knights*, the poet alludes with great delight to a sum of five talents, which Kleon had been compelled “to disgorge:” a present tendered to him by the insular subjects of Athens (if we may believe Theopompus) for the purpose of procuring a remission of their tribute, and which the *Knights*, whose evasions of military service he had exposed, compelled him to relinquish.³

But when we put together the different heads of indictment accumulated by Aristophanês, it will be found that they are not easily reconcilable one with the other. For an Athenian, whose temper led him to violent crimination of others, at the inevitable price of multiplying and exasperating personal enemies, would find it peculiarly dangerous, if not impossible, to carry on peculation for his own account. If, on the other hand, he took the latter turn, he would be inclined to purchase connivance from others even by winking at real guilt on their part, far from making himself conspicuous as a calumniator of innocence. We must therefore discuss the side of the indictment which is indicated in Thucydidês; not Kleon as truckling to the people and cheating for his own pecuniary profit (which

¹ Aristophan. *Equit.* 55, 391, 740, &c. In one passage of the play, Kleon is reproached with pretending to be engaged at Argos in measures for winning the alliance of that city, but in reality, under cover of this proceeding, carrying on clandestine negotiations with the Lacedæmonians (464). In two other passages, he is denounced as being the person who obstructs the conclusion

of peace with the Lacedæmonians (790, 1390).

² Thucyd. v. 17; iii. 45. καταφανε-
στερος μὲν εἶναι κακουργῶν, καὶ ἀπι-
στότερος διαβάλλων—βυαιότατος τῶν πο-
λιτῶν.

³ Aristophan. *Acharn.* 8, with the Scholiast, who quotes from Theopompus. Theopompus, *Fragment.* 99, 100, 101, ed. Didot.

is certainly not the character implied in his speech about the Mitylenæans as given to us by the historian¹), but Kleon as a man of violent temper and fierce political antipathies—a bitter speaker—and sometimes dishonest in his calumnies against adversaries. These are the qualities which, in all countries of free debate, go to form what is called a great opposition speaker. It was thus that the elder Cato—"the universal biter, whom Persephonê was afraid even to admit into Hades after his death"—was characterised at Rome, even by the admission of his admirers to some extent, and in a still stronger manner by those who were unfriendly to him, as Thucydides was to Kleon.² In Cato such a temper was not inconsistent with a high sense of public duty. And Plutarch recounts an anecdote respecting Kleon, that on first beginning his political career, he called his friends together, and dissolved his intimacy with them, conceiving that private

¹ The public speaking of Kleon was characterised by Aristotle and Theopompus (see Schol. ad Lucian. Timon, c. 30), not as wheedling, but as full of arrogance: in this latter point too like that of the elder Cato at Rome (Plutarch, Cato, c. 14). The derisory tone of Cato in his public speaking, too, is said to have been impertinent and disgusting (Plutarch, Reipub. Gerend. Præcept., p. 803, c. 7).

² An epigram which Plutarch (Cato, c. 1) gives us, from a poet contemporary of Cato the Censor, describes him—

Πυρρόν, παρὰ ἀκέρτην, γλαυκάμματον, οὐδὲ θανάτῳ

Πέρκιον εἰς Ἀΐδην Περσεφονῆν δέχεται.

Livy says, in an eloquent encomium on Cato (xxxix. 40)—"Simultates nimio plures et exercuerunt eum, et ipse exercuit eas: nec facile dixeris utrum magis presserit eum nobilitas, an ille agitaverit nobilitatem. Asperi procul dubio animi, et linguæ acerbæ et immodice liberæ fuit: sed invicti a cupiditatibus animi et rigidæ innocentie: contemptor gratiæ, divitiarum . . . Hunc sicut omni vitâ, tum censuram petentem premebat nobilitas; coierantque candidati omnes ad deiciendum honore eum: non solum ut ipsi potius adipiscerentur, nec quia indignabantur novum hominem censorem videre; sed etiam quod tristem censuram, periculosamque multorum famæ, et ab læso a plerisque et ledendi cupido, expectabant."

See also Plutarch (Cato, c. 15, 16—his comparison between Aristides and Cato, c. 2) about the prodigious number of accusations in which Cato was engaged, either as prosecutor or as party prosecuted. His bitter feud with the *nobilitas* is analogous to that of Kleon against the Hippeis.

I need hardly say that the comparison of Cato with Kleon applies only to domestic politics; in the military courage and energy for which Cato is distinguished, Kleon is utterly wanting. We are not entitled to ascribe to him anything like the superiority of knowledge and general intelligence which we find recorded of Cato.

The expression of Cicero respecting Kleon—"turbulentum quidem civem, sed tamen eloquentem" (Cicero, Brutus, 7) appears to be a translation of the epithets of Thucydides—βιαστότατος—τῷ δήμῳ πιθανώτατος (iii. 45).

The remarks made too by Latin critics on the style and temper of Cato's speeches, might almost seem to be a translation of the words of Thucydides about Kleon. Fronto said about Cato—"Concionatur Cato infeste, Gracchus turbulente, Tullius copiose. Jam in judiciis *savir* idem Cato, triumphat Cicero, tumultuat Gracchus." See Dübner's edition of Meyer's *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, p. 117 (Paris, 1837).

friendships would distract him from his paramount duty to the commonwealth.¹

Moreover, the reputation of Kleon, as a frequent and unmeasured accuser of others, may be explained partly by a passage of his enemy Aristophanês : a passage the more deserving of confidence as a just representation of fact, since it appears in a comedy (the "Frogs,") represented (405 B.C.) fifteen years after the death of Kleon, and five years after that of Hyperbolus, when the poet had less motive for misrepresentations against either. In the "Frogs," the scene is laid in Hades, whither the god Dionysus goes in the attire of Hêraklês and along with his slave Xanthias, for the purpose of bringing up again to earth the deceased poet Euripidês. Among the incidents, Xanthias in the attire which his master had worn, is represented as acting with violence and insult towards two hostesses of eating-houses ; consuming their substance, robbing them, refusing to pay when called upon, and even threatening their lives with a drawn sword. Upon which, the women, having no other redress left, announce their resolution of calling, the one upon her protector Kleon, the other on Hyperbolus, for the purpose of bringing the offender to justice before the dikastery.² This passage shows us (if inferences on comic evidence are to be held as admissible) that Kleon and Hyperbolus became involved in accusations partly by helping poor persons, who had been wronged, to obtain justice before the dikastery. A rich man who had suffered injury might purchase of Antipho or some other rhetor, advice and aid as to the conduct of his complaint. But a poor man or woman would think themselves happy to obtain the gratuitous suggestion, and sometimes the auxiliary speech, of Kleon or Hyperbolus ; who would thus extend their own popularity by means very similar to those practised by the leading men in Rome.³

¹ Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præcep., p. 806. Compare two other passages in the same treatise, p. 805, where Plutarch speaks of the ἀπόνοια καὶ δεινότης of Kleon ; and p. 812, where he says, with truth, that Kleon was not at all qualified to act as general in a campaign.

² Aristophan. Ran. 566-576.

³ Here again we find Cato the elder

represented as constantly in the forum at Rome, lending aid of this kind and espousing the cause of others who had grounds of complaint (Plutarch, Cato, c. 3), *πρῶτ' μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν βαδίσει καὶ παρίσταται τοῖς δεομένοις—τοὺς μὲν θαυμαστὰς καὶ φίλους ἐκτὰ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ζυγγοῦν, &c.*

But besides lending aid to others, doubtless Kleon was often also a prosecutor, in his own name, of official delinquents, real or alleged. That some one should undertake this duty, was indispensable for the protection of the city: otherwise the responsibility to which official persons were subjected after their term of office would have been merely nominal: and we have proof enough that the general public morality of these official persons, acting individually, was by no means high. But the duty was at the same time one which most persons would and did shun. The prosecutor, while obnoxious to general dislike, gained nothing even by the most complete success; and if he failed so much as not to procure a minority of votes among the dikasts, equal to one-fifth of the numbers present, he was condemned to pay a fine of 1000 drachms. What was still more serious, he drew upon himself a formidable mass of private hatred, from the friends, partisans, and the political club of the accused party—extremely menacing to his own future security and comfort in a community like Athens. There was therefore little motive to accept, and great motive to decline, the task of prosecuting on public grounds. A prudent politician at Athens would undertake it occasionally, and against special rivals; but he would carefully guard himself against the reputation of doing it frequently or by inclination—and the orators constantly do so guard themselves in those speeches which yet remain.

Necessity
for voluntary
accusers at
Athens—general danger
and obloquy
attending the
function.

It is this reputation which Thucydides fastens upon Kleon, and which, like Cato the censor at Rome, he probably merited: from native acrimony of temper, from a powerful talent for invective, and from his position both inferior and hostile to the Athenian knights or aristocracy, who overshadowed him by their family importance. But in what proportion of cases his accusations were just or calumnious—the real question upon which a candid judgement turns—we have no means of deciding either in his case or in that of Cato. "To lash the wicked (observes Aristophanês himself¹) is not only no blame, but is even a matter of honour to the good." It has not been common to allow to Kleon the benefit of this observation,

We have no
evidence to
decide in
what proportion
of cases he
accused
wrongfully.

¹ Aristophan. Equit. 1271.—Λοιδόρησαι τοὺς πονηροὺς, οὐδὲν ἐστ' ἐπιφθονόν,
'ἀλλὰ τιμὴ τοῖσι χρηστοῖς, ὅστις εὖ λογίζεται.

though he is much more entitled to it than Aristophanês. For the attacks of a poetical libeller admit neither of defence nor retaliation; whereas a prosecutor before the dikastery found his opponent prepared to reply or even to retort—and was obliged to specify his charge, as well as to furnish proof of it—so that there was a fair chance for the innocent man not to be confounded with the guilty.

The quarrel of Kleon with Aristophanês is said to have arisen out of an accusation which he brought against that poet¹ in the senate of Five Hundred, on the subject of his second comedy, the "Babylonians," exhibited B.C. 426, at the festival of the urban Dionysia in the month of March. At that season many strangers were present at Athens; especially many visitors and deputies from the subject-allies, who were bringing their annual tribute. And as the "Babylonians" (now lost), like so many other productions of Aristophanês, was full of slashing ridicule, not only against individual citizens, but against the functionaries and institutions of the city²—Kleon instituted a complaint against it in the senate, as an exposure dangerous to the public security before strangers and allies. We have to recollect that Athens was then in the midst of an embarrassing war—that the fidelity of her subject-allies was much doubted—that Lesbos, the greatest of her allies, had been reconquered only in the preceding year, after a revolt both troublesome and perilous to the Athenians. Under such circumstances, Kleon might see plausible reason for thinking that a political comedy of the Aristophanic vein and talent tended to degrade the city in the eyes of strangers, even granting that it was innocuous when confined to the citizens themselves. The poet complains³ that Kleon summoned him before the senate, with terrible threats and calumny: but it does not appear that any penalty was inflicted. Nor indeed had the senate competence

Private
dispute
between
Kleon and
Aristo-
phanês.

¹ It appears that the complaint was made ostensibly against Kallistratus, in whose name the poet brought out the "Babylonians" (Schol. ad. Arist. Vesp. 1284), and who was of course the responsible party—though the real author was doubtless perfectly well known. The Knights was the first play brought out by the poet in his own name.

² See Acharn. 377, with the Scholia,

and the anonymous biography of Aristophanês.

Both Meineke (Aristoph. Fragm. Comic. Gr. vol. ii. p. 966) and Ranke (Commentat. de Aristoph. Vita, p. cccxxx) try to divine the plot of the "Babylonians;" but there is no sufficient information to assist them.

³ Aristoph. Acharn. 355-475.

to find him guilty or punish him, except to the extent of a small fine. They could only bring him to trial before the dikastery, which in this case plainly was not done. He himself however seems to have felt the justice of the warning: for we find that three out of his four next following plays, before the peace of Nikias (the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, and the *Wasps*), were represented at the Lenæan festival,¹ in the month of January, a season when no strangers nor allies were present. Kleon was doubtless much incensed with the play of the *Knights*, and seems to have annoyed the poet, either by bringing an indictment against him for exercising freeman's rights without being duly qualified (since none but citizens were allowed to appear and act in the dramatic exhibitions), or by some other means which are not clearly explained. We cannot make out in what way the poet met him, though it appears that finding less public sympathy than he thought himself entitled to, he made an apology without intending to be bound by it.² Certain it is, that his remaining plays subsequent to the *Knights*, though containing some few bitter jests against Kleon, manifest no second deliberate plan of attack against him.

¹ See the arguments prefixed to these three plays; and *Acharn.* 475; *Equit.* 881.

It is not known whether the first comedy entitled *The Clouds* (represented in the earlier part of B.C. 423, a year after the *Knights*, and a year before the *Wasps*) appeared at the Lenæan festival of January, or at the urban Dionysia in March. It was unsuccessful, and the poet partially altered it with a view to a second representation. If it be true that this second representation took place during the year immediately following (B.C. 422: see Mr. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici ad ann. 422*), it must have been at the urban Dionysia in March, just at the time when the truce for one year was coming to a close; for the *Wasps* was represented in that year at the Lenæan festival, and the same poet would hardly be likely to bring out two plays. The inference which Ranke draws from *Nubes* 310, that it was represented at the Dionysia, is not however very conclusive (Ranke, *Commentat. de Aristoph. Vita*, p. dcxxi., prefixed to his edition of the *Plutus*).

² See the obscure passage, *Vespæ* 1285 seq.; *Aristoph. Vita Anonymi*, p. xiii. ed. Bekker; *Demosthen. cont. Meid.* p. 532.

It appears that Aristophanès was of Æginetan parentage (*Acharn.* 629); so that the *γραφὴ ξενίας* (indictment for undue assumption of the rights of an Athenian citizen) was founded upon a real fact. Between the time of the conquest of Ægina by Athens, and the expulsion of the native inhabitants in the first year of the Peloponnesian war (an interval of about twenty years), probably no inconsiderable number of Æginetans became intermingled or intermarried with Athenian citizens. Especially men of poetical talent in the subject-cities would find it their interest to repair to Athens: Ion came from Chios, and Achæus from Eretria; both tragic composers.

The comic author Eupolis seems also to have directed some taunts against the foreign origin of Aristophanès—if Meineke is correct in his interpretation of a passage (*Historia Comico. Græc.* i. p. 111).

The battle of Amphipolis removed at once the two most pronounced individual opponents of peace, Kleon and Brasidas. Athens, too, was more than ever discouraged and averse to prolonged fighting; for the number of hoplites slain at Amphipolis doubtless filled the city with mourning, besides the unparalleled disgrace now tarnishing Athenian soldiership. The peace-party under the auspices of Nikias and Lachês, relieved at once from the internal opposition of Kleon, as well as from the foreign enterprise of Brasidas, were enabled to resume their negotiations with Sparta in a spirit promising success. King Pleistoanax, and the Spartan ephors of the year, were on their side equally bent on terminating the war, and the deputies of all the allies were convoked at Sparta for discussion with the envoys of Athens. Such discussion was continued during the whole autumn and winter after the battle of Amphipolis, without any actual hostilities on either side. At first the pretensions advanced were found very conflicting; but at length, after several debates, it was agreed to treat upon the basis of each party surrendering what had been acquired by war. The Athenians insisted at first on the restoration of Plataea; but the Thebans replied that Plataea was theirs neither by force nor by treason—but by voluntary capitulation and surrender of the inhabitants. This distinction seems to our ideas somewhat remarkable, since the capitulation of a besieged town is not less the result of force than capture by storm. But it was adopted in the present treaty: and under it the Athenians, while foregoing their demand of Plataea, were enabled to retain Nisaea, which they had acquired from the Megarians, and Anaktorium and Sollium¹ which they had taken from Corinth. To ensure accommodating temper on the part of Athens, the Spartans held out the threat of invading Attica in the spring, and of establishing a permanent fortification in the territory: and they even sent round proclamation to their allies, enjoining all the details requisite for this step. Since Attica had now been exempt

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-30. The statement in cap. 30 seems to show that this was the ground on which the Athenians were allowed to retain Sollium and Anaktorium. For if their retention of these two places had been distinctly

and in terms at variance with the treaty, the Corinthians would doubtless have chosen this fact as the ostensible ground of their complaint: whereas they preferred to have recourse to a *πρόσχημα* or sham-plea.

from invasion for three years, the Athenians were probably not insensible to this threat of renewal under a permanent form.

At the beginning of spring—about the end of March, 421 B.C.—shortly after the urban Dionysia at Athens—the important treaty was concluded for the term of fifty years. The following were its principal conditions :—

1. All shall have full liberty to visit all the public temples of Greece—for purposes of private sacrifice, consultation of oracle, or visit to the festivals. Every man shall be undisturbed both in going and coming. [The value of this article will be felt when we recollect that the Athenians and their allies had been unable to visit either the Olympic or the Pythian festival since the beginning of the war.]

Peace called
the peace of
Nikias—
concluded
in March
421 B.C.
Conditions
of peace.

2. The Delphians shall enjoy full autonomy and mastery of their temple and their territory. [This article was intended to exclude the ancient claim of the Phokian confederacy to the management of the temple ; a claim which the Athenians had once supported, before the Thirty years' truce ; but they had now little interest in the matter, since the Phokians were in the ranks of their enemies.]

3. There shall be peace for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with their respective allies, with abstinence from mischief either overt or fraudulent, by land as well as by sea.

4. Neither party shall invade for purposes of mischief the territory of the other—not by any artifice or under any pretence.

Should any subject of difference arise, it shall be settled by equitable means, and by oaths tendered and taken, in form to be hereafter agreed on.

5. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Amphipolis to the Athenians.

They shall farther *relinquish* to the Athenians Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. But these cities shall remain autonomous, on condition of paying tribute to Athens according to the assessment of Aristeidês. Any citizen of these cities (Amphipolis as well as the others) who may choose to quit them shall be at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property. Nor shall the cities be counted hereafter either as allies of Athens or of Sparta,

unless Athens shall induce them by amicable persuasions to become her allies, which she is at liberty to do if she can.

The inhabitants of Mekyberna, Sanê, and Singê, shall dwell independently in their respective cities, just as much as the Olynthians and Akanthians.—[These were towns which adhered to Athens and were still numbered as her allies; though they were near enough to be molested by Olynthus¹ and Akanthus, against which this clause was intended to ensure them.]

The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall restore Panaktum to the Athenians.

6. The Athenians shall restore to Sparta Koryphasium, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleum, Atalantê—with all the captives in their hands from Sparta or her allies. They shall farther release all Spartans or allies of Sparta now blocked up in Skiônê.

7. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall give back all the captives in their hands, from Athens or her allies.

8. Respecting Skiônê, Torônê, Sermylus, or any other town in the possession of Athens—the Athenians may take their own measures.

9. Oaths shall be exchanged between the contracting parties according to the solemnities held most binding in each city respectively, and in the following words—"I will adhere to this convention and truce sincerely and without fraud." The oaths shall be annually renewed, and the terms of peace

¹ Compare v. 39 with v. 18, which seems to me to refute the explanation suggested by Dr. Arnold, and adopted by Poppo.

The use of the word ἀποδόντων in regard to the restoration of Amphipolis to Athens—and of the word παρέδοσαν in regard to the *relinquishment* of the other cities—deserves notice. Those who drew up the treaty, which is worded in a very confused way, seem to have intended that the word παρέδοσαν should apply both to Amphipolis and the other cities—but that the word ἀποδόντων should apply exclusively to Amphipolis. The word παρέδοσαν is applicable also to the restoration of Amphipolis—for that which is *restored* is of course *delivered up*. But it is re-

markable that this word παρέδοσαν does not properly apply to the other cities; for they were not *delivered up* to Athens—they were only *relinquished*, as the clauses immediately following farther explain. Perhaps there is a little Athenian pride in the use of the word—first to intimate indirectly that the Lacedæmonians were to *deliver up* various cities to Athens—then to add words afterwards, which show that the cities were only to be *relinquished*—not surrendered to Athens.

The provision for guaranteeing liberty of retirement and carrying away of property, was intended chiefly for the Amphipolitans, who would naturally desire to emigrate, if the town had been actually restored to Athens.

shall be inscribed on columns at Olympia, Delphi, and the Isthmus, as well as at Sparta and Athens.

10. Should any matter have been forgotten in the present convention, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians may alter it by mutual understanding and consent, without being held to violate their oaths.

These oaths were accordingly exchanged. They were taken by seventeen principal Athenians, and as many Spartans, on behalf of their respective countries—on the 26th day of the month Artemisius at Sparta, and on the 24th day of Elaphebolion at Athens, immediately after the urban Dionysia: Pleistolas being Ephor eponymus at Sparta, and Alkæus Archon eponymus at Athens. Among the Lacedæmonians swearing, are included the two kings, Agis and Pleistoanax—the Ephor Pleistolas (and perhaps other ephors, but this we do not know)—and Tellis, the father of Brasidas. Among the Athenians sworn are comprised Nikias, Lachês, Agnon, Lamachus, and Demosthenês.¹

Such was the peace (commonly known by the name of the peace of Nikias) concluded in the beginning of the eleventh spring of the war, which had just lasted ten full years. Its conditions being put to the vote at Sparta in the assembly of deputies from the Lacedæmonian allies, the majority accepted them: which, according to the condition adopted and sworn to by every member of the confederacy,² made it binding upon all. There was indeed a special reserve allowed to any particular state in case of religious scruple, arising out of the fear of offending some of their gods or heroes. Saving this reserve, the peace had been formally acceded to by the decision of the confederates. But it soon appeared how little the vote of the majority was worth, even though enforced by the strong pressure of Lacedæmon herself—when the more powerful members were among the dissentient minority. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians all refused to accept it.

The peace is only partially accepted by the allies of Sparta.

The Bœotians, Megarians, and Corinthians, all repudiate it.

The Corinthians were displeased because they did not re-

¹ Thucyd. v. 19.

² Thucyd. v. 17-30. παραβήσεσθαι τε ἔφασαν (the Lacedæmonians said) αὐτοὺς (the Corinthians) τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ ἤδη ἀδικεῖν ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὰς Ἀθηναίων σπονδὰς, εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι ὅτι ἔν τῷ πλῆθος τῶν συμμαχῶν ψήφισται, ἢ μὴ τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κώλυμα ᾖ.

cover Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians because they were required to surrender Panaktum. In spite of the urgent solicitations of Sparta, the deputies of all these powerful states not only denounced the peace as unjust, and voted against it in the general assembly of allies—but refused to accept it when the vote was carried, and went home to their respective cities for instructions.¹

Such were the conditions, and such the accompanying circumstances, of the peace of Nikias, which terminated, or professed to terminate, the great Peloponnesian War, after a duration of ten years. Its consequences and fruits—in many respects such as were not anticipated by either of the concluding parties—will be seen in the following chapters.

B.C. 421.
March.

¹ Thucyd. v. 22.

CHAPTER LV.

FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL
OF OLYMPIAD 90.

MY last chapter terminated with the peace called the Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C.—between Athens and the Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.

This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading them to listen to the peace party who acted with Nikias. The general principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties of what had been acquired by war—yet excluding such places as had been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve, the Athenians, while prevented from recovering Plataæa, continued to hold Nisæa, the harbour of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connexion with the revolted allies of Athens in Thrace—that is, Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skólus, Olynthus, and Spartólus. These six cities, however, were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose voluntarily to become so—but only to pay regularly to Athens the tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy. Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave them, was at liberty to do so and to carry away his property. Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens, together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to take their own measures. On

Negotiations for peace during the winter following the battle of Amphipolis.

Peace called the peace of Nikias—concluded in March 421 B.C. Conditions of peace.

their part, they engaged to release all captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore Pylus, Kythera, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skionê.

Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should have free access to the sacred Pan-hellenic festivals, either by land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be guaranteed.

The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which might arise.¹

Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as many principal Lacedæmonians.

Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace—and ratified as it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates—still there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent, but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians also, on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of them moreover took common offence at the article which provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent, and without consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought proper.² Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.

So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however, that having obtained the favourable vote of the majority, they resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking up the confederacy. Besides the earnest

Peace accepted at Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian alliance.

The most powerful members of the alliance refuse to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and Eleians.

¹ Thucyd. v. 17-29.

² Thucyd. v. 18.

desire of recovering their captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it, through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.¹

Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—their great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with Argos.

Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn, than the Spartans proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions required, the Athenians drew the favourable lot:—an advantage so very great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot conferred.²

Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the peace—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.

The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras with two others to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, Ischagoras met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government, pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled, the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found this

¹ Thucyd. v. 14, 22, 76.

² Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

impossible. He was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away, and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them to compliance were fruitless.¹

The Spartans were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens, at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos, if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the moment was now favourable for alliance with Athens, from the decided pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês. The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing of the peace—awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan

Separate
alliance for
mutual de-
fence con-
cluded be-
tween
Sparta and
Athens.

¹ Thucyd. v. 21, 22.

captives should be restored. Accordingly a treaty was concluded between the two, for fifty years—not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance. Each party ^{Terms of the alliance.} pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was the single provision of the alliance,—with one addition, however, of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians respecting their serf-population. But at the present moment it was of peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylus, planted there by themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.

An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the envoys from Amphipolis—probably not more than a month or two after the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually renewed,—and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without violating the oath.¹ Moreover the treaty was directed to be inscribed on two columns; one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê in the acropolis of Athens.

The most important result of this new alliance was something not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well assured, between the Spartan Ephors and Nikias at the time when it was concluded. All ^{Athens restores the Spartan captives.} the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith restored.²

¹ Thucyd. v. 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people; then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second treaty and the first (ὁὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον, v. 24)

may have been more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace—the manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.

² Thucyd. v. 24.

Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian inclinations of her leading men, (at this moment Alkibiadès was competing with Nikias for the favour of Sparta, as will be stated presently,) than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to assist in keeping down the Helots—and the still more important after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her second best—without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided advantage in regard to her chief enemy—advantage, however, which had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses. This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the commencement of spring; whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized any one of their promised concessions: nay more—in trying to do so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second treaty which practically annuls the first, and which ensures to the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for such alliance was at this moment (under the uncertain relations with Argos) not less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little doubt that if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence, she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives: for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we grant it to have been a real

Mismanagement of the political interests of Athens by Nikias and the peace party.

fact and not merely simulated, might have been removed by decisive co-operation on the part of Sparta with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years before, when the hoplites were first enclosed in Sphacteria, but before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but merely said, through their envoys, "Give us the men in the island, and accept, in exchange, peace, together with our alliance."¹ At that moment there were some plausible reasons in favour of granting the proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled to make a better bargain. But *now*, there were no reasons in its favour, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material importance to her—but peace had been already sworn to on both sides, after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position, accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit—and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved unproductive in reality? The alliance in fact prevented the peace from being fulfilled: it became (as Thucydidēs himself² admits) no peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.

Thucydidēs states on more than one occasion,—and it was the sentiment of Nikias himself,—that at the moment of concluding the peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of disadvantage and dishonour in reference to Athens.³ He alludes chiefly to the captives in the hands

¹ Thucyd. iv. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὁμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, δίδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ συμμαχίαν καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλήν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν, ἀνταποδόντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.

² Thucyd. v. 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὃν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, &c.

³ Thucyd. v. 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τούτου ἢ τε Λακεδαιμόνων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουε καὶ ὑπερφύθη διὰ τὰς συμφορὰς.—(Nikias) λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῇ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρε-

of the latter—for as to other matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Mêthonê. Yet so inconsiderate and short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away this advantage—suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace—and nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which she desired. Most certainly, there was never any public recommendation of Kleon (as far as our information goes) so ruinously impolitic as this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan Ephors amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser, with his criminative eloquence, had passed away,—replaced only by an inferior successor the lamp-maker¹ Hyperbolus—and leaving the Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for birth and station, descended from gods and heroes—there remained no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence—"Wait, as you are entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in exchange for the captives."

The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of enforcement, by giving up the captives ; which imparted a freedom of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first blockade of Sphakteria. Yet

πεί (Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, &c. (v. 46).—Οἷς πρῶτον μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἢ ἐύμβασις, &c.

¹ Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.

it seems that under the present Ephors Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis, if he could ; if not, to evacuate it, and bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course the place was not surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated ; and she then considered that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained unperformed.¹ The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians : but the Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice with Athens, terminable at ten days' notice on either side.²

Discontent and remonstrances of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence of the non-performance of the conditions—they repent of having given up the captives—excuses of Sparta.

In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were established—the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians had sworn for themselves and their allies—yet the most powerful among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens ; nor had the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which was (they said) all the intervention in their power, since they were not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms along with Athens,³ for the purpose of constraining them to accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a

¹ Thucyd. v. 21-35.

² Thucyd. v. 32.

³ Thucyd. v. 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ' Ἀθηναίων τούτους, ἢν μὴ θέλωσι,

κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι χρόνους δὲ προβ-
θεῖν το δνευ ξυγγραφῆς, ἐν οἷς χρῆν
τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίου
εἶναι.

day, after which these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the surrender of Pylus—or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian garrison with the Helot deserters from that place—leaving in it none but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None of the stipulations of the treaty in their favour had yet been performed—none even seemed in course of being performed; so that they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.¹ Their remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.²

The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain were Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though favoured by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The many critics on Grecian history who think no term too harsh for the demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens. Amphipolis

¹ Thucyd. v. 35. *τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργον γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπενον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴδὲν δίκαιον διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὕτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεβίβωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς*

ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλονται ἀποδεδωκότες, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 35. *πολλὰς δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῇ θέρῃ τούτῳ, &c.*

had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydides and Euklēs : it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of Nikias.

So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendancy of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring : Argos therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power, and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both sides ;¹ while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens.² To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new

New combinations in Peloponnesus—suspicion entertained of concert between Sparta and Athens—Argos stands prominently forward—state of Argos—aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed in that city.

¹ Thucyd. v. 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians—*δὶ λχθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἀλφειτα*.

He characterises the Argeians as anxious for this reason to prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the peace of Nikias—about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas ; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself upon which he lays too great stress.

² Thucyd. v. 67. *Ἀργείων οἱ χίλιοι*

λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρείχε.

Diodorus (xii. 75) represents the first formation of this Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit, so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydides *ἐκ πολλοῦ* as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantinea. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would be a *long* time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment, during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.

chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.

The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy.¹ And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.

Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians.

On retiring from the conferences at Sparta—where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavoured to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy—and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially

The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand forward as head of a new Peloponnesian alliance.

¹ Thucyd. v. 29. μή μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλονται Λακεδαιμόνιοι δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii. 75.

if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realise their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly.¹

Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos, under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantinea and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive battle.² Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantinea was less so—though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself³ a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject-allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens—a period when the lesser states of

Congress of recusant Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—the Mantineians join Argos—state of Arcadia—rivalship of Tegea and Mantinea.

¹ Thucyd. v. 28.

² Thucyd. iv. 134.

³ Thucyd. v. 29. *Τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκადίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμισον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ*

σχολὴν ἦγον.

As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 417, 418, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.

Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy—so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay moreover near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.

To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatised or grouped into aggregations under the ascendancy of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta,—especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by ensuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy.¹ Moreover the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantinea. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta² (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.

In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth: whither the Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach for the leading part which they had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and organising a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They (the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and

Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian envoys at the congress at Corinth—redefence of the Corinthians—presence of religious scruple.

¹ Thucyd. i. 125.

² Thucyd. v. 29. Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι

ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τί τι εἰδότες μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔμα δι' ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, &c.

perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the peace—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy, that the decision of the majority should be binding on all, except in such cases as involved some offence to Gods or Heroes.” Encouraged by the presence of many sympathising deputies—Bœotian, Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,¹ &c.—the Corinthians replied with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim their real ground for rejecting the peace—viz. that it had not procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium; since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had no interest—next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious—upon that reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It *was* a religious impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they revolted from Athens; and we should have infringed those separate oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after consultation with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the purpose of urging the Corinthians to realise forthwith the hopes of alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their side to obtain a decided affirmative—being requested to come again at the next conference.²

Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea

¹ Thucyd. v. 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν συμμάχων, ὅσοι οὐδ' αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδὰς (παρεκάλεισαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς

Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἃ μὲν ἡδικοῦντο, οὐ δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 30.

of the new Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation, yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme. They were restrained in part, doubtless, by the bitterness of Lacedæmonian reproof—for the open consummation of this revolt apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very old feelings—but still more by the discovery that their friends, who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the oligarchy at Sparta.¹ They were linked together by com-

The Bœotians and Megarians refuse to break with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos—the Corinthians hesitate in actually joining Argos.

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρεῖς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες ἡσυχάζον, περιωρόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ νομίζοντες σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἥσσον ζυμφορὸν εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.

These words, περιωρόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear, and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators, as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted (with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as a gloss, and thus to construe περιωρόμενοι as a middle verb, "waiting to see the event," or literally, "keeping a look-out about them." But taking the text as it now stands, the sense which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.

Most of the critics translate περιωρόμενοι "slighted or despised by the Lacedæmonians." But in the first place, this is not true as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would then be in opposite directions. "The Bœotians, though despised by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian

democracy dangerous." And this is the sense which Haack actually proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.

Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιωρόμενοι "feeling themselves slighted;" and the latter says, "The Bœotians and Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than the constitution of Sparta." But this again puts an inadmissible meaning on ἡσυχάζον, which means "stood as they were." The Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves with Argos, and this they decline doing; they prefer to remain as they are, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.

I submit that the word περιωρᾶν does not necessarily mean "to slight or despise," but sometimes "to leave alone, to take no notice of, to abstain from interfering." Thus, Thucyd. i. 24. Ἐπιδόμιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δέδομενοι μὴ σφᾶς περιωρᾶν

munion of interest, not merely as being both neighbours and intense enemies of Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse—the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians, and next to go on and enrol Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join the new confederacy.

The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantinea, in thus revolting from Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies. To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it, under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the Olympian Zeus—in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When the Peloponnesian war began,¹ and the Lacedæmonians began to call for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small as well as great, against Athens—the Lepreates were, by the standing agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from con-

The Eleians become allies of Argos—their reasons for doing so—relations with Lepreum—the Corinthians now join Argos also.

φθειρομένων, &c. Again, i. 69. καὶ νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἔκας ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς ὄντας περιόρῳτε, &c. The same is the sense of περιδεῖν and περιψέσθαι, ii. 20. In all these passages there is no idea of contempt implied in the word: the "leaving alone," or "abstaining from interference," proceeds from feelings quite different from contempt.

So in the passage here before us, περιόρῳμενοι seems the passive participle in this sense. Thucydides, having just described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the words here in discus-

sion) that no similar interference was resorted to by them to prevent the Boeotians and Megarians from joining her: "The Boeotians and Megarians remained as they were—left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians, and thinking the Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of Sparta."

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικῆς πολέμου ἀπέφερον ἔπειτα, παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἡλείοι ἐπηγάκασον, οἱ δ' ἐτάρακτο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.

For the agreement here alluded to, see a few lines forward.

tinuing to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement, to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly in their favour. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more disposed to carry out her general system of favouring the autonomy of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless the Spartans persisted in their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and denounced the Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies, contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general confederacy when the war began, —to the effect that each imperial city should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted. After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προ-
φέρουσες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν
Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινας, ταῦτα
ἔχοντας καὶ ἐξελεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες
ἀφίστανται, &c.

Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage. It was extremely important to such of the confederates as were imperial cities—that is, which had subordinates or subject-allies.

Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive, in my opinion, the scope of the agreement, which did

not relate to captures made during the war by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would be a question of superiority of force—for no agreement could bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own imperial *immediate* members, and the *mediate* or subordinate dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the confederacy against the

That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantinea, had now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the junction of that city—seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success, we are not told. The mere fact of Mantinea having joined Argos, seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing the same: and so it proved,—for the Tegeans decidedly refused the proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened by this repulse, which they had by no means expected—having been so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace, while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta and all her confederacy, including Boeotia and Megara. In this embarrassment they betook themselves to the Boeotians, whom they again entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already once refused, and not likely to be now granted—but intended to usher in a different request preferred at the same time. The Boeotians were entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days' notice, such as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal, they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to conclude no other without the concurrence of the

Refusal of Tegea to separate from Sparta. The Corinthians are disheartened—their application through the Boeotians to Athens.

common enemy. But the confederacy at the same time gave its guarantee that the imperial state should re-enter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of Mantinea (mentioned a few pages back, p. 413) the Mantineians had violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified in interfering at the request of

their subjects to maintain the autonomy of the latter. For Thucydides expressly states, that the Mantineians had subdued these Arcadian districts, during the very time while the war against Athens was going on—*τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκადίας κατέστραπτο δῆκοον, ἐνι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου οὗτος* (v. 29). The Eleians were in possession of Lepreum, and in receipt of tribute from it, before that war began.

Corinthians. So far the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and back their application for an armistice—which the Athenians declined to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this answer, the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The Bœotians maintained their ten days' armistice; and the Corinthians were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace *de facto*, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.¹

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which they had sustained by the revolt of Mantinea and Elis. At the request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory, and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantinea, the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on the frontiers of Elis.² These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had been manumitted as a reward,

¹ Thucyd. v. 32. Κορινθίους δὲ ἀνακωχὴ δῶροντος ἢ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks—"By δῶροντος is meant a mere agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion. And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their word very different from the breach of their oath."

Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes. There was no agreement at all—either in words or by oath. There was a simple absence of hostilities, *de facto*, not arising out of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, l. 66; iii. 25, 26.

The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better reason, have declined to conclude the ten days' armistice with the Bœotians—because these latter still remained allies of Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of the latter.

² Thucyd. v. 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously enfranchised, or the sons of such.

and allowed to reside where they chose. But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished commanders, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they had caused 2000 of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims personally, but simply from fear of the whole body, and of course greater fear of the bravest.¹

It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots that the Lacedæmonians had to guard—but also against danger (real or supposed) from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of Sphakteria had been untarnished by any real cowardice or military incompetence, nevertheless, under the inexorable customs and tone of opinion at Sparta, these men would be looked upon as more or less degraded; or at least, there would be enough to make them fancy that they were so looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already in the exercise of various functions, when the Ephors, contracting suspicions of their designs, condemned them all to temporary disqualification for any official post; placing the whole of their property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors, from every act either of purchase or sale.² This species of disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers were at length relieved from it—the danger being supposed to be over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly from Thucydides, that many of these captives were among the first and wealthiest families in the state; and the Ephors may have apprehended that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and organising revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous

Treatment of the Spartan captives after their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 80.

² Thucyd. v. 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε μήτε ἀρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.

For the usual treatment of Spartan soldiers who fled from battle, see Xenophon, Rep. Laced. c. 9; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 30; Herodot. vii. 231.

spirit of the regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a long imprisonment (justly pointed out by modern historians), would not weigh much with the Ephors under any symptoms of public danger.

Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear nothing, except that the town of Skiōnē at length surrendered to them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death the male population of military age—selling the women and children into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it, nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him, and to his countrymen generally. The reader will however now be sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war, not to be surprised at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiōnē and its territory was made over to the Plataean refugees. The native population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions—were now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat at Amphipolis had created a belief in Athens that this removal had offended the gods—under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle, the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian exiles.¹ They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian Gulf, which were captured by the Chalkidians of Thrace.²

Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled. The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos, ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial

The Athenians re-capture Skiōnē—put to death all the adult males.

Political relations in Peloponnesus—change of Ephors at Sparta—the new Ephors are hostile to Athens.

¹ Thucyd. v. 32.

² Thucyd. v. 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold in preferring the conjecture of Poppe—Χαλκιδῆς—in this place.

success. Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—King Pleistoanax as well as the Ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice, and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover, the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the summer (seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October, B.C. 421) the year of these Ephors expired, and new Ephors were nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things this was an important revolution: for out of the five new Ephors, two (Kleobûlus and Xenarês) were decidedly hostile to peace with Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.¹ And we may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional monarchy of Sparta—the least popular government in Greece, in principle and detail.

The new Ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the settlement of the pending differences, at which, among the rest, Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But, after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,² originated, in concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance. This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would grasp at it in preference (so these Ephors affirmed), even if it cost them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were urged, first to become allies of Argos them-

Congress at Sparta—Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies, present—long debates, but no settlement attained of any one of the disputed points—intrigues of the anti-Athenian Ephors—Kleobûlus and Xenarês.

¹ Thucyd. v. 36.

² Thucyd. v. 37. *ἔπεισταλμένοι ἀπὸ τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ Ξενάρου καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, &c.*

selves, and then to bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered to the Athenians in exchange for Pylus—for Sparta could not easily go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.¹

Such were the plans which Kleobólus and Xenarês laid with the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favour the purpose at once: for on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the Bœotarchs, on their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan Ephors and the wishes of these Argeians. The Bœotarchs also entered heartily into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked favour, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance with Argos.

That sanction was to be obtained from "the Four Senates of the Bœotians"—bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known. But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent, that the Bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course, even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans accordingly.² They proposed to these four Senates a resolution in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial. Their particular object was (as they stated) to form alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace—for mutual defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connexion with Corinth had always been intimate, while the-

¹ Thucyd. v. 36.

² Thucyd. v. 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν . . . ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵ περ κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἂν ἅπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσι.

position of the four parties named was the same—all being recusants of the recent peace. But the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive terms, in order that it might authorise them to proceed farther afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manoeuvre, skilfully contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control its proceedings. But the Bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even hear of alliance with Corinth—so much did they fear to offend Sparta by any special connexion with a city which had revolted from her. Nor did the Bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications with Kleobólus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly, under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained unexecuted.¹

But the anti-Athenian Ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê, and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led through Phylê²—had been an Athenian possession, until six months before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the Bœotians.³ A special provision of the treaty between Athens and Sparta prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia, to request from the

The Lacedæmonians conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians raze Panaktum to the ground.

¹ Thucyd. v. 38.

² See Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. ii. ch. xvii. p. 370.

³ Thucyd. v. 3.

Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to Athens, she might be induced to surrender Pylus. The Bœotians refused compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the latter (either by its terms or by its recognized import) not to enter into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly bent upon getting possession of Panaktum—while the prospect of breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings, the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for surrender as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect that the district round it should always remain without resident inhabitants,—as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common pasture.

B.C. 420.
Application
from the Ar-
geians to
Sparta, to
renew the ex-
piring treaty.
Project of re-
newed treaty
agreed upon.
Curious sti-
pulation
about com-
bat by cham-
pions, to
keep the
question
open about
the title to
Thyrea.

These negotiations, after having been in progress through-
out the winter, ended in the accomplishment of
the alliance and the destruction of Panaktum at the
beginning of spring or about the middle of March.
And while the Lacedæmonian Ephors thus seemed
to be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia,
they were agreeably surprised by an unexpected
encouragement to their views from another quarter.
An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit
renewal of the peace just expiring. The Argeians
found that they made no progress in the enlarge-
ment of their newly-formed confederacy, while their
recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair
of realising their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian head-
ship. But when they learnt that the Lacedæmonians had
concluded a separate alliance with the Bœotians, and that
Panaktum had been razed, their disappointment was con-
verted into positive alarm for the future. Naturally inferring
that this new alliance would not have been concluded except
in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole proceeding

as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens—the destruction of Panaktum being conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession. Under such a persuasion—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished no collateral evidence to explain their real intent—the Argeians saw themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta, and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without a moment's delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson—two Argeians much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city—to press for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spārtans, and to obtain the best terms they could.

To the Lacedæmonian Ephors this application was eminently acceptable—the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring about. Negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a peremptory negative—the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other—prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement. Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea—there was to be full liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will be recollected, that, about 120 years before this date, there had been a combat of this sort by 300 champions on each side, in which, after desperate valour on both sides, the victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined. The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the altera-

tion which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval that it now appeared a perfect absurdity—even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians, the most old-fashioned people in Greece.¹ Yet since they hazarded nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation of a breach with Athens—they at last agreed to the condition, drew up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted, the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.

Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan Ephors seemed now to have carried all their points—friendship with Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means (through the possession of Panaktum) of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylus. But they were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum (at the time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at Sparta), they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at Athens: nevertheless Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens, at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact: Panaktum as well as the prisoners were thus *restored* (he pretended)—for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and he claimed the cession of Pylus in exchange.²

But he soon found that the final term of Athenian com-

¹ Thucyd. v. 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἰδοὺς μυστὰ εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ "Ἀργὸς πάντως φίλιον ἔχειν) συνεχώρησαν ἐφ' οἷς ἤξιον, καὶ συνεγράψαντο.

By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that the treaty was

not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by the secretary or authorised officer, and ultimately engraved on a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but seemingly no official signature.

² Thucyd. v. 42.

pliance had been reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for keeping such alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum and Pylus had been brought to a close. Both the alliance, and the demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened by the quibble of Andromedès—that demolition of the fort being tantamount to restitution and precluding any farther tenancy by the enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent notes and protocols (to employ a modern phrase): nevertheless not one of the conditions favourable to Athens had yet been executed (except the restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number)—while she on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought to a head by this mission of Andromedès, discharged itself in the harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.¹

The envoys are badly received at Athens—angry feeling against the Lacedæmonians.

Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading Athenians, to whose improvident facility and misjudgement the embarrassment of the moment was owing, were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation against Spartan perfidy—if it were only to divert attention from their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadès son of Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the Ekklesia, and giving to it a substantive aim.

Alkibiadès stands forward as a party-leader. His education and character.

The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was the splendour, wealth,

¹ Thucyd. v. 42.

and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax,—and such the effect of that lineage upon the democratical public of Athens¹—that he stepped speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honour in a trireme of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch over him. But even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of Periklês and his brother Ariphron.² His violent passions, love of enjoyment, ambition of pre-eminence, and insolence towards others,³ were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout his life. His finished beauty of person, both as boy, youth, and mature man, caused him to be much run after by women⁴—and even by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training, procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public palæstræ.

¹ Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης . . . ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τότε νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.

The expression of Plutarch, however, ἐπὶ μεῖράκιον, seems an exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).

Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men—defined a *young man* to be one under thirty years of age—the senatorial age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 35).

² Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi. p. 353, sect. 33, 34; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.

Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἂν τις οἶοιτο

ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ ἀσχόμεσθαι ὀντινοῦν.

This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês, in the Symposium, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato, Alkibiad. i. c. 1, 2, 3.

Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 16-25.

Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δηλὸν ἐστὶ τοῖς παιδικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).

⁴ I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words, the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ' αὖθις μὲν κάλλος ὅπῃ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν γυναικῶν θηρώμενος, &c.

These men not only endured his petulance, but were even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them. Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence—amidst corrupting influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an age, combined with great wealth and the highest position—it was not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadès. The anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both these constituent elements of morality ; and though, in regard to the particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly marked and sufficiently established in all.

A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so circumstanced ; and it appears that with him these tastes were indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort of his wife Hippareté, daughter of Hipponikus, who was slain at the battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents : when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadès violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion, and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one, which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadès. He strikes the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a copy of Homer—he strikes Taureas,¹ a rival chorégus, in the public theatre, while the representation is going on—he strikes Hipponikus (who afterwards became his father-in-law), out of a wager of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology—he protects the Thasian poet Hégemon, against whom an indictment had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with his own hand from the list put up in the public edifice, called Metrôon ; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on for trial.² Nor does it

Great energy and capacity of Alkibiadès in public affairs—his reckless expenditure—lawless demeanour—unprincipled character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military service.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49 ; Thucyd. vi. 16 ; Antipho apud Athenæum, xii. p. 525.

² Athenæus, ix. p. 407.

appear that any injured person ever dared to bring Alkibiadēs to trial before the dikastery, though we read with amazement the tissue of lawlessness¹ which marked his private life—a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal, judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or discredited—and which were recognized as modifying elements in the current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom they injured as well as by those whom they favoured. In the speech which Thucydidēs² ascribes to Alkibiadēs

¹ Thucyd. vi. 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidēs, which is of great force and significance—*φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν δίαίταν*, &c. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi. 28. *τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν παρανομίαν*.

The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the *λοιδόρια* of Antipho (Athenæus, xii. p. 525).

The description of Alkibiadēs, given in that Discourse called the *Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος*, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenēs (c. 12, p. 1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical compositions. *Τοῦτο δ', Ἀλκιβιάδην εὐρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν πολλῶ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερφανῶς, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς, τὰ δ' ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προσηρμένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους οὐκίας πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυφόμενον*.

Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad tendencies of Alkibiadēs, full illustrations will be seen in his proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence here ascribed to Sokratēs is unfortunately far less borne out.

² Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2; Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.

I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to Alkibiadēs in the

Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, p. 216, 217) can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as Sokratēs is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the general relations of Alkibiadēs with others: compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.

Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures of the palaestra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them—and the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the *Lysis* and the *Charmidēs*—also the *Rivales*, where the scene is laid in the house of a *γραμματιστῆς* or schoolmaster. In the *Lysis*, Sokratēs professes to set his own conversation with these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their goodwill. *Ὅθω χρῆ, ὃ ἱκνέθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινῶντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαννοῦντα, καὶ διαβρίπτοντα* (*Lysis*, c. 7, p. 210).

See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadēs as a youth, Euripid. Suppl. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the beautiful lines in the *Atys* of Catullus, 60-69.

There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this society and conversation of their

before the Athenian public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints of the democracy.

Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behaviour, Alkibiadês stood distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger; owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês by protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man, also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him: expensive duties, which (as we might expect) he discharged not merely with sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact expenditure of this sort, though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the Ekklesia, when various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favour, and in after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.¹

To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and pre-eminence, a certain measure of rhetorical facility and per-

boyish years; though the subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be produced and discussed.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.

suasive power was indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers¹—Prodikus, Protagoras, and others; but most of all, that of Sokratês. His intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês (like the oligarchical Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter) was attracted to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation—his suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting new thoughts and combinations—his mastery of apposite and homely illustrations—his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long cross-examination—his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete, when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate; with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the knack from Sokratês,² and to copy his formidable string of interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the

¹ See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.

² See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 12-24, 39-47.

Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρῶ-
σκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους, ὁμιλησάτην,
ὃν χρόνον ὁμιλεῖτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ὥρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως.
'Επὶ γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες οὐκ ἄλλοις
τισὶ μάλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ
τοῖς μάλιστα πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά . . .
'Επεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων
ὀφέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν
οὐκ ἔτι προσήσαν, οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλ-
λως ἤρεσκεν' εἰτε προσέλοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν
ἡμάρτανον ἐλεγχομένοι ἤχθοντο' τὰ δὲ
τῆς πόλεως ἔπραττον, ὥστερ' ἐνεκεν καὶ
Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato,
Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23; c. 22,
p. 33.

Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the society of

Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.

"Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii. 16) obijciunt comici, docere eum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato."

The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon. Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by any one as teacher of Alkibiadês; which is an exaggeration in the other direction (Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222).

poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom this eminent talent resided ; especially Alkibiadēs, who not only owed his life to the generous valour of Sokratēs at Potidæa, but had also learnt in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the philosopher in his armour, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.¹ But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratēs with the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty, or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes of discussion, in the society of all these sophists—Prodikus, and Protagoras not less than Sokratēs ; for in the Athenian sense of the word, Sokratēs was a sophist as well as the others : and to the rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadēs and Kritias, such society was highly useful.² It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition, including mental accomplishments as well as political success : it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded : it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and obstructions of human well-being, both public and private : it even suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence from which their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to learn more or less to think, and familiarised with the difference between truth and

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, c. 35-36, p. 220, &c.).

² See the representation given in the *Protagoras* of Plato, of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratēs goes to seek instruction from Protagoras—and of the objects which Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction (Plato, *Protagoras*, c. 2, p. 310 D ; c. 8, p. 316 C ; c. 9, p. 318, &c. : compare also Plato, *Meno*, p. 91, and *Gorgias*, c. 4, p. 449 E—asserting the connexion, in the mind of Gorgias, between teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρο-

νείν, &c.). It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the polemical charges against those who are called the Sophists, even as we find them in Plato—without scrutiny and consideration. But modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their favour which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.

This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.

error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics. Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had thus, as far as it went, a moralising effect, though this was rarely their purpose in the pursuit.¹

¹ I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as "ensnared by the Sophists," while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists—when he describes the Sophists as "pretenders to wisdom,"—as "a new school,"—as "teaching that there was no real difference between truth and falsehood, right and wrong," &c.

All the plausibility that there is in this representation arises from a confusion between the original sense, and the modern sense, of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation of the word at Athens, it meant not a *school* of persons professing common doctrines—but a *class* of men bearing the same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative, partly professional; but they differed widely from each other, both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont. Sophistas, Orat. xiii.; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation—was called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money, and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so fond of dwelling (Xenophon. Memor. i. 6, 12), has plainly no essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds the Dikasts, "Recollect that you Athenians put to death the *Sophist Sokratês*, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Kritias" (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74), he uses the word in its

natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty years—but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just as he would have said, *Hippokratês the physician*, *Phaidias the sculptor*, &c. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and Isokratês sophists (Ars. Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.). The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls "the new School of the Sophists"—as "a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or falsehood, right or wrong," &c. See a striking passage in the Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks (as I think) that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês, will be careful how he advances them against the general profession to which Sokratês belonged.

That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of Sophists, (as there are and always have been among schoolmasters, professors, lawyers, &c., and all bodies of men), I do not doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonising exclusively Sokratês and his followers—will be felt when we recollect, that the well-known Apologue, called the *Choice of Hercules*, was the work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favourite theme of lecture (Xenophon, Memor. ii. 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with which it presents one of the most important points of view of moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato, or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the class to which he belonged, as teaching "that there was

Alkibiadès, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be found in Athens, that of Sokratès most of all and most frequently. The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as could be done without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoilt youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life. But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life of Alkibiadès attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation, public or private, ever got footing in his mind—how much the ends which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of aggrandisement. In the later part of life, Sokratès was marked out to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of Alkibiadès and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.

At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public life, Alkibiadès came forward with a reputation stained by private enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent demeanour. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that position to which his rank, connexions, and club-partisans, afforded him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extra-

Conflicting sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadès—his great energy and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which he inspires.

no real difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood," &c., is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of Dr. Thirlwall's history.

I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of the Republic (vi. c. 6, 7, p. 492-493), refutes the imputation against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth. He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that morality which was received as true and just in their age and society—nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor (he says) is society itself: the Sophists merely repeat the voice and judgement of society. Without inquiring at present

how far Plato or Sokratès were right in condemning the received morality of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there were doubtless some who taught a better morality; others who taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.

Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the corruption of the character of Alkibiadès—wealth, rank, personal beauty, flatterers. &c.; but he does not name the Sophists among them (Memorab. i. 2, 24, 25).

ordinary energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigour in execution—not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and what distinguished him from all, was his extraordinary flexibility of character,¹ and consummate power of adapting himself to new habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances required. Like Themistoklēs—whom he resembled as well in ability and vigour as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means—Alkibiadēs was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a secondary quality subordinate to action; and though he possessed enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at least according to the high standard of Athens.² But his career affords a memorable example of splendid qualities both for action and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from meddling citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant

¹ Cornel. Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii. p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.

Ὁ δὲ γὰρ τοιοῦτον δέι, τοιοῦτος εἴμ' ἐγώ, says Odysseus in the Philoktētēs of Sophoklēs.

² I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of Demosthenēs (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the eloquence of Alkibiadēs (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch, Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.

Antisthenēs—companion and pupil of Sokratēs and originator of what is called the Cynic philosophy—contemporary and personally acquainted with Alkibiadēs—was full of admiration for his extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly, and audacious—but unschooled—ἀπαίδευτος. His scandals about the lawless life of Alkibiadēs, however, exceed what we can reasonably admit, even

from a contemporary (Antisthenēs ap. Athenæum, v. p. 220, xii. p. 534). Antisthenēs had composed a dialogue, called Alkibiadēs (Diog. Laërt. vi. 15).

See the collection of the *Fragmenta Antisthenis* (by A. G. Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, p. 17-19).

The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanēs, Pherekratēs, and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels against the excesses of Alkibiadēs, real or supposed. There was a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadēs, who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity, had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the Baptæ. See Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Græc. Eupolidis Βάρται and Κόλακες* (vol. ii. p. 447-494) and Aristophanēs *Τριφάλῃς*, p. 1166: also Meineke's first volume, *Historia Critica Comicæ Græc.* p. 124-136; and the *Dissertat. xix.* in Buttmann's *Mythologus*, on the Baptæ and the Cottyttia.

voluntary expenditure in the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by overthrowing¹ the constitution to make himself master of the persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired confidence or esteem to any one: and sooner or later, among a public like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting sentiments: "the Athenians desired him, hated him, but still wished to have him,"—was said in the latter years of his life by a contemporary poet—while we find also another pithy precept delivered in regard to him—"You ought not to keep a lion's whelp in your city at all; but if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to his behaviour."² Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an exile and enemy; but the great harm which he did to her was, in his capacity of adviser—awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandisement which dictated his own personal actions.

Mentioning Alkibiadès now for the first time, I have somewhat anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion's whelp was yet young, and had neither acquired his entire strength, nor disclosed his full-grown claws.

B.C. 420.
Alkibiadès tries to renew the ancient, but interrupted connexion of his ancestors with Lacedæmon, as proxeni.

He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long before the peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in his family, as in that of his relation Periklès, were democratical: his grandfather Alkibiadès had been vehement in his opposition to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced an established con-

¹ Thucyd. vi. 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p. 800. The sketch which Plato draws (in the first three chapters of the ninth Book of the Republic) of the citizen who erects himself into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens—exactly suits the character of Alkibiadès. See also the same

treatise, vi. 6-8, p. 491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his German translation of the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadès the first.

² Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadès, c. 16; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.

nexion of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical and philo-Laonian sentiment—doubtless far more consonant to his natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same general party with Nikias, and with Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards became his bitter opponents. And it was in part probably to put himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his grandfather had broken off.¹

To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens. Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favourable sympathies of their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration of her captives. Indeed he not only advocated these measures, but tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent of Sparta, for carrying them through at Athens. From such selfish hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of Proxenus of Sparta—Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind and gratuitous philo-Laonian concessions of Nikias. But the captives on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point which he wished ; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his advances—not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he

The Spartans reject his advances—he turns against them—alters his politics, and becomes their enemy at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. v. 43, vi. 90 ; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi. p. 352, sect. 27-30.

Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.

was capable. But this contemptuous refusal from the Spartans stung him so to the quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,¹ he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.

The moment was favourable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new political leader to espouse this side ; and was rendered still more favourable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favour of Athens had yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for altering his tone respecting the Spartans—and for denouncing them as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful friends and family guests. The condition of that city, disengaged by the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of connexion with Athens—a policy now strongly recommended by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful allies—Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth ; but on the other hand, such acquisition rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to the Athenians.

It was not so much however the inclination towards Argos, but the growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans of Alkibiadês. And when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived at Athens from Boeotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of Panaktum in exchange for Pylus,—when it farther became known that the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the Boeotians without consulting Athens—the unmeasured expres-

¹ Thucyd. v. 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν ἠγαντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχηςτος ἐπραξαν τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητά ἐπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἦν τοῦ

πάππου ἀπειπόντος αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενόεῖτο ἀνανεώσασθαι. Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι τό τε πρῶτον ἀντίειπεν, &c.

sion of displeasure in the Athenian Ekklesia showed Alkibiadēs that the time was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent his own voice to strengthen the discontent against Sparta, he at the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this

He induces the Argeians to send envoys to Athens—the Argeians eagerly embrace this opening, and drop their negotiations with Sparta.

intimation at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace: having been sent thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without allies, to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with Athens—a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial state at sea, yet not interfering with their own primacy in Peloponnesus—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint embassy, Argeian, Eleian and Mantineian.¹ The alliance between these three cities had already been rendered more intimate, by a second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a party—though Corinth had refused all concern in the second.²

But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of their envoy Andromedēs, and probably warned by reports from Nikias and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without a moment's delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens³—Philocharidas, Leon and Endius: with full powers to settle all matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all alliance of Athens with Argos—to explain that the alliance of Sparta with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of evil to Athens—and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylus should be restored to them

Embassy of the Lacedæmonians to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw up the alliance. The envoys are favourably received.

¹ Thucyd. v. 43.

² Thucyd. v. 48.

³ Thucyd. v. 44. Ἀφικοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις κατὰ τάχος, &c.

in exchange for the demolished Panaktum. Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition. And when the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an audience before the public assembly,—the impression which they made, on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly favourable. It was indeed so favourable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.

To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their two families.¹ This probably assisted in procuring for him a secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should succeed: but he intimated that they would find the public assembly turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanour of the senate; so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions. He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come, not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain, discuss, and report; the people would then find that they could gain nothing by intimidation—explanations would be heard, and disputed points be discussed with temper—while he (Alkibiadês) would speak emphatically in their favour. He would advise, and felt confident that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylus—a step which his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing. He gave

Trick by which Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles the Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians against Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 6.

them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his counsel.¹ The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity of these suggestions,² and still more delighted to find that the man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was prepared to speak in their favour. His language obtained with them, probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta, only a few months before ; and he appeared now to be simply resuming that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party under all circumstances : if, by complying with the recommendation of Alkibiadēs, they could gain *his* strenuous advocacy and influence also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting, but without even warning Nikias—which was exactly what Alkibiadēs desired, and had probably required them to promise.

Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced : upon which Alkibiadēs himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put the question to them, upon what footing they came ?³ what powers they brought with them ? They immediately declared that they had brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with which their declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct contrary ; the assembled people, who, made aware of that previous affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from their lips ; lastly, most of all, Nikias himself—their confidential agent and probably their

¹ Thucyd. v. 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, πρίσιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς, ἣν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἔκειν, Πύλον τε αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (πέισειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ ἄλλα ξυλλαλᾶν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὥς οὐδὲν ἀλλοῦ ἐν νῶ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταῦτα τοὺς Ἀργεῖους ξυμμά-

χους ποιήσῃ.

² Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ' εἰπὼν ὄρκους ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας αὐτῷ, καὶ θαυμάζοντας ἕμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν, ὥς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

³ Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτῶ μενοὶ δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πᾶν φιλανθρωπῶς, ἐφ' οἷς ἀφργμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν ἔκειν αὐτοκράτορες.

host at Athens—who had doubtless announced them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management of their case before the assembly—all were alike astounded, and none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation of the people equalled their astonishment. There was an unanimous burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together. To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed before. Nor was this all:¹ he took advantage of the vehement acclamation which welcomed his invectives to propose that the Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it; causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a religious scruple then recognised as paramount.

This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein of Fielding's Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus, historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic. Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if they ever equalled the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and Zeus in his manner of over-

¹ Thucyd. v. 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐτί ἤνεχοντο, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἐτοίμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν τοὺς Ἀργεῖους, &c.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

reaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of public faith and consistency—a facility in publicly unsaying what they have just before publicly said—and a treachery towards their own confidential agent—which is truly surprising, and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character.¹

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately : but this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honour and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace : Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith—1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens.²

The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required ; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still

¹ Euripid. *Andromach.* 445-455 ; Herodot. ix. 54 ; Thucyd. iv. 50.

² Thucyd. v. 46.

retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy—a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just—but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobólus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos—the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favour to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys (already at hand in the city) from Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.¹

Failure of the embassy of Nikias at Sparta—Athens concludes the alliance with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea.

The words of this convention which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.² [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantinea and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purpose of damage.

Conditions of this convention and alliance.

¹ Thucyd. v. 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

² Thucyd. v. 47. ὅτι ἐν σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἀρχουσιν ἐκάτεροι.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it; neither of the four shall in that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantinea, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution.¹

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oaths—by whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantinea; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and

¹ Thucyd. v. 48. καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν ἕκαστοι. The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν συμμάχων ὧν

ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.

alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities—and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”

“The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”¹

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote

Complicated relations among the Grecian states as to treaty and alliance.

of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and Sparta still retained the alliance² concluded between themselves, without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there was an armistice terminable at ten days' notice. Lastly, Corinth could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies towards Sparta.³

The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival of the 90th Olympiad or 420 B. C.; the festival being about the beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.⁴ That festival was memorable, on more than one

¹ Thucyd. v. 47.

² Thucyd. v. 48.

³ Thucyd. v. 48-50.

⁴ Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίᾳσι στήλην χαλκὴν κοινῇ Ὀλυμπίοις τοῖς ὕνι (Thucyd. v. 47)—words of the treaty.

ground. It was the first which had been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all Greeks free access to the great Panhellenic temples, with liberty of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches. For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been excluded from sending their solemn legations or *Theories*, and from attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.¹ Now that such exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the visit of the Athenians was felt both by themselves and by others as a novelty. No small curiosity was entertained to see what figure the *Theôry* of Athens would make as to show and splendour. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumours that Athens had been so much impoverished by the war as to be prevented from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the presence of Olympic Zeus.

Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had discredited his political rival Nikias, giving a new direction to the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined

First appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the beginning of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in the chariot-race.

¹ Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in Olymp. 88 and 89 (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch, Aratus, c. 28).

But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a Rhodian *Theôry*, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in safety.

From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little can be inferred; because even at this very Olympic festival of 420 B.C., Lichas, the Spartan was present as a spectator—though all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the Eleians (Thucyd. v. 50).

that his first appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders. The Athenian Theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with first-rate splendour, and with the amplest show of golden ewers, censors, &c., for the public sacrifice and procession.¹ But when the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor at his own cost—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four, which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of his seven chariots also came in fourth; but no crown or proclamation (it seems) was awarded to any after the second in order. We must recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend against—not merely private men, but even despots and governments. Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian Theôrs provided for their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned; but a separate tent which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself, was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they would be glad to cultivate his favour, as he had now become one of the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must farther recollect that they as well as Athens had been excluded from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this imposing re-appearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of Hellas.

Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the Athenian assembly, that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced an effect upon the Grecian mind highly benefi-

¹ Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, *Memorabil.* iii. 3, 12.

cial to Athens:¹ dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the war, and establishing beyond dispute

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίας τε θεωρίας, πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμησθαι· διότι ἄρματα μὲν ἕπτα καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδὲς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε, καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τᾶλλα ἄξιως τῆς νίκης παρεσκευασάμην.

The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and the Athenian allies towards Olympia—and of Alkibiadēs himself towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece—in the first half of the year 420 B.C.

Alkibiadēs obtained from Euripidēs the honour of an epinikion ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious that the poet alleges Alkibiadēs to have been first, second, and *third*, in the course; while Alkibiadēs himself, more modest and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and *fourth*. Euripidēs informs us that Alkibiadēs was crowned twice and proclaimed twice—*δὶς στεφθέντ' ἑλὰν κάρνυκ βοῶν παραδούναι*. Reiske, Coray and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this word *δὶς* to *τρίς*, without any authority—which completely alters the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has properly restored the word *δὶς*.

How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the Oratio de Bigis of Isokratēs, composed in defence of the son of Alkibiadēs at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps more. Isokratēs repeats the loose assertion of Euripidēs, *πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος* (Or. xvi. p. 353. sect. 40). The spurious Oration called that of Andokidēs against Alkibiadēs also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century B.C. That oration sets forth all the proceedings of Alkibiadēs in a very

invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story of Alkibiadēs having robbed an Athenian named Diomēdēs of a fine chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratēs—see Andokid. cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadēs may have left one of the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadēs by the Chians, Ephesians, &c., as described in that oration, is likely to be substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ. i. p. 3.

Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the seven chariots of Alkibiadēs ran—in how many races—for all the seven could not (in my judgement) have run in one and the same race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since the course involved going *twelve* times round the goal (Pindar, Ol. iii. 33; vi. 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race described by Sophoklēs (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to construe strictly the expression of the poet—*δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν ὄχον*—it would seem that this was the extreme number permitted to run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description in Sophoklēs (compare Demosth. *Ἐπερ. Ἀδγ.* p. 1410), who refers indeed to a Pythian, and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main circumstances must have been common to both—and we know that the twelve turns (*δωδεκάγυρα*—*δωδεκάδρομον*) were common to both (Pindar, Pyth. v. 31).

Alkibiadēs was not the only person who gained a chariot-victory at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C.—Lichas the Lacedæmonian also gained one (Thucyd. v. 50), though the chariot was obliged to be entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted from attendance.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 316) says, "We are not aware that the Olympiad (in which

her vast wealth and power. He was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient to repel the charge from himself (which it was his purpose to do) both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation or violence at the public cost. All the unfavourable impressions suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated by such a stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and hatred of personal com-

these chariot-victories of Alkibiadès were gained) can be distinctly fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424."

In my judgement, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C. 424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition, and their numerous individual visitors—appears to me contrary to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424 would occur just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious *Theôry*, to pass by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i. 4, 20.

Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce, for one year, and of the Peace of Nikias—expressly stipulate for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals. The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C., without impediment, these stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning. But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.

I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadès contended with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all suitable.

Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there was only *one* chariot-race at this Olympic festival—that all the seven chariots of Alkibiadès ran in this one race—and that in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained the prize: thus implying that Alkibiadès could not have gained the prize at the same festival.

I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable.

We know from Pausanias (vi. 13, 2) that even in the case of the *Stadiodromi* or runners who contended in the stadium, all were not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets or batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat, and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was sure to have won two heats.

Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runner, much more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of spectators. Alkibiadès and Lichas may therefore both have gained chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of them can have gained the grand final prize—and which of the two that was, it is impossible to say.

petitors. And this feeling was not the less real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public favour.

If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished by the re-appearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking—the exclusion of the Lacedæmonians. Such exclusion was the consequence of the new political interests

The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred legation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of alleged violation of the Olympic truce.

of the Eleians, combined with their increased consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos, Athens, and Mantinea. It has already been mentioned that since the peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians acting as arbitrators in the case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency, had declared it to be autonomous and had sent a body of troops to defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks upon the district since the junction with their new allies; for the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of 1000 hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce, during which all violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the Lacedæmonians had sent the 1000 hoplites into Lepreum, and had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions—after the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man—2000 minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympus, a part to the Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home before their heralds crossed the borders), so that *they* were interdicted from all military operations; of

which the Lacedæmonian hoplites had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the Lacedæmonians rejoined that the behaviour of the Eleians themselves contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the sending of the hoplites—thus showing that they did not consider the truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine at once, would publicly, on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred legation called Theôry, occupying a formal and recognised place at the solemnity.¹

As all the other Grecian states (with the single exception of Lepreum) were present by their Theôries² as well as by individual spectators, so the Spartan Theôry “shone by its absence” in a manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme indeed was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken—so pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back of the Sphakterian disaster³—that they

Alarm felt at the festival lest the Spartans should come in arms.

¹ Thucyd. v. 49, 50.

² Thucyd. v. 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἰργαστοὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἰκοὶ ἔθουσιν· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες

ἰδεώρου, πλὴν Λεπρεατῶν.

³ Thucyd. v. 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τούτων ἢ τε Λακεδαιμόνων μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπεράφθη διὰ τὰς

were supposed likely to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their Theōrs into the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid 1000 hoplites from Mantinea as well as the same number from Argos, for the purpose of repelling this probable attack; while a detachment of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot-racing. Lichas,¹ a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum, and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows.² Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however; the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history,

ξυμφορὰς, οἳ τε Ἀργεῖοι ἀρίστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, &c.

¹ See a previous note, p. 452.

² Thucyd. v. 50. Λίχας δ' Ἀρκεσίλαον Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν βαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσσεως, προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέθηκε τὸν ἥνολχον, βουλόμενος δηλώσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἔργον.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia,

if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the disorder, by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).—It may be remarked that more summary measures would probably be required to maintain order in an open race-course than in a closed theatre. Some allowance ought reasonably to be made for this difference.

offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption.¹ The boldness of the Eleians in putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadēs and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ in the third year of the war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarēs the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and waverers to be able to succour it; and the Bœotians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Bœotian troops; dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance.²

¹ It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards, during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 21; Diodor. xiv. 17).

² Thucyd. v. 51, 52.

Depressed
estimation of
Sparta
throughout
Greece—
Herakleia.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE
BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her; but Spartan envoys were present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress. The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos now that she was united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling to pronounce themselves in favour of one so as to make an enemy of the other.¹

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadēs, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence.

At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklēs. After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Boeotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce—at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with singular ill-success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became to recover these lost dependencies, especially

B.C. 419.

New policy
of Athens at-
tempted by
Alkibiadēs.

¹ Thucyd. v. 48-50.

Amphipolis : Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed—the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also : Athens had surrendered her capital advantage without regaining Amphipolis ; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there ; next, that Alkibiadēs, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case), was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover, his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and barbarous region ; lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort the hardships and extreme cold (insupportable to all except the iron frame of Sokratēs) which he had himself endured at the blockade of Potidæa twelve years before,¹ and which any armament destined to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organising a counter-alliance under Argos, sufficient to keep her in check, and at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.

Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites

¹ Plato, *Symposion*, c. 35, p. 220. δεινὸν γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες, πάγου οἴου δεινότητος, &c.

and bowmen, and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadēs exhibited the spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters—a spectacle at that moment new and striking.¹ He first turned his attention to the Achæan towns in the north-west, where he persuaded the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to undertake the labour of connecting their town with the sea by means of long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian Gulf; whereby the Athenians, who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would have become masters of the commerce of the Gulf. But the Corinthians and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief, despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme—and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.² Yet the march of Alkibiadēs doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian interest throughout the Achæan coast.

He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land, dispensing with the labour of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum (the south-eastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula) whenever they sent forces to Argos. Moreover the territory of Epidaurus bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering state of the temple of Apollo Pythæus (situated within the walls of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy

Expedition
of Alkibiadēs
into the interior of Pe-
loponnesus.

Attack upon
Epidaurus
by Argos
and Athens.

¹ Thucyd. v. 52. Isokratēs (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349) speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadēs in his usual loose and exaggerated language: but he has a right

to call attention to it as something very memorable at the time.

² Thucyd. v. 52.

over Epidaurus and other neighbouring cities—seemingly the remnant of that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in early times had been theirs.¹ The Epidaurians owed to this temple certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations—one of which, arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.

Their invading march however was for a time suspended by the news that king Agis, with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies, had advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on the north-west, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.² But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was found so unfavourable that he abandoned his march for the present and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as soon as that month had expired.

On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which they set out was already the 26th of the month preceding the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks occasionally

Movements
of the Spar-
tans and
Argeians.

The sacred
month Kar-
neius—
trick played
by the Ar-
geians with
their
calendar.

¹ Thucyd. v. 53, with Dr. Arnold's note.

² Thucyd. v. 54. ἦδει δὲ οὐδὲς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ πόλεις ἐξ ἧν ἐπέμψθησαν.

This incident shows that Sparta

employed the military force of her allies without any regard to their feelings—quite as decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too powerful to be thus treated.

employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of their lunar system. Having begun their march on the 26th of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding day still the 26th, thus disallowing the lapse of time, and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantinea, not being Dorians, were under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly the army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste: all this time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the field, invoked the aid of their allies, who however had already been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose, any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself. Some allies however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend aid by entering the territory alone.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι φθινόωτος, καὶ ἀγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ἐδήουν· Ἐπιδαυριοὶ δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν τὸν μῆνα προὔφασισάντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.

In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and unsatisfactory.

The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and literal possible—"The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of the month before Karneius, and *keeping that day during the whole time*, invaded the Epidaurian territory and went on ravaging it." By "during the whole time" is meant, during the whole time that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgement—they kept the 26th day of the antecedent month for a whole fortnight or

so—they called each successive day by the same name—they stopped the computed march of time—the 27th was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 331)—"they began their march on a day which they had *αἰώνως* been used to keep holy." But the words on this construction introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main affirmation of the sentence.

The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd than the two votes said to have been passed by the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.) who, being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that month should be the month Anthestérion—next that it should be the month Boédromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkétés might be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Démétéρ, both nearly at the same time. Demetrius, being about to quit

Meanwhile the Athenians had convoked another congress of deputies at Mantinea, for the purpose of discussing proposi-

Athens in the month Munychion, went through both ceremonies with little or no delay (Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26). Compare also the speech ascribed to Alexander at the Granikus, directing a second month Artemisius to be substituted for the month Daesius (Plutarch, Alex. c. 16).

Besides if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv. 7, 2, 5; v. 1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on the ground of it being the period of the holy truce—though it *really was* not so—οὐχ ὅποτε καθήκοι χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὅποτε ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας—Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι, ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνασόμενοι καλεῖν, ἐπεμψαν, ὥσπερ εἰδότες, ἀστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας, ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς. On more than one occasion this stratagem was successful: the Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of the heralds, who affirmed that it *was* the time of the truce, though in reality it was not so. At last the Spartan king Agesiopolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put the express question to these oracles, whether he was bound to accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he was under no obligation to submit to such a pretence: accordingly, he sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons; and invaded the Argeian territory.

Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference—that the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore, that such

an analogous incident justifies the interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in Thucydides.

But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel, I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd for adoption—with the same eyes as we should regard it now.

With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient divergence between lunar and solar time was different in each different city. Accordingly the lunar month of one city did not (except by accident) either begin or end at the same time as the lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. T. i. p. 734)—“Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi cycclus intercalationum utrique populo idem sit: sed ubi differunt cyccli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat alter, eorum qui non intercalant mensis certus cedit jam in eum mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi.” Compare also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, p. 21-27—where all that is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is well brought together.

The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F. Hermann, p. 84-124): indeed the only single name resting on positive proof, is that of a month *Hermæus*. How far the months of Argos agreed with those of Epidaurus or Sparta, we do not know, nor have we any right to presume that they did agree. Nor is it by any means clear that every city in Greece had what may properly be called a *system* of intercalation, so correct as to keep the calendar right with-

tions of peace : perhaps this may have been a point carried by Nikias at Athens, in spite of Alkibiadēs. What other deputies attended, we are not told : but Euphamidas, coming as envoy from Corinth, animated, even at the opening of the debates, upon the inconsistency of assembling a peace congress while war was actually raging in the Epidaurian territory. So much were the Athenian deputies struck with this observation that they departed, persuaded the Argeians to retire from Epidaurus, and then came back to resume negotiations. Still however the pretensions of both parties were found irreconcilable, and the congress broke up ; upon which the Argeians again returned to renew their devastations in Epidaurus, while the Lacedæmonians, immediately on the expiration of the Karneian month, marched out again, as far as their border town of Karyæ, but were again arrested and forced to return by

Congress at
Mantineia
for peace—
the discus-
sions prove
abortive.

out frequent arbitrary interferences. Even at Athens, it is not yet satisfactorily proved that the Metonic calendar was ever actually received into civil use. Cicero, in describing the practice of the Sicilian Greeks about reckoning of time, characterises their interferences for the purpose of correcting the calendar as occasional rather than systematic. Verres took occasion from these interferences to make a still more violent change, by declaring the ides of January to be the calends of March (Cicero, Verr. ii. 52, 129).

Now where a people are accustomed to get wrong in their calendar, and to see occasional interferences introduced by authority to set them right, the step which I here suppose the Argeians to have taken about the invasion of Epidaurus will not appear absurd and preposterous. The Argeians would pretend that the real time for celebrating the festival of Karneia had not yet arrived. On that point, they were not bound to follow the views of other Dorian states—since there does not seem to have been any recognised authority for proclaiming the commencement of the Karneian truce, as the Eleians proclaimed the Olympic, and the Corinthians the Isthmiac truce. In saying therefore that the 26th of the month preceding Karneius should be repeated, and that the 27th should not be recognised as arriving for a fortnight or three

weeks, the Argeian government would only be employing an expedient the like of which had been before resorted to—though, in the case before us, it was employed for a fraudulent purpose.

The Spartan month *Hekatombeus* appears to have corresponded with the Attic month *Hekatombeon*—the Spartan month following it, *Karneius*, with the Attic month *Metageitnion* (Hermann, p. 112)—our months July and August ; such correspondence being by no means exact or constant. Both Dr. Arnold and Gölter speak of *Hekatombeus* as if it were the *Argeian* month preceding *Karneius* ; but we only know it as a *Spartan* month. Its name does not appear among the months of the Dorian cities in Sicily, among whom nevertheless *Karneius* seems universal. See Franz, *Comm. ad Corp. Inscript. Græc.* No. 5475, 5491, 5640. Part xxxii. p. 640.

The tricks played with the calendar at Rome, by political authorities for party purposes are well known to every one. And even in some states of Greece, the course of the calendar was so uncertain as to serve as a proverbial expression for inextricable confusion. See Hesychius—'Εν Κέφ τις ἡμέρα ; 'Επὶ τῶν οὐκ ἐγγνώστων ὁδὸς γὰρ οἶον ἐν Κέφ τις ἡμέρα, οὐκ οὐκ ἔσται αἱ ἡμέραι, ἀλλ' ὥς ἕκαστοι θέλουσιν ἐγρῶσι. —See also Aristoph. *Nubes*, 605.

unfavourable border-sacrifices. Intimation of their out-march, however, was transmitted to Athens; upon which Alkibiadēs, at the head of 1000 Athenian hoplites, was sent to join the Argeians. But before he arrived, the Lacedæmonian army had been already disbanded: so that his services were no longer required, and the Argeians carried their ravages over one-third of the territory of Epidaurus before they at length evacuated it.¹

The Epidaurians were reinforced about the end of September by a detachment of 300 Lacedæmonian hoplites under Agesippidas, sent by sea without the knowledge of the Athenians. Of this the Argeians preferred loud complaints at Athens. They had good reason to condemn the negligence of the Athenians as allies, for not having kept better naval watch at their neighbouring station of Ægina, and for having allowed this enemy to enter the harbour of Epidaurus. But they took another ground of complaint somewhat remarkable. In the alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, it had been stipulated that neither of the four should suffer the passage of troops through its territory without the joint consent of all. Now the sea was accounted a part of the territory of Athens: so that the Athenians had violated this article of the treaty by permitting the Lacedæmonians to send troops by sea to Epidaurus. And the Argeians now required Athens, in compensation for this wrong, to carry back the Mesenians and Helots from Kephallenia to Pylus, and allow them to ravage Laconia. The Athenians, under the persuasion of Alkibiadēs, complied with their requisition; inscribing, at the foot of the pillar on which their alliance with

Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly violated by both.

¹ Thucyd. v. 55. καὶ Ἀθηναίων αὐτοῖς χίλιοι ἐβοήθησαν ὁπλίται καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης στρατηγός, πυθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐξεστρατεύσθαι· καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν ἔτι αὐτῶν εἶδει, ἀπῆλθον. This is the reading which Portus, Bloomfield, Didot, and Gölter, either adopt or recommend; leaving out the particle δέ, which stands in the common text after πυθόμενοι.

If we do not adopt this reading, we must construe ἐξεστρατεύσθαι (as Dr. Arnold and Poppo construe it) in the sense of "had already completed their

expedition and returned home." But no authority is produced for putting such a meaning upon the verb ἐκστρατεύω: and the view of Dr. Arnold, who conceives that this meaning exclusively belongs to the preterite or pluperfect tense, is powerfully contradicted by the use of the word ἐξεστρατευμένων (ii. 7), the same verb and the same tense—yet in a meaning contrary to that which he assigns.

It appears to me the less objectionable proceeding of the two, to dispense with the particle δέ.

Sparta stood recorded, that the Lacedæmonians had not observed their oaths. Nevertheless they still abstained from formally throwing up their treaty with Lacedæmon, or breaking it in any other way.¹ The relations between Athens and Sparta thus remained, in name—peace and alliance—so far as concerns direct operations against each other's territory; in reality—hostile action as well as hostile manœuvring, against each other, as allies respectively of third parties.

The Argeians, after having prolonged their incursions on the Epidaurian territory throughout all the autumn, made in the winter an unavailing attempt to take the town itself by storm. Though there was no considerable action, but merely a succession of desultory attacks, in some of which the Epidaurians even had the advantage—yet they still suffered serious hardship, and pressed their case forcibly on the sympathy of Sparta. Thus importuned, and mortified as well as alarmed by the increasing defection or coldness which they now experienced throughout Peloponnesus—the Lacedæmonians determined, during the course of the ensuing summer, to put forth their strength vigorously, and win back their lost ground.²

Towards the month of June (B.C. 418), they marched with their full force, freemen as well as Helots, under king Agis, against Argos. The Tegeans and other Arcadian allies joined them on the march, while their other allies near the Isthmus—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, Sikyonians, Phliasians, &c.—were directed to assemble at Phlius. The number of these latter allies was very considerable—for we hear of 5000 Bœotian hoplites, and 2000 Corinthian: the Bœotians had with them also 5000 light-armed, 500 horsemen, and 500 foot-soldiers, who ran alongside of the horsemen. The numbers of the rest, or of Spartans themselves, we do not know; nor probably did Thucydides himself know: for we find him remarking elsewhere the impenetrable concealment of the Lacedæmonians on all public affairs, in reference to the numbers at the subsequent battle of Mantinea. Such muster of the Lacedæmonian alliance was no secret to the Argeians, who marching first to Mantinea, and there taking up the force of that city as well as

B.C. 418.
Invasion of
Argos by
Agis and the
Lacedæmo-
nians, Bœo-
tians, and
Corinthians.

¹ Thucyd. v. 56.

² Thucyd. v. 57.

3000 Eleian hoplites who came to join them, met the Lacedæmonians in their march at Methydrum in Arcadia. The two armies being posted on opposite hills, the Argeians had resolved to attack Agis the next day, so as to prevent him from joining his allies at Phlius. But he eluded the separate encounter by decamping in the night, reached Phlius, and operated his junction in safety. We do not hear that there was in the Lacedæmonian army any commander of lochus, who, copying the unreasonable punctilio of Amompharetus before the battle of Plataæa, refused to obey the order of retreat before the enemy, to the imminent risk of the whole army. And the fact that no similar incident occurred now, may be held to prove that the Lacedæmonians had acquired greater familiarity with the exigencies of actual warfare.

As soon as the Lacedæmonian retreat was known in the morning, the Argeians left their position also, and marched with their allies, first to Argos itself—next to Nemea, on the ordinary road from Corinth and Phlius to Argos, by which they imagined that the invaders would approach. But Agis acted differently. Distributing his force into three divisions, he himself with the Lacedæmonians and Arcadians, taking a short, but very rugged and difficult road, crossed the ridge of the mountains and descended straight into the plain near Argos. The Corinthians, Pellenians, and Phliasians were directed to follow another mountain road, which entered the same plain upon a different point : while the Bœotians, Corinthians, and Sikyonians followed the longer, more even, and more ordinary route, by Nemea. This route, though apparently frequented and convenient, led for a considerable distance along a narrow ravine called the Trêtus, bounded on each side by mountains. The united army under Agis was much superior in number to the Argeians ; but if all had marched in one line by the frequented route through the narrow Trêtus, their superiority of number would have been of little use, whilst the Argeians would have had a position highly favourable to their defence. By dividing his force, and taking the mountain road with his own division, Agis got into the plain of Argos in the rear of the Argeian position at Nemea. He anticipated that when the Argeians saw him devastating their properties near the city, they would forth-

Approach of
the invaders
to Argos by
different
lines of
march.

with quit the advantageous ground near Nemea to come and attack him in the plain : the Bœotian division would thus find the road by Nemea and the Trêtus open, and would be able to march without resistance into the plain of Argos, where their numerous cavalry would act with effect against the Argeians engaged in attacking Agis. This triple march was executed. Agis with his division, and the Corinthians with theirs, got across the mountains into the Argeian plain during the night; while the Argeians,¹ hearing at daybreak that he was near their city, ravaging Saminthus and other places, left their position at Nemea to come down to the plain and attack him. In their march they had a partial skirmish with the Corinthian division, which, having reached a high ground immediately above the Argeian plain, was found nearly in the road. But this affair was indecisive, and they soon found themselves in the plain near to Agis and the Lacedæmonians, who lay between them and their city.

On both sides the armies were marshalled, and order taken for battle. But the situation of the Argeians was in reality little less than desperate : for while they had Agis and his division in their front, the Corinthian detachment was near enough to take them in flank, and the Bœotians marching along the undefended road through the Trêtus would attack them in the rear. The Bœotian cavalry too would act with full effect upon them in the plain, since neither Argos, Elis, nor Mantinea, seem to have possessed any horsemen : a description of force which ought to have been sent from Athens, though from some cause which does not appear, the Athenian contingent had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, in spite of a position so very critical, both the Argeians and their allies were elate with confidence and impatient for battle ; thinking only of the division of Agis immediately in their front, which appeared to be enclosed between them and their city—and taking no heed to the other formidable enemies in their flank and rear. But the Argeian generals were better aware than their soldiers of the real danger : and just as the two armies were about to

Superior forces and advantageous position of the invaders—danger of Argos—Agis takes upon him to grant an armistice to the Argeians, and withdraws the army—dissatisfaction of the allies.

¹ Thucyd. v. 58. Οἱ δὲ Ἀργεῖοι γινώσκοντες ἐβοήθουν ἡμέρας ἥδη ἐκ τῆς Νεμέας, &c.

charge, Alkiphron, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians at Argos, accompanied Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of the Argeians, to a separate parley with Agis, without consultation or privity on the part of their own army. They exhorted Agis not to force on a battle, assuring him that the Argeians were ready both to give and receive equitable satisfaction, in all matters of complaint which the Lacedæmonians might urge against them—and to conclude a just peace for the future. Agis, at once acquiescing in the proposal, granted them a truce of four months to accomplish what they had promised. He on his part also took this step without consulting either his army or his allies, simply addressing a few words of confidential talk to one of the official Spartans near him. Immediately he gave the order for retreat, and the army, instead of being led to battle, was conducted out of the Argeian territory, through the Nemean road whereby the Bœotians had just been entering. But it required all the habitual discipline of Lacedæmonian soldiers to make them obey this order of the Spartan king, alike unexpected and unwelcome.¹ For the army were fully sensible both of the prodigious advantages of their position, and of the overwhelming strength of the invading force, so that all the three divisions were loud in their denunciations of Agis, and penetrated with shame at the thoughts of so disgraceful a retreat. And when they all saw themselves in one united body at Nemea, previous to breaking up and going home,—so as to have before their eyes their own full numbers and the complete equipment of one of the finest Hellenic armies which had ever been assembled—the Argeian body of allies, before whom they were now retiring, appeared contemptible in the comparison, and they separated with yet warmer and more universal indignation against the king who had betrayed their cause.

On returning home, Agis incurred not less blame from the Spartan authorities than from his own army, for having thrown away so admirable an opportunity of subduing Argos. This was assuredly no more than he deserved: but we read, with no small

Severe censure against Agis on his return to Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 60. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ἐχέμαχοι εἶποντο μὲν ὥς ἤγειτο διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐν αἰτίᾳ δὲ εἶχον κατ' ἀλλήλους πολλὰ τὸν Ἄγιον, &c.

astonishment, that the Argeians and their allies on returning were even more exasperated against Thrasylus,¹ whom they accused of having traitorously thrown away a certain victory. They had indeed good ground, in the received practice, to censure him for having concluded a truce without taking the sense of the people. It was their custom, on returning from a march, to hold a public court-martial before entering the city, at a place called the Charadrus or winter torrent near the walls, for the purpose of adjudicating on offences and faults committed in the army. Such was their wrath on this occasion against Thrasylus, that they would scarcely be prevailed upon even to put him upon his trial, but began to stone him. He was forced to seek personal safety at the altar; upon which the soldiers tried him, and he was condemned to have his property confiscated.²

Very shortly afterwards, the expected Athenian contingent arrived, which probably ought to have come earlier: 1000 hoplites, with 300 horsemen, under Lachês and Nikostratus. Alkibiadês came as ambassador, probably serving as a soldier also among the horsemen. The Argeians, notwithstanding their displeasure against Thrasylus, nevertheless felt themselves pledged to observe the truce which he had concluded, and their magistrates accordingly desired the newly-arrived Athenians to depart. Nor was Alkibiadês even permitted to approach and address the public assembly, until the Mantineian and Eleian allies insisted that thus much at least should not be refused. An assembly was therefore convened, in which these allies took part, along with the Argeians. Alkibiadês contended strenuously that the recent truce with the Lacedæmonians was null and void: since it had been contracted without the privity of all the allies, distinctly at variance with the terms of the alliance. He therefore called upon them to resume military operations forthwith, in conjunction with the reinforcement now seasonably arrived. His speech so persuaded the assembly, that the Mantineians and Eleians consented at once to join him in an expedition against the Arcadian town

¹ Thucyd. v. 60. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔτι ἐν πολλῷ πλέονι αἰτίᾳ εἶχον τοὺς σπεισμένους ἀνευ τοῦ πλῆθους, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 60.

of Orchomenus ; the Argeians also, though at first reluctant, very speedily followed them thither. Orchomenus was a place important to acquire, not merely because its territory joined that of Mantinea on the northward, but because the Lacedæmonians had deposited therein the hostages which they had taken from Arcadian townships and villages as guarantee for fidelity. Its walls were however in bad condition, and its inhabitants, after a short resistance, capitulated. They agreed to become allies of Mantinea—to furnish hostages for faithful adhesion to such alliance—and to deliver up the hostages deposited with them by Sparta.¹

Encouraged by first success, the allies debated what they should next undertake. The Eleians contended strenuously for a march against Lepreum, while the Mantineians were anxious to attack their enemy and neighbour Tegea. The Argeians and Athenians preferred the latter—incomparably the more important enterprise of the two : but such was the disgust of the Eleians at the rejection of their proposition, that they abandoned the army altogether, and went home. Notwithstanding their desertion, however, the remaining allies continued together at Mantinea organizing their attack upon Tegea, in which city they had a strong favourable party, who had actually laid their plans, and were on the point of proclaiming the revolt of the city from Sparta,² when the philo-Laconian Tegeans just saved themselves by despatching an urgent message to Sparta and receiving the most rapid succour. The Lacedæmonians, filled with indignation at the news of the surrender of Orchomenus, vented anew all their displeasure against Agis, whom they now threatened with the severe punishment of demolishing his house and fining him in the sum of 100,000 drachmæ or about 27½ Attic talents. He urgently entreated, that an opportunity might be afforded to him of redeeming by some brave deed the ill name which he had incurred : if he failed in doing so, then they might inflict upon him what penalty they chose. The penalty was accordingly withdrawn : but a restriction, new to the Spartan constitution, was now placed upon the authority of the king. It had been, before, a part of his prerogative to lead out the army single-handed and on his own authority ;

Plans against
Tegea—the
Eleians re-
turn home.

¹ Thucyd. v. 62.

² Thucyd. v. 64. *δσον οὐκ ἀφέστηκεν, &c.*

but a council of Ten was now named, without whose concurrence he was interdicted from exercising such power.¹

To the great good fortune of Agis, the pressing message now arrived announcing imminent revolt of Tegea—the most important ally of Sparta, and close upon her border. Such was the alarm occasioned by this news, that the whole military population instantly started off to relieve the place, Agis at their head—the most rapid movement ever known to have been made by Lacedæmonian soldiers.² When they arrived at Orestheium in Arcadia in their way, perhaps hearing that the danger was somewhat less pressing, they sent back to Sparta one-sixth part of the forces, for home defence—the oldest as well as the youngest men. The remainder marched forward to Tegea, where they were speedily joined by their Arcadian allies. They farther sent messages to the Corinthians and Bœotians, as well as to the Phokians and Lokrians, invoking the immediate presence of these contingents in the territory of Mantinea. The arrival of such reinforcements, however, even with all possible zeal on the part of the cities contributing, could not be looked for without some lapse of time; the rather, as it appears that they could not get into the territory of Mantinea except by passing through that of Argos³—which could not be safely attempted until they had all formed a junction. Accordingly Agis, impatient to redeem his reputation, marched at once with the Lacedæmonians and the Arcadian allies present into the territory of Mantinea, and took up a position near the Herakleion or temple of Hēraklēs,⁴ from whence he began to ravage the neighbouring lands. The Argeians and their allies presently came forth from Mantinea, planted themselves near him, but on very rugged and impracticable ground—and thus offered him battle. Nothing daunted by the difficulties of the position, he marshalled his army and led it up to attack them. His

¹ Thucyd. v. 63.

² Thucyd. v. 64. ἐνταῦθα δὲ βοήθεια τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίνεται αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν Εἰλωτῶν πανδημεὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ ὅλα οὕτω πρότερον. The out-march of the Spartans just before the battle of Plataea (described in Herodot. vii. 10) seems however to have been quite as rapid

and instantaneous.

³ Thucyd. v. 64. ξυνέκλρε γὰρ διὰ μέσου.

⁴ The Lacedæmonian kings appear to have felt a sense of protection in encamping near a temple of Hēraklēs, their heroic progenitor (see Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 1, 31).

rashness on the present occasion might have produced as much mischief as his inconsiderate concession to Thrasyllus near Argos, had not an ancient Spartan called out to him that he was now merely proceeding "to heal mischief by mischief." So forcibly was Agis impressed either with this timely admonition, or by the closer view of the position which he had undertaken to assault, that he suddenly halted the army, and gave orders for retreat—though actually within distance, no greater than the cast of a javelin, from the enemy.¹

His march was now intended to draw the Argeians away from the difficult ground which they occupied. On the frontier between Mantinea and Tegea—both situated on a lofty but enclosed plain, drained only by katabothra or natural subterranean channels in the mountains—was situated a head of water, the regular efflux of which seems to have been kept up by joint operations of both cities for their mutual benefit. Thither Agis now conducted his army, for the purpose of turning the water towards the side of Mantinea, where it would occasion serious damage; calculating that the Mantineians and their allies would certainly descend from their position to hinder it. No stratagem however was necessary to induce the latter to adopt this resolution. For so soon as they saw the Lacedæmonians, after advancing to the foot of the hill, first suddenly halt—next retreat—and lastly disappear—their surprise was very great; and this surprise was soon converted into contemptuous confidence and impatience to pursue the flying enemy. The generals, not sharing such confidence, hesitated at first to quit their secure position: upon which the troops became clamorous, and loudly denounced them for treason in letting the Lacedæmonians quietly escape a second time, as they had before done near Argos. These generals would probably not be the same with those who had incurred, a short time before, so much undeserved censure for their convention with Agis: but the murmurs on the present occasion, hardly less unreasonable, drove them, not without considerable shame and confusion, to give orders for advance.

Manœuvres
of Agis to
bring on a
battle on
fair ground.

¹ Thucyd. v. 65. See an exclamation by an old Spartan mentioned as productive of important consequences, at the moment when a battle was going to commence, in Xenophon, Hellen. vii. 4, 25.

They abandoned the hill, marched down into the plain so as to approach the Lacedæmonians, and employed the next day in arranging themselves in good battle order, so as to be ready to fight at a moment's notice.

Meanwhile it appears that Agis had found himself disappointed in his operations upon the water. He had either not done so much damage, or not spread so much terror, as he had expected: and he accordingly desisted, putting himself again in march to resume his position at the Herakleion, and supposing that his enemies still retained their position on the hill. But in the course of this march he came suddenly upon the Argeian and allied army where he was not in the least prepared to see them. They were not only in the plain, but already drawn up in perfect order of battle. The Mantineians occupied the right wing, the post of honour, because the ground was in their territory: next to them stood their dependent Arcadian allies: then the chosen Thousand-regiment of Argos, citizens of wealth and family trained in arms at the cost of the state: alongside of them, the remaining Argeian hoplites with their dependent allies of Kleônæ and Orneæ: last of all, on the left wing, stood the Athenians, their hoplites as well as their horsemen.

It was with the greatest surprise that Agis and his army beheld this unexpected apparition. To any other Greeks than Lacedæmonians, the sudden presentation of a formidable enemy would have occasioned a feeling of dismay from which they would have found it difficult to recover; and even the Lacedæmonians, on this occasion, underwent a momentary shock unparalleled in their previous experience.¹ But they now felt the full advantage of their rigorous training and habit of military obedience, as well as of that subordination of officers which was peculiar to themselves in Greece. In other Grecian armies orders were proclaimed to the troops in a loud voice by a herald, who received them personally from the general: each *taxis* or company, indeed, had its own taxiarch, but the latter did not receive his orders separately from the general,

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. μάλιστα δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἐς δ' ἐμέμνητο, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ κατ' ἐπελάγησαν· διὰ βραχείας γὰρ μελλήσεως ἢ παρασκευῇ αὐτοῖς ἐγίνετο, &c.

and seems to have had no personal responsibility for the execution of them by his soldiers. Subordinate and responsible military authority was not recognised. Among the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, there was a regular gradation of military and responsible authority—"commanders of commanders"—each of whom had his special duty in ensuring the execution of orders.¹ Every order emanated from the Spartan king when he was present, and was given to the Polemarchs (each commanding a Mora, the largest military division), who intimated it to the Lochagi, or colonels of the respective Lochi. These again gave command to each Pentekontêr, or captain of a Pentekosty; lastly, he to the Enômotarch, who commanded the lowest subdivision called an Enômoty. The soldier thus received no immediate orders except from the Enômotarch, who was in the first instance responsible for his Enômoty; but the Pentekontêr and the Lochage were responsible also each for his larger division; the pentekosty including four enômoties, and the lochus four pentekosties—at least so the numbers stood on this occasion. All the various military manœuvres were familiar to the Lacedæmonians from their unremitting drill, so that their armies enjoyed the advantage of readier obedience along with more systematic command. Accordingly, though thus taken by surprise, and called on now for the first time in their lives to form in the presence of an enemy, they only manifested the greater promptitude² and anxious haste in obeying the orders of Agis, transmitted through the regular series of officers. The battle array was attained, with regularity as well as with speed.

Gradation of command and responsibility peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.

The extreme left of the Lacedæmonian line belonged by ancient privilege to the Skiritæ; mountaineers of the border district of Laconia skirting the Arcadian Parrhasii, seemingly east of the Eurotas near its earliest and highest course. These men, originally

Lacedæmonian line; privileged post of the Skiritæ on the left.

¹ Thucyd. v. 66. Ἰχεδὸν γὰρ τι πᾶν, πλὴν ὀλίγου, τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἄρχόντων εἰσι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιμελὲς τοῦ δρωμένου πολλοῖς προσήκει.

Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. xi. 5. Αἱ παραγωγαὶ ὥσπερ ἐκ κήρυκος ἐκ τοῦ ἐνομοτάρχου λόγῳ δηλοῦνται: com-

pare xi. 8. τῷ ἐνομοτάρχῃ παραγγύεται εἰς μέγαρον παρ' ἑσπίδα καθίστασθαι, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 66. εὐθὺς ἐπὶ σπουδῇ καθίσταντο ἐς κόσμον τὸν ἑαυτῶν, "Ἀγίδοι τοῦ βασιλέως ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου, κατὰ τὸν νόμον, &c.

Arcadians, now constituted a variety of Laconian Perioeci, with peculiar duties as well as peculiar privileges. Numbered among the bravest and most active men in Peloponnesus, they generally formed the vanguard in an advancing march; and the Spartans stand accused of having exposed them to danger as well as toil with unbecoming recklessness.¹ Next to the Skiritæ, who were 600 in number, stood the enfranchised Helots, recently returned from serving with Brasidas in Thrace, and the Neodamôdes, both probably summoned home from Lepreum, where we were told before that they had been planted. After them, in the centre of the entire line, came the Lacedæmonian lochi, seven in number, with the Arcadian dependent allies, Heræan and Mænalian, near them. Lastly, in the right wing, stood the Tegeans, with a small division of Lacedæmonians occupying the extreme right, as the post of honour. On each flank there were some Lacedæmonian horsemen.²

Thucydides, with a frankness which enhances the value of his testimony wherever he gives it positively, informs us that he cannot pretend to set down the number of either army. It is evident that this silence is not for want of having inquired—but none of the answers which he received appeared to him trustworthy: the extreme secrecy of Lacedæmonian politics admitted of no certainty about *their* numbers, while the empty numerical boasts of other Greeks served only to mislead. In the absence of assured information about aggregate number, the historian gives us some general information accessible to every inquirer, and some facts visible to a spectator. From his language it is conjectured, with some probability, by Dr. Thirlwall and others, that he was himself present at the battle, though in what capacity, we cannot determine, as he was an exile from his country. First he states that the Lacedæmonian army *appeared* more numerous than that of the enemy. Next he tells us, that independent of the Skiritæ on the left, who were 600 in number—the remaining Lacedæmonian front, to the extremity of their right wing—consisted of 448 men; each enômoty having *four* men in front. In respect to depth, the different enômoties

Uncertain
numbers of
both armies.

¹ Xenophon, *Cyrop.* iv. 2, 1: see Diodor. xv. c. 32; Xenophon, *Rep. Laced.* xiii. 6.

² Thucyd. v. 67.

were not all equal ; but for the most part, the files were eight deep. There were seven lochi in all (apart from the Skiritæ) ; each lochus comprised four pentekosties—each pentekosty contained four enômoties.¹ Multiplying 448 by 8, and adding the 600 Skiritæ, this would make a total of 4184 hoplites, besides a few horsemen on each flank. Respecting light-armed, nothing is said. I have no confidence in such an estimate—but the total is smaller than we should have expected, considering that the Lacedæmonians had marched out from Sparta with their entire force on a pressing emergency, and that they had only sent home one-sixth of their total, their oldest and youngest soldiers.

It does not appear that the generals on the Argeian side

¹ Very little can be made out respecting the structure of the Lacedæmonian army. We know that the Enômoty was the elementary division—the military unit : that the Pentekosty was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of Enômoties : that the Lochus also was composed of a definite (not always the same) number of Pentekosties. The Mora appears to have been a still larger division, consisting of so many Lochi (according to Xenophon, of four Lochi) : but Thucydides speaks as if he knew no division larger than the Lochus.

Beyond this very slender information, there seems no other fact certainly established about the Lacedæmonian military distribution. Nor ought we reasonably to expect to find that these words *Enômoty*, *Pentekosty*, *Lochus*, &c., indicate any fixed number of men : our own names *regiment*, *company*, *troop*, *brigade*, *division*, &c., are all more or less indefinite as to positive numbers and proportion to each other.

That which was peculiar to the Lacedæmonian drill, was, the teaching a small number of men, like an Enômoty (25, 32, 36 men, as we sometimes find it), to perform its evolutions under the command of its Enômotarch. When this was once secured, it is probable that the combination of these elementary divisions was left to be determined in every case by circumstances.

Thucydides states several distinct facts. 1. Each Enômoty had *four men in front*. 2. Each Enômoty *varied in depth*, according as every lochagus chose. 3. Each lochus had four pente-

kosties, and each pentekosty four enômoties.—Now Dobree asks, with much reason, how these assertions are to be reconciled ? Given the number of men in front, and the number of enômoties in each Lochus—the depth of the Enômoty is of course determined, without reference to the discretion of any one. These two assertions appear distinctly contradictory ; unless we suppose (what seems very difficult to believe) that the Lochage might make one or two of the four files of the same Enômoty deeper than the rest. Dobree proposes, as a means of removing this difficulty, to expunge some words from the text. One cannot have confidence, however, in the conjecture.

Another solution has been suggested, viz., that each lochagus had the power of dividing his lochus into more or fewer enômoties as he chose, only under the obligation that four men should constitute the front rank of each enômoty : the depth would then of course be the variable item. I incline to believe that this is what Thucydides here means to indicate. When he says, therefore, that there were four pentekosties in each lochus and four enômoties in each pentekosty—we must suppose him to allude to the army as it marched out from Sparta ; and to intimate, by the words which follow, that each lochagus had the power of modifying that distribution in regard to his own lochus, when the order of battle was about to be formed. This, at any rate, seems the least unsatisfactory solution of the difficulty.

made any attempt to charge while the Lacedæmonian battle-array was yet incomplete. It was necessary for them, according to Grecian practice, to wind up the courage of their troops by some words of exhortation and encouragement; and before these were finished, the Lacedæmonians may probably have attained their order. The Mantineian officers reminded their countrymen that the coming battle would decide whether Mantinea should continue to be a free and imperial city, with Arcadian dependencies of her own, as she now was—or should again be degraded into a dependency of Lacedæmon. The Argeian leaders dwelt upon the opportunity which Argos now had of recovering her lost ascendancy in Peloponnesus, and of revenging herself upon her worst enemy and neighbour. The Athenian troops were exhorted to show themselves worthy of the many brave allies with whom they were now associated, as well as to protect their own territory and empire by vanquishing their enemy in Peloponnesus.

It illustrates forcibly the peculiarity of Lacedæmonian character, that to them no similar words of encouragement were addressed either by Agis or any of the officers. "They knew (says the historian¹) that long practice beforehand, in the business of war, was a better preservative than fine speeches on the spur of the moment." As among professional soldiers, bravery was assumed as a thing of course, without any special exhortation: but mutual suggestions were heard among them with a view to get their order of battle and position perfect,—which at first it probably was not, from the sudden and hurried manner in which they had been constrained to form. Moreover various war-songs, perhaps those of Tyrtæus, were chanted in the ranks. At length the word was given to attack: the numerous pipers in attendance (an hereditary caste at Sparta) began to play, while the slow, solemn, and equable march of the troops adjusted itself to the time given by these instruments without any break or wavering in the line. A striking contrast to this deliberate pace was presented by the enemy; who having no pipers or other

¹ Thucyd. v. 69. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ καὶ ἐκαστοὺς τε καὶ μετὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἡπίσταντο τὴν παρακλέυσιν τῆς μνήμης ἀγαθοῖς οὖσιν ἐποιοῦντο, εἰδότες ἔργων ἐκ πολλοῦ μέλ-την πλείω σώζουσιν ἢ λόγων δι' αἰγῆς καλῶς βηθέντων παραίνεσιν.

musical instruments, rushed forward to the charge with a step vehement and even furious,¹ fresh from the exhortations just addressed to them.

It was the natural tendency of all Grecian armies, when coming into conflict, to march not exactly straight forward, but somewhat aslant towards the right. Battle of Mantinea.

The soldiers on the extreme right of both armies set the example of such inclination, in order to avoid exposing their own unshielded side; while for the same reason every man along the line took care to keep close to the shield of his right hand neighbour. We see from hence that, with equal numbers, the right was not merely the post of honour, but also of comparative safety. So it proved on the present occasion; even the Lacedæmonian discipline being noway exempt from this cause of disturbance. Though the Lacedæmonian front, from their superior numbers, was more extended than that of the enemy, still their right files did not think themselves safe without slanting still farther to the right, and thus outflanked very greatly the Athenians on the opposite left wing; while on the opposite side the Mantineians who formed the right wing, from the same disposition to keep the left shoulder forward, outflanked, though not in so great a degree, the Skiritæ and Brasideians on the Lacedæmonian left. King Agis, whose post was with the Lochi in the centre, saw plainly that when the armies closed, his left would be certainly taken in flank, and perhaps even in the rear. Accordingly he thought it necessary to alter his dispositions even at this critical moment, which he relied upon being able to accomplish through the exact discipline, practised evolutions, and slow march of his soldiers.

The natural mode of meeting the impending danger would have been to bring round a division from the extreme right, where it could well be spared, to the extreme left against the advancing Mantineians. But the ancient privilege of the Skiritæ, who always fought by themselves on the extreme left, forbade such an order.² Accordingly, Agis gave signal to the

Movement ordered by Agis, on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed. His left wing is defeated.

¹ Thucyd. v. 70. Ἀργεῖοι μὲν καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, ἐντόνως καὶ ὀργῇ χωροῦντες, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, βραδέως καὶ ὑπὸ αὐλητῶν πολλῶν νόμφ' ἐγκαθεστῶτων, οὐ τοῦ θείου χάριν, ἀλλ' ἵνα δμαλῶς μετὰ ρυθ-

μοῦ βαίνοντες προέλθοιεν καὶ μὴ διασπασθεῖν αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις, ὅπερ φιλεῖ τὰ μεγάλα στρατόπεδα ἐν ταῖς προσόδοις ποιεῖν.
² Thucyd. v. 67. Τότε δὲ κέρας μὲν εὐάνυμον Σκιρίται αὐτοῖς καθίσταντο,

Brasideians and Skiritæ to make a flank movement on the left so as to get on equal front with the Mantineians ; while in order to fill up the vacancy thus created in his line, he sent orders to the two polemarchs Aristoklēs and Hipponoidas, who had their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders : so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed : and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back ; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-waggons in the rear ; some of the elder troops who guarded the waggons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right ; where Agis, with his body-guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan Lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy ; with the Argeians, their elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi—with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos—and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were com-

Complete ultimate victory of the Lacedæmonians.
 ἀεὶ ταύτην τὴν τάξιν μόνοι Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες, &c.

The strong and precise language, which Thucydides here uses, shows that this was a privilege pointedly noted and much esteemed : among the Lacedæmonians, especially, ancient routine

was more valued than elsewhere. And it is essential to take notice of the circumstance, in order to appreciate the generalship of Agis, which has been rather hardly criticised.

pletely victorious, after a short resistance—indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape.¹ While thus defeated in front, they were taken in

¹ Thucyd. v. 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς Ἀργεῖους) ἔτρεψαν, οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ', ὡς ἐπύρεσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκαταδάψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify *design* or *purpose*; ἔνεκα being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning: accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppe, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μὴ; others affirm that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ μὴ. "Formula τοῦ, τοῦ μὴ (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque consilium significat: interdum effectum (i. e. ὥστε μὴ); hic causam indicat (i. e. διὰ τὸ μὴ, or τῷ μὴ)." But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorised; while the second (which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself) is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence—for the passage of Thucydides (ii. 4, τοῦ μὴ ἐκφεύγειν) may be as well construed (as Poppe's note thereupon suggests) without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of ἔνεκα τοῦ or consilium. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They supposed that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been "trodden under foot," were so trodden down by the Lacedæmonians

in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit—qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydides in regard to this very battle. They were not all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them—not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii. 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it was the Argeians in front (not the Lacedæmonians) who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file) in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 4, 11; (Economic. vii. 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydides describes, three distinct subjects—1. The Lacedæmonians. 2. The Argeian soldiers who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers who trod them down in order to get away themselves.—Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative just as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας ὑπ'

flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis' army, and the Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians—and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit

δ' αλλων or δ' α' ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative but not formally specified (*i. e.* those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves)—or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly—that the *design* or *purpose* (*consilium*) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers.

Farther the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming *after* φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgement, τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case coming *before* φθῆναι and forming the *subject* of it. The words will thus read (ἐνεκα) τοῦ τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς)—“in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them”—“might not come upon them too soon,” *i. e.* “sooner than they could get away.” And since the word ἐγκατάληψις is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates—*i. e.* τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας—subject as well as attribute

—for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the meaning expressed in full and concrete words—*ἔστιν οὗς καὶ καταταγθέντας δ' ἀλλήλων φευγόντων* (or *βιαζομένων*), *ἐνεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαμβάνοντας αὐτοὺς* (τοὺς φεύγοντας): “As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat; and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape.”

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι used in its regular and legitimate sense of *purpose* or *consilium*. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence, which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydides.

against a defeated enemy.¹ There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus; and 200 Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned home.²

Such was the important battle of Mantinea, fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before: the number and grandeur

Great effects of the victory in re-establishing the reputation of Sparta.

of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatised as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantinea silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre-eminence before the eyes of Greece. It worked so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs: but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantinea any of that professional

¹ Thucyd. v. 73; Diodor. xii. 79.

² Thucyd. v. 73.

aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised—the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus.¹

We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklēs and Hipponoidas, whose disobedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards on their return to Sparta.²

Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark that the defeat was greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklēs at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation.³ Shortly after the defeat, the 3000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantinea—probably regretting their previous untoward departure—together with a reinforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began—a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle⁴—and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they

Operations
of Argeians,
Eleians, &c.,
near Epi-
daurus.

¹ Thucyd. v. 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τότε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἐς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἑλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδύτητα, ἐνὶ ἔργῳ τοῦτ' ἀπελύσαντο.

τύχη μὲν, ὡς ἰδοῦσιν, κακίζομενα, γὰρ μὴ δέ, οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ ὄντες.

² Thucyd. v. 72.

³ Thucyd. i. 141.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 75.

had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial success—now found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be accomplished: but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion—their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory.¹

So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force—at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party—philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat at Mantinea had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders—who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiadês, had aspired to maintain an ascendancy in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta—now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantinea, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been

Political
change at
Argos, arising out of the
battle of
Mantinea.

¹ Thucyd. v. 75.

seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory,¹ and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. So long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical government. But when the defeat of Mantinea reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a conspiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy.²

As the first step towards the execution of this scheme the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far as Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could: another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connexion with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously press-

Oligarchical
conspiracy of
the Thousand-
regiment at
Argos, in
concert with
the Lacedæ-
monians.

¹ Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantinea, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution—notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten—*Οἱ γυνώριμοι εὐδοκίμησαντες ἐν Μαντινείᾳ*, &c.

An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadēs and Thrasylus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, *Hellen.* i. 2, 15-17.

² Thucyd. v. 76; Diodor. xii. 8a.

ing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadēs, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos,—and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows:—

“The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and the men-hostages from the Mænalii. They shall restore to the Lacedæmonians the men now in Mantinea, whom the Lacedæmonians had placed as hostages for safe custody in Orchomenus, and whom the Argeians and Mantineians have carried away from that place. They shall evacuate Epidaurus, and raze the fort recently erected near it. The Athenians, unless they also forthwith evacuate Epidaurus, shall be proclaimed as enemies to Lacedæmon as well as to Argos, and to the allies of both. The Lacedæmonians shall restore all the hostages whom they now have in keeping, from whatever place they may have been taken. Respecting the sacrifice alleged to be due to Apollo by the Epidaurians, the Argeians will consent to tender to them an oath, which if they swear, they shall clear themselves.¹ Every city in Peloponnesus, small or great, shall be autonomous and at liberty to maintain its own ancient constitution. If any extra-Peloponnesian city shall come against Peloponnesus

Treaty of
peace be-
tween Sparta
and Argos.

¹ Thucyd. v. 77. The text of Thucydides is incurably corrupt, in regard to several words of this clause; though the general sense appears sufficiently certain, that the Epidaurians are to be allowed to clear themselves in respect to this demand by an oath. In regard to this purifying oath it seems to have been essential that the oath should be tendered by one litigant party and taken by the other; perhaps therefore σέμεν or θέμεν ἄν (Valckenaer's conjecture) might be preferable to εἰμεν ἄν.

To Herodot. vi. 86 and Aristotel. Rhetoric. i. 16, 6, which Dr. Arnold

and other commentators notice in illustration of this practice, we may add the instructive exposition of the analogous practice in the procedure of Roman law, as given by Von Savigny in his *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, sect. 309-313, vol. vii. p. 53-83. It was an oath tendered by one litigant party to the opposite in hopes that the latter would refuse to take it; if taken, it had the effect of a judgement in favour of the swearer. But the Roman lawyers laid down many limits and formalities, with respect to this *jusjurandum delatum*, which Von Savigny sets forth with his usual perspicuity.

with mischievous projects, Lacedæmon and Argos will take joint counsel against it, in the manner most equitable for the interest of the Peloponnesians generally. The extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be in the same position with reference to this treaty as the allies of Lacedæmon and Argos in Peloponnesus—and shall hold their own in the same manner. The Argeians shall show this treaty to their allies, who shall be admitted to subscribe to it, if they think fit. But if the allies desire anything different, the Argeians shall send them home about their business.”¹

Such was the agreement sent ready prepared by the Lacedæmonians to Argos, and there literally accepted. It presented a reciprocity little more than nominal, imposing one obligation of no importance upon Sparta; though it answered the purpose of the latter by substantially dissolving the alliance of Argos with its three confederates.

But this treaty was meant by the oligarchical party in Argos only as preface to a series of ulterior measures. As soon as it was concluded, the menacing army of Sparta was withdrawn from Tegea, and was exchanged for free and peaceful intercommunication between the Lacedæmonians and Argeians. Probably Alkibiadês at the same time retired, while the renewed visits and hospitalities of Lacedæmonians at Argos strengthened the interest of their party more than ever. They were soon powerful enough to persuade the Argeian assembly formally to renounce the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea—and to conclude a special alliance with Sparta, on the following terms:—

“There shall be peace and alliance for fifty years between the Lacedæmonians and the Argeians—upon equal terms each giving amicable satisfaction, according to its established

¹ Thucyd. v. 77. Ἐπιδειξάμενος δὲ τοῖς συμμάχοις ἐμβάλλεσθαι, αἱ καὶ αὐτοῖς δοκῇ αἱ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο δοκῇ τοῖς συμμάχοις, οἷκαδ' ἀπιδάλλειν. See Dr. Arnold's note, and Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xxiv. vol. iii. p. 342.

One cannot be certain about the meaning of these two last words—but I incline to believe that they express a peremptory and almost a hostile sentiment, such as I have given in the text. The allies here alluded to are Athens, Elis, and Mantinea; all hostile in

feeling to Sparta. The Lacedæmonians could not well decline admitting these cities to share in this treaty as it stood; but would probably think it suitable to repel them even with rudeness, if they desired any change.

I rather imagine, too, that this last clause (ἐπιδειξάμενος) has reference exclusively to the Argeians, and not to the Lacedæmonians also. The form of the treaty is that of a resolution already taken at Sparta, and sent for approval to Argos.

constitution, to all complaints preferred by the other. On the same condition, also, the other Peloponnesian cities shall partake in this peace and alliance—holding their own territory, laws, and separate constitution. All extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta shall be put upon the same footing as the Lacedæmonians themselves. The allies of Argos shall also be put upon the same footing as Argos herself, holding their own territory undisturbed. Should occasion arise for common military operations on any point, the Lacedæmonians and Argeians shall take counsel together, determining in the most equitable manner they can for the interest of their allies. If any one of the cities hereunto belonging, either in or out of Peloponnesus, shall have disputes either about boundaries or other topics, she shall be held bound to enter upon amicable adjustment.¹ If any allied city shall quarrel with another allied city, the matter shall be referred to some third city satisfactory to both. Each city shall render justice to her own citizens according to her own ancient constitution.”

Treaty of alliance between Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with Athens, Mantinea, and Elis.

It will be observed that in this treaty of alliance, the disputed question of headship is compromised or evaded. Lacedæmon and Argos are both put upon an equal footing, in respect to taking joint counsel for the general body of allies: they two alone are to decide, without consulting the other allies, though binding themselves to have regard to the interests of the latter. The policy of Lacedæmon also pervades the treaty—that of ensuring autonomy to all the lesser states of Peloponnesus, and thus breaking up the empire of Elis, Mantinea, or any other larger state which might have dependencies.² And accor-

Submission of Mantinea to Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 79. Αἱ δὲ τινὶ τῶν πόλεων ἢ ἀμφίλογα, ἢ τῶν ἐν ὧς ἢ τῶν ἐκτὸς Πελοποννήσου, αἵτε περὶ ὧν αἵτε περὶ ἄλλου τινὸς, διακρίθημεν.

The object of this clause I presume to be, to provide that the joint forces of Lacedæmon and Argos should not be bound to interfere for every separate dispute of each single ally with a foreign state, not included in the alliance. Thus, there were at this time standing disputes between Bœotia and Athens—and between Megara and Athens: the Argeians probably would not choose to pledge themselves to interfere for the

maintenance of the alleged rights of Bœotia and Megara in these disputes. They guard themselves against such necessity in this clause.

M. H. Meier, in his recent Dissertation (Die Privat-Schiedsrichter und die öffentlichen Diäteten Athens (Halle, 1846), sect. 19, p. 41), has given an analysis and explanation of this treaty which seems to me on many points unsatisfactory.

² All the smaller states in Peloponnesus are pronounced by this treaty to be (if we repeat the language employed with reference to the Delphians pecu-

dingly the Mantineians, finding themselves abandoned by Argos, were constrained to make their submission to Sparta, enrolling themselves again as her allies, renouncing all command over their Arcadian subjects, and delivering up the hostages of these latter—according to the stipulation in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Argos.¹ The Lacedæmonians do not seem to have meddled farther with Elis. Being already possessed of Lepreum (through the Brasideian settlers planted there), they perhaps did not wish again to provoke the Eleians, from fear of being excluded a second time from the Olympic festival.

Meanwhile the conclusion of the alliance with Lacedæmon (about November or December 418 B.C.) had still farther depressed the popular leaders at Argos. The oligarchical faction, and the chosen regiment of the Thousand, all men of wealth and family, as well as bound together by their common military training, now saw their way clearly to the dissolution of the democracy by force, and to the accomplishment of a revolution. Instigated by such ambitious views, and flattered by the idea of admitted headship jointly with Sparta, they espoused the new policy of the city with extreme vehemence, and began immediately to multiply occasions of collision with Athens. Joint Lacedæmonian and Argeian envoys were despatched to Thrace and Macedonia. With the Chalkidians of Thrace, the revolted subjects of Athens, the old alliance was renewed, and even new engagements concluded; while Perdikkas of Macedonia was urged to renounce his covenants with Athens, and join the new confederacy. In that quarter the influence of Argos was considerable; for the Macedonian princes prized very highly their ancient descent from Argos, which constituted them brethren of the Hellenic family. Accordingly Perdikkas consented to the demand and concluded the new treaty; insisting, however, with his

Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.

liarily in the peace of Nikias) *αὐτονόμους, αὐτοτελείς, αὐτοδίκους*, Thucyd. v. 19. The last clause of this treaty guarantees *αὐτοδικίαν* to all—though in language somewhat different—*τοῖς δὲ ἔταις κατὰ πατρίαν δικάζεσθαι*. The expression in this treaty *αὐτοπόλις* is substantially equivalent to *αὐτοτελείς*

in the former.

It is remarkable that we never find in Thucydides the very convenient Herodotean word *δωσιδικοί* (Herodot. vi. 41), though there are occasions in these fourth and fifth books on which it would be useful to his meaning.

¹ Thucyd. v. 81; Diodor. xii. 81.

habitual duplicity, that the step should for the moment be kept secret from Athens.¹ In farther pursuance of the new tone of hostility to that city, joint envoys were also sent thither, to require that the Athenians should quit Peloponnesus, and especially that they should evacuate the fort recently erected near Epidaurus. It seems to have been held jointly by Argeians, Mantineians, Eleians, and Athenians; and as the latter were only a minority of the whole, the Athenians in the city judged it prudent to send Dêmosthenês to bring them away. That general not only effected the retreat, but also contrived a stratagem which gave to it the air almost of an advantage. On his first arrival in the fort, he proclaimed a gymnastic match outside of the gates for the amusement of the whole garrison, contriving to keep back the Athenians within until all the rest had marched out: then hastily shutting the gates, he remained master of the place.² Having no intention however of keeping it, he made it over presently to the Epidaurians themselves, with whom he renewed the truce to which they had been parties jointly with the Lacedæmonians five years before, two years before the peace of Nikias.³

The mode of proceeding here resorted to by Athens, in respect to the surrender of the fort, seems to have been dictated by a desire to manifest her displeasure B.C. 417. against the Argeians. This was exactly what the Argeian leaders and oligarchical party, on their side, most desired; the breach with Athens had become irreparable, and their plans were now matured for violently subverting their own democracy. They concerted with Sparta a joint military expedition, of 1000 hoplites from each city (the first joint expedition under the new alliance), against Sikyôn, for the purpose of introducing more thorough-paced oligarchy into the already

¹ Compare Thucyd. v. 80, and v. 83.

² The instances appear to have been not rare, wherein Grecian towns changed masters, by the citizens thus going out of the gates all together, or most part of them, for some religious festival. See the case of Smyrna (Herodot. i. 150) and the precautionary suggestions of the military writer Æneas, in his treatise called Poliorketicus, c. 17.

³ Thucyd. v. 80. *Καὶ ὕστερον Ἐπιδαυρίους ἀναγεσάμενοι τὰς σπονδὰς, αὐτοὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπέδοσαν τὸ τέλος.* We are here told that the Athenians RENEWED their truce with the Epidaurians: but I know no truce previously between them, except the general truce for a year, which the Epidaurians swore to, in conjunction with Sparta (iv. 119), in the beginning of B.C. 423.

oligarchical Sikyōnian government. It is possible that there may have been some democratical opposition gradually acquiring strength at Sikyōn: yet that city seems to have been, as far as we know, always oligarchical in policy, and passively faithful to Sparta. Probably therefore that joint enterprise against Sikyōn was nothing more than a pretext to cover the introduction of 1000 Lacedæmonian hoplites into Argos, whither the joint detachment immediately returned, after the business at Sikyōn had been accomplished. Thus reinforced, the oligarchical leaders and the chosen Thousand at Argos put down by force the democratical constitution in that city, slew the democratical leaders, and established themselves in complete possession of the government.¹

This revolution (accomplished about February B.C. 417)—the result of the victory of Mantinea and the consummation of a train of policy laid by Sparta—raised her ascendancy in Peloponnesus to a higher and more undisputed point than it had ever before attained. The towns in Achaia were as yet not sufficiently oligarchical for her purpose—perhaps since the march of Alkibiadēs thither two years before—accordingly she now remodelled their governments in conformity with her own views. The new rulers of Argos were subservient to her, not merely from oligarchical sympathy, but from need of her aid to keep down internal rising against themselves: so that there was neither enemy, nor even neutral, to counterwork her or to favour Athens, throughout the whole peninsula.

But the Spartan ascendancy at Argos was not destined to last. Though there were many cities in Greece, in which oligarchies long maintained themselves unshaken, through adherence to a traditional routine, and by being usually in the hands of men accustomed to govern—yet an oligarchy erected by force upon the ruins of a democracy was rarely of long duration. The angry discontent of the people, put down by temporary intimidation, usually revived, and threatened the security of the rulers enough to render them suspicious and probably

B.C. 417.

Oligarchy in
Sikyōn and
the towns in
Achaia.

Violences of
the Thou-
sand at
Argos:
counter-re-
volution in
that town:
restoration of
the demo-
cracy.

¹ Thucyd. v. 81. Καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἀργεῖοι, χίλιοι ἑκάτεροι, ἐυστρατεύσαντες, τὰ τ' ἐν Σικυῶνι ἐς ὀλίγους μάλ-
λον κατέστησαν αὐτοὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι

ἐλθόντες, καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνα ξυμφορῶν
ἤδη καὶ τὸν ἐν Ἀργεῖ δῆμον κατέλαβον,
καὶ ὀλιγαρχία ἐπέτηδεν τοῖς Λακεδαι-
μόνιοις κατέστη. Compare Diodor. xii. 80.

cruel. Such cruelty moreover was not their only fault: they found their emancipation from democratical restraints too tempting to be able to control either their lust or their rapacity. With the population of Argos—comparatively coarse and brutal in all ranks, and more like Korkyra than like Athens—such abuse was pretty sure to be speedy as well as flagrant. Especially the chosen regiment of the Thousand—men in the vigour of their age, and proud of their military prowess as well as of their wealthier station—construed the new oligarchical government which they had helped to erect as a period of individual licence to themselves. The behaviour and fate of their chief, Bryas, illustrates the general demeanour of the troop. After many other outrages against persons of poorer condition, he one day met in the streets a wedding procession, in which the person of the bride captivated his fancy. He caused her to be violently torn from her company, carried her to his house, and possessed himself of her by force. But in the middle of the night, this high-spirited woman revenged herself for the outrage by putting out the eyes of the ravisher while he was fast asleep:¹ a terrible revenge, which the pointed clasp-pins of the feminine attire sometimes enabled women² to take upon those who wronged them. Having contrived to make her escape, she found concealment among her friends, as well as protection among the people generally, against the indignant efforts of the chosen Thousand to avenge their leader.

From incidents such as this, and from the multitude of petty insults which so flagitious an outrage implies as co-existent, we are not surprised to learn that the Demos of Argos soon recovered their lost courage, and resolved upon an effort to put down their oligarchical oppressors. They waited for the moment when the festival called the *Gymnopædiæ* was in course of being solemnised at Sparta—a festival at which the choric performances of men and boys were so interwoven with Spartan religion as well as bodily training, that the Lacedæmonians would make no military movement until they were finished. At this critical moment, the Argeian Demos rose in insurrection; and after a sharp contest, gained

¹ Pausanias, ii. 20, 1.

² See Herodot. v. 87; Euripid. *Hecub.* 1152, and the note of Musgrave on line 1135 of that drama.

a victory over the oligarchy, some of whom were slain, while others only saved themselves by flight. Even at the first instant of danger, pressing messages had been sent to Sparta for aid. But the Lacedæmonians at first peremptorily refused to move during the period of their festival: nor was it until messenger after messenger had arrived to set forth the pressing necessity of their friends, that they reluctantly put aside their festival to march towards Argos. They were too late: the precious moment had already passed by. They were met at Tegea by an intimation that their friends were overthrown, and Argos in possession of the victorious people. Nevertheless various exiles who had escaped still promised them success, urgently entreating them to proceed: but the Lacedæmonians refused to comply, returned to Sparta, and resumed their intermitted festival.¹

Thus was the oligarchy of Argos overthrown—after a continuance of about four months,² from February to June 417 B.C.—and the chosen Thousand regiment either dissolved or destroyed. The movement excited great sympathy in several Peloponnesian cities,³ who were becoming jealous of the exorbitant preponderance of Sparta. Nevertheless the Argeian Demos though victorious within the city, felt so much distrust of being able to maintain themselves, that they sent envoys to Sparta to plead their cause and to entreat favourable treatment: a proceeding which proves the insurrection to have been spontaneous, not fomented by Athens. But the envoys of the expelled oligarchs were there to confront them, and the Lacedæmonians, after a lengthened discussion, adjudging the Demos to have been guilty of wrong, proclaimed the resolution of sending forces to put them down. Still the habitual tardiness of Lacedæmonian habits prevented any immediate or separate movement. Their allies were to be summoned, none being very zealous in the cause,—and least of all at this moment when the period of harvest was at hand: so that about three months intervened before any actual force was brought together.

¹ Thucyd. v. 82; Diodor. xii. 80.

² Diodorus (xii. 80) says that it lasted eight months: but this, if correct at all, must be taken as beginning from the alliance between Sparta and Argos, and not from the first establishment of the

oligarchy. The narrative of Thucydides does not allow more than four months for the duration of the latter.

³ Thucyd. v. 82. *ἐνθροῦσαν δὲ τὴν τευχισμὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ τοῖς πόλεων.*

This important interval was turned to account by the Argeian Demos, who, being plainly warned that they were to look on Sparta only as an enemy, immediately renewed their alliance with Athens. Regarding her as their main refuge, they commenced the building of long walls to connect their city with the sea, in order that the road might always be open for supplies and reinforcement from Athens in case they should be confined to their walls by a superior Spartan force. The whole Argeian population—men and women, free and slave—set about the work with the utmost ardour: while Alkibiadēs brought assistance from Athens¹—especially skilled masons and carpenters, of whom they stood in much need. The step may probably have been suggested by himself, as it was the same which, two years before, he had urged upon the inhabitants of Patræ. But the construction of walls adequate for defence, along the line of four miles and a half between Argos and the sea,² required a long time. Moreover the oligarchical party within the town, as well as the exiles without—a party defeated but not annihilated—strenuously urged the Lacedæmonians to put an end to the work, and even promised them a counter-revolutionary movement in the town as soon as they drew near to assist—the same intrigue which had been entered into by the oligarchical party at Athens forty years before, when the walls down to Peiræus were in course of erection.³ Accordingly about the end of September (417 B.C.), King Agis conducted an army of Lacedæmonians and allies against Argos, drove the population within the city, and destroyed so much of the Long Walls as had been already raised. But the oligarchical party within were not able to realize their engagements of rising in arms, so that he was obliged to retire after merely ravaging the territory and taking the town of Hysizæ, where he put to death all the freemen who fell into his hands. After his departure, the Argeians retaliated these ravages upon the neighbouring territory of Phlius, where the exiles from Argos chiefly resided.⁴

¹ Thucyd. v. 82. *Kal oi mèn 'Aργείοι παρήμει, καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ γυναῖκες καὶ οἰκέται, ἐτείχιζον.* &c. Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 15.

² Pausanias, ii. 36, 3.

³ Thucyd. i. 107.

⁴ Thucyd. v. 83. Diodorus inaccurately states that the Argeians had

already built their long walls down to the sea—*πυθόμενοι τοὺς 'Αργείους φκοδομηκέναι τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης* (xii. 81). Thucydides uses the participle of the present tense—*τὰ οἰκοδομούμενα τεῖχη ἐλόντες καὶ κατασκάψαντες*, &c.

The close neighbourhood of such exiles—together with the declared countenance of Sparta, and the continued schemes of the oligarchical party within the walls—kept the Argeian democracy in perpetual uneasiness and alarm throughout the winter, in spite of their recent victory and the suppression of the dangerous regiment of a Thousand. To relieve them in part from embarrassment, Alkibiadēs was despatched thither early in the spring with an Athenian armament and twenty triremes. His friends and guests appear to have been now in ascendancy, as leaders of the democratical government; and in concert with them, he selected 300 marked oligarchical persons, whom he carried away and deposited in various Athenian islands, as hostages for the quiescence of the party (B.C. 416). Another ravaging march was also undertaken by the Argeians into the territory of Phlius, wherein however they sustained nothing but loss. And again about the end of September, the Lacedæmonians gave the word for a second expedition against Argos. But having marched as far as the borders, they found the sacrifices (always offered previous to leaving their own territory) so unfavourable that they returned back and disbanded their forces. The Argeian oligarchical party, in spite of the hostages recently taken from them, had been on the watch for this Lacedæmonian force, and had projected a rising; or at least were suspected of doing so—to such a degree that some of them were seized and imprisoned by the government, while others made their escape.¹ Later in the same winter, however, the Lacedæmonians became more fortunate with their border sacrifices,—entered the Argeian territory in conjunction with their allies (except the Corinthians, who refused to take part)—and established the Argeian oligarchical exiles at Orneæ; from which town these latter were again speedily expelled, after the retirement of the Lacedæmonian army, by the Argeian democracy with the aid of an Athenian reinforcement.²

¹ Thucyd. v. 116. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, μελλήσαντες εἰς τὴν Ἀργεῖαν στρατεῖν ἀνεχώρησαν. Καὶ Ἀργεῖοι διὰ τὴν ἐκείνων μέλλειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὰς ὑποσπῆσαντες, τοὺς μὲν ἐνέλαβον, οἱ δ' αὐτοὺς καὶ διέφυγον.
I presume μέλλειν here is not used

in its ordinary meaning of *waiting, delay*, but is to be construed by the previous verb μελλήσαντες, and agreeably to the analogy of iv. 126—"prospect of action immediately impending;" compare Diodor. xii. 81.

² Thucyd. vi. 7.

To maintain the renewed democratical government of Argos, against enemies both internal and external, was an important policy to Athens, as affording the basis, which might afterwards be extended, of an anti-Laconian party in Peloponnesus. But at the present time the Argeian alliance was a drain and an exhaustion rather than a source of strength to Athens; very different from the splendid hopes which it had presented prior to the battle of Mantinea—hopes of supplanting Sparta in her ascendancy within the Isthmus. It is remarkable, that in spite of the complete alienation of feeling between Athens and Sparta—and continued reciprocal hostilities, in an indirect manner, so long as each was acting as ally of some third party—nevertheless neither the one nor the other would formally renounce the sworn alliance, nor obliterate the record inscribed on its stone column. Both parties shrank from proclaiming the real truth, though each half-year brought them a step nearer to it in fact. Thus during the course of the present summer (416 B.C.) the Athenian and Messenian garrison at Pylus became more active than ever in their incursions on Laconia, and brought home large booty; upon which the Lacedæmonians, though still not renouncing the alliance, publicly proclaimed their willingness to grant what we may call letters of marque, to any one, for privateering against Athenian commerce. The Corinthians also, on private grounds of quarrel, commenced hostilities against the Athenians.¹ Yet still Sparta and her allies remained in a state of formal peace with Athens: the Athenians resisted all the repeated solicitations of the Argeians to induce them to make a landing on any part of Laconia and commit devastation.² Nor was the licence of free intercourse for individuals as yet suspended. We cannot doubt that the Athenians were invited to the Olympic festival of 416 B.C. (the 91st Olympiad), and sent thither their solemn legation along with those of Sparta and other Dorian Greeks.

B.C. 416.
Nominal
peace, but
precarious
relations
between
Athens and
Sparta.

¹ Thucyd. v. 115.

² Thucyd. vi. 105. Andokidēs affirms, that the war was resumed by Athens against Sparta on the persuasion of the Argeians (Orat. de Pac. c. 1, 6, 3, 31, p. 93-105). This assertion is indeed partially true: the alliance

with Argos was one of the causes of the resumption of war, but only one among others, some of them more powerful. Thucydides tells us that the *persuasions* of Argos to induce Athens to throw up her alliance with Sparta, were repeated and unavailing.

Now that they had again become allies of Argos, the Athenians probably found out, more fully than they had before known, the intrigue carried on by the former Argeian government with the Macedonian Perdikkas. The effects of these intrigues however had made themselves felt even earlier in the conduct of that prince, who—having as an ally of Athens engaged to co-operate with an Athenian expedition projected under Nikias for the spring or summer of 417 B.C. against the Chalkidians of Thrace and Amphipolis—now withdrew his concurrence, receded from the alliance of Athens, and frustrated the whole scheme of expedition. The Athenians accordingly placed the ports of Macedonia under naval blockade, proclaiming Perdikkas an enemy.¹

Nearly five years had elapsed since the defeat of Kleon without any fresh attempt to recover Amphipolis: the project just alluded to appears to have been the first. The proceedings of the Athenians with regard to this important town afford ample proof of that want of wisdom on the part of their leading men Nikias and Alkibiadês, and of erroneous tendencies on the part of the body of the citizens, which we shall gradually find conducting their empire to ruin. Among all their possessions out of Attica, there was none so valuable as Amphipolis: the centre of a great commercial and mining region—situated on a large river and lake which the Athenian navy could readily command—and claimed by them with reasonable justice, since it was their original colony, planted by their wisest statesman Periklês. It had been lost only through unpardonable negligence on the part of their generals: and when lost, we should have expected to see the chief energies of Athens directed to the recovery of it; the more so, as if once recovered, it admitted of being made sure and retained as a future possession. Kleon is the only leading man who at once proclaims to his countrymen the important truth that it never can be recovered except by force. He strenuously urges his countrymen to make the requisite military effort, and prevails upon them in part to do so, but the attempt disgracefully fails—partly through his own incom-

Relations of Athens with Perdikkas of Macedonia.

Negligence of Athens about Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party: adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês.

¹ Thucyd. v. 83.

petence as commander, whether his undertaking of that duty was a matter of choice or of constraint—partly through the strong opposition and antipathy against him from so large a portion of his fellow-citizens which rendered the military force not hearty in the enterprise. Next, Nikias, Lachês, and Alkibiadês, all concur in making peace and alliance with the Lacedæmonians, under express promise and purpose to procure the restoration of Amphipolis. But after a series of diplomatic proceeding which display as much silly credulity in Nikias as selfish deceit in Alkibiadês, the result becomes evident, as Kleon had insisted, that peace will not restore to them Amphipolis, and that it can only be regained by force. The fatal defect of Nikias is now conspicuously seen : his inertness of character and incapacity of decided or energetic effort. When he discovered that he had been out-manceuvred by the Lacedæmonian diplomacy, and had fatally misadvised his countrymen into making important cessions on the faith of equivalents to come, we might have expected to find him spurred on by indignant repentance for this mistake, and putting forth his own strongest efforts, as well as those of his country, in order to recover those portions of her empire which the peace had promised, but did not restore. Instead of which he exhibits no effective movement, while Alkibiadês begins to display the defects of his political character, yet more dangerous than those of Nikias—the passion for showy, precarious, boundless, and even perilous novelties. It is only in the year 417 B.C., after the defeat of Mantinea had put an end to the political speculations of Alkibiadês in the interior of Peloponnesus, that Nikias projects an expedition against Amphipolis ; and even then it is projected only contingent upon the aid of Perdikkas, a prince of notorious perfidy. It was not by any half-exertions of force that the place could be regained, as the defeat of Kleon had sufficiently proved. We obtain from these proceedings a fair measure of the foreign politics of Athens at this time, during what is called the peace of Nikias, preparing us for that melancholy catastrophe which will be developed in the coming chapters—where she is brought near to ruin by the defects of Nikias and Alkibiadês combined ; for by singular misfortune she does not reap the benefit of the good qualities of either.

It was in one of the three years between 420-416 B.C., though we do not know in which, that the vote of ostracism took place, arising out of the contention between Nikias and Alkibiadês.¹ The political antipathy between the two having reached a point of great violence, it was proposed that a vote of ostracism should be taken, and this proposition (probably made by the partisans of Nikias, since Alkibiadês was the person most likely to be reputed dangerous) was adopted by the people. Hyperbolus the lamp-maker, son of Chremês, a speaker of considerable influence in the public assembly, strenuously supported it, hating Nikias not less than Alkibiadês. Hyperbolus is named by Aristophanês as having succeeded Kleon in the mastership of the rostrum in the Pnyx :² if this were true, his supposed demagogic pre-eminence would commence about September 422 B.C., the period of the death of Kleon. Long before that time, however, he had been among the chief butts of the comic authors, who ascribe to him the same baseness, dishonesty, impudence, and malignity in accusation, as that which they fasten upon Kleon, though in language which seems to imply an inferior idea of his power. And it may be doubted whether Hyperbolus ever succeeded to the same influence as had been enjoyed by Kleon, when we observe that Thucydidês does not name him in any of the important debates which took place at and after the peace of Nikias. Thucydidês only mentions him once—in 411 B.C., while he was in banishment under sentence of ostracism, and resident at Samos. He terms him, "one Hyperbolus, a person of bad character, who had been ostracised, not from fear of dangerous excess of dignity and power, but through his wickedness and his being felt as a disgrace to the city."³ This sentence of

¹ Dr. Thirlwall (History of Greece, vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 360) places this vote of ostracism in midwinter or early spring of 415 B.C., immediately before the Sicilian expedition.

His grounds for this opinion are derived from the Oration called Andokidês against Alkibiadês, the genuineness of which he seems to accept (see his Appendix II. on that subject, vol. iii. p. 494, seq.).

The more frequently I read over this Oration, the more do I feel persuaded

that it is a spurious composition of one or two generations after the time to which it professes to refer. My reasons for this opinion have been already stated in previous notes. I cannot think that Dr. Thirlwall's Appendix is successful in removing the objections against the genuineness of the speech. See my preceding ch. xlvii. note.

² Aristophan. Pac. 680.

³ Thucyd. viii. 73. 'Τπέρβολόν τι τινὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μοχθηρὸν ἄθρονον, ὠστρακισμένον οὐ διὰ δυνάμεως αἰ-

Thucydides is really the only evidence against Hyperbolus : for it is not less unjust in his case than in that of Kleon to cite the jests and libels of comedy as if they were so much authentic fact and trustworthy criticism. It was at Samos that Hyperbolus was slain by the oligarchical conspirators who were aiming to overthrow the democracy at Athens. We have no particular facts respecting him to enable us to test the general character given by Thucydides.

At the time when the resolution was adopted at Athens, to take a vote of ostracism suggested by the political dissension between Nikias and Alkibiades, about twenty-four years had elapsed since a similar vote had been resorted to ; the last example having been that of Periklēs and Thucydides¹ son of Melēsius, the latter of whom was ostracised about 442 B.C. The democratical constitution had become sufficiently confirmed to lessen materially the necessity for ostracism as a safeguard against individual usurpers : moreover there was now full confidence in the numerous Dikasteries as competent to deal with the greatest of such criminals—thus abating the necessity as conceived in men's minds, not less than the real necessity, for such precautionary intervention. Under such a state of things, altered reality as well as altered feeling, we are not surprised to find that the vote of ostracism now invoked, though we do not know the circumstances which immediately preceded it, ended in an abuse, or rather in a sort of parody, of the ancient preventive. At a moment of extreme heat of party-dispute, the friends of Alkibiades probably accepted the challenge of Nikias and concurred in supporting a vote of

Gradual desuetude of the ostracism, as the democracy became assured.

ἀξιώματος φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ ποτηρίαν καὶ αἰσχύνην τῆς πόλεως. According to Androton (Fragm. 48, ed. Didot)—ὡστρακισμένον διὰ φανόθητα.

Compare about Hyperbolus, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11 ; Plutarch, Alkibiades, c. 13 ; Ælian. V. H. xii. 43 ; Theopompus, Fragm. 102, 103, ed. Didot.

¹ I ought properly to say, the last example fairly comparable to this struggle between Nikias and Alkibiades, to whom, as rival politicians and men of great position, Periklēs and Thucydides bore a genuine analogy. There had been one sentence of ostracism

passed more recently ; that against Damon, the musical teacher, sophist, and companion of Periklēs. The political enemies of Periklēs procured that Damon should be ostracised, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 4). This was a great abuse and perversion of the ostracism, even in its principle. We know not how it was brought about : nor can I altogether shut out a suspicion, that Damon was sentenced to banishment, as a consequence either of trial or of non-appearance to an accusation—not ostracised at all.

ostracism ; each hoping to get rid of the opponent. The vote was accordingly decreed, but before it actually took place, the partisans of both changed their views, preferring to let the political dissension proceed without closing it by separating the combatants. But the ostracising vote, having been formally pronounced, could not now be prevented from taking place : it was always however perfectly general in its form, admitting of any citizen being selected for temporary banishment. Accordingly the two opposing parties, each doubtless including various clubs or *Hetæries*, and according to some accounts, the friends of Phæax also, united to turn the vote against some one else. They fixed upon a man whom all of them jointly disliked—Hyperbolus.¹ By thus concurring, they obtained a sufficient number of votes against him to pass the sentence which sent him into temporary banishment. But such a result was in no one's contemplation when the vote was decreed to take place, and Plutarch even represents the people as clapping their hands at it as a good joke. It was presently recognised by every one, seemingly even by the enemies of Hyperbolus, as a gross abuse of the ostracism. And the language of Thucydidês himself distinctly implies this : for if we even grant that Hyperbolus fully deserved the censure which that historian bestows, no one could treat his presence as dangerous to the commonwealth : nor was the ostracism introduced to meet low dishonesty or wickedness. It was, even before, passing out of the political morality of Athens ; and this sentence consummated its extinction, so that we never hear of it as employed afterwards. It had been extremely valuable, in earlier days, as a security to the growing democracy against individual usurpation of power, and against dangerous exaggeration of rivalry between individual leaders : but the democracy was now strong enough to dispense with such exceptional protection. Yet if Alkibiadês had returned as victor from Syracuse, it is highly probable that the Athenians would have had no other means than the precautionary antidote of ostracism to save themselves from him as despot.

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 13 ; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 11. Theophrastus says that the violent opposition at first ; and the coalition afterwards, was not

between Nikias and Alkibiadês, but between Phæax and Alkibiadês. The coalition of votes and parties may well have included all three.

It was in the beginning of summer 416 B.C., that the Athenians undertook the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Mélos—one of the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thêra, which was not already included in their empire. Mélos and Thêra were both ancient colonies of Lacedæmon, with whom they had strong sympathies of lineage. They had never joined the confederacy of Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens; but at the same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war against her, nor given her any ground of complaint,¹ until she landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She now renewed her attempt, sending against the island a considerable force under Kleomêdês and Tisias: thirty Athenian triremes, with six Chian, and two Lesbian—1200 Athenian hoplites, and 1500 hoplites, from the allies—with 300 bowmen and twenty horse-bowmen. These officers, after disembarking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject-ally of Athens.

B.C. 416.
Siege of
Mélos by the
Athenians.

It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece—even in governments not professedly democratical—to discuss propositions for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the present occasion the Melian leaders departed from this practice, admitting the envoys only to a private conversation with their executive council. Of the conversation which passed, Thucydidês professes to give a detailed and elaborate account—at surprising length, considering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct observations, with as many replies, interchanged between the Athenian envoys and the Melians; no one of them separately long, and some very short—but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very impressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what we here read in Thucydidês is in far larger proportion his own, and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a public harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportunity of consulting the recollection of many different persons: it was a private conversation, wherein three or four

Dialogue set
forth by
Thucydidês,
between the
Athenian en-
voys and the
Executive
Council of
Mélos.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 91.

Athenians, and perhaps ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now as all the Melian prisoners of military age and certainly all those leading citizens then in the town who had conducted this interview, were slain immediately after the capture of the town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose report Thucydides could possibly have heard what really passed. That he did hear either from or through them, the general character of what passed, I make no doubt: but there is no ground for believing that he received from them anything like the consecutive stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative reasoning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.

The Athenian begins by restricting the subject of discussion to the mutual interests of both parties in the peculiar circumstances in which they now stand; in spite of the disposition of the Melians to enlarge the range of topics, by introducing considerations of justice and appealing to the sentiment of impartial critics. He will not multiply words to demonstrate the just origin of the Athenian empire, erected on the expulsion of the Persians—or to set forth injury suffered, as pretext for the present expedition. Nor will he listen to any plea on the part of the Melians, that they, though colonists of Sparta, have never fought alongside of her or done Athens wrong. He presses upon them to aim at what is attainable under existing circumstances, since they know as well as he, that justice in the reasoning of mankind is settled according to equal compulsion on both sides; the strong doing what their power allows, and the weak submitting to it.¹ To this the

Language represented by Thucydides as having been held by the Athenian envoys—with the replies of the Melians.

¹ In reference to this argumentation of the Athenian envoy, I call attention to the attack and bombardment of Copenhagen by the English Government in 1807, together with the language used by the English envoy to the Danish Prince Regent on the subject. We read as follows in M. Thiers' *Histoire du Consulat. et de l'Empire* :—

“L'agent choisi étoit digne de sa mission. C'étoit M. Jackson qui avoit été autrefois chargé d'affaires en France, avant l'arrivée de Lord Whitworth à Paris, mais qu'on n'avoit pas pu y laisser, à cause du mauvais esprit qu'il manifestoit en toute occasion. Introduit

auprès du régent, il alléguait de prétendues stipulations secrètes, en vertu desquelles le Danemark devoit, (disoit-on) de gré ou de force, faire partie d'une coalition contre l'Angleterre : il donna comme raison d'agir la nécessité où se trouvoit le cabinet Britannique de prendre des précautions pour que les forces navales du Danemark et le passage du Sund ne tombassent pas au pouvoir des François : et en conséquence il demanda au nom de son gouvernement, qu'on livrât à l'armée Angloise la forteresse de Kronenberg qui commande le Sund, le port de Copenhague, et enfin la flotte elle-même—promettant de garder le

Melians reply, that (omitting all appeal to justice and speaking only of what was expedient) they hold it to be even expedient for Athens not to break down the common moral sanction of mankind, but to permit that equity and justice shall still remain as a refuge for men in trouble, with some indulgence even towards those who may be unable to make out a case of full and strict right. Most of all was this the interest of Athens herself, inasmuch as her ruin, if it ever occurred, would be awful both as punishment to herself and as lesson to others "We are not afraid of *that* (rejoined the Athenian) even if our empire should be overthrown. It is not imperial cities like Sparta who deal harshly with the conquered. Moreover our present contest is not undertaken against Sparta—it is a contest to determine whether subjects shall by their own attack prevail over their rulers. This is a risk for us to judge of: in the mean time let us remind you that we come here for the advantage of our own empire, and that we are now speaking with a view to your safety—wishing to get you under our empire without trouble to ourselves, and to preserve you for the mutual benefit of both of us."—"Cannot you leave us alone, and let us be your friends instead of enemies, but neither allies of you nor of Sparta?"—said the Melians. "No (is the reply)—your friendship does us more harm than your enmity: your friendship is a proof of our weakness, in the eyes of our subject-allies—your enmity will give a demonstration of our power."—"But do your subjects really take such a measure of equity, as to put us, who have no sort of connexion with you, on the same footing with themselves, most of whom are your own colonists, while many of them have even revolted from you and been reconquered?"—"They do:

tout en dépôt, pour le compte du Danemark, qui seroit remis en possession de ce qu'on alloit lui enlever, dès que le danger seroit passé. M. Jackson assura que le Danemark ne perdrait rien, que l'on se conduiroit chez lui en auxiliaires et en amis—que les troupes Britanniques payeroient tout ce qu'elles consommeroient.—Et avec quoi, répondit le prince indigné, payeriez-vous notre honneur perdu, si nous adhérons à cette infame proposition?—Le prince continuant, et opposant à cette perfide intention la conduite loyale du Danemark, qui n'avoit pris aucune précau-

tion contre les Anglois, qui les avoit toutes prises contre les François, ce dont on abusoit pour le surprendre—*M. Jackson répondit à cette juste indignation par une insolente familiarité, disant que la guerre étoit la guerre, qu'il falloit se résigner à ces nécessités, et céder au plus fort quand on étoit le plus foible.* Le prince congédia l'agent Anglois avec des paroles fort dures, et lui déclara qu'il alloit se transporter à Copenhague, pour y remplir ses devoirs de prince et de citoyen Danois." (Thiers, Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire, tome viii. livre xxviii. p. 190.)

for they think that both one and the other have fair ground for claiming independence, and that if you are left independent, this arises only from your power and from our fear to attack you. So that your submission will not only enlarge our empire, but strengthen our security throughout the whole; especially as you are islanders, and feeble islanders too, while we are lords of the sea.”—“But surely that very circumstance is in other ways a protection to you, as evincing your moderation: for if you attack us, you will at once alarm all neutrals, and convert them into enemies.”—“We are in little fear of continental cities, who are out of our reach and not likely to take part against us,—but only of islanders; either yet unincorporated in our empire, like you,—or already in our empire and discontented with the constraint which it imposes. It is such islanders who by their ill-judged obstinacy are likely, with their eyes open, to bring both us and themselves into peril.”—“We know well (said the Melians, after some other observations had been interchanged) how terrible it is to contend against your superior power, and your good fortune; nevertheless we trust that in point of fortune we shall receive fair treatment from the Gods, since we stand upon grounds of right against injustice—and as to our inferior power, we trust that the deficiency will be made up by our ally Sparta, whose kindred race will compel her from very shame to aid us.”—“We too (replied the Athenians) think that we shall not be worse off than others in regard to the divine favour. For we neither advance any claim, nor do any act, overpassing that which men believe in regard to the Gods, and wish in regard to themselves. What we believe about the Gods is the same as that which we see to be the practice of men: the impulse of nature inclines them of necessity to rule over what is inferior in force to themselves. This is the principle on which we now proceed—not having been the first either to lay it down or to follow it, but finding it established and likely to continue for ever—and knowing well too that you or others in our position would do as much. As for your expectations from the Lacedæmonians, founded on the disgrace of their remaining deaf to your call, we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, but we at the same time deprecate such foolishness. For the Lacedæmonians are indeed most studious of excellence in regard to themselves and their own national customs. But

looking at their behaviour towards others, we affirm roundly, and can prove by many examples of their history, that they are of all men the most conspicuous in construing what is pleasing as if it were honourable, and what is expedient as if it were just. Now that is not the state of mind which you require, to square with your desperate calculations of safety."

After various other observations interchanged in a similar tenor, the Athenian envoys, strenuously urging upon the Melians to reconsider the matter more cautiously Refusal of the Melians to submit. among themselves, withdrew, and after a certain interval, were recalled by the Melian council to hear the following words—"We hold to the same opinion as at first, men of Athens. We shall not surrender the independence of a city which has already stood for 700 years: we shall yet make an effort to save ourselves—relying on that favourable fortune which the Gods have hitherto vouchsafed to us, as well as upon aid from men, and especially from the Lacedæmonians. We request that we may be considered as your friends, but as hostile to neither party; and that you will leave the island after concluding such a truce as may be mutually acceptable."—"Well (said the Athenian envoys), you alone seem to consider future contingencies as clearer than the facts before your eyes, and to look at an uncertain distance through your own wishes, as if it were present reality. You have staked your all upon the Lacedæmonians, upon fortune, and upon fond hopes; and with your all you will come to ruin."

The siege was forthwith commenced. A wall of circumvallation, distributed in portions among the different allies of Athens, was constructed round the town; Siege and capture of Mêlos. which was left under full blockade both by sea and land, while the rest of the armament retired home. The town remained blocked up for several months. During the course of that time the besieged made two successful sallies, which afforded them some temporary relief, and forced the Athenians to send an additional detachment under Philokratês. At length the provisions within were exhausted; plots for betrayal commenced among the Melians themselves, so that they were constrained to surrender at discretion. The Athenians resolved to put to death all the men of military age,

and to sell the women and children as slaves. Who the proposer of this barbarous resolution was, Thucydides does not say; but Plutarch and others inform us that Alkibiades¹ was strenuous in supporting it. Five hundred Athenian settlers were subsequently sent thither, to form a new community; apparently not as kleruchs, or out-citizens of Athens,—but as new Melians.²

Taking the proceedings of the Athenians towards Mæla from the beginning to the end, they form one of the grossest and most inexcusable pieces of cruelty combined with injustice which Grecian history presents to us. In appreciating the cruelty of such wholesale executions, we ought to recollect that the laws of war placed the prisoner altogether at the disposal of his conqueror, and that an Athenian garrison, if captured by the Corinthians in Naupaktus, Nisæa, or elsewhere, would assuredly have undergone the same fate, unless in so far as they might be kept for exchange. But the treatment of the Melians goes beyond all rigour of the laws of war; for they had never been at war with Athens, nor had they done anything to incur her enmity. Moreover the acquisition of the island was of no material value to Athens; not sufficient to pay the expenses of the armament employed in its capture. And while the gain was thus in every sense slender, the shock to Grecian feeling by the whole proceeding seems to have occasioned serious mischief to Athens. Far from tending to strengthen her entire empire by sweeping in this small insular population who had hitherto been neutral and harmless, it raised nothing but odium against her, and was treasured up in after times as among the first of her misdeeds.

To gratify her pride of empire by a new conquest—easy to effect, though of small value—was doubtless her chief motive; probably also strengthened by pique against Sparta, between

¹ Plutarch, Alkibiades, c. 16. This is doubtless one of the statements which the composer of the Oration of Andokides against Alkibiades found current in respect to the conduct of the latter (sect. 123). Nor is there any reason for questioning the truth of it.

² Thucyd. v. 106. τὸ δὲ χωρίον αὐτοὶ φέκσαν, ἀπολίκους ὕστερον πεντα-

κόλους πέμψαντες. Lysander restored some Melians to the island after the battle of Ægospotami (Xenoph. Hæll. ii. 2, 9): some therefore must have escaped or must have been spared, or some of the youths and women, sold as slaves at the time of the capture, must have been redeemed or emancipated from captivity.

whom and herself a thoroughly hostile feeling subsisted—and by a desire to humiliate Sparta through the Melians. This passion for new acquisition, superseding the more reasonable hopes of recovering the lost portions of her empire, will be seen in the coming chapters breaking out with still more fatal predominance.

Both these two points, it will be observed, are prominently marked in the dialogue set forth by Thucydides. I have already stated that this dialogue can hardly represent what actually passed, except as to a few general points, which the historian has followed out into deductions and illustrations,¹ thus dramatising the given situation in a powerful and characteristic manner. The language put into the mouth of the Athenian envoys is that of pirates and robbers, as Dionysius of Halikarnassus² long ago remarked, intimating his suspicion that Thucydides had so set out the case for the purpose of discrediting the country which had sent him into exile. Whatever may be thought of this suspicion, we may at least affirm that the arguments which he here ascribes to Athens are not in harmony even with the defects of the Athenian character. Athenian speakers are more open to the charge of equivocal wording, multiplication of false pretences, softening down the bad points of their case, putting an amiable name upon vicious acts, employing what is properly called *sophistry* where their purpose needs it.³ Now the language of the envoy at Mélos, which has been sometimes cited as illustrating the immorality of the class or profession (falsely called a school) named Sophists at Athens, is above all things remarkable for a sort of audacious frankness—a disdain not merely of sophistry in the modern sense of the word, but even of such plausible excuse as might have been offered. It has been strangely argued as if "*the good old plan, That they should take who have the power, And they should keep who can*"—had been first discovered and openly promulgated by Athenian sophists: whereas the true purpose and value of sophists,

View taken
by Thucy-
dides of this
incident.

¹ Such is also the opinion of Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* vol. iii. ch. xxiv. p. 348.

² Dionys. Hal. *Judic. de Thucyd.* c. 37-42, p. 906-920 Reisk.: compare the remarks in his *Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium, de Præcipuis Historicis*, p. 774

Reisk.

³ Plutarch, *Alkibiad.* 16. τοὺς Ἀθηναίους δεῖ τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἐνομήτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένους, παιδείας καὶ φιλοanthropίας.—To the same purpose Plutarch, *Solon*, c. 15.

even in the modern and worst sense of the word (putting aside the perversion of applying that sense to the persons called Sophists at Athens), is, to furnish plausible matter of deceptive justification—so that the strong man may be enabled to act upon this “good old plan” as much as he pleases, but without avowing it, and while professing fair dealing or just retaliation for some imaginary wrong. The wolf in Æsop’s fable (of the Wolf and the Lamb) speaks like a sophist; the Athenian envoy at Mēlos speaks in a manner totally unlike a sophist, either in the Athenian sense or in the modern sense of the word; we may add, unlike an Athenian at all, as Dionysius has observed.

As a matter of fact and practice, it is true that stronger states in Greece and in the contemporary world, did habitually tend, as they have tended throughout the course of history down to the present day, to enlarge their power at the expense of the weaker. Every territory in Greece, except Attica and Arcadia, had been seized by conquerors who dispossessed or enslaved the prior inhabitants. We find Brasidas reminding his soldiers of the good sword of their forefathers, which had established dominion over men far more numerous than themselves, as matter of pride and glory; and when we come to the times of Philip and Alexander of Macedon, we shall see the lust of conquest reaching a pitch never witnessed among free Greeks. Of right thus founded on simple superiority of force, there were abundant examples to be quoted as parallels to the Athenian conquest of Mēlos: but that which is unparalleled is the mode adopted by the Athenian envoy of justifying it, or rather of setting aside all justification, looking at the actual state of civilization in Greece. A barbarous invader casts his sword into the scale in lieu of argument: a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea if he can—a false plea or sham plea, if he has no better. But the Athenian envoy neither copies the contemptuous silence of the barbarian, nor the smooth lying of the civilized invader. Though coming from the most cultivated city in Greece, where the vices prevalent were those of

¹ Compare also what Brasidas says in his speech to the Akanthians, v. 80.—*ἰσχυρὸς δίκαιώσει, ἢ ἡ τύχη ἔδωκεν*, &c.

refinement and not of barbarism, he disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy more than would have been done by an envoy even of Argos or Korkyra. He even disdains to mention—what might have been said with perfect truth as matter of fact, whatever may be thought of its sufficiency as a justification—that the Melians had enjoyed for the last fifty years the security of the Ægean waters at the cost of Athens and her allies, without any payment of their own.

So at least he is made to do in the Thucydidean dramatic fragment—*Μήλου Ἀλώσις* (the Capture of Mēlos) —if we may parody the title of the lost tragedy of Phrynichus—"The Capture of Miletus." And I think a comprehensive view of the history of Thucy-
Place which it occupies in the general historical conception of Thucydides.
didēs will suggest to us the explanation of this drama, with its powerful and tragical effect. The capture of Mēlos comes immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which was resolved upon three or four months afterwards, and despatched during the course of the following summer. That expedition was the gigantic effort of Athens, which ended in the most ruinous catastrophe known to ancient history. From such a blow it was impossible for Athens to recover. Though crippled indeed, she struggled against its effects with surprising energy; but her fortune went on in the main declining—yet with occasional moments of apparent restoration—until her complete prostration and subjugation by Lysander. Now Thucydidēs, just before he gets upon the plane of this descending progress, makes a halt, to illustrate the sentiment of Athenian power in its most exaggerated, insolent, and cruel manifestation, by his dramatic fragment of the envoys at Mēlos. It will be recollected that Herodotus, when about to describe the forward march of Xerxēs into Greece, destined to terminate in such fatal humiliation—impresses his readers with an elaborate idea of the monarch's insolence and superhuman pride by various conversations between him and the courtiers about him as well as by other anecdotes, combined with the overwhelming specifications of the muster at Doriskus. Such moral contrasts and juxtapositions, especially that of ruinous reverse following upon overweening good fortune, were highly interesting to the Greek mind. And Thucydidēs—having before him an act of great injustice and cruelty on the part of Athens, com-

mitted exactly at this point of time—has availed himself of the form of dialogue, for once in his history, to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis. They are, however, his own sentiments, conceived as suitable to the situation : not those of the Athenian envoy—still less, those of the Athenian public—least of all, those of that much calumniated class of men, the Athenian sophists.

CHAPTER LVII.

SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE
GELONIAN DYNASTY.

IN the preceding chapters, I have brought down the general history of the Peloponnesian war to the time immediately preceding the memorable Athenian expedition against Syracuse, which changed the whole face of the war. At this period, and for some time to come, the history of the Peloponnesian Greeks becomes intimately blended with that of the Sicilian Greeks. But hitherto the connexion between the two has been merely occasional, and of little reciprocal effect; so that I have thought it for the convenience of the reader to keep the two streams entirely separate, omitting the proceedings of Athens in Sicily during the first ten years of the war. I now proceed to fill up this blank; to recount as much as can be made out of Sicilian events during the interval between 461—416 B.C.; and to assign the successive steps whereby the Athenians entangled themselves in ambitious projects against Syracuse, until they at length came to stake the larger portion of their force upon that fatal hazard.

The extinction of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse,¹ followed by the expulsion or retirement of all the other despots throughout the island, left the various Grecian cities to re-organise themselves in free and self-constituted governments. Unfortunately our memorials respecting this revolution are miserably scanty; but there is enough to indicate that it was something much more than a change from single-headed to popular government. It included, farther, transfers on the largest scale both of inhabitants and of property. The preceding despots had sent many old citizens into exile, transplanted others from one part of Sicily to another, and pro-

Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and of other despots from the other Sicilian towns.

¹ See above, ch. xliii., for the history of these events. I now take up the thread from that chapter.

vided settlements for numerous immigrants and mercenaries devoted to their interest. Of these proceedings much was reversed, when the dynasties were overthrown, so that the personal and proprietary revolution was more complicated and perplexing than the political. After a period of severe commotion, an accommodation was concluded, whereby the adherents of the expelled dynasty were planted partly in the territory of Messênê, partly in the re-established city of Kamarina, in the eastern portion of the southern coast bordering on Syracuse.¹

But though peace was thus re-established, these large mutations of inhabitants, first begun by the despots, —and the incoherent mixture of races, religious institutions, dialects, &c., which was brought about unavoidably during the process—left throughout Sicily a feeling of local instability, very different from the

Large changes of resident inhabitants—effects of this fact.

¹ Mr. Mitford, in the spirit which is usual with him, while enlarging upon the suffering occasioned by this extensive revolution both of inhabitants and of property throughout Sicily, takes no notice of the cause in which it originated—viz. the number of foreign mercenaries whom the Gelonian dynasty had brought in and enrolled as new citizens (Gelon alone having brought in 10,000, Diodor. xi. 72), and the number of exiles whom they had banished and dispossessed.

I will here notice only one of his misrepresentations respecting the events of this period, because it is definite as well as important (vol. iv. p. 9, chap. xviii. sect. 1).

“But thus (he says) in every little state, lands were left to become public property, or to be assigned to new individual owners. *Everywhere, then, that favourite measure of democracy, the equal division of the lands of the state, was resolved upon*: a measure impossible to be perfectly executed; impossible to be maintained as executed; and of very doubtful advantage, if it could be perfectly executed and perfectly maintained.”

Again—sect. iii. p. 23, he speaks of “that incomplete and iniquitous partition of land,” &c.

Now, upon this we may remark—

1. The *equal division of the lands of the state*, here affirmed by Mr. Mitford,

is a pure fancy of his own. He has no authority for it whatever. Diodorus says (xi. 76) *κατεκληρονομήσθη τὴν γῆν, &c.*; and again (xi. 86) he speaks of *τὴν ἀναδασμὸν τῆς χώρας*, the *re-division of the territory*: but respecting *equality of division*—not one word does he say. Nor can any principle of division, in this case, be less probable than equality. For one of the great motives of the re-division, was to provide for those exiles who had been dispossessed by the Gelonian dynasty: and these men would receive lots, greater or less on the ground of compensation for the greater or less as it might have been. Besides, immediately after the re-division, we find rich and poor mentioned just as before (xi. 86).

2. Next Mr. Mitford calls “the equal division of all the lands of the state the favourite measure of democracy.” This is an assertion not less incorrect. Not a single democracy in Greece (so far as my knowledge extends) can be produced in which such equal partition is ever known to have been carried into effect. In the Athenian democracy, especially, not only there existed constantly great inequality of landed property, but the oath annually taken by the popular Heliastic judges had a special clause, protesting emphatically against *re-division of the land or extinction of debts*.

long traditional tenures in Peloponnesus and Attica, and numbered by foreign enemies among the elements of its weakness.¹ The wonder indeed rather is, that such real and powerful causes of disorder were soon so efficaciously controlled by the popular governments, that the half-century now approaching was decidedly the most prosperous and undisturbed period in the history of the island.

The southern coast of Sicily was occupied (beginning from the westward) by Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Kamarina. Then came Syracuse, possessing the south-eastern cape, and the southern portion of the eastern coast : next, on the eastern coast, Leontini, Katana, and Naxos : Messênê, on the strait adjoining Italy. The centre of the island and even much of the northern coast, was occupied by the non-Hellenic Sikels and Sikans ; on this coast, Himera was the only Grecian city. Between Himera and Cape Lilybæum, the western corner of the island was occupied by the non-Hellenic cities of Eggesta and Eryx, and by the Carthaginian seaports, of which Panormus (Palermo) was the principal.

Of these various Grecian cities, all independent, Syracuse was the first in power, Agrigentum the second. The causes above noticed, disturbing the first commencement of popular governments in all of them, were most powerfully operative at Syracuse. We do not know the particulars of the democratical constitution which was there established, but its stability was threatened by more than one ambitious pretender, eager to seize the sceptre of Gelo and Hiero. The most prominent among these pretenders was Tyndarion, who employed a considerable fortune in distributing largesses and procuring partisans among the poor. His political designs were at length so openly manifested, that he was brought to trial, condemned, and put to death ; yet not without an abortive insurrection of his partisans to rescue him. After several leading citizens had tried and failed in a similar manner, the people thought it expedient to pass a law similar to the Athenian ostracism, authorising the infliction of temporary preventive banishment.² Under this law several

Relative power and condition of the Sicilian cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. Ostracism tried and abandoned.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 17.

² Diodor. xi. 86, 87. The institution at Syracuse was called the *petalism*,

powerful citizens were actually and speedily banished; and such was the abuse of the new engine by the political parties in the city, that men of conspicuous position are said to have become afraid of meddling with public affairs. Thus put in practice, the institution is said to have given rise to new political contentions, not less violent than those which it checked, insomuch that the Syracusans found themselves obliged to repeal the law not long after its introduction. We should have been glad to learn some particulars concerning this political experiment, beyond the meagre abstract given by Diodorus—and especially to know the precautionary securities by which the application of the ostracising sentence was restrained at Syracuse. Perhaps no care was taken to copy the checks and formalities provided by Kleisthenēs at Athens, yet under all circumstances, the institution, though tutelary if reserved for its proper emergencies, was eminently open to abuse, so that we have no reason to wonder that abuse occurred, especially at a period of great violence and discord. The wonder rather is, that it was so little abused at Athens.

Although the ostracism (or petalism) at Syracuse was speedily discontinued, it may probably have left a salutary impression behind, as far as we can judge from the fact that new pretenders to despotism are not hereafter mentioned. The republic increases in wealth and manifests an energetic action in foreign affairs. The

Power and
foreign ex-
ploits of
Syracuse.

B.C. 453.

Syracusan admiral Phaëllus was despatched with a powerful fleet to repress the piracies of the Tyrrhenian maritime towns, and after ravaging the island of Elba returned home, under the suspicion of having been bought off by bribes from the enemy; on which accusation he was tried and banished—a second fleet of sixty triremes, under Apellēs being sent to the same regions. The new admiral not only plundered many parts of the Tyrrhenian coast, but also carried his ravages into the island of Corsica (at that time a Tyrrhenian possession), and reduced the island of Elba completely. His return was signalled by a large number of captives and a rich booty.¹

because in taking the votes, the name of the citizen intended to be banished was written upon a leaf of olive, instead of a shell or potsherd.

¹ Diodor. xi. 87, 88.

Meanwhile the great antecedent revolutions, among the Grecian cities in Sicily, had raised a new spirit among the Sikels of the interior, and inspired the Sikel prince Duketius, a man of spirit and ability, with large ideas of aggrandisement. Many exiled Greeks having probably sought service with him, it was either by their suggestion, or from having himself caught the spirit of Hellenic improvement, that he commenced the plan of bringing the petty Sikel communities into something like city-life and collective co-operation. Having acquired glory by the capture of the Grecian town of Morgantina, he induced all the Sikel communities (with the exception of Hybla) to enter into a sort of federative compact. Next, in order to obtain a central point for the new organization, he transferred his own little town from the hill top, called Menæ, down to a convenient spot of the neighbouring plain, near to the sacred precinct of the gods called Paliki.¹ As the veneration paid to these gods, determined in part by the striking volcanic manifestations in the neighbourhood, rendered this plain a suitable point of attraction for Sikels generally, Duketius was enabled to establish a considerable new city of Palikê, with walls of large circumference, and an ample range of adjacent land which he distributed among a numerous Sikel population, probably with some Greeks intermingled.

The powerful position which Duketius had thus acquired is attested by the aggressive character of his measures, intended gradually to recover a portion at least of that ground which the Greeks had appropriated at the expense of the indigenous population. The Sikel town of Ennesia had been seized by the Hieronian Greeks expelled from Ætna, and had received from them the name of Ætna.² Duketius now found means to reconquer it, after ensnaring by stratagem the leading magistrate. He was next bold enough to invade the territory of the Agrigentines, and to besiege one of their country garrisons called Motyum. We are impressed with a

B.C. 452.
Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town of Palikê.

B.C. 451.
Exploits of Duketius—he is defeated and becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, who spare him, and send him to Corinth.

¹ Diodor. xi. 78, 88, 90. The proceeding of Duketius is illustrated by the description of Dardanus in the Iliad, xx. 216.

Κτίσσει δὲ Δαρδανίην, ἐπεὶ οὕτω Ἴλιος ἱρή

Ἐν πεδίῳ πεπλόιστο, πόλιν μαρόπων ἀνθρώπων,
Ἄλλ' ἔθ' ὑπερείας ψικουν πολυπυδάκου Ἰδης.

Compare Plato, De Legg. iii. p. 681, 682.

² Diodor. xi. 76.

high idea of his power when we learn that the Agrigentines while marching to relieve the place, thought it necessary to invoke aid from the Syracusans, who sent to them a force under Bolkon. Over this united force Duketius gained a victory—in consequence of the treason or cowardice of Bolkon as the Syracusans believed—insomuch that they condemned him to death. In the succeeding year, however, the good fortune of the Sikel prince changed. The united army of these two powerful cities raised the blockade of Motyum, completely defeated him in the field, and dispersed all his forces. Finding himself deserted by his comrades and even on the point of being betrayed, he took the desperate resolution of casting himself upon the mercy of the Syracusans. He rode off by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city unknown, and sat down as a suppliant on the altar in the agora, surrendering himself together with all his territory. A spectacle thus unexpected brought together a crowd of Syracuse citizens exciting in them the strongest emotions: and when the magistrates convened the assembly for the purpose of deciding his fate, the voice of mercy was found paramount, in spite of the contrary recommendations of some of the political leaders. The most respected among the elder citizens—earnestly recommending mild treatment towards a foe thus fallen and suppliant, coupled with scrupulous regard not to bring upon the city the avenging hand of Nemesis—found their appeal to the generous sentiment of the people welcomed by one unanimous cry of "Save the suppliant."¹ Duketius, withdrawn from the altar, was sent off to Corinth under his engagement to live there quietly for the future; the Syracusans providing for his comfortable maintenance.

Duketius
breaks his
parole and
returns to
Sicily.

Amidst the cruelty habitual in ancient warfare, this remarkable incident excites mingled surprise and admiration. Doubtless the lenient impulse of the people mainly arose from their seeing Duketius actually before them in suppliant posture at their altar, instead of being called upon to determine his fate in his absence—just as the Athenian people were in like manner moved by the actual sight of the captive Dorieus, and induced

¹ Diodor. xi. 91, 92. 'Ο δὲ δῆμος ὁσπερ τινὶ μὲν φωνῇ σώζειν πάντας ἔβλεπον ἐκέλευεν.

to spare his life, on an occasion which will be hereafter recounted.¹ If in some instances the assembled people, obeying the usual vehemence of multitudinous sentiment, carried severities to excess,—so, in other cases, as well as in this, the appeal to their humane impulses will be found to have triumphed over prudential regard for future security. Such was the fruit which the Syracusans reaped for sparing Duketius, who, after residing a year or two at Corinth, violated his parole. Pretending to have received an order from the oracle, he assembled a number of colonists, whom he conducted into Sicily to found a city at Kalé Aktê on the northern coast belonging to the Sikels. We cannot doubt that when the Syracusans found in what manner their lenity was requited, the speakers who had recommended severe treatment would take great credit on the score of superior foresight.²

But the return of this energetic enemy was not the only mischief which the Syracusans suffered. Their resolution to spare Duketius had been adopted without the concurrence of the Agrigentines, who had helped to conquer him; and the latter, when they saw him again in the island and again formidable, were so indignant that they declared war against Syracuse. A standing jealousy prevailed between these two great cities, the first and second powers in Sicily. War actually broke out between them, wherein other Greek cities took part. After lasting some time, with various acts of hostility, and especially a serious

B.C. 446.
Conquests of
Syracuse in
the interior
of Sicily—
death of
Duketius.

¹ Xenophon, Hellen. i. 5, 19; Pausanias, vi. 7, 2.

² Mr. Mitford recounts as follows the return of Duketius to Sicily—"The Syracusan chiefs brought back Duce-tius from Corinth, apparently to make him instrumental to their own views for advancing the power of their commonwealth. They permitted, or rather encouraged, him to establish a colony of mixed people, Greeks and Sicels, at Kalé Aktê, on the northern coast of the island" (ch. xviii. sect. i. vol. iv. p. 13).

The statement that "the Syracusans brought back Duketius, or encouraged him to come back or to found the colony of Kalé Aktê," is a complete departure from Diodorus on the part of Mr. Mitford; who transforms a breach of parole on the part of the Sikel prince into an

ambitious manœuvre on the part of the Syracusan democracy. The words of Diodorus, the only authority in the case, are as follows (xii. 8):—Οὗτος δὲ (Duketius) ὀλίγον χρόνον μένας ἐν τῇ Κορίνθῳ, τὰς ὁμολογίας ἔλυσεν, καὶ προσποιησάμενος χρησμόν ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν αὐτῷ δεδοσθαι, κτίσαι τὴν Καλὴν Ἀκτὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον μετὰ πολλῶν οἰκητόρων συνελαβόντο δὲ καὶ τῶν Σικελῶν τινες, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Ἀρχωνίδης, ὁ τῶν Ἐρβηταίων δυναστεύων. Οὗτος μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν οἰκισμόν τῆς Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐγένετο Ἀκραγαντινοὶ δὲ, ἅμα μὲν φθονοῦντες τοῖς Συρακουσίοις, ἅμα δ' ἐγκαλοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι Δουκέτιον ὄντα κοινὸν πολέμον διέσωσαν ἔνευ τῆς Ἀκραγαντίνων γυνάμης, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις.

defeat of the Agrigentines at the river Himera, these latter solicited and obtained peace.¹ The discord between the two cities however had left leisure to Duketius to found the city of Kalê Aktê, and to make some progress in re-establishing his ascendancy over the Sikels, in which operation he was overtaken by death. He probably left no successor to carry on his plans, so that the Syracusans, pressing their attacks vigorously, reduced many of the Sikel townships in the island—regaining his former conquest Morgantinê, and subduing even the strong position and town called Trinakia,² after a brave and desperate resistance on the part of the inhabitants.

By this large accession both of subjects and of tribute, combined with her recent victory over Agrigentum, Syracuse was elevated to the height of power, and began to indulge schemes for extending her ascendancy throughout the island: with which view her horsemen were doubled in number, and one hundred new triremes were constructed.³ Whether any, or what steps were taken to realise her designs, our historian does not tell us. But the position of Sicily remains the same at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war: Syracuse, the first city as to power—indulging in ambitious dreams, if not in ambitious aggressions; Agrigentum, a jealous second, and almost a rival; the remaining Grecian states maintaining their independence, yet not without mistrust and apprehension.

Though the particular phenomena of this period, however, have not come to our knowledge, we see enough to prove that it was one of great prosperity for Sicily. The wealth, commerce, and public monuments of Agrigentum, especially, appear to have even surpassed those of the Syracusans. Her trade with Carthage and the African

¹ Diodor. xii. 8.

² Diodor. xii. 29. For the reconquest of Morgantinê, see Thucyd. iv. 65.

Respecting this town of Trinakia, known only from the passage of Diodorus here, Paulmier (as cited in Wesseling's note), as well as Mannert (*Geographie der Griechen und Römer*, b. x. ch. xv. p. 446), intimate some scepticism; which I share so far as to believe that Diodorus has greatly overrated its

magnitude and importance.

Nor can it be true, as Diodorus affirms, that Trinakia was *the only* Sikel township remaining unsubdued by the Syracusans, and that, after conquering that place, they had subdued them all. We know that there were no inconsiderable number of independent Sikels, at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily (Thucyd. vi. 88; vii. 2).

³ Diodor. xii. 30.

coast was both extensive and profitable; for at this time neither the vine nor the olive were much cultivated in Libya, and the Carthaginians derived their wine and oil from the southern territory of Sicily,¹ particularly that of Agrigentum. The temples of the city, among which that of Olympic Zeus stood foremost, were on the grandest scale of magnificence, surpassing everything of the kind in Sicily. The population of the city, free as well as slave, was very great: the number of rich men, keeping chariots, and competing for the prize at the Olympic games, was renowned—not less than the accumulation of works of art, statues, and pictures,² with manifold insignia of ornament and luxury. All this is particularly brought to our notice, because of the frightful catastrophe which desolated Agrigentum in 406 B.C. from the hands of the Carthaginians. It was in the interval which we are now describing, that such prosperity was accumulated; doubtless not in Agrigentum alone, but more or less throughout all the Grecian cities of the island.

Nor was it only in material prosperity that they were distinguished. At this time, the intellectual movement in some of the Italian and Sicilian towns was very considerable. The inconsiderable town of Elea in the Gulf of Poseidonia nourished two of the greatest speculative philosophers in Greece—Parmenidēs and Zeno. Empedoklēs of Agrigentum was hardly less eminent in the same department, yet combining with it a political and practical efficiency. The popular character of the Sicilian governments stimulated the cultivation of rhetorical studies, wherein not only Empedoklēs and Pōlus at Agrigentum, but Tisias and Korax at Syracuse, and still more, Gorgias at Leontini—acquired great reputation.³ The constitution established at Agrigentum after the dispossession of the Theronian dynasty was at first not thoroughly democratical, the principal authority residing in a large Senate of One Thousand

Intellectual
movement
in Sicily—
Empedoklēs
—Tisias—
Korax—
Gorgias.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 81.

² Diodor. xiii. 82, 83, 90.

³ See Aristotle as cited by Cicero, Brut. c. 12; Plato, Phædr. p. 267, c. 113, 114; Dionys. Halic. Judicium de Isocrate, p. 534 R, and Epist. II. ad Ammæum, p. 792; also Quintilian, iii. 1, 125. According to Cicero (de In-

ventionē, ii. 2), the treatises of these ancient rhetoricians ("usque a principe illo et inventore Tisiā") had been superseded by Aristotle, who had collected them carefully, "nominatim," and had improved upon their expositions. Dionysius laments that they had been so superseded (Epist. ad Ammæ. p. 722).

members. We are told even that an ambitious club of citizens were aiming at the re-establishment of a despotism, when Empedoklēs, availing himself of wealth and high position, took the lead in a popular opposition; so as not only to defeat this intrigue, but also to put down the Senate of One Thousand and render the government completely democratical. His influence over the people was enhanced by the vein of mysticism, and pretence to miraculous or divine endowments, which accompanied his philosophical speculations, in a manner similar to Pythagoras.¹ The same combination of rhetoric with metaphysical speculation appears also in Gorgias of Leontini whose celebrity as a teacher throughout Greece was both greater and earlier than that of any one else. It was a similar demand for popular speaking in the assembly and the judicatures which gave encouragement to the rhetorical teachers Tisias and Korax at Syracuse.

In such state of material prosperity, popular politics, and intellectual activity, the Sicilian towns were found at the breaking out of the great struggle between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy in 431 B.C. In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears to have never aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town—much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference²—were yet connected by sympathy, and on one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Kamarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messênê—together with Lokri and Tarentum in Italy: among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalkidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy.³

¹ Diogenes, Laërt. viii. 64-71; Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, sect. ii. p. 70; Ritter, Geschichte der alten Philosophie, vol. i. ch. vi. p. 533 *seqq.*

² Thucyd. iv. 61-64. This is the tenor of the speech delivered by Hermokratēs at the congress of Gela in the

eight year of the Peloponnesian war. His language is remarkable: he calls the non-Sicilian Greeks ἀλλοφύλους.

³ The inscription in Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptt.* (No. 74, Part I. p. 112) relating to the alliance between Athens and Rhegium, conveys little certain infor-

Sicilian cities
—their con-
dition and
proceedings
at the first
breaking out
of the Pelo-
ponnesian
war, 431 B.C.

Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connexion of the Sicilian cities on both sides with Central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though doubtless sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, Syracuse.

It was the memorable quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, and the intervention of Athens in that quarrel (B.C. 433—432), which brought the Sicilian parties one step nearer to co-operation in the Peloponnesian quarrel, in two different ways; first, by exciting the most violent anti-Athenian war-spirit in Corinth, with whom the Sicilian Dorians held their chief commerce and sympathy—next, by providing a basis for the action of Athenian maritime force in Italy and Sicily, which would have been impracticable without an established footing in Korkyra. But Plutarch (whom most historians have followed) is mistaken, and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he ascribes to the Athenians at this time ambitious projects in Sicily of the nature of those which they came to conceive seven or eight years afterwards. At the outbreak, and for some years before the outbreak, of the war, the policy of Athens was purely conservative, and that of her enemies aggressive, as I have shown in a former chapter. At that

Relations of Sicily to Athens and Sparta—altered by the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of Athens.

mation. Boeckh refers it to a covenant concluded in the archonship of Apseudes at Athens (Olymp. 86, 4, B.C. 433-432, the year before the Peloponnesian war) renewing an alliance which was even then of old date. But it appears to me that the supposition of a renewal is only his own conjecture: and even the name of the archon, *Apsēudes*, which he has restored by a plausible conjecture, can hardly be considered as certain.

If we could believe the story in Justin. iv. 3, Rhegium must have ceased to be Ionic before the Peloponnesian war.

He states, that in a sedition at Rhegium, one of the parties called in auxiliaries from Himera. These Himeraean exiles having first destroyed the enemies against whom they were invoked, next massacred the friends who had invoked them—"ausi facinus nulli tyranno comparandum." They married the Rhegine women, and seized the city for themselves.

I do not know what to make of this story, which neither appears noticed in Thucydides, nor seems to consist with what he tells us.

moment Sparta and Corinth anticipated large assistance from the Sicilian Dorians, in ships of war, in money, and in provisions: while the value of Korkyra as an ally of Athens consisted in affording facilities for obstructing such reinforcements, far more than from any anticipated conquests.¹

In the spring of 431 B.C., the Spartans, then organising their first invasion of Attica and full of hope that Athens would be crushed in one or two campaigns, contemplated the building of a vast fleet of 500 ships of war among the confederacy. A considerable portion of this charge was imposed upon the Italian and Sicilian Dorians, and a contribution in money besides; with instructions to refrain from any immediate declaration against Athens until their fleet should be ready.² Of such expected succour, indeed, little was ever realised in any way; in ships, nothing at all. But the expectations and orders of Sparta show, that here as elsewhere, she was then on the offensive, and Athens only on the defensive. Probably the Corinthians had encouraged the expectation of ample reinforcements from Syracuse and the neighbouring

Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Expectations not realised.

¹ Thucyd. i. 36.

² Thucyd. ii. 7. Καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν, πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις, ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τάκεινων ἐλομένοις, ναῦς ἐπετάχθησαν ποιῆσαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὥς ἐς τὴν πάντα ἄριθμὸν πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἐσόμενον, &c.

Respecting the construction of this perplexing passage, read the notes of Dr. Arnold, Poppo, and Göller: compare Poppo, ad Thucyd. vol. i. ch. xv. p. 181.

I agree with Dr. Arnold and Göller in rejecting the construction of αὐτοῦ with ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, in the sense of "those ships which were in Peloponnesus from Italy and Sicily." This would be untrue in point of fact, as they observe: there were no Sicilian ships of war in Peloponnesus.

Nevertheless I think (differing from them) that αὐτοῦ is not a pronoun referring to ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας, but is used in contrast with those words, and really means "in or about Peloponnesus." It was contemplated that new ships should be built in Sicily and Italy of sufficient number to make the total fleet of the Lacedæmonian confederacy (including the triremes already

in Peloponnesus) equal to 500 sail. But it was never contemplated that the triremes in Italy and Sicily *alone* should amount to 500 sail, as Dr. Arnold (in my judgement, erroneously) imagines. Five hundred sail for the entire confederacy would be a prodigious total: 500 sail for Sicily and Italy *alone*, would be incredible.

To construe the sentence as it stands now (putting aside the conjecture of νῆες instead of ναῦς, or ἐπετάχθη instead of ἐπετάχθησαν, which would make it run smoothly), we must admit the supposition of a break or double construction, such as sometimes occurs in Thucydides. The sentence begins with one form of construction and concludes with another. We must suppose (with Göller) that αἱ πόλεις is understood as the nominative case to ἐπετάχθησαν. The dative cases (Λακεδαιμονίοις—ἐλομένοις) are to be considered, I apprehend, as governed by νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν: that is, these dative cases belong to the first form of construction, which Thucydides has not carried out. The sentence is begun as if νῆες ἐπετάχθησαν were intended to follow.

towns,—a hope which must have contributed largely to the confidence with which they began the struggle. What were the causes which prevented it from being realised, we are not distinctly told: and we find Hermokratês the Syracusan reproaching his countrymen fifteen years afterwards (immediately before the great Athenian expedition against Syracuse) with their antecedent apathy.¹ But it is easy to see, that as the Sicilian Greeks had no direct interest in the contest—neither wrongs to avenge, nor dangers to apprehend, from Athens—nor any habit of obeying requisitions from Sparta; so they might naturally content themselves with expressions of sympathy and promises of aid in case of need, without taxing themselves to the enormous extent which it pleased Sparta to impose, for purposes both aggressive and purely Peloponnesian. Perhaps the leading men in Syracuse, from attachment to Corinth, may have sought to act upon the order. But no similar motive would be found operative either at Agrigentum or at Gela or Selinus.

Though the order was not executed, however, there can be little doubt that it was publicly announced and threatened, thus becoming known to the Ionic cities in Sicily as well as to Athens; and that it weighed materially in determining the latter afterwards to assist those cities, when they sent to invoke her aid. Instead of despatching their forces to Peloponnesus, where they had nothing to gain, the Sicilian Dorians preferred attacking the Ionic cities in their own island, whose territory they might have reasonable hopes of conquering and appropriating—Naxos, Katana, and Leontini. These cities doubtless sympathised with Athens in her struggle against Sparta; yet, far from being strong enough to assist her or to threaten their Dorian neighbours, they were unable to defend themselves without Athenian aid. They were assisted by the Dorian city of Kamarina, which was afraid of her powerful border city Syracuse—and by Rhegium in Italy; while Lokri in Italy, the bitter enemy of Rhegium, sided with Syracuse against them. In the fifth summer of the war, finding themselves blockaded by sea and confined to their walls, they sent to Athens, both to entreat succour as allies² and Ionians—and to represent

The Dorian cities in Sicily attack the Ionic cities in Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 34: compare iii. 86.

² Thucy. vi. 86.

that if Syracuse succeeded in crushing them, she and the other Dorians in Sicily would forthwith send over the positive aid which the Peloponnesians had so long been invoking. The eminent rhetor Gorgias of Leontini, whose peculiar style of speaking is said to have been new to the Athenian assembly, and to have produced a powerful effect, was at the head of this embassy. It is certain that this rhetor procured for himself numerous pupils and large gains not merely in Athens, but in many other towns of Central Greece,¹ though it is exaggeration to ascribe to his pleading the success of the present application.

Now the Athenians had a real interest as well in protecting these Ionic Sicilians from being conquered by the Dorians in the island, as in obstructing the transport of Sicilian corn to Peloponnesus: and they sent twenty triremes under Lachês and Charceadês,—with instructions, while accomplishing these objects, to ascertain the possibility of going beyond the defensive, and making conquests. Taking station at Rhegium, Lachês did something towards rescuing the Ionic cities in part from their maritime blockade, and even undertook an abortive expedition against the Lipari isles, which were in alliance with Syracuse.² Throughout the ensuing

year, he pressed the war in the neighbourhood of Rhegium and Messênê, his colleague Charceadês being slain. Attacking Mylæ in the Messenian territory, he was fortunate enough to gain so decisive an advantage over the troops of Messênê, that that city itself capitulated to him, gave hostages, and enrolled itself as ally of Athens and the Ionic cities.³ He also contracted an alliance with the non-Hellenic city of Egesta, in the north-west portion of Sicily, and he invaded the territory of Lokri, capturing one of the country forts on the river Halex:⁴ after which, in a

¹ Thucyd. iii. 86; Diodor. xii. 53; Plato, Hipp. Maj. p. 282 B. It is remarkable that Thucydides, though he is said (with much probability) to have been among the pupils of Gorgias, makes no mention of that rhetor personally as among the envoys. Diodorus probably copied from Ephorus the pupil of Isokratês. Among the writers of the Isokratæan school, the persons of

distinguished rhetors, and their supposed political efficiency, counted for much more than in the estimation of Thucydides. Pausanias (vi. 17, 3) speaks of Tisias also as having been among the envoys in this celebrated legation.

² Thucyd. iii. 88; Diodor. xii. 54.

³ Thucyd. iii. 90; vi. 6.

⁴ Thucyd. iii. 99.

second debarkation, he defeated a Lokrian detachment under Proxenus. But he was unsuccessful in an expedition into the interior of Sicily against Inéssus. This was a native Sikel township, held in coercion by a Syracusan garrison in the acropolis; which the Athenians vainly attempted to storm, being repulsed with loss.¹ Lachês concluded his operations in the autumn by an ineffective incursion on the territory of Himera, and on the Lipari isles. On returning to Rhegium at the beginning of the ensuing year (B.C. 425), he found Pythodôrus already arrived from Athens to supersede him.²

That officer had come as the forerunner of a more considerable expedition, intended to arrive in the spring under Eurymedon and Sophoklês, who were to command in conjunction with himself. The Ionic cities in Sicily, finding the squadron under Lachês insufficient to render them a match for their enemies at sea, had been emboldened to send a second embassy to Athens, with request for farther reinforcements—at the same time making increased efforts to enlarge their own naval force. It happened that at this moment the Athenians had no special employment elsewhere for their fleet, which they desired to keep in constant practice. They accordingly resolved to send to Sicily forty additional triremes, in full hopes of bringing the contest to a speedy close.³

Second expedition
under Pythodôrus.

Early in the ensuing spring, Eurymedon and Sophoklês started from Athens for Sicily in command of this squadron, with instructions to afford relief at Korkyra in their way, and with Demosthenês on board to act on the coast of Peloponnesus. It was this fleet which, in conjunction with the land forces under the command of Kleon, making a descent almost by accident on the Laconian coast at Pylus, achieved for Athens the most signal success of the whole war—the capture of the Lacedæmonian hoplites in Sphakteria.⁴ But the fleet was so long occupied, first in the blockade of that island, next in operations at Korkyra, that it did not reach Sicily until about the month of September.⁵

B.C. 425.

Such delay, eminently advantageous for Athens generally,

¹ Thucyd. iii. 103.

² Thucyd. iii. 115.

³ Thucyd. iii. 115.

⁴ See ch. lii.

⁵ Thucyd. iv. 48.

was fatal to her hopes of success in Sicily during the whole summer. For Pythodôrus, acting only with the fleet previously commanded by Lachês at Rhegium, was not merely defeated in a descent upon Lokri, but experienced a more irreparable loss by the revolt of Messênê; which had surrendered to Lachês a few months before, and which, together with Rhegium, had given to the Athenians the command of the strait. Apprised of the coming Athenian fleet, the Syracusans were anxious to deprive them of this important base of operations against the island; and a fleet of twenty sail,—half Syracusan, half Lokrian—was enabled by the concurrence of a party in Messênê to seize the town. It would appear that the Athenian fleet was then at Rhegium, but that town was at the same time threatened by the entrance of the entire land force of Lokri, together with a body of Rhegine exiles: these latter were even not without hopes of obtaining admission by means of a favourable party in the town. Though such hopes were disappointed, yet the diversion prevented all succour from Rhegium to Messênê. The latter town now served as a harbour for the fleet hostile to Athens,¹ which was speedily reinforced to more than thirty sail, and began maritime operations forthwith, in hopes of crushing the Athenians and capturing Rhegium, before Eurymedon should arrive. But the Athenians, though they had only sixteen triremes together with eight others from Rhegium, gained a decided victory—in an action brought on accidentally for the possession of a merchantman sailing through the strait. They put the enemy's ships to flight, and drove them to seek refuge, some under protection of the Syracusan land-force at Cape Pelôrus near Messênê, others under the Lokrian force near Rhegium—each as they best could, with the loss of one trireme.² This defeat so broke up the scheme of Lokrian operations against the latter place, that their land-force

¹ Thucyd. iii. 115; iv. 1.

² Thucyd. iv. 24. *καὶ νικηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τῶν ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς ἑκαστοὶ ἔτυχον, ἐς τὰ οἰκεία στρατόπεδα, τό τε ἐν τῇ Μεσσήνῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ῥηγίῳ, μίαν ναὺν ἀπολέσαντες, &c.*

I concur in Dr. Arnold's explanation of this passage, yet conceiving that the

words *ὡς ἑκαστοὶ ἔτυχον* designate the fight as disorderly, insomuch that *all* the Lokrian ships did not get back to the Lokrian station, nor *all* the Syracusan ships to the Syracusan station: but each separate ship fled to either one or the other, as it best could.

retired from the Rhegine territory, while the whole defeated squadron was reunited on the opposite coast under Cape Pelôrus. Here the ships were moored close on shore under the protection of the land-force, when the Athenians and Rhegines came up to attack them; but without success, and even with the loss of one trireme which the men on shore contrived to seize and detain by a grappling iron; her crew escaping by swimming to the vessels of their comrades. Having repulsed the enemy, the Syracusans got aboard, and rowed close along-shore, partly aided by tow-ropes, to the harbour of Messênê, in which transit they were again attacked, but the Athenians were a second time beaten off with the loss of another ship. Their superior seamanship was of no avail in this along-shore fighting.¹

The Athenian fleet was now suddenly withdrawn in order to prevent an intended movement in Kamarina, where a philo-Syracusan party under Archias threatened revolt: and the Messenian forces, thus left free, invaded the territory of their neighbour

Defeat of the
Messenians
by the Nax-
ians and
Sikels, near
Naxos.

the Chalkidic city of Naxos, sending their fleet round to the mouth of the Akesinês near that city. They were ravaging the lands, and were preparing to storm the town, when a considerable body of the indigenous Sikels was seen descending the neighbouring hills to succour the Naxians, upon which, the latter, elate with the sight and mistaking the new-comers for their Grecian brethren from Leontini, rushed out of the gates and made a vigorous sally at a moment when their enemies were unprepared. The Messenians were completely defeated, with the loss of no less than 1000 men, and with a still greater loss sustained in their retreat home from the pursuit of the Sikels. Their fleet went back also to Messênê, from whence such of the ships as were not Messenian returned home. So much was the city weakened by its recent defeat, that a Lokrian garrison was sent for its

¹ Thucyd. iv. 25. ἀποσιμωσάντων ἐκείνων καὶ προεμβαλόντων.

I do not distinctly understand the nautical movement which is expressed by ἀποσιμωσάντων, in spite of the notes of the commentators. And I cannot but doubt the correctness of Dr. Arnold's explanation, when he says, "The Syra-

cusans, on a sudden, threw off their towing-ropes, made their way to the open sea by a lateral movement, and thus became the assailants," &c. The open sea was what the Athenians required, in order to obtain the benefit of their superior seamanship.

protection under Demomelês, while the Leontines and Naxines, together with the Athenian squadron on returning from Kamarina, attacked it by land and sea in this moment of distress. A well-timed sally of the Messenians and Lokrians, however, dispersed the Leontine land-force, but the Athenian force, landing from their ships, attacked the assailants while in the disorder of pursuit, and drove them back within the walls. The scheme against Messênê, however, had now become impracticable, so that the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium.¹

Thus indecisive was the result of operations in Sicily, during the first half of the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war: nor does it appear that the Athenians undertook anything considerable during the autumnal half, though the full fleet under Eurymedon had then joined Pythodôrus.² Yet while the presence of so large an Athenian fleet at Rhegium would produce considerable effect upon the Syracusan mind,—the triumphant promise of Athenian affairs, and the astonishing humiliation of Sparta, during the months immediately following the capture of Sphakteria, probably struck much deeper. In the spring of the eighth year of the war, Athens was not only in possession of the Spartan prisoners, but also of Pylus and Kythêra, so that a rising among the Helots appeared noway improbable. She was in the full swing of hope, while her discouraged enemies were all thrown on the defensive. Hence the Sicilian Dorians, intimidated by a state of affairs so different from that in which they had begun the war three years before, were now eager to bring about a pacification in their island.³ The Dorian city of Kamarina, which had hitherto acted along with the Ionic or Chalkidic cities, was the first to make a separate accommodation with its neighbouring city of Gela; at which latter place deputies were invited to attend from all the cities in the island, with a view to the conclusion of peace.⁴

This congress met in the spring of 424 B.C., when Syracuse

¹ Thucyd. iv. 25.

² Thucyd. iv. 48.

³ Compare a similar remark made by the Syracusan Hermokratês, nine years afterwards, when the great Athenian

expedition against Syracuse was on its way—respecting the increased disposition to union among the Sicilian cities produced by common fear of Athens (Thucyd. vi. 33). ⁴ Thucyd. iv. 58.

the most powerful city in Sicily, took the lead in urging the common interest which all had in the conclusion of peace. The Syracusan Hermokratês, chief adviser of this policy in his native city, now appeared to vindicate and enforce it in the congress. He was a well-born, brave, and able man, superior to all pecuniary corruption, and clear-sighted in regard to the foreign interests of his country ;¹ but at the same time, of pronounced oligarchical sentiments, mistrusted by the people, seemingly with good reason, in regard to their internal constitution. The speech which Thucydidês places in his mouth, on the present occasion, sets forth emphatically the necessity of keeping Sicily at all cost free from foreign intervention, and of settling at home all differences which might arise between the various Sicilian cities. Hermokratês impresses upon his hearers that the aggressive schemes of Athens, now the greatest power in Greece, were directed against all Sicily, and threatened all cities alike, Ionians not less than Dorians. If they enfeebled one another by internal quarrels, and then invited the Athenians as arbitrators, the result would be ruin and slavery to all. The Athenians were but too ready to encroach everywhere, even without invitation: they had now come, with a zeal outrunning all obligation, under pretence of aiding the Chalkidic cities who had never aided them,—but in the real hope of achieving conquest for themselves. The Chalkidic cities must not rely upon their Ionic kindred for security against evil designs on the part of Athens: as Sicilians, they had a paramount interest in upholding the independence of the island. If possible, they ought to maintain undisturbed peace; but if that were impossible, it was essential at least to confine the war to Sicily, apart from any foreign intruders. Complaints should be exchanged, and injuries redressed, by all, in a spirit of mutual forbearance; of which Syracuse—the first city in the island, and best able to sustain the brunt of war,—was prepared to set the example; without that foolish over-valuation of favourable chances so ruinous even to first-rate powers, and with full sense of the uncertainty of the future. Let them all feel that they were neighbours, inhabitants of the same island, and called by the

B.C. 424.
Congress of
the Sicilian
cities at
Gela. Speech
of Hermo-
kratês.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 45.

common name of Sikeliots; and let them all with one accord repel the intrusion of aliens in their affairs, whether as open assailants or as treacherous mediators.¹

This harangue from Hermokratês, and the earnest dispositions of Syracuse for peace, found general sympathy among the Sicilian cities, Ionic as well as Doric. All of them doubtless suffered by the war, and the Ionic cities, who had solicited the intervention of the Athenians as protectors against Syracuse, conceived from the evident uneasiness of the latter a fair assurance of her pacific demeanour for the future.

Accordingly the peace was accepted by all the belligerent parties, each retaining what they possessed, except that the Syracusans agreed to cede Morgantinê to Kamarina, on receipt of a fixed sum of money.² The Ionic cities stipulated that Athens should be included in the pacification; a condition agreed to by all, except the Epizephyrian Lokrians.³ They next acquainted Eurymedon and his colleagues with the terms; inviting them to accede to the pacification in the name of Athens, and then to withdraw their fleet from Sicily.

¹ See the speech of Hermokratês, Thucyd. iv. 59-64. One expression in this speech indicates that it was composed by Thucydides many years after its proper date, subsequently to the great expedition of the Athenians against Syracuse in 415 B.C.; though I doubt not that Thucydides collected the memoranda for it at the time.

Hermokratês says, "The Athenians are now near us with a few ships, lying in wait for our blunders"—*οἱ δὲ ναυαγῶντες ἡμῶν τηροῦσιν, ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ παρόντες*, &c. (iv. 60.)

Now the fleet under the command of Eurymedon and his colleagues at Rhegium included all or most of the ships which had acted at Sphakteria and Korkyra, together with those which had been previously at the strait of Messina under Pythodôros. It could not have been less than fifty sail, and may possibly have been sixty sail. It is hardly conceivable that any Greek, speaking in the early spring of 424 B.C., should have alluded to this as a *small* fleet: assuredly Hermokratês would not thus allude to it, since it was for the interest

of his argument to exaggerate rather than extenuate, the formidable manifestations of Athens.

But Thucydides, composing the speech after the great Athenian expedition of 415 B.C., so much more numerous and commanding in every respect, might not unnaturally represent the fleet of Eurymedon as "a few ships," when he tacitly compared the two. This is the only way that I know of explaining such an expression.

The Scholiast observes that some of the copies in his time omitted the words *ὀλίγαις ναυσὶ*: probably they noticed the contradiction which I have remarked; and the passage may certainly be construed without those words.

² Thucyd. iv. 65. We learn from Polybius (Fragm. xii. 22, 23, one of the *Excerpta* recently published by Müller from the Cod. Vatic.) that Timæus had in his 21st book described the Congress at Gela at considerable length, and had composed an elaborate speech for Hermokratês: which speech Polybius condemns, as a piece of empty declamation.

³ Thucyd. v. 5.

General peace made between the Sicilian cities. Eurymedon accedes to the peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet.

These generals had no choice but to close with the proposition. Athens thus was placed on terms of peace with all the Sicilian cities ; with liberty of access reciprocally for any single ship of war, but not for any larger force, to cross the sea between Sicily and Peloponnesus. Eurymedon then sailed with his fleet home.¹

On reaching Athens, however, he and his colleagues were received by the people with much displeasure. He himself was fined, and his colleagues Sophoklès and Pythodòrus banished, on the charge of having been bribed to quit Sicily, at a time when the fleet (so the Athenians believed) was strong enough to have made important conquests. Why the three colleagues were differently treated, we are not informed.² This sentence was harsh and unmerited ; for it does not seem that Eurymedon had it in his power to prevent the Ionic cities from concluding peace—while it is certain that without them he could have achieved nothing serious. All that seems unexplained, in his conduct as recounted by Thucydidès, is,—that his arrival at Rhegium with the entire fleet in September 425 B.C., does not seem to have been attended with any increased vigour or success in the prosecution of the war. But the Athenians (besides an undue depreciation of the Sicilian cities which we shall find fatally misleading them hereafter) were at this moment at the maximum of extravagant hopes, counting upon new triumphs everywhere, impatient of disappointment, and careless of proportion between the means entrusted to, and the objects expected from, their commanders. Such unmeasured confidence was painfully corrected in the course of a few months, by the battle of Delium and the losses in Thrace. But at the present moment, it was probably not less astonishing than grievous to the three generals, who had all left Athens prior to the success in Sphakteria.

The Ionic cities in Sicily were soon made to feel that they had been premature in sending away the Athenians. Dispute between Leontini and Syracuse, the same cause which had occasioned the invocation of Athens three years before, broke out afresh soon after the pacification of Gela. The democratical government

Displeasure
of the Athe-
nians against
Eurymedon
and his col-
leagues.

B.C. 424-422.
Intestine dis-
ension in
Leontini—
expulsion of
the Leontine
Demos, by
the aid of
Syracuse.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 13-52.

² Thucyd. iv. 65.

of Leontini came to the resolution of strengthening their city by the enrolment of many new citizens; and a re-division of the territorial property of the state was projected in order to provide lots of land for these new-comers. But the aristocracy of the town, upon whom the necessity would thus be imposed of parting with a portion of their lands, forestalled the project, seemingly before it was even formally decided, by entering into a treasonable correspondence with Syracuse, bringing in a Syracusan army, and expelling the Demos.¹ While these exiles found shelter as

¹ Thucyd. v. 4. Λεοντίνιοι γὰρ, ἀπελθόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐκ Σικελίας μετὰ τὴν ξύμβασιν, πολίτας τε ἐπεγράψαντο πολλοὺς, καὶ ὁ δῆμος τὴν γῆν ἐπενόει ἀναδασσάσθαι. Οἱ δὲ δυνατοὶ αἰσθόμενοι Συρακοσίους τε ἐπάγονται καὶ ἐκβάλλουσι τὸν δῆμον. Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐπιλαυήθησαν ὡς ἑκαστοί, &c.

Upon this Dr. Arnold observes—“The principle on which this ἀναδασμός γῆς was re-demanded, was this; that every citizen was entitled to his portion, κλῆρος, of the land of the state, and that the admission of new citizens rendered a re-division of the property of the state a matter at once of necessity and of justice. It is not probable that in any case the actual κλῆροι of the old citizens were required to be shared with the new members of the state; but only, as at Rome, the Ager Publicus, or land still remaining to the state itself, and not apportioned out to individuals. This land, however, being beneficially enjoyed by numbers of the old citizens, either as common pasture, or as being farmed by different individuals on very advantageous terms, a division of it among the newly-admitted citizens, although not, strictly speaking, a spoliation of private property, was yet a serious shock to a great mass of existing interests, and was therefore always regarded as a revolutionary measure.”

I transcribe this note of Dr. Arnold rather from its intrinsic worth than from any belief that analogy of agrarian relations existed between Rome and Leontini. The Ager Publicus at Rome was the product of successive conquests from foreign enemies of the city: there may indeed have been originally a similar Ager Publicus in the peculiar domain of Rome itself, anterior to all conquests; but this must at any rate

have been very small, and had probably been absorbed and assigned in private property before the agrarian disputes began.

We cannot suppose that the Leontines had any Ager Publicus acquired by conquest, nor are we entitled to presume that they had any at all, capable of being divided. Most probably the lots for the new citizens were to be provided out of private property. But unfortunately we are not told how, nor on what principles and conditions. Of what class of men were the new immigrants? Were they individuals altogether poor, having nothing but their hands to work with—or did they bring with them any amount of funds, to begin their settlement on the fertile and tempting plain of Leontini? (Compare Thuc. i. 27, and Plato de Leg. v. p. 744 A.) If the latter, we have no reason to imagine that they would be allowed to acquire their new lots gratuitously. Existing proprietors would be forced to sell at a fixed price, but not to yield their properties without compensation. I have already noticed, that to a small self-working proprietor, who had no slaves, it was almost essential that his land should be near the city; and provided this were ensured, it might be a good bargain for a new resident having some money, but no land elsewhere, to come in and buy.

We have no means of answering these questions: but the few words of Thucydides do not present this measure as revolutionary, or as intended against the rich, or for the benefit of the poor. It was proposed on public grounds, to strengthen the city by the acquisition of new citizens. This might be wise policy, in the close neighbourhood of a doubtful and superior city, like Syra-

they could in other cities, the rich Leontines deserted and dismantled their own city, transferred their residence to Syracuse, and were enrolled as Syracusan citizens. To them the operation was exceedingly profitable, since they became masters of the properties of the exiled Demos in addition to their own. Presently, however, some of them, dissatisfied with their residence in Syracuse, returned to the abandoned city, and fitted up a portion of it called Phokeis, together with a neighbouring strong post called Brikinies. Here, after being joined by a considerable number of the exiled Demos, they contrived to hold out for some time against the efforts of the Syracusans to expel them from their fortifications.

The new enrolment of citizens projected by the Leontine democracy, seems to date during the year succeeding the pacification of Gela, and was probably intended to place the city in a more defensible position in case of renewed attacks from Syracuse—thus compensating for the departure of the Athenian auxiliaries. The Leontine Demos, in exile and suffering, doubtless bitterly repenting that they had concurred in dismissing these auxiliaries, sent envoys to Athens with complaints, and renewed prayers for help.¹

Application of the Leontine Demos for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax to make observations.

cuse; though we cannot judge of the policy of the measure, without knowing more. But most assuredly Mr. Mitford's representation can be noway justified from Thucydides—"Time and circumstances had greatly altered the state of property in all the Sicilian commonwealths, since *that incomplete and iniquitous partition of lands*, which had been made, on the general establishment of democratical government, after the expulsion of the family of Gelon. In other cities the poor rested under their lot; but in Leontini, they were warm in project for a *fresh and equal partition*; and to strengthen themselves against the party of the wealthy, they carried, in the general assembly, a decree for associating a number of new citizens" (Mitford, H. G., ch. xviii. sect. ii. vol. iv. p. 23).

I have already remarked, in a previous note, that Mr. Mitford has misrepresented the re-division of lands which took place after the expulsion of

the Gelonian dynasty. That re-division had not been upon the principle of equal lots: it is not therefore correct to assert, as Mr. Mitford does, that the present movement at Leontini arose from the innovation made by time and circumstances in that equal division: as little is it correct to say that the poor at Leontini desired "a fresh and equal partition." Thucydides says *not one word about equal partition*. He puts forward the enrolment of new citizens as the substantive primary resolution, actually taken by the Leontines—the re-division of the lands as a measure consequent and subsidiary to this, and as yet existing only in project (*ἔνδεκα*). Mr. Mitford states the fresh and equal division to have been the real object of desire, and the enrolment of new citizens to have been proposed with a view to attain it. His representation is greatly at variance with that of Thucydides.

¹ Justin (iv. 4) surrounds the Sicilian

But Athens was then too much pressed to attend to their call. Her defeat at Delium and her losses in Thrace had been followed by the truce for one year, and even during that truce, she had been called upon for strenuous efforts in Thrace to check the progress of Brasidas. After the expiration of the truce, she sent Phæax and two colleagues to Sicily (B.C. 422) with the modest force of two triremes. He was directed to try and organise an anti-Syracusan party in the island, for the purpose of re-establishing the Leontine Demos. In passing along the coast of Italy, he concluded amicable relations with some of the Grecian cities, especially with Lokri, which had hitherto stood aloof from Athens: and his first addresses in Sicily appeared to promise success. His representations of danger from Syracusan ambition were well received both at Kamarina and Agrigentum. For on the one hand, that universal terror of Athens which had dictated the pacification of Gela, had now disappeared; while on the other hand the proceeding of Syracuse in regard to Leontini was well calculated to excite alarm. We see by that proceeding that sympathy between democracies in different towns was not universal: the Syracusan democracy had joined with the Leontine aristocracy to expel the Demos—just as the despot Gelon had combined with the aristocracy of Megara and Eubœa, sixty years before, and had sold the Demos of those towns into slavery. The birthplace of the famous rhetor Gorgias was struck out of the list of inhabited cities; its temples were deserted; and its territory had become a part of Syracuse. All these were circumstances so powerfully affecting Grecian imagination that the Kamarinæans, neighbours of Syracuse on the other side, might well fear lest the like unjust conquest, expulsion, and absorption, should soon overtake them. Agrigentum, though without any similar fear, was disposed, from policy and jealousy of Syracuse, to second the views of Phæax. But when the latter proceeded to Gela, in order to procure the adhesion of that city in addition to the other two, he found himself met by so resolute an opposition, that his whole scheme was frustrated, nor did he think it

envoys at Athens with all the insignia of misery and humiliation, while addressing the Athenian assembly—"Sordidâ veste, capillo barbâque promissis, et omni squaloris habitu ad misericordiam commovendam conquisito, concione deformes adeunt."

advisable even to open his case at Selinus or Himera. In returning, he crossed the interior of the island through the territory of the Sikels to Katana, passing in his way by Brikinnies, where the Leontine Demos were still maintaining a precarious existence. Having encouraged them to hold out by assurances of aid, he proceeded on his homeward voyage. In the strait of Messina he struck upon some vessels conveying a body of expelled Lokrians from Messênê to Lokri. The Lokrians had got possession of Messênê after the pacification of Gela, by means of an internal sedition; but after holding it some time, they were now driven out by a second revolution. Phæax, being under agreement with Lokri, passed by these vessels without any act of hostility.¹

The Leontine exiles at Brikinnies, however, received no benefit from his assurances, and appear soon afterwards to have been completely expelled. Nevertheless Athens was noway disposed, for a considerable time, to operations in Sicily. A few months after the visit of Phæax to that island, came the peace of Nikias. The consequences of that peace occupied her whole attention in Peloponnesus, while the ambition of Alkibiadês carried her on for three years in intra-Peloponnesian projects and co-operation with Argos against Sparta. It was only in the year 417 B.C., when these projects had proved abortive, that she had leisure to turn her attention elsewhere. During that year, Nikias had contemplated an expedition against Amphipolis in conjunction with Perdikkas, whose desertion frustrated the scheme. The year 416 B.C. was that in which Mêlos was besieged and taken.

Meanwhile the Syracusans had cleared and appropriated all the territory of Leontini, which city now existed only in the talk and hopes of its exiles. Of these latter a portion seem to have continued at Athens pressing their entreaties for aid; which began to obtain some attention about the year 417 B.C., when another incident happened to strengthen their chance of success. A quarrel broke out between the neighbouring cities of Selinus (Hellenic) and Egesta (non-Hellenic) in the western corner of Sicily; partly about a piece of land on

Leontini depopulated—the Demos expelled—Leontine exiles at Athens.

B.C. 417.

War between Selinus and Egesta—the latter applies to Athens for aid.

¹ Thucyd. v. 4, 5.

the river which divided the two territories, partly about some alleged wrong in cases of internuptial connexion. The Selinuntines, not satisfied with their own strength, obtained assistance from the Syracusans their allies, and thus reduced Egesta to considerable straits by land as well as by sea.¹ Now the Egestæans had allied themselves with Lachés ten years before, during the first expedition sent by the Athenians to Sicily; upon the strength of which alliance they sent to Athens, to solicit her intervention for their defence, after having in vain applied both to Agrigentum and to Carthage. It may seem singular that Carthage did not at this time readily embrace the pretext for interference—considering that ten years afterwards she interfered with such destructive effect against Selinus. At this time, however, the fear of Athens and her formidable navy appears to have been felt even at Carthage,² thus protecting the Sicilian Greeks against the most dangerous of their neighbours.

The Egestæan envoys reached Athens in the spring of 416 B.C., at a time when the Athenians had no immediate project to occupy their thoughts, except the enterprise against Mélos, which could not be either long or doubtful. Though urgent in setting forth the necessities of their position, they at the same time did not appear like the Leontines, as mere helpless suppliants, addressing themselves to Athenian compassion. They rested their appeal chiefly on grounds of policy. The Syracusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), were now hard pressing upon a second (Egesta), and would thus successively subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, allied to Peloponnesus both by race and descent, and sure to lend effective aid in putting down Athens herself. It was therefore essential for Athens to forestall this coming danger by interfering forthwith to uphold her remaining allies against the encroachments of Syracuse. If she would send a naval expedition adequate to

B.C. 416.
Promises of
the Eges-
tæans: mo-
tives offered
to Athens
for interven-
tion in Sicily.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 6; Diodor. xii. 82. The statement of Diodorus—that the Egestæans applied not merely to Agrigentum but also to Syracuse—is highly improbable. The war which he men-

tions as having taken place some years before between Egesta and Lilybæum (xi. 86) in 454 B.C., may probably have been a war between Egesta and Selinus.
² Thucyd. vi. 34.

the rescue of Egesta, the Egestæans themselves engaged to provide ample funds for the prosecution of the war.¹

Such representations from the envoys, and fears of Syracusan aggrandisement as a source of strength to Peloponnesus, worked along with the prayers of the Leontines in rekindling the appetite of Athens for extending her power in Sicily. The impression made upon the Athenian public, favourable from the first, was wound up to a still higher pitch by renewed discussion. The envoys were repeatedly heard in the public assembly,² together with those citizens who supported their propositions. At the head of these was Alkibiadês, who aspired to the command of the intended expedition, tempting alike to his love of glory, of adventure, and of personal gain. But it is plain from these renewed discussions that at first the disposition of the people was by no means decided, much less unanimous; and that a considerable party sustained Nikias in a prudential opposition. Even at last, the resolution adopted was not one of positive consent, but a mean term such as perhaps Nikias himself could not resist. Special envoys were despatched to Egesta—partly to ascertain the means of the town to fulfil its assurance of defraying the costs of war—partly to make investigations on the spot, and report upon the general state of affairs.

Alkibiadês warmly espouses their cause, and advises intervention.

Perhaps the commissioners despatched were men themselves not unfriendly to the enterprise; nor is it impossible that some of them may have been individually bribed by the Egestæans:—at least such a supposition is not forbidden by the average state of Athenian public morality. But the most honest or even suspicious men could hardly be prepared for the deep-laid stratagems put in practice to delude them on their arrival at Egesta. They were conducted to the rich temple of Aphroditê on Mount Eryx, where the plate and donatives were exhibited before them; abundant in number, and striking to the eye, yet composed mostly of silver-gilt

Inspecting commissioners despatched by the Athenians to Egesta—frauds practised by the Egestæans to delude them.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 6; Diodor. xii. 83.

² Thucyd. vi. 6. *ἔν ἀκούοντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν τε Ἑγεσταίων πολλάκις λεγόντων καὶ τῶν ξυναγορευόντων αὐτοῖς, ἐψηφίσαντο, &c.*

Mr. Mitford takes no notice of all these previous debates, when he imputes to the Athenians hurry and passion in the ultimate decision (ch. xviii. sect. ii. vol. iv. p. 30).

vessels, which, though falsely passed off as solid gold, were in reality of little pecuniary value. Moreover, the Egæstæan citizens were profuse in their hospitalities and entertainments both to the commissioners and to the crews of the triremes.¹

They collected together all the gold and silver vessels, dishes, and goblets, of Egæsta, which they farther enlarged by borrowing additional ornaments of the same kind from the neighbouring cities, Hellenic as well as Carthaginian. At each successive entertainment every Egæstæan host exhibited all this large stock of plate as his own property—the same stock being transferred from house to house for the occasion. A false appearance was thus created, of the large number of wealthy men in Egæsta; and the Athenian seamen, while their hearts were won by the caresses, saw with amazement this prodigious display of gold and silver, and were thoroughly duped by fraud.² To complete the illusion, by resting it on a basis of reality and prompt payment, sixty talents of uncoined silver were at once produced as ready for the operations of war. With this sum in hand, the Athenian commissioners, after finishing their examination, and the Egæstæan envoys also, returned to Athens, which they reached in the spring of 415 B.C.,³ about three months after the capture of Mælos.

The Athenian assembly being presently convened to hear their report, the deluded commissioners drew a magnificent picture of the wealth, public and private, which they had actually seen and touched at Egæsta, and presented the sixty

¹ Thucyd. vi. 46. ἰδίᾳ ξενίσεις ποιοῦμενοι τῶν τριηριτῶν, τὰ τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσὰ καὶ ἀργυρὰ συλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύς πόλεων καὶ φοινικικῶν καὶ Ἑλληνίδων αἰτησάμενοι, ἐσέφερον ἐς τὰς ἐστιάσεις ὡς οἰκεῖα ἕκαστοι. Καὶ πάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρωμένων, μεγάλην τὴν ἐκπληξιν τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τριηρῶν Ἀθηναίοις παρεῖχον, &c.

Such loans of gold and silver plate betoken a remarkable degree of intimacy among the different cities.

² Thucyd. vi. 46; Diodor. xii. 83.

³ To this winter or spring, perhaps, we may refer the representation of the

lost comedy *Τριφάλης* of Aristophanes. Iberians were alluded to in it, to be introduced by Aristarchus; seemingly Iberian mercenaries, who were among the auxiliaries talked of at this time by Alkibiades and the other prominent advisers of the expedition, as a means of conquest in Sicily (Thucyd. vi. 90). The word *Τριφάλης* was a nickname (not difficult to understand) applied to Alkibiades, who was just now at the height of his importance, and therefore likely enough to be chosen as the butt of a comedy. See the few fragments remaining of the *Τριφάλης*, in Meineke, *Fragm. Comic. Gr.* vol. ii. p. 1162-1167.

talents (one month's pay for a fleet of sixty triremes) as a small instalment out of the vast stock remaining behind. While they thus officially certified the capacity of the Egestæans to perform their promise of defraying the cost of the war, the seamen of their trireme, addressing the assembly in their character of citizens—beyond all suspicion of being bribed—overflowing with sympathy for the town in which they had just been so cordially welcomed—and full of wonder at the display of wealth which they had witnessed—would probably contribute still more effectually to kindle the sympathies of their countrymen. Accordingly when the Egestæan envoys again renewed their petitions and representations, confidently appealing to the scrutiny which they had undergone—when the distress of the suppliant Leontines was again depicted—the Athenian assembly no longer delayed coming to a final decision. They determined to send forth with sixty triremes to Sicily, under three generals with full powers—Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus; for the purpose, first, of relieving Egesta; next, as soon as that primary object should have been accomplished, of re-establishing the city of Leontini; lastly, of furthering the views of Athens in Sicily, by any other means which they might find practicable.¹ Such resolution being passed, a fresh assembly was appointed for the fifth day following, to settle the details.

B.C. 415.

Return of the commissioners to Athens—impression produced by their report. Resolution taken to send an expedition to Sicily.

We cannot doubt that this assembly, in which the reports from Egesta were first delivered, was one of unqualified triumph to Alkibiadês and those who had from the first advocated the expedition—as well as of embarrassment and humiliation to Nikias who had opposed it. He was probably more astonished than any one else at the statements of the commissioners and seamen, because he did not believe in the point which they went to establish. Yet he could not venture to contradict eye-witnesses speaking in evident good faith—and as the assembly went heartily along with them, he laboured under great difficulty in repeating his objections to a scheme now so much strengthened in public favour. Accordingly his speech was probably hesitating and ineffective; the more so, as his

Embarrassment of Nikias as opposer of the expedition.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 8. Diodor. xii. 83.

opponents, far from wishing to make good any personal triumph against himself, were forward in proposing his name first on the list of generals, in spite of his own declared repugnance.¹ But when the assembly broke up, he became fearfully impressed with the perilous resolution which it had adopted, and at the same time conscious that he had not done justice to his own case against it. He therefore resolved to avail himself of the next assembly four days afterwards, for the purpose of reopening the debate, and again denouncing the intended expedition. Properly speaking, the Athenians might have declined to hear him on this subject. Indeed the question which he raised could not be put without illegality; the principle of the measure had been already determined, and it remained only to arrange the details, for which special purpose the coming assembly had been appointed. But he was heard, and with perfect patience; and his harangue, a valuable sample both of the man and of the time, is set forth at length by Thucydides. I give here the chief points of it, not confining myself to the exact expressions.

“Though we are met to-day, Athenians, to settle the particulars of the expedition already pronounced against Sicily, yet I think we ought to take farther counsel whether it be well to send that expedition at all; nor ought we thus hastily to plunge, at the instance of aliens, into a dangerous war noway belonging to us. To myself personally, indeed, your resolution has offered an honourable appointment, and for my own bodily danger I care as little as any man: yet no considerations of personal dignity have ever before prevented me, nor shall now prevent me, from giving you my honest opinion, however it may clash with your habitual judgements. I tell you then, that in your desire to go to Sicily, you leave many enemies here behind you, and that you will bring upon yourselves new enemies from thence to help them. Perhaps you fancy that your

Speech of
Nikias at
the second
Assembly
held by the
Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 8. Ὁ δὲ Νικίας, ἀκούσιος μὲν ᾗρημένος ἄρχεω, &c. The reading ἀκούσιος appears better sustained by MSS., and intrinsically more suitable, than ἀκούσας, which latter word probably arose from the correction of some reader who was surprised that Nikias made in the second assembly a speech which properly belonged to

the first—and who explained this by supposing that Nikias had not been present at the first assembly. That he was not present, however, is highly improbable. The matter, nevertheless, does require some explanation; and I have endeavoured to supply one in the text.

truce with Sparta is an adequate protection. In name indeed (though only in name, thanks to the intrigues of parties both here and there), that truce may stand, so long as your power remains unimpaired ; but on your first serious reverses, the enemy will eagerly take the opportunity of assailing you. Some of your most powerful enemies have never even accepted the truce ; and if you divide your force as you now propose, they will probably set upon you at once along with the Sicilians, whom they would have been too happy to procure as co-operating allies at the beginning of the war. Recollect that your Chalkidian subjects in Thrace are still in revolt, and have never yet been conquered : other continental subjects, too, are not much to be trusted ; and you are going to redress injuries offered to Egesta, before you have yet thought of redressing your own. Now your conquests in Thrace, if you make any, can be maintained ; but Sicily is so distant and the people so powerful, that you will never be able to maintain permanent ascendancy ; and it is absurd to undertake an expedition wherein conquest cannot be permanent, while failure will be destructive. The Egestæans alarm you by the prospect of Syracusan aggrandisement. But to me it seems, that the Sicilian Greeks, even if they become subjects of Syracuse, will be less dangerous to you than they are at present : for as matters stand now, they might possibly send aid to Peloponnesus, from desire on the part of each to gain the favour of Lacedæmon—but imperial Syracuse would have no motive to endanger her own empire for the purpose of putting down yours. You are now full of confidence, because you have come out of the war better than you at first feared. But do not trust the Spartans : they, the most sensitive of all men to the reputation of superiority, are lying in wait to play you a trick in order to repair their own dishonour : their oligarchical machinations against you demand all your vigilance, and leave you no leisure to think of these foreigners at Egesta. Having just recovered ourselves somewhat from the pressure of disease and war, we ought to reserve this newly-acquired strength for our own purpose, instead of wasting it upon the treacherous assurances of desperate exiles from Sicily."

Nikias then continued, doubtless turning towards Alkiadês : " If any man, delighted to be named to the command,

though still too young for it, exhorts you to this expedition in his own selfish interests, looking to admiration for his ostentation in chariot-racing, and to profit from his command as a means of making good his extravagances—do not let such a man gain celebrity for himself at the hazard of the entire city. Be persuaded that such persons are alike unprincipled in regard to the public property and wasteful as to their own—and that this matter is too serious for the rash counsels of youth. I tremble when I see before me this band sitting, by previous concert, close to their leader in the assembly—and I in my turn exhort the elderly men, who are near them, not to be shamed out of their opposition by the fear of being called cowards. Let them leave to these men the ruinous appetite for what is not within reach: in the conviction that few plans ever succeed from passionate desire—many, from deliberate foresight. Let them vote against the expedition—maintaining undisturbed our present relations with the Sicilian cities, and desiring the Egestæans to close the war against Selinus, as they have begun it, without the aid of Athens.¹ Nor be thou afraid, Prytanis (Mr. President), to submit this momentous question again to the decision of

¹ Thucyd. vi. 9-14. Καὶ σὺ, ὃ πρό-
τανι, ταῦτα, εἴπερ ἡγεῖ σοι προσήκειν
κῆδεσθαι τε τῆς πόλεως, καὶ βούλει
γενέσθαι πολίτης ἀγαθὸς, ἐπιψήφισε, καὶ
γνώμας προτίθει αὖθις Ἀθηναίους, νομί-
σας εἰ ὀρθώσεις τὸ ἀναψήφισαι, τὸ μὲν
λύειν τοὺς νόμους μὴ μετὰ τῶνδ' ἂν
μαρτύρων αἰτίαν σκεῖν, τῆς δὲ πόλεως
κακῶς βουλευσαμένης ἰατρὸς ἂν γενέσ-
θαι, &c.

I cannot concur in the remarks of Dr. Arnold either on this passage, or upon the parallel case of the renewed debate in the Athenian assembly on the subject of the punishment to be inflicted on the Mitylenæans (see above, ch. I. and Thucyd. iii. 36). It appears to me that Nikias was here asking the Prytanis to do an illegal act, which might well expose him to accusation and punishment. Probably he *would* have been accused on this ground, if the decision of the second assembly had been different from what it actually turned out—if they had reversed the decision of the former assembly, but only by a small majority.

The distinction taken by Dr. Arnold

between what was *illegal* and what was merely *irregular*, was little marked at Athens: both were called *illegal*—*τῶν νόμων λύειν*. The rules which the Athenian assembly, a sovereign assembly, laid down for its own debates and decisions, were just as much *laws* as those which it passed for the guidance of private citizens.

Both in this case, and in the Mitylenæan debate, I think the Athenian Prytanis committed an illegality. In the first case, every one is glad of the illegality, because it proved the salvation of so many Mitylenæan lives. In the second case, the illegality was productive of practical bad consequences, inasmuch as it seems to have brought about the immense extension of the scale upon which the expedition was projected. But there will occur in a few years a third incident (the condemnation of the six generals after the battle of Arginusæ) in which the prodigious importance of a strict observance of forms will appear painfully and conspicuously manifest.

the assembly—seeing that breach of the law in the presence of so many witnesses, cannot expose thee to impeachment, while thou wilt afford opportunity for the correction of a perilous misjudgement.”

Such were the principal points in the speech of Nikias on this memorable occasion. It was heard with attention, and probably made some impression ; since it completely reopened the entire debate, in spite of the formal illegality. Immediately after he sat down, while his words were yet fresh in the ears of the audience, Alkibiadès rose to reply. The speech just made, bringing the expedition again into question, endangered his dearest hopes both of fame and of pecuniary acquisition. Opposed to Nikias both in personal character and in political tendencies, he had pushed his rivalry to such a degree of bitterness, that at one moment a vote of ostracism had been on the point of deciding between them. That vote had indeed been turned aside by joint consent, and discharged upon Hyperbolus : yet the hostile feeling still continued on both sides, and Nikias had just manifested it by a parliamentary attack of the most galling character—all the more galling because it was strictly accurate and well-deserved. Provoked as well as alarmed, Alkibiadès started up forthwith—his impatience breaking loose from the formalities of an exordium.

“Athenians, I both have better title than others to the post of commander (for the taunts of Nikias force me to begin here), and I account myself fully worthy of it. Reply of Alkibiadès. Those very matters, with which he reproaches me, are sources not merely of glory to my ancestors and myself, but of positive advantage to my country. For the Greeks, on witnessing my splendid Theôry at Olympia, were induced to rate the power of Athens even above the reality, having before regarded it as broken down by the war ; when I sent into the lists seven chariots, being more than any private individual had ever sent before—winning the first prize, coming in also second and fourth, and performing all the accessories in a manner suitable to an Olympic victory. Custom attaches honour to such exploits, but the power of the performers is at the same time brought home to the feelings of spectators. My exhibitions at Athens, too, choregic and others, are naturally viewed with jealousy by my rivals here ; but in the eyes of strangers they

are evidences of power. Such so-called folly is by no means useless, when a man at his own cost serves the city as well as himself. Nor is it unjust, when a man has an exalted opinion of himself, that he should not conduct himself towards others as if he were their equal ; for the man in misfortune finds no one to bear a share of it. Just as, when we are in distress, we find no one to speak to us—in like manner let a man lay his account to bear the insolence of the prosperous ; or else let him give equal dealing to the low, and then claim to receive it from the high. I know well that such exalted personages, and all who have in any way obtained eminence, have been during their lifetime unpopular, chiefly in society with their equals, and to a certain extent with others also ; while after their decease, they have left such a reputation as to make people claim kindred with them falsely—and to induce their country to boast of them, not as though they were aliens or wrong-doers, but as her own citizens and as men who did her honour. It is this glory which I desire ; and in pursuit of which I incur such reproaches for my private conduct. Yet look at my public conduct, and see whether it will not bear comparison with that of any other citizen. I brought together the most powerful states in Peloponnesus without any serious cost or hazard to you, and made the Lacedæmonians peril their all at Mantinea on the fortune of one day : a peril so great, that, though victorious, they have not even yet regained their steady belief in their own strength.

“Thus did my youth, and my so-called monstrous folly, find suitable words to address the Peloponnesian powers, and earnestness to give them confidence and obtain their co-operation. Be not now, therefore, afraid of this youth of mine : but so long as I possess it in full vigour, and so long as Nikias retains his reputation for good fortune, turn us each to account in our own way.”¹

Having thus vindicated himself personally, Alkibiadēs went on to deprecate any change of the public resolution already taken. The Sicilian cities (he said) were not so formidable as was represented. Their population was numerous indeed, but fluctuating, turbulent, often on the move, and without local attachment. No man there considered himself as a permanent

¹ Thucyd. vi. 16, 17.

resident nor cared to defend the city in which he dwelt ; nor were there arms or organization for such a purpose. The native Sikels, detesting Syracuse, would willingly lend their aid to her assailants. As to the Peloponnesians, powerful as they were, they had never yet been more without hope of damaging Athens than they were now : they were not more desperate enemies now, than they had been in former days :¹ they might invade Attica by land, whether the Athenians sailed to Sicily or not ; but they could do no mischief by sea, for Athens would still have in reserve a navy sufficient to restrain them. What valid ground was there, therefore, to evade performing obligations which Athens had sworn to her Sicilian allies ? To be sure *they* could bring no help to Attica in return :—but Athens did not want them on her own side of the water—she wanted them in Sicily, to prevent her Sicilian enemies from coming over to attack her. She had originally acquired her empire by a readiness to interfere wherever she was invited ; nor would she have made any progress, if she had been backward or prudish in scrutinising such invitations. She could not now set limits to the extent of her imperial sway ; she was under a necessity not merely to retain her present subjects, but to lay snares for new subjects—on pain of falling into dependence herself if she ceased to be imperial. Let her then persist in the resolution adopted, and strike terror into the Peloponnesians by undertaking this great expedition. She would probably conquer all Sicily ; at least she would humble Syracuse : in case even of failure, she could always bring back her troops, from her unquestionable superiority at sea. The stationary and inactive policy recommended by Nikias was not less at variance with the temper, than with the position, of Athens, and would be ruinous to her if pursued. Her military organization would decline, and her energies would be wasted in internal rub and conflict, instead of that aspiring readiness of enterprise, which, having become engrafted upon her laws and habits, could not be now renounced, even if bad in itself, without speedy destruction.²

Such was substantially the reply of Alkibiadēs to Nikias.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 17. Καὶ νῦν οὐτε ἀνέλπιστοί πο μᾶλλον Πελοποννήσιοι ἐς ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο, εἴτε καὶ πᾶν ἔρρωνται, &c.

² Thucyd. vi. 16-19.

The debate was now completely reopened, so that several speakers addressed the assembly on both sides; more however, decidedly, in favour of the expedition than against it. The alarmed Egestæans and Leontines renewed their supplications, appealing to the plighted faith of the city: probably also, those Athenians who had visited Eggesta stood forward again to protest against what they would call the ungenerous doubts and insinuations of Nikias. By all these appeals, after considerable debate, the assembly was so powerfully moved, that their determination to send the fleet became more intense than ever; and Nikias, perceiving that farther direct opposition was useless, altered his tactics. He now attempted a manœuvre, designed indirectly to disgust his countrymen with the plan, by enlarging upon its dangers and difficulties, and insisting upon a prodigious force as indispensable to surmount them. Nor was he without hopes that they might be sufficiently disheartened by such prospective hardships, to throw up the scheme altogether. At any rate, if they persisted, he himself as commander would thus be enabled to execute it with completeness and confidence.

Second
speech of
Nikias—ex-
aggerating the difficul-
ties and
dangers of
the expedi-
tion, and
demanding a
force on the
largest scale.

Accepting the expedition, therefore, as the pronounced fiat of the people, he reminded them that the cities which they were about to attack, especially Syracuse and Selinus, were powerful, populous, free—well-prepared in every way with hoplites, horsemen, light-armed troops, ships of war, plenty of horses to mount their cavalry, and abundant corn at home. At best, Athens could hope for no other allies in Sicily except Naxos and Katana, from their kindred with the Leontines. It was no mere fleet, therefore, which could cope with enemies like these on their own soil. The fleet indeed must be prodigiously great, for the purpose not merely of maritime combat, but of keeping open communication at sea, and ensuring the importation of subsistence. But there must besides be a large force of hoplites, bowmen, and slingers—a large stock of provisions in transports—and above all, an abundant amount of money: for the funds promised by the Egestæans would be found mere empty delusion. The army must be not simply a match for the enemy's regular hoplites and powerful cavalry, but also independent of foreign aid

from the first day of their landing.¹ If not, in case of the least reverse, they would find everywhere nothing but active enemies, without a single friend. "I know (he concluded) that there are many dangers against which we must take precaution, and many more in which we must trust to good fortune, serious as it is for mere men to do so. But I choose to leave as little as possible in the power of fortune, and to have in hand all means of reasonable security at the time when I leave Athens. Looking merely to the interests of the commonwealth, this is the most assured course; while to us who are to form the armament, it is indispensable for preservation. If any man thinks differently, I resign to him the command."²

The effect of this second speech of Nikias on the assembly, coming as it did after a long and contentious debate, was much greater than that which had been produced by his first. But it was an effect totally opposite to that which he himself had anticipated and intended. Far from being discouraged or alienated from the expedition by those impediments which he had studiously magnified, the people only attached themselves to it with greater obstinacy. The difficulties which stood in the way of Sicilian conquest served but to endear it to them the more, calling forth increased ardour and eagerness for personal exertion in the cause. The people not only accepted, without hesitation or deduction, the estimate which Nikias had laid before them of risk and cost, but warmly extolled his frankness not less than his sagacity, as the only means of making success certain. They were ready to grant without reserve every thing which he asked, with an enthusiasm and unanimity such as was rarely seen to reign in an Athenian assembly. In fact, the second speech of Nikias had brought the two dissentient veins of the assembly into a confluence and harmony, all the more welcome because unexpected. While his partisans seconded it as the best way of neutralising the popular madness, his opponents—Alkibiadēs,

Effect of this speech—increased eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—ardour and unanimity in reference to the plan.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 22.

² Thucyd. vi. 23. ὅπερ ἐγὼ φοβοῦμενος, καὶ εἰδὼς πολλὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς δεῖν βουλευσασθαι, ἔτι δὲ πλείω εὐτυχῆσαι (χαλεπὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπους ὄντας), οὐτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοῦς ἐμμαντὸν

βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν, παρασκευῇ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰκότων ἀσφαλῆς ἐκπλεῦσαι. Ταῦτα γὰρ τῇ τε ἐμπόσῃ πόλει βεβαίωτα ἡγοῦμαι, καὶ ἡμῖν τοῖς στρατευομένοις σωτήρια· εἰ δὲ τῷ ἄλλως δοκεῖ, παρήμῃ αὐτῷ τὴν ἀρχήν.

the Egestæans, and the Leontines—caught at it with acclamation, as realising more than they had hoped for, and more than they could ever have ventured to propose. If Alkibiades had demanded an armament on so vast a scale, the people would have turned a deaf ear. But such was their respect for Nikias—on the united grounds of prudence, good fortune, piety and favour with the gods—that his opposition to their favourite scheme had really made them uneasy; and when he made the same demand, they were delighted to purchase his concurrence by adopting all such conditions as he imposed.¹

It was thus that Nikias, quite contrary to his own purpose, not only imparted to the enterprise a gigantic magnitude which its projectors had never contemplated, but threw into it the whole soul of Athens, and roused a burst of ardour beyond all former example. Every man present, old as well as young, rich and poor, of all classes and professions, was eager to put down his name for personal service. Some were tempted by the love of gain; others by the curiosity of seeing so distant a region, others again by the pride and supposed safety of enlisting in so irresistible an armament. So overpowering was the popular voice in calling for the execution of the scheme, that the small minority who retained their objections were afraid to hold up their hands, for fear of incurring the suspicion of want of patriotism. When the excitement had somewhat subsided, an orator named Demostratus, coming forward as spokesman of this sentiment, urged Nikias to declare at once, without farther evasion, what force he required from the people. Disappointed as Nikias was, yet being left without any alternative, he sadly responded to the appeal; saying that he would take farther counsel with his colleagues, but that speaking on his first impression, he thought the triremes required must be not less than one hundred, nor the hoplites less than 5000—Athenians and allies together. There must farther be a proportional equipment of other forces and accompaniments, especially Kretan bowmen and slingers. Enormous as this requisition was, the vote of the people not only sanctioned it without delay, but even went beyond it. They conferred

Excitement
in the city
among all
classes—
great in-
crease in the
scale on
which the ex-
pedition was
planned.

¹ Plutarch. Compare Nikias and Crassus, c. 3.

upon the generals full power to fix both the numbers of the armament and every other matter relating to the expedition just as they might think best for the interest of Athens.

Pursuant to this momentous resolution, the enrolment and preparation of the forces was immediately begun. Messages were sent to summon sufficient triremes from the nautical allies, as well as to invite hoplites from Argos and Mantinea, and to hire bowmen and slingers elsewhere. For three months the generals were busily engaged in this proceeding, while the city was in a state of alertness and bustle—fatally interrupted however by an incident which I shall recount in the next chapter.

B.C. 415.
April.

Large preparations made for the expedition.

Considering the prodigious consequences which turned on the expedition of Athens against Sicily, it is worth while to bestow a few reflections on the preliminary proceedings of the Athenian people. Those who are accustomed to impute all the misfortunes of Athens to the hurry, passion, and ignorance of democracy, will not find the charge borne out by the facts which we have been just considering. The supplications of Egestæans and Leontines, forwarded to Athens about the spring or summer of 416 B.C., undergo careful and repeated discussion in the public assembly. They at first meet with considerable opposition, but the repeated debates gradually kindle both the sympathies and the ambition of the people. Still, however, no decisive step is taken without more ample and correct information from the spot, and special commissioners are sent to Egesta for the purpose. These men bring back a decisive report, triumphantly certifying all that the Egestæans had promised. We cannot at all wonder that the people never suspected the deep-laid fraud whereby their commissioners had been duped.

Review of these preliminary proceedings to the Sicilian expedition.

Upon the result of that mission from Egesta, the two parties for and against the projected expedition had evidently joined issue: and when the commissioners returned, bearing testimony so decisive in favour of the former, the party thus strengthened thought itself warranted in calling for a decision immediately, after all the previous debates. Nevertheless, the measure still had to surmount the renewed and hearty opposition of Nikias, before it became finally ratified. It was this long and frequent debate, with opposition often repeated

but always outreasoned, which, working gradually deeper and deeper conviction in the minds of the people, brought them all into hearty unanimity to support it, and made them cling to it with that tenacity which the coming chapters will demonstrate. In so far as the expedition was an error, it certainly was not error arising either from hurry, or want of discussion, or want of inquiry. Never in Grecian history was any measure more carefully weighed beforehand, or more deliberately and unanimously resolved.

The position of Nikias in reference to the measure is remarkable. As a dissuasive and warning counsellor, he took a right view of it; but in that capacity he could not carry the people along with him. Yet such was their steady esteem for him personally, and their reluctance to proceed in the enterprise without him, that they eagerly embraced any conditions which he thought proper to impose. And the conditions which he named had the effect of exaggerating the enterprise into such gigantic magnitude as no one in Athens had ever contemplated; thus casting into it so prodigious a proportion of the blood of Athens, that its discomfiture would be equivalent to the ruin of the commonwealth. This was the first mischief occasioned by Nikias, when, after being forced to relinquish his direct opposition, he resorted to the indirect manœuvre of demanding more than he thought the people would be willing to grant. It will be found only the first among a sad series of other mistakes—fatal to his country as well as to himself.

Giving to Nikias, however, for the present, full credit for the wisdom of his dissuasive counsel and his scepticism about the reports from Eggesta, we cannot but notice the opposite quality in Alkibiadês. His speech is not merely full of overweening insolence as a manifestation of individual character, but of rash and ruinous instigations in regard to the foreign policy of his country. The arguments whereby he enforces the expedition against Syracuse are indeed more mischievous in their tendency than the expedition itself, for the failure of which Alkibiadês is not to be held responsible. It might have succeeded in its special object, had it been properly conducted; but even if it had succeeded, the remark of Nikias is not the less just, that Athens was aiming at an unmeasured breadth of empire.

Advice and
influence of
Nikias.

Advice and
influence of
Alkibiadês.

which it would be altogether impossible for her to preserve. When we recollect the true political wisdom with which Periklès had advised his countrymen to maintain strenuously their existing empire, but by no means to grasp at any new acquisitions while they had powerful enemies in Peloponnesus—we shall appreciate by contrast the feverish system of never-ending aggression inculcated by Alkibiadès, and the destructive principles which he lays down that Athens must for ever be engaged in new conquests, on pain of forfeiting her existing empire and tearing herself to pieces by internal discord. Even granting the necessity for Athens to employ her military and naval force (as Nikias had truly observed), Amphipolis and the revolted subjects in Thrace were still unsubdued; and the first employment of Athenian force ought to be directed against them, instead of being wasted in distant hazards and treacherous novelties, creating for Athens a position in which she could never permanently maintain herself. The parallel which Alkibiadès draws, between the enterprising spirit whereby the Athenian empire had been first acquired, and the undefined speculations which he was himself recommending, is altogether fallacious. The Athenian empire took its rise from Athenian enterprise, working in concert with a serious alarm and necessity on the part of all the Grecian cities in or round the Ægean Sea. Athens rendered an essential service by keeping off the Persians, and preserving that sea in a better condition than it had ever been in before: her empire had begun by being a voluntary confederacy, and had only passed by degrees into constraint; while the local situation of all her subjects was sufficiently near to be within the reach of her controlling navy. Her new career of aggression in Sicily was in all these respects different. Nor is it less surprising to find Alkibiadès asserting that the multiplication of subjects in that distant island, employing a large portion of the Athenian naval force to watch them, would impart new stability to the pre-existing Athenian empire. How strange also to read the terms in which he makes light of enemies both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily; the Sicilian war being a new enterprise hardly less in magnitude and hazard than the Peloponnesian!¹—to notice the

¹ Thucyd. vi. 1. οὐ πολλὰ τινι ὑποδεέστερον πόλεμον, &c. : compare vii. 28.

honour which he claims to himself for his operations in Peloponnesus and the battle of Mantinea,¹ which had ended in complete failure, and in restoring Sparta to the maximum of her credit as it had stood before the events of Sphakteria! There is in fact no speech in Thucydides so replete with rash, misguiding, and fallacious counsels, as this harangue of Alkibiades.

As a man of action, Alkibiades was always brave, vigorous, and full of resource; as a politician and adviser, he was especially mischievous to his country, because he addressed himself exactly to their weak point, and exaggerated their sanguine and enterprising temper into a temerity which overlooked all permanent calculation. The Athenians had now contracted the belief that they, as lords of the sea, were entitled to dominion and receipt of tribute from all islands—a belief which they had not only acted upon, but openly professed, in their attack upon Mælos during the preceding autumn. As Sicily was an island, it seemed to fall naturally under this category of subjects: for we ought not to wonder, amidst the inaccurate geographical data current in that day, that they were ignorant how much larger Sicily was² than the largest island in the Ægean. Yet they seem to have been aware that it was a prodigious conquest to struggle for; as we may judge from the fact, that the object was one kept back rather than openly avowed, and that they acceded to all the immense preparations demanded by Nikias.³ Moreover we shall see presently that even the armament which was despatched had conceived nothing beyond vague and hesitating ideas of something great to be achieved in Sicily. But if the Athenian public were rash and ignorant, in contemplating the conquest of Sicily, much more extravagant were the views of Alkibiades: though I cannot bring myself to believe that even he (as he afterwards asserted) really looked beyond Sicily to the conquest of Carthage and her empire. It was not merely ambition which he

¹ Compare Plutarch, Præcept. Rei-publ. Gerend. p. 804.

² Thucyd. v. 99; vi. 1-6.

³ Thucyd. vi. 6. ἐφίμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀλθεστάτῃ προφάσει, τῆς πάσης (Σικελίας) ἄρξιν, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐκρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν συγγένεσι καὶ

τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμάχοις.

Even in the speech of Alkibiades, the conquest of Sicily is only once alluded to—and that indirectly; rather as a favourable possibility, than as a result to be counted upon.

desired to gratify. He was not less eager for the immense private gains which would be consequent upon success, in order to supply those deficiencies which his profligate expenditure had occasioned.¹

When we recollect how loudly the charges have been preferred against Kleon—of presumption, of rash policy, and of selfish motive, in reference to Sphakteria, to the prosecution of the war generally, and to Amphipolis; and when we compare these proceedings with the conduct of Alkibiadēs as here described—we shall see how much more forcibly such charges attach to the latter than the former. It will be seen, that the vices of Alkibiadēs, and the defects of Nikias, were the cause of far greater ruin to Athens than either Kleon or Hyperbolus, even if we regard the two latter with the eyes of their worst enemies.

¹ Thucyd. vi. 15. Καὶ μάλιστα στρατηγήσαι τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ ἐλπίζων Σικελίαν τε δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ Καρχηδόνα λήψεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἅμα εὐτυχήσας χρήμασί τε καὶ δόξῃ ὠφελήσειν. *Ὦν γὰρ ἐν ἀξιώματι ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσπῶν, ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις μείζουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν οὐσίαν ἐχρήστο ἐς τε τὰς ἱπποτροφίας καὶ τὰς ἄλλας δαπάνας, &c.

Compare vi. 90. Plutarch (Alkib. c. 19; Nikias, c. 12). Plutarch sometimes speaks as if, not Alkibiadēs alone (or at least in conjunction with a few partisans), but the Athenians generally, set out with an expectation of conquering Carthage as well as Sicily. In the speech which Alkibiadēs made at Sparta after his banishment (Thucyd. vi. 90),

he does indeed state this as the general purpose of the expedition. But it seems plain that he is here ascribing, to his countrymen generally, plans which were only fermenting in his own brain—as we may discern from a careful perusal of the first twenty chapters of the sixth book of Thucydides.


In the Oration de Pace of Andokidēs (sect. 30), it is alleged that the Syracusans sent an embassy to Athens, a little before this expedition, entreating to be admitted as allies of the Athenians, and affirming that Syracuse would be a more valuable ally to Athens than Egesta or Katana. This statement is wholly untrue.

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